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3 *Received: 6 December 2012 Accepted: 5 January 2013 Published: 15 January 2013*

4

5 **Abstract**

6 Nigeria witnessed the emergence of Boko Haram - an Islamic sect - in 2002 and its active
7 insurgency since 2009. This paper studies the Boko Haram and its operations with a view to
8 determine its relationship with Northern struggle for political hegemony. With the aid of
9 secondary method of data collection and Islamic fundamentalist theory as framework of
10 analysis, the paper observed that the primary goals of the sect are the overthrow of none
11 Muslim and moderate Muslim government and the Islamization of Nigeria. It observed also
12 that the sect receives financial, administrative and security support from many top Northern
13 Islamic politicians, serving political office holders and Northern members of the armed forces.
14 Finally, government anti-terrorism campaign has drastically reduced the spread, success and
15 regularity of Boko Haram insurgency. The paper therefore recommends punitive
16 anti-terrorism laws, and the adoption of state of emergency as a regular approach to fighting
17 terrorism among others in Nigeria.

18

19 **Index terms—**

20 **1 Introduction**

21 Nigeria has continued to face political instability and crisis since the census crisis of 1962 orchestrated by Northern
22 quest to dominate the South, and the transition crisis of 1964 that culminated in the 1967-1970 Nigerian civil
23 war. The instability manifested as coups and counter coups, religious and ethnic conflicts, failed transition
24 programmes, politically motivated high level murders, electoral violence, arson and electoral litigations that
25 overturned many declared victories. Since 1983 when Nigeria recorded a failed attempt at civilian transition
26 of power due to Northern dominated National Party of Nigeria's manipulation of electoral process and results,
27 Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented level of violence that ranges from inter/intra-communal and ethnic
28 clashes, ethno-religious violence, demonstrations or civil strife, arson, armed robbery, political assassination,
29 murder, gender-based violence, election violence, and bomb explosion [Ogunyemi and Align, 2011].

30 This high level of insecurity has been exacerbated by catastrophic terrorism that have taken terrible
31 humanitarian toll and threatened Nigeria's cooperate existence as witnessed in the Niger Delta region and many
32 Northern States. ??aplan [1994:3] summarized the scenario thus:

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35 The country is becoming increasingly ungovernable.... Ethnic and regional splits are deepening, a situation
36 made worse by an increase in the number of states from 19 to 30 and a doubling in the number of local governing
37 authorities. Religious cleavages are more serious; Muslim fundamentalism and evangelical Christian militancy
38 are on the rise; and northern Muslim anxiety over southern ??Christian] control of the economy is intense . . .
39 the will to keep Nigeria together is now very weak.

40 Consequent upon this, many insurgent and ethnically based organizations such as the Oduduwa Peoples'
41 Congress (OPC), the Egbesu boys, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
42 (MASSOB), Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC), the Bakassi Boys, Igbo Peoples' Congress (IPC), Niger Delta
43 Volunteer Force (NDVF), Niger Delta Resistant Movement (NDRM), Movement for the Survival of the Izon
44 Nationality of the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), the Yobe Taliban, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
45 Delta (MEND), Jama'at Ahlus al-Sunnah Liddawati Wal-Jihad or better known as Boko Haram, and a host
46 of many other violence wielding groups emerged. Of these groups, this paper studies Boko Haram because its

6 A) REGIME CHANGE

47 activities, destructions and killings are the most contemporary with sophisticated connections to many past and
48 serving political office holders and military personnel.

49 According to Connell (2012), Boko Haram was founded in 1995 by Abubakah Lawan under the original
50 name Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra with its headquarters in Maiduguri, Nigeria. Its original goal of improving
51 the economic hardship and poor living standards in the country through struggle attracted followers in their
52 hundreds ??Farouk, 2012:2). However, when Lawan left for studies at the University of Medina in Saudi
53 Arabia, a radicalized Muslim cleric named Muhammad Yusuf assumed leadership position of the group and
54 renamed the group Boko Haram ??Connell, 2012:88), which simply means western education is forbidden. Yusuf
55 equally changed the primary goals of the sect towards the overthrow of the secular Nigerian Government and
56 the enforcement of an anti-Western Sharia law based government. Consequently, the sect attacks churches and
57 government buildings, personnel and institutions. They have carried out several attacks against security agencies,
58 government properties, churches and markets together with United Nations headquarters in Abuja ??Brock, 2011].

59 However, the increasing spread and successful operations of the Boko Haram sect against the people and
60 government of the Federal republic of Nigeria, the level of destruction of lives and property in the face of multiple
61 armed security forces is a puzzle that needs to be resolved. This dangerous trend has been complicated by the
62 allegation of complicity among former heads of state, high-ranking political office holders and security personnel.
63 The disappearance of Kabiru Sokoto -a terrorist suspect from the police cell, the arrests of some security personnel
64 who were smuggling illegal arms into the country by Customs officials, and the arrests of some security personnel
65 safeguarding or transporting illegal arms into Abuja, etc are equally matters of serious concern. Unfortunately,
66 none of those arrested suspects and collaborators has been prosecuted. This paper therefore studies the insurgency
67 with a view to examine the factors that have encouraged the growth and expansion of Boko Haram operations,
68 its relationship with Northern political agenda and achievements so far.

69 2 II.

70 3 Materials and Methods

71 This study is predominantly based on information derived from secondary sources such as relevant texts, journals,
72 magazines, newspapers, official publications, historical documents and the Internet, which served as tangible
73 sources of insight into terrorism, politics and conflicts. The time-span of the study is primarily but not exclusively
74 between 2007 when Boko Haram began its public campaign against constituted governments and 2013 being the
75 current time Nigerians witnessed its terrors across the Northern Nigeria. The choice of 2007 as starting point
76 of this inquiry was informed by the fact that it marked the year the Islamic sect recorded its first public and
77 successful attack. That was even the year the group revealed for the first time the reasons for its campaign
78 against the government and Nigerians.

79 However, the inquiry is strictly limited to recorded information about Boko Haram and its insurgent activities
80 that can be found on the internet and libraries. The paper is interest in such information as the rise and activities
81 of Boko Haram, its operations across Nigeria, government responses to their claims and actions, and the impact
82 such actions.

83 Consequently, the paper adopts content analysis as its method of analysis. The method here is to sift the
84 findings in the works available for this research, check the consistency of the opinions of either the authors
85 and/or the actors; evaluate such findings or opinions with other existing findings on the subject. The data shall
86 equally be examined in the light of other thesis and findings on the subject matter. Through these methods, the
87 paper draws inferences on the data generated during the research and their consequences for party dominance in
88 Nigeria's democratic process.

89 4 III.

90 5 Gap in the Extant Literature

91 This section reviews available literature on regime change, terrorism, terrorism in Nigeria, and the emergence of
92 Boko-Haram as a terrorist group in Nigeria.

93 6 a) Regime Change

94 The concept of regime change has being variously defined by scholars. According to ??ooth (1998:5) it is the act of
95 changing "both the fundamental rules of politics and the makeup of its coalition (a regime shift)". Other authors
96 such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) perceive it as the possible outcome of the strategic interaction of domestic
97 political groups. These authors ignored the role or influence of external or foreign players in such an interaction
98 ??Bonfatti, 2011:5). They equally ignored the role or influence of non-state actors, who are not members of any
99 political party nor act in the name of any of such parties such insurgent or rebel groups. Nevertheless, the concept
100 of regime change is associated with the substitution of one type of regime with another i.e. civilian regime with
101 military regime, or substitution of the executive arm of government with another through elections, coup d'état,
102 litigations/legal process, revolution, and or the death of the incumbent chief executive (Baird, 2001;Caldeira
103 and Gibson, 1992). In essence, it is the constitutional or unconstitutional removal or replacement of the chief

104 executive of a state whether military or civilian regime or a change from one regime type to another, which in
105 effect leads to the substitution of all political appointees with other set of people. From the perspective prism
106 of changes in structures, mechanisms of operation and procedure, Albrecht and Schlumberger [2004] classified
107 regime change into five as follows: change in the Structures of legitimacy and strategies of legitimization; elite
108 change; change in institution building/arrangement of power; co-optation i.e. restricting populism and widening
109 the regime's power base; and external influences/intervention.

110 The nature and dynamics of regime change depends on the socio-political and economic forces that are
111 responsible for change. Such forces can be indigenous or exogenous. In most cases regime change is associated
112 with perceived inability of the existing political system or administrators of such system to translate popular
113 in-put demands on a policy issue into political action (Tyler and Mitchell, 1994; Easton, 1965b). This leads to
114 decline in legitimacy, the emergence of civil rights movements and activism. In this case, people's dissatisfaction
115 with dividends of bad governance propels pressure that results in coup d'état, assassination of the incumbent,
116 or demand for early elections. Such a regime is voted out of power by the people. Generally, social tension,
117 mass unemployment among young people, religious fundamentalism, poverty, undemocratic culture, ideology,
118 despotism or autocratic governance, democracy, security and economic expansion or advantage has been noted
119 by scholars as the major reasons causing nationally or internationally sponsored regime change.

120 Booth [1998:9 emphasis mine] in the study of regime change in South American countries from traditional
121 political stability, guerrilla insurgency, military reformism, personalistic authoritarianism, socialist revolution, to
122 civilian-led liberal democracy between 1970 and the late 1990s argued that, Regime coalition members benefit
123 from inclusion in the regime. [Consequently,] Social and economic change can generate and mobilize new political
124 actors who may seek inclusion into the ruling coalition and its benefits, and who may or may not be admitted
125 by those within the regime. Socio-economic change can dramatically affect the resources available to the regime.
126 This inclusion tendency in South American politics that normally alters both the character and rules of the
127 regime i.e. regime shift is necessitated by corporatist tendencies and the willingness of new actors to fight the
128 status quo till they are included in the regime. It therefore suffices to say that South American political actors
129 do not work for regime change but shift or transformation.

130 Thus, intra and inter class struggle due to social exclusion from the structure of distribution lead to rebellion,
131 revolution and political violence that inevitably cause changes in regime [Gurr, 1970; ??alton, 1984:13]. Many
132 scholars such as Walton [1984]; Skocpol [1979]; Paige [1975]; Olson [1979]; Wickham-Crowley ??1992]; Booth
133 [1996], ??illiams [1986]; Gasiorowski [1995] and Brockett [1988] generally agree that rapid economic change and
134 evolving class relations are powerful factors that cause mass mobilization needed for a violent challenge to any
135 regime. Such group of people when mobilized focuses their energy on changing the status quo. ??ya [1979] and
136 Tilly [1978] note that the ruling coalition is always the target of such a change, while the coalition itself enhances
137 the rebellion through repression thereby promoting the expected change. It is more profitable however for the
138 ruling group to share power with broader sets of citizens to avoid total regime change. Thus, redistribution of
139 resources leads to mobilization and democratization [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006].

140 The literature also noted the role of external interests that were not accommodated by regimes as forces that
141 influence or cause the movement for changing regimes. ??eligon and Booth [1993]; Huntington [1993]; Easterly
142 et Al. ??2008]; Dube et Al.

143 (2011); Whitehead (1991); Carothers (1991) among others stressed the role of external intervention to change
144 an existing regime and or imposition of preferred regime type because their interests, which is predominantly
145 economic (Bonfatti, 2011), are not safeguarded in such regimes. Such external forces may be strengthening a
146 prevailing regime by supporting it or weakening it through or withheld support, supply of resources to domestic
147 actors, altering their relative strength and capacity to act (Muller and Seligson, 1994). They may also use
148 international institutions to pressurize regimes to adopt certain policies or regime types through such instruments
149 like foreign loans, aid, arms, trade, cooperation at the international level, military assistance etc (Booth, 1998).

150 7 b) Terrorism

151 There is no commonly accepted conceptualisation of terrorism. From the perception of imperial and autocratic
152 regimes, certain group actions that are against their interests are branded terrorist actions, while for the
153 perpetrators, such actions are nationalistic and emancipatory ??Gunaratna, 2002]. The debate over what
154 constitute terrorism has been summed up in the following expression, 'one man's freedom fighter is another
155 man's terrorist.' The crux of the arguments is that actions considered by the state as terrorism take the form of
156 asymmetric warfare between groups, movements and organisations often against the state. These include ethnic
157 identity conflicts, which is characterised by irredentist and secessionist movements and multi-party civil war.
158 Such actions are guided by religious or ethno-nationalist ideas and characterised by hatred, fear and genocide
159 and have no declarations of war, few battles and are typified by attrition, terror and violence against civilians
160 [Kaldor, 1999; Laquer, 2001; Gilbert, 2003; Holsti, 1996]. In some cases like the Rwanda and Burundi genocides,
161 dominant ethnic groups employ the instrumentalities of the state to perpetuate the same act against other groups
162 that are not in power. Still such state sponsored or perpetuated terror is not termed terrorism.

163 To some other scholars, terrorism is a violent reaction against an established social order wherein terrorists
164 are seen as social actors seeking for change in society and use violence as instruments to destroy the existing
165 framework of society or merely change it. Such violence can be for reform or revolution. This is due to the

166 existence of a set of existential and development human needs that require satisfaction on a hierarchical basis.
167 Indifference to such needs on the part of government normally leads actors into violence against the state [Burton,
168 1979;Gurr, 1970 and. This implies that if the basic human needs of individual nonstate actors are unsatisfied
169 they can generate grievance terrorism, revolutionary terrorism or reactionary Although consensus will continue
170 to elude the conceptualisation of terrorism for a long time ??Laqueur, 1987:72], the concept is relative to the
171 legitimacy of state governance, or as specific methods of political violence, such as hijack or bombing or as acts
172 of violence against a specific target group, particularly civilians [Wilkinson, 2000]. In line with this, the United
173 States Department of Defence in ??aqueur [2001] conceptualized of terrorism as; "Unlawful use of force or violence
174 against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments to accept political, religious or ideological
175 objectives." ??offman [1999:32] noted that terrorism can even be located in the "threats to the stability of nation
176 states by non-state actors and nongovernmental processes and organisations." The predominance of state power
177 over private forces made the relative legitimacy explanation of terrorism the widely accepted understanding of
178 the concept. Resultantly, the concept represents a challenge and threat to state authority by an illegitimate
179 body. However, Schmid and Jongman [2004:2] offered more neutral conceptualization terrorism as;

180 A method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as instrumental targets of violence. These
181 instrumental victims share group or class characteristics, which form the basis for the victimisation. Other
182 members of that group or class are put in a chronic state of fear (terror)?. the purpose of which is to change
183 attitudes or behaviour favouring the interests of the user of method of combat.

184 Available literature such as Bowyer [1978]; ??aqueur [2001] and Richmond [2006] These outcomes made some
185 scholars like Enders and Sandler, ??2002]; Abadie and Gardeazabal [2001]; Barros [2003] to embark on an
186 exploration of alternative methods of waging counter terror wars. They noted such alternative like assassinations
187 and kidnappings of terrorist group leaders such as the ones conducted by ETA between 1968 and 2000; the
188 application of different political ideologies by those in power; increases in police and military fiscal allocations
189 as well as increases in foreign investment in the home country or base where the terrorist groups are based.
190 The United States for instance raised its "Appropriations for Combating Terrorism and Protecting Critical
191 Infrastructure" by over 650% from \$13.6 billion dollars in 2002 to \$88.1 billion in 2004 ??Congressional Budget
192 Office, 2005]. This excludes the billions of dollars spent since September 11th on counter terrorism around the
193 world.

194 8 c) Boko-Haram and Terrorism in Nigeria

195 The emergence of Boko Haram, which can be traced to the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a Shiite movement
196 led by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky that was funded by Iran, laid the background for the contemporary terrorist
197 activities in Nigeria since 2007. Since then, the sect has vigorously pursued the propagation of an extreme Islamic
198 doctrine, which sees Western education and the leadership of non-hard-line Muslims and or Christians as evil and
199 immoral. The sect forbids everything Western i.e. Western education and modern science and technology are
200 sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden (Danjibo, 2009;Adesoji, 2010). The sect seeks to
201 create an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Nigeria by any means at its disposal and at whatever human cost
202 it deems necessary [Bumah, 2009]. For this, the sect has carried out numerous deadly attacks against Nigerian
203 governments, their institutions and structures, and Nigerians in general. On its part, the state has reacted to
204 these brutal attacks by legislating against it, waging antiterrorist wars and declaring state of emergency in three
205 states where the sect is based and operates mostly. This paper pursues an analysis of the aim of bookharam
206 insurgency in Nigeria, the nuances of its operations, and an evaluation of state sponsored antiterror programmes.
207 Suffice to say, the paper will test the applicability of the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of anti-terrorism wars
208 within the Nigerian context.

209 9 IV.

210 10 Theoretical Nexus

211 With the consideration of the primary reasons that led to emergence of Boko Haram sect, this paper adopts the
212 Islamic fundamentalist theory as its framework of analysis. According to ??odgkin [1975:247], the fundamental
213 principle of the theory, which guided Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, was "to make upon the heathen king who?make
214 no profession of Islam, is obligatory by assent". Therefore, the goal of Islamising Nigeria under the sharia law
215 dates back to the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio in 1804 [Adetoro, 1982]. Since then, the goal has always being the
216 motive behind various ethno-religious riots in Northern Nigeria.

217 Recently, Farouk (2012) observed that the Boko Haram sect and insurgency is an expression of the Quranic
218 verse which states that "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors"
219 (Quran 649). Usigbe (2012) noted that President Goodluck Jonathan was recently directed by the Boko Haram
220 sect to embrace Islam or resign. Furthering the argument, Suleiman (2011) reporting the public statement issued
221 by Boko Haram group in Maiduguri on April 24, 2011, noted that their objectives were to abolish democracy
222 and institute Sharia law as instrument of justice and islamization. The sect preached first total islamization of
223 Nigeria until 2009 when it took arms against the state because of the Maiduguri crisis of July, 2009 that led to
224 the death of Mohammed Yusuf and some of their members. For this reason, one of the sect's spokesmen declared;

225 we would continue to fight until Islam is well established and the Muslims regain their freedom all over Nigeria.
226 We would never be ready to compromise and we don't need amnesty. The only solution to what is happening is
227 for the government to repent, jettison democracy, drop the constitution and adopt the laws in the Holy Qur'an
228 ??Suleiman, 2011:50).

229 First, the sect called on government to prosecute the police officers involved in the extrajudicial killing of
230 their leader Mohammed Yusuf and some members. They equally called for the arrest and trial of some former
231 Northern Nigeria Governors for what they described as acts of "betrayal" because the former governors used
232 them as thugs.

233 The relevance of this theory to our study relates to the fact that over 60% of Nigerians are not Moslems.
234 They are either Christians, Traditional religionists, atheists, members of the church of Satan and other religious
235 affiliations. The real threat posed by the emergence and activities of Boko Haram stems from the fact that these
236 none Muslims are prepared for a showdown with the Islamic sect. The theory enables us therefore to understand
237 the attacks and counter attacks in the Northern Nigeria, relocation of non-indigenes out of many states in the
238 North and its economic, social and political consequences. The theory enables us also to study the reasons for
239 and impact of government's counter terror operations in the Northern part of Nigeria, the overall impact of the
240 terror and counter terror activities on tourism, foreign investments, economic activities, fiscal appropriation for
241 security/armed forces, and growth. The theory is therefore relevant for the study.

242 V.

243 **11 Findings and Discussions a) Book-Haram Insurgency**

244 Boko Haram is one of the Islamic fundamentalist sects in Nigeria that adopted violence as a weapon of attracting
245 national and international responses to their demands or interests. "Boko-Haram" is a name that was derived
246 from Hausa and Arabic words. "Boko" in Hausa means "western education" and "Haram" an Arabic word means
247 "sin" [Obinna, 2011]. It therefore suffices to say that the name Boko-Haram literally means western education is a
248 sin. This symbolises the original name of this sect, Jama'atu AhlisSunna Lidda'awatiwal-Jihad, which stands for
249 "The Group of Al-Sunna for Preaching and Jihad". It is innocuous therefore to argue from the onset that Boko-
250 Haram is an Islamic sect established for the purposes of stamping out western civilization and for prosecuting
251 jihad.

252 Consequently, the sect is against Christians, moderate Muslims and the government of Nigeria, and began by
253 stockpiling arms and ammunitions between 2002 and 2008 [Soyombo, 2012]. Security reports and government's
254 investigation of their activities led to the 2009 massive five days Boko Haram riots across Bauchi that later
255 spread to Yobe, Maiduguri, Kano and Borno. During the riot, over 800 people including the leader of the sect
256 -Mohammed Yusuf -were killed. This marked the beginning of their violent campaign in Nigeria. The sect
257 embarked on regular and more violent attacks against churches, security establishments and media organizations
258 with heavy human casualty. The increasing spread and dimension of the insurgency promoted the Sultan of
259 Sokoto, the Governor of Niger State, Dr Mu'azu Babangida Aliyu, the Coalition of Muslim Clerics in Nigeria
260 (CMCN), the Islamic Circle of North America, the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada, the Muslim Council of
261 Britain, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Council on American Islamic Relations to observe that
262 the sect's activities have exceeded religious goal-islamization (Oladeji and Agba, 2011).

263 The sect is now pursuing political agenda also. This paper argues that this is not a change of goal as
264 overthrowing non-Islamic regimes is one of their primary goals that manifested itself during the 2011 general
265 elections.

266 In order to secure electoral victory at all cost during the 2011 election, desperate northern politicians recruited
267 members of the sect to rig the 2011 elections in their favour at the state and federal levels, those who won the
268 elections dumped them while those who failed particularly to win the presidential elections further funded and
269 used them to cause havoc [Dibia, 2012]. Consequently, they enjoy the full support of major Northern political
270 elites and members of the armed forces who want the North to dominantly occupy the seat of the presidency. The
271 failure of the Northern political elites to win the presidential ticket during the 2011 elections led to intensified
272 Boko Haram attacks against government, Christian and Southern targets in the North. The list of Boko Haram
273 attacks seems endless as they continued into 2013. A brief summary of these attacks are graphically presented
274 in a Analyzing the above table, it is evident that their attacks are coordinated and aimed at three primary
275 targets, which are government institutions, Christians and educational institutions. This satisfies the demand of
276 the primary goals of the sect, which is islamization, elimination of western education and the over throw of the
277 government of none or moderate Muslim leaders for effective islamisation project.

278 **12 b) Government Responses to Boko-Haram Insurgency**

279 The government of the Federal republic of Nigeria evolved programmes and strategies to neutralize and checkmate
280 the activities of terrorist organizations in Nigeria. In summary, these programmes and strategies includes
281 negotiation with various groups towards peace and greater security, establishment of resettlement centres and
282 empowerment of the almageris, establishment of Joint military Task Force and subsequent strikes against members
283 of Boko Haram and their camps, changes in immigration procedures, increased surveillance, and increased the
284 severity of penalties associated with Boko Haram terrorist attacks [Donahue, 2001].

13 C) SUMMARY

285 First, the National Assembly (NASS) initiated a legislative process aimed at criminalising terrorism via the
286 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act in 2002. The ineffectiveness of this process led
287 to the presentation of Terrorism Prevention Bill to the Senate in 2006 that was subsequently defeated. Its re-
288 introduction in 2008 has passed the second reading but has been hindered by the debate over the appropriateness
289 or otherwise of some provisions, which sought to include the struggle for resources control in the Niger Delta
290 as terrorist act. This shows that government's efforts between 2002 and 2008 to enactment an anti-terrorism
291 legislation is aimed specifically at the Niger Delta region [Sankore, 2008] and not the Northern Boko-Haram.

292 It is pertinent to note that the sect was considered to be an evil with strong capability and evil intention
293 that need to be checked through the application of sufficient strength to deter or defeat the sect. Consequently,
294 government arrested several members of the group largely in Bauchi during its massive five days uprising. The
295 arrest exacerbated the uprising, orchestrated further wide spread attacks, which led to violent confrontation
296 between government forces and the sect that led to the deaths of about 700 people [Nossiter, 2009]. This led
297 to a more organised and sophisticated military campaign against the sect that calumniated in the declaration of
298 state of emergency in three states where they are primarily based and majority of their attacks were launched.

299 This forced many members of the sect into exile in neighbouring countries like Chad, Niger etc. The
300 operations of the joint task force set up to ensure peace and security in the state of emergency zones have
301 not succeeded to wipe out Boko Haram attacks completely but they have reduced their attacks drastically and
302 to an infinitesimal level compared to earlier operations. The joint task force has equally been intercepting
303 and confiscating illegally imported arms and ammunitions, discovering and destroying Boko Haram weapon
304 production centres/laboratories, discovering and seizing stock piles of arms and ammunitions, and destroying
305 the sect's training camps and hideouts scattered all over the Northern region. At the height of these military
306 operations, circumstances revealed the obscure fact that some top government functionaries and members of the
307 armed forces, traditional rulers, business magnets and frustrated politicians from the Northern Nigeria were the
308 major sponsors of the sect.

309 In addition to the above, the federal government has proposed amnesty for all Boko Haram members that
310 reject violence. In pursuance of this, the government has set up amnesty and reconciliation committee ??Brock,

311 13 c) Summary

312 Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country with over 350 ethnic nationalities that has been divided into two parallel groups
313 following the Othman Dan Fodio jihad, and whose drive or struggle to control the political system is principally
314 or fundamentally structured by religion since 1914. The predominance of Muslims in the North and Christians in
315 the South orchestrated the unending North-South struggle that has come to define public policies, development
316 programmes, the rules of political process and regime change in Nigeria. The hegemonic drive of the core Northern
317 Muslims to control the political system, which is the instrument of capital accumulation and class formation in
318 Nigeria -a drive perpetuated for about four decades out of five decades of Nigeria's independence through military
319 dictatorship, has been the cause of political instability in Nigeria. The entrance of civil rule from 1999 and power
320 shift to the South led to the emergence of Boko-Haram as an insurgent sect.

321 This paper observed that the primary objectives of Boko Haram as an Islamic sect are jihad and overthrow of
322 the non-Islamic government headed by southerners since 1999. The sect silently stockpiled weapons /ammunitions
323 between 2002 and 2007 when transition or regime change was expected to favour the North and in preparation
324 for jihad and overthrow of the incumbent government if it does not. The security forces were unable to detect
325 this secret military preparation because the sect was sponsored by many Northern retired and serving military
326 personnel and politicians. These facts explains the reasons why the entire Boko Haram insurgent actions
327 were targeted against government institutions, Christian churches, Southerners, their business concerns, and
328 habitations. These attacks are broad, scientific and mostly successful until government initiated anti-terrorist
329 actions against the sect in 2013. This paper equally observes that there is no functional anti-terrorism law in
330 Nigeria. Thus, the government of federal republic of Nigeria adopted a multiple approach to countering Boko
331 Haram insurgency. Security Agents detect, seize and/or destroy various forms of ammunitions that were either
332 imported or stockpiled by the Boko Haram sect. Security Agents equally uncovered and destroy many Boko
333 Haram training camps and hide-outs.

334 Supplementing these efforts, government embarked on amnesty and human empowerment programmes
335 particularly for the almageris. A high powered amnesty committee was set by the federal government, which
336 has been visiting, discussing and negotiation with key stakeholders in the North and assumed members of the
337 Boko-Haram sect. The inability of these to influence the sect to stop its attacks led to the declaration of state
338 of emergency in three core Northern states where they operate. This neutralized and reduced both the temerity
339 and regularity of the sect's attacks and brought back relative peace in Northern Nigeria.

340 The scenario is not without disastrous consequences for the socio-economic, political, and international
341 personality of Nigeria. The insurgency has led to forced and unprepared external and internal migration of
342 people out of many major Northern cities/states; increased unemployment, poverty, and anti-social behaviours
343 particularly among migrants; heavy loss of government revenue, private and public property, and thousands of
344 human lives; hindered foreign investments and tourism in Nigeria; exacerbated the pre-existing ethno-cultural
345 and religious schisms and phobism in Nigeria; and created high level of insecurity of lives and property in Nigeria.

346 Consequently, the following recommendations are offered as a means of countering terrorist activities in Nigeria:

347 1. Government should enact punitive anti-terrorism laws that meets the international template and devoid of
348 ethnic sentiments. 2. Security officials aiding and abating Boko Haram insurgency in terms of arms acquisition,
349 transportation or movement, operations should be charged with treason. 3. The current state of emergency
350 policy and its associated operations should be sustained as antiterrorism strategy in Nigeria.

351 **14 Global Journal of Human Social Science**

352 Volume XIII Issue V Version I ()F 2 98

353 Year 2013 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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²() F Boko Haram Insurgency: A Northern Agenda for Regime Change and Islamization in Nigeria, 2007
-2013 terrorism, which has an agenda for either destroying or reforming the existing social system.

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⁴() F Boko Haram Insurgency: A Northern Agenda for Regime Change and Islamization in Nigeria, 2007
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and Mohr, 1997;

Year 2013

2 90

revealed four primary reasons for terrorist actions as follow: 1. Functional reason [i.e. Terrorism is intended to instill fear into the lives of those against whom the violence is directed, even if they are not the actual physical recipients of the violence]. In this case both those that are targeted and those who witnessed it are affected by such actions [Tzu, 1963; Wilkinson, 2000].

3. Tactical reasons [i.e. Terrorist acts are tactically committed as instrument of negotiation to achieve short term gains like the exchange of hijack 8

hostages for prisoners, or a bank robbery to fund arms procurement, or even to attract economic empowerment].

4. Political reason [i.e. Incumbent political elites or regime do declare political opponents, who have 'illegitimate designs' on state power, as terrorists.

This enables the state to employ a 'free hand' and legitimately pursue an agenda to eradicate its opposition, regardless of whether they are actually linked to terrorists' activities or not (Wilkinson, 2000].

State monopoly of legitimised violence allows it to embark on terrorist acts in the guise of anti-terrorist policies against opponents both nationally and internationally. The varied nature of the reasons for terrorism leads to various forms of terrorist actions and respective state sponsored counter terrorist activities. These anti-

increased likelihood of new terrorist activities [Prunckun

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Figure 2:

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