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I. Introduction

Nigeria has continued to face political instability and crisis since the census crisis of 1962 orchestrated by Northern quest to dominate the South, and the transition crisis of 1964 that culminated in the 1967-1970 Nigerian civil war. The instability manifested as coups and counter coups, religious and ethnic conflicts, failed transition programmes, politically motivated high level murders, electoral violence, arson and electoral litigations that overturned many declared victories. Since 1983 when Nigeria recorded a failed attempt at civilian transition of power due to Northern dominated National Party of Nigeria's manipulation of electoral process and results, Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented level of violence that ranges from inter/intra-communal and ethnic clashes, ethno-religious violence, demonstrations or civil strife, arson, armed robbery, political assassination, murder, gender-based violence, election violence, and bomb explosion [Ogunyemi and Align, 2011].

This high level of insecurity has been exacerbated by catastrophic terrorism that have taken terrible humanitarian toll and threatened Nigeria's cooperate existence as witnessed in the Niger Delta region and many Northern States. Kaplan [1994:3] summarized the scenario thus:

> The country is becoming increasingly ungovernable.... Ethnic and regional splits are deepening, a situation made worse by an increase in the number of states from 19 to 30 and a doubling in the number of local governing authorities. Religious cleavages are more serious; Muslim fundamentalism and evangelical Christian militancy are on the rise; and northern Muslim anxiety over southern [Christian] control of the economy is intense . . . the will to keep Nigeria together is now very weak.

Consequent upon this, many insurgent and ethnically based organizations such as the Oduduwa Peoples' Congress (OPC), the Egbesu boys, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC), the Bakassi Boys, Igbo Peoples' Congress (IPC), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), Niger Delta Resistant Movement (NDRM), Movement for the Survival of the Izon Nationality of the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), the Yobe Taliban, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Jama'at Ahlus al-Sunnah Liddawati Wal-Jihad or better known as Boko Haram, and a host of many other violence wielding groups emerged. Of these groups, this paper studies Boko Haram because its activities, destructions and killings are the most contemporary with sophisticated connections to many past and serving political office holders and military personnel.

According to Connell (2012), Boko Haram was founded in 1995 by Abubakah Lawan under the original name Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra with its headquarters in Maiduguri, Nigeria. Its original goal of improving the economic hardship and poor living standards in the country through struggle attracted followers in their hundreds (Farouk, 2012:2). However, when Lawan left for studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, a radicalized Muslim cleric named Muhammad Yusuf assumed leadership position of the group and renamed the group Boko Haram (Connell, 2012:88), which simply means western education is forbidden. Yusuf equally changed the primary goals of the sect towards the overthrow of the secular Nigerian Government and the enforcement of an anti-Western Sharia law based government. Consequently, the sect attacks churches and government buildings, personnel and institutions. They have carried out several attacks against security

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agencies, government properties, churches and markets together with United Nations headquarters in Abuja [Brock, 2011].

However, the increasing spread and successful operations of the Boko Haram sect against the people and government of the Federal republic of Nigeria, the level of destruction of lives and property in the face of multiple armed security forces is a puzzle that needs to be resolved. This dangerous trend has been complicated by the allegation of complicity among former heads of state, high-ranking political office holders and security personnel. The disappearance of Kabiru Sokoto – a terrorist suspect from the police cell, the arrests of some security personnel who were smuggling illegal arms into the country by Customs officials, and the arrests of some security personnel safeguarding or transporting illegal arms into Abuja, etc are equally matters of serious concern. Unfortunately, none of those arrested suspects and collaborators has been prosecuted. This paper therefore studies the insurgency with a view to examine the factors that have encouraged the growth and expansion of Boko Haram operations, its relationship with Northern political agenda and achievements so far.

II. Materials and Methods

This study is predominantly based on information derived from secondary sources such as relevant texts, journals, magazines, newspapers, official publications, historical documents and the Internet, which served as tangible sources of insight into terrorism, politics and conflicts. The time-span of the study is primarily but not exclusively between 2007 when Boko Haram began its public campaign against constituted governments and 2013 being the current time Nigerians witnessed its terrors across the Northern Nigeria. The choice of 2007 as starting point of this inquiry was informed by the fact that it marked the year the Islamic sect recorded its first public and successful attack. That was even the year the group revealed for the first time the reasons for its campaign against the government and Nigerians.

However, the inquiry is strictly limited to recorded information about Boko Haram and its insurgent activities that can be found on the internet and libraries. The paper is interest in such information as the rise and activities of Boko Haram, its operations across Nigeria, government responses to their claims and actions, and the impact such actions.

Consequently, the paper adopts content analysis as its method of analysis. The method here is to sift the findings in the works available for this research, check the consistency of the opinions of either the authors and/or the actors; evaluate such findings or opinions with other existing findings on the subject. The data shall equally be examined in the light of other thesis and findings on the subject matter. Through these methods, the paper draws inferences on the data generated during the research and their consequences for party dominance in Nigeria's democratic process.

III. Gap in the Extant Literature

This section reviews available literature on regime change, terrorism, terrorism in Nigeria, and the emergence of Boko-Haram as a terrorist group in Nigeria.

a) Regime Change

The concept of regime change has being variously defined by scholars. According to Booth (1998:5) it is the act of changing "both the fundamental rules of politics and the makeup of its coalition (a regime shift)". Other authors such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) perceive it as the possible outcome of the strategic interaction of domestic political groups. These authors ignored the role or influence of external or foreign players in such an interaction (Bonfatti, 2011:5). They equally ignored the role or influence of non-state actors, who are not members of any political party nor act in the name of any of such parties such insurgent or rebel groups. Nevertheless, the concept of regime change is associated with the substitution of one type of regime with another i.e. civilian regime with military regime, or substitution of the executive arm of government with another through elections, coup d'état, litigations/legal process, revolution, and or the death of the incumbent chief executive (Baird, 2001; Caldeira and Gibson, 1992). In essence, it is the constitutional or unconstitutional removal or replacement of the chief executive of a state whether military or civilian regime or a change from one regime type to another, which in effect leads to the substitution of all political appointees with other set of people. From the perspective prism of changes in structures, mechanisms of operation and procedure, Albrecht and Schlumberger [2004] classified regime change into five as follows: change in the Structures of legitimacy and strategies of legitimization; elite change; change in institution building/arrangement of power; co-optation i.e. restricting populism and widening the regime's power base; and external influences/intervention.

The nature and dynamics of regime change depends on the socio-political and economic forces that are responsible for change. Such forces can be indigenous or exogenous. In most cases regime change is associated with perceived inability of the existing political system or administrators of such system to translate popular in-put demands on a policy issue into political action (Tyler and Mitchell, 1994; Easton, 1965b). This leads to decline in legitimacy, the emergence of civil rights movements and activism. In this case, people's dissatisfaction with dividends of bad governance propels pressure that results in coup d'état,

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assassination of the incumbent, or demand for early elections. Such a regime is voted out of power by the people. Generally, social tension, mass unemployment among young people, religious fundamentalism, poverty, undemocratic culture, ideology, despotism or autocratic governance, democracy, security and economic expansion or advantage has been noted by scholars as the major reasons causing nationally or internationally sponsored regime change.

Booth [1998:9 emphasis mine] in the study of regime change in South American countries from traditional political stability, guerrilla insurgency, military reformism, personalistic authoritarianism, socialist revolution, to civilian-led liberal democracy between 1970 and the late 1990s argued that,

> Regime coalition members benefit from inclusion in the regime. [Consequently,] Social and economic change can generate and mobilize new political actors who may seek inclusion into the ruling coalition and its benefits, and who may or may not be admitted by those within the regime. Socio-economic change can dramatically affect the resources available to the regime.

This inclusion tendency in South American politics that normally alters both the character and rules of the regime i.e. regime shift is necessitated by corporatist tendencies and the willingness of new actors to fight the status quo till they are included in the regime. It therefore suffices to say that South American political actors do not work for regime change but shift or transformation.

Thus, intra and inter class struggle due to social exclusion from the structure of distribution lead to rebellion, revolution and political violence that inevitably cause changes in regime [Gurr, 1970; Walton, 1984:13]. Many scholars such as Walton [1984]; Skocpol [1979]; Paige [1975]; Olson [1979]; Wickham-Crowley [1992]; Booth [1996], Williams [1986]; Gasiorowski [1995] and Brockett [1988] generally agree that rapid economic change and evolving class relations are powerful factors that cause mass mobilization needed for a violent challenge to any regime. Such group of people when mobilized focuses their energy on changing the status quo. Aya [1979] and Tilly [1978] note that the ruling coalition is always the target of such a change, while the coalition itself enhances the rebellion through repression thereby promoting the expected change. It is more profitable however for the ruling group to share power with broader sets of citizens to avoid total regime change. Thus, redistribution of resources leads to mobilization and democratization [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006].

The literature also noted the role of external interests that were not accommodated by regimes as forces that influence or cause the movement for changing regimes. Seligson and Booth [1993]; Huntington [1993]; Easterly et Al. [2008]; Dube et Al. (2011); Whitehead (1991); Carothers (1991) among others stressed the role of external intervention to change an existing regime and or imposition of preferred regime type because their interests, which is predominantly economic (Bonfatti, 2011), are not safeguarded in such regimes. Such external forces may be strengthening a prevailing regime by supporting it or weakening it through or withheld support, supply of resources to domestic actors, altering their relative strength and capacity to act (Muller and Seligson, 1994). They may also use international institutions to pressurize regimes to adopt certain policies or regime types through such instruments like foreign loans, aid, arms, trade, cooperation at the international level, military assistance etc (Booth, 1998).

b) Terrorism

There is no commonly accepted conceptualisation of terrorism. From the perception of imperial and autocratic regimes, certain group actions that are against their interests are branded terrorist actions, while for the perpetrators, such actions are nationalistic and emancipatory [Gunaratna, 2002]. The debate over what constitute terrorism has been summed up in the following expression, 'one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist.' The crux of the arguments is that actions considered by the state as terrorism take the form of asymmetric warfare between groups, movements and organisations often against the state. These include ethnic identity conflicts, which is characterised by irredentist and secessionist movements and multi-party civil war. Such actions are guided by religious or ethno-nationalist ideas and characterised by hatred, fear and genocide and have no declarations of war, few battles and are typified by attrition, terror and violence against civilians [Kaldor, 1999; Laquer, 2001; Gilbert, 2003; Holsti, 1996]. In some cases like the Rwanda and Burundi genocides, dominant ethnic groups employ the instrumentalities of the state to perpetuate the same act against other groups that are not in power. Still such state sponsored or perpetuated terror is not termed terrorism.

To some other scholars, terrorism is a violent reaction against an established social order wherein terrorists are seen as social actors seeking for change in society and use violence as instruments to destroy the existing framework of society or merely change it. Such violence can be for reform or revolution. This is due to the existence of a set of existential and development human needs that require satisfaction on a hierarchical basis. Indifference to such needs on the part of government normally leads actors into violence against the state [Burton, 1979; Gurr, 1970 and 1988]. This implies that if the basic human needs of individual non-state actors are unsatisfied they can generate grievance terrorism, revolutionary terrorism or reactionary terrorism, which has an agenda for either destroying or reforming the existing social system.

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Although consensus will continue to elude the conceptualisation of terrorism for a long time [Laqueur, 1987:72], the concept is relative to the legitimacy of state governance, or as specific methods of political violence, such as hijack or bombing or as acts of violence against a specific target group, particularly civilians [Wilkinson, 2000]. In line with this, the United States Department of Defence in Laqueur [2001] conceptualized of terrorism as; "Unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments to accept political, religious or ideological objectives." Hoffman [1999:32] noted that terrorism can even be located in the "threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors and nongovernmental processes and organisations." The predominance of state power over private forces made the relative legitimacy explanation of terrorism the widely accepted understanding of the concept. Resultantly, the concept represents a challenge and threat to state authority by an illegitimate body. However, Schmid and Jongman [2004:2] offered more neutral conceptualization terrorism as;

> A method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as instrumental targets of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics, which form the basis for the victimisation. Other members of that group or class are put in a chronic state of fear (terror)…. the purpose of which is to change attitudes or behaviour favouring the interests of the user of method of combat.

Available literature such as Bowyer [1978]; Laqueur [2001] and Richmond [2006] revealed four primary reasons for terrorist actions as follow:

1. Functional reason [i.e. Terrorism is intended to provoke a response to further the cause by strategic manipulation]. This suggests that terrorism can be perpetuated to force a reaction from an established political power centre, governing authority or state against the instigators, their supporters and even the population in general in a manner that may lead to intense and indiscriminate state repression in order to deprive the government of legitimacy and radicalise the masses [Rubenstein, 1987; O'Sullivan and Herman, 1991].
2. Symbolic reason [i.e. Terrorism purposely carried out as a symbol to terrorise, intimidate and strike fear into the lives of those against whom the violence is directed, even if they are not the actual physical recipients of the violence]. In this case both those that are targeted and those who witnessed it are affected by such actions [Tzu, 1963; Wilkinson, 2000].
3. Tactical reasons [i.e. Terrorist acts are tactically committed as instrument of negotiation to achieve short term gains like the exchange of hijack hostages for prisoners, or a bank robbery to fund arms procurement, or even to attract economic empowerment].
4. Political reason [i.e. Incumbent political elites or regime do declare political opponents, who have 'illegitimate designs' on state power, as terrorists. This enables the state to employ a 'free hand' and legitimately pursue an agenda to eradicate its opposition, regardless of whether they are actually linked to terrorists' activities or not (Wilkinson, 2000]. State monopoly of legitimised violence allows it to embark on terrorist acts in the guise of anti-terrorist policies against opponents both nationally and internationally.

The varied nature of the reasons for terrorism leads to various forms of terrorist actions and respective state sponsored counter terrorist activities. These anti- or counter- terrorism activities as noted by the United States Congressional Budget Office [2002 & 2005]; Guinnessy and Dawson [2002]; Macilwain [2002]; Silke [2004], etc include airport screening, anti-terrorism products for personal use, arrest, assassinations, blast resistant luggage, building security, detection devises for biological or chemical weapons, diplomatic efforts, educational support, emergency response preparedness, fortification of embassies, gas masks, hostage negotiation, laws against terrorism, medical antidotes for anthrax, medical antidotes for nerve gas, medical antidotes for other chemical or biological weapons, metal detectors, prosecution strategies, psychological counselling, punishment and sentencing, religious interventions, social and economic responses, UN Conventions and multilateral interventions, use of force by one country to another, use of media, etc.

Silke (2005), Cauley and Im [1988] and McCord [2003] observed that these anti-terrorism measures are often ineffective and increase the temerity with which terror is being perpetuated. Enders, Sandler and Cauley [1990]; Enders and Sandler [1993] evaluation of multiple counter terrorism programmes and outcomes between 1968 and 1993 consolidated this argument. Equally, Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare [1994] evaluation of the effectiveness of six Israeli military-led retaliation attacks on reducing terrorism from the PLO and Lebanon that took place between 1972 and 1988 when Israeli athletes were killed at the Munich Olympic Games of 1972 and observed the ineffectiveness of the counter terrorism strikes. However, some scholars like MacKenzie [2000]; Sherman et al. [2002]; Weisburd et al., [2003]; Enders and Sandler [2000] observed dual effect on the effectiveness of counter terrorism activities. Many effects are close to a zero effect while others provide no statistical evidence that the counter-terrorism strategy was harmful. Other studies shows that such programmes produce negative effects leading to increased likelihood of new terrorist activities [Prunckun

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and Mohr, 1997; Silke, 2005]. For instance, generally statistics show that the United States' 1986 attack on Libya after Libya's involvement in the bombing of the LaBelle Discotheque in West Berlin significantly increased the number of terrorist attacks, at least in the short run.

These outcomes made some scholars like Enders and Sandler, [2002]; Abadie and Gardeazabal [2001]; Barros [2003] to embark on an exploration of alternative methods of waging counter terror wars. They noted such alternative like assassinations and kidnappings of terrorist group leaders such as the ones conducted by ETA between 1968 and 2000; the application of different political ideologies by those in power; increases in police and military fiscal allocations as well as increases in foreign investment in the home country or base where the terrorist groups are based. The United States for instance raised its "Appropriations for Combating Terrorism and Protecting Critical Infrastructure" by over 650% from $13.6 billion dollars in 2002 to $88.1 billion in 2004 [Congressional Budget Office, 2005]. This excludes the billions of dollars spent since September 11th on counter terrorism around the world.

c) Boko-Haram and Terrorism in Nigeria

The emergence of Boko Haram, which can be traced to the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a Shiite movement led by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky that was funded by Iran, laid the background for the contemporary terrorist activities in Nigeria since 2007. Since then, the sect has vigorously pursued the propagation of an extreme Islamic doctrine, which sees Western education and the leadership of non-hard-line Muslims and or Christians as evil and immoral. The sect forbids everything Western i.e. Western education and modern science and technology are sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden (Danjibo, 2009; Adesoji, 2010). The sect seeks to create an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Nigeria by any means at its disposal and at whatever human cost it deems necessary [Bumah, 2009]. For this, the sect has carried out numerous deadly attacks against Nigerian governments, their institutions and structures, and Nigerians in general. On its part, the state has reacted to these brutal attacks by legislating against it, waging anti-terrorist wars and declaring state of emergency in three states where the sect is based and operates mostly. This paper pursues an analysis of the aim of book-haram insurgency in Nigeria, the nuances of its operations, and an evaluation of state sponsored anti-terror programmes. Suffice to say, the paper will test the applicability of the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of anti-terrorism wars within the Nigerian context.

IV. Theoretical Nexus

With the consideration of the primary reasons that led to emergence of Boko Haram sect, this paper adopts the Islamic fundamentalist theory as its framework of analysis. According to Hodgkin [1975:247], the fundamental principle of the theory, which guided Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, was "to make upon the heathen king who…make no profession of Islam, is obligatory by assent". Therefore, the goal of Islamising Nigeria under the sharia law dates back to the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio in 1804 [Adetoro, 1982]. Since then, the goal has always being the motive behind various ethno-religious riots in Northern Nigeria.

Recently, Farouk (2012) observed that the Boko Haram sect and insurgency is an expression of the Quranic verse which states that "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors" (Quran 649). Usigbe (2012) noted that President GoodLuck Jonathan was recently directed by the Boko Haram sect to embrace Islam or resign. Furthering the argument, Suleiman (2011) reporting the public statement issued by Boko Haram group in Maiduguri on April 24, 2011, noted that their objectives were to abolish democracy and institute Sharia law as instrument of justice and islamization. The sect preached first total islamization of Nigeria until 2009 when it took arms against the state because of the Maiduguri crisis of July, 2009 that led to the death of Mohammed Yusuf and some of their members. For this reason, one of the sect's spokesmen declared;

> we would continue to fight until Islam is well established and the Muslims regain their freedom all over Nigeria. We would never be ready to compromise and we don't need amnesty. The only solution to what is happening is for the government to repent, jettison democracy, drop the constitution and adopt the laws in the Holy Qur'an (Suleiman, 2011:50).

First, the sect called on government to prosecute the police officers involved in the extra – judicial killing of their leader Mohammed Yusuf and some members. They equally called for the arrest and trial of some former Northern Nigeria Governors for what they described as acts of "betrayal" because the former governors used them as thugs.

The relevance of this theory to our study relates to the fact that over 60% of Nigerians are not Moslems. They are either Christians, Traditional religionists, atheists, members of the church of Satan and other religious affiliations. The real threat posed by the emergence and activities of Boko Haram stems from the fact that these none Muslims are prepared for a showdown with the Islamic sect. The theory enables us therefore to understand the attacks and counter attacks in the Northern Nigeria, relocation of non-indigenes out of many states in the North and its economic, social and political consequences. The theory enables us also to

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study the reasons for and impact of government's counter terror operations in the Northern part of Nigeria, the overall impact of the terror and counter terror activities on tourism, foreign investments, economic activities, fiscal appropriation for security/armed forces, and growth. The theory is therefore relevant for the study.

V. Findings and Discussions

a) Book-Haram Insurgency

Boko Haram is one of the Islamic fundamentalist sects in Nigeria that adopted violence as a weapon of attracting national and international responses to their demands or interests. "Boko-Haram" is a name that was derived from Hausa and Arabic words. "Boko" in Hausa means "western education" and "Haram" an Arabic word means "sin" [Obinna, 2011]. It therefore suffices to say that the name Boko-Haram literally means western education is a sin. This symbolises the original name of this sect, Jama'atu AhlisSunna Lidda'awatiwal-Jihad, which stands for "The Group of Al-Sunna for Preaching and Jihad". It is innocuous therefore to argue from the onset that Boko-Haram is an Islamic sect established for the purposes of stamping out western civilization and for prosecuting jihad.

Consequently, the sect is against Christians, moderate Muslims and the government of Nigeria, and began by stockpiling arms and ammunitions between 2002 and 2008 [Soyombo, 2012]. Security reports and government's investigation of their activities led to the 2009 massive five days Boko Haram riots across Bauchi that later spread to Yobe, Maiduguri, Kano and Borno. During the riot, over 800 people including the leader of the sect – Mohammed Yusuf – were killed. This marked the beginning of their violent campaign in Nigeria. The sect embarked on regular and more violent attacks against churches, security establishments and media organizations with heavy human casualty. The increasing spread and dimension of the insurgency promoted the Sultan of Sokoto, the Governor of Niger State, Dr Mu'azu Babangida Aliyu, the Coalition of Muslim Clerics in Nigeria (CMCN), the Islamic Circle of North America, the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada, the Muslim Council of Britain, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Council on American Islamic Relations to observe that the sect's activities have exceeded religious goal- islamization (Oladeji and Agba, 2011).

The sect is now pursuing political agenda also. This paper argues that this is not a change of goal as overthrowing non-Islamic regimes is one of their primary goals that manifested itself during the 2011 general elections.

In order to secure electoral victory at all cost during the 2011 election, desperate northern politicians recruited members of the sect to rig the 2011 elections in their favour at the state and federal levels, those who won the elections dumped them while those who failed particularly to win the presidential elections further funded and used them to cause havoc [Dibia, 2012]. Consequently, they enjoy the full support of major Northern political elites and members of the armed forces who want the North to dominantly occupy the seat of the presidency. The failure of the Northern political elites to win the presidential ticket during the 2011 elections led to intensified Boko Haram attacks against government, Christian and Southern targets in the North. The list of Boko Haram attacks seems endless as they continued into 2013. A brief summary of these attacks are graphically presented in a table below as follows:

Some of the Boko Haram Attacks between 2007 and 2013

s/n	Date	Location	Nature of Attacks	Remarks
1	July 26, 2009	Bauchi	5 days uprising and attack on a police station that spread to Maiduguri, Borno, Yobe, and Kano	Over 800 people killed
2	July 27, 2009	Yobe	Attack on Potiskum, Yobe State Divisional Police Headquarters	3 Police men and 1 fire service officer died.
3	March 13, 2010	Plateau state	Churches and markets	300 people killed
4	September 7, 2010	Bauchi	Attacked Prisons	killed 5 guards and freed over 700 inmates, including former sect members.
5	October 1, 2010	Abuja	Explosions near the Eagle Square	12 people killed & many injured.
6	October 11, 2010	Maiduguri	Bombing/gun attack on a police station	destroys the station and injures three
7	December 24 2010	Barkin Ladi, Jos	Bomb attack	Eight people killed
8	December 28, 2010	Jos	Christmas eve bomb attack on church	38 people killed
9	December 31,	Abuja	The group attack a Mammy market at	11 people killed

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	2010		Army Mogadishu Barracks	
10	7 January 21, 2011	Maiduguri	Attack on politicians	8 persons killed including ANPP governorship candidate
11	March 2 2011	Kaduna State	The residence of the Divisional police Officer, Mustapha Sandamu	2 police men killed
12	March 30, 2011	Damaturu, Yobe State	Bomb attack	injured a police officer
13	April 8, 2011	Niger State	Bombing of INEC office in Suleja	Killed 8 Corps members
14	April 9 2011	Unguwar Doki Maiduguri	Bomb explosion occurred at a polling unit	Killed 17 people and many injured
15	April 29 2011	Bauchi state	Army Barracks in Bauchi bombed	No death
16	May 29, 2011	Bauchi State	Explosion at mammy market of Shandawanka barracks	claimed 18 lives and left many injured
17	May 30 2011	Maiduguri	Bombs exploded early morning on Baga road in	13 persons died and 40 injured
18	June 7, 2011	Maiduguri	Series of bomb blasts	claimed five lives and injured many others
19	June 16, 2011	Abuja	Bombing of Nigerian Police Headquarters	three killed and many vehicles damaged
20	June 16, 2011	Maiduguri	bomb blast at Damboa town	Four children killed
21	June 20, 2011	Katsina State	Boko Haram stormed Kankara Police station	9 police men killed
22	July 9, 2011	Maiduguri	A clash between Boko Haram and the military	31 persons killed
23	July 11 2011	Kaduna State	Tragic explosion at a relaxation joint in Fokados street	Many people killed
24	July 12, 2011	Borno State	Boko Haram threw an explosive device on a moving military patrol vehicle	5 persons killed
25	July 15, 2011	Borno State	Explosion in Maiduguri	Injured five people
26	July 23, 2011	Borno State	An explosion close to the palace of the Shehu of Borno, Abubakar Garbai Elkanem	Injured three soldiers
27	July 25, 2011	Maiduguri	Bomb explosion near the palace of traditional ruler	Eight persons died
28	August 25, 2011	Maiduguri	Bank robbery	killed 4 policemen, 1 solder and 7 civilians and removed undisclosed sum of money
29	August 26, 2011	Abuja	A Suicide Bomber Drove Into The United Nations building	25 persons killed and 60 injured
30	September 12, 2011	Bauchi State	Bomb attack on a police station in Misau	Seven people, including four policemen
31	September 13, 2011	Maiduguri	Armed attack on military vehicle	injured four solders
32	October 3, 2011	Maiduguri	Attack on Baga Market	3 people killed
33	November 4, 2011	Yobe state	Attacks of Damaturu villages	150 people killed
34	December 24, 2011	Jos	Bomb attacks in churches and markets	80 people killed
35	December 25, 2011	Niger State	Christmas Day bombing in Madalla	50 people died
36	December 30, 2011	Maiduguri	Bomb attacks	Seven people killed
37	January 5, 2012	Gombe state	Bomb attack in a church	Six people died
38	January 6, 2012	Yola	Bomb attack in a Christ Apostolic Church	17 people died while 20 Igbo people were also killed in Mubi
39	January 20, 2012	Kano State	Bomb attacks	250 people killed in multiple attacks
40	January 22, 2012	Bauchi State	Attacks in churches and the headquarters of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area in	Two churches destroyed, two military personnel, a DPO and eight civilian killed

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			the state.	
41	February 10, 2012	Kano	Attacked a Police Station in Shagari Quarters	Many injured
42	February 15, 2012	Kogi State	Caused Jail Break in Koton Karji Prisons	A warder killed And 199 prisoners released
43	April 26 2012	Abuja	Bombing of three media houses	killed 8 people & injured 13 people
44	April,29,2012	Kano	Attack on Bayero University, Kano	killed 13 Christian Worshippers, a senior non-academic staff & two Professors
45	April 30, 2012	Jalingo	Bomb explosion	11 persons killed & several others wounded

Sources : Punch17, June, 2011, Punch 27, February, 2012, Punch 23, February, 2012, Guardian 20, February, 2012, Guardian 12, March, 2012, Nigerian Tribune 30, January, 2012 etc.

Analyzing the above table, it is evident that their attacks are coordinated and aimed at three primary targets, which are government institutions, Christians and educational institutions. This satisfies the demand of the primary goals of the sect, which is islamization, elimination of western education and the over throw of the government of none or moderate Muslim leaders for effective islamisation project.

b) Government Responses to Boko-Haram Insurgency

The government of the Federal republic of Nigeria evolved programmes and strategies to neutralize and checkmate the activities of terrorist organizations in Nigeria. In summary, these programmes and strategies includes negotiation with various groups towards peace and greater security, establishment of resettlement centres and empowerment of the almageris, establishment of Joint military Task Force and subsequent strikes against members of Boko Haram and their camps, changes in immigration procedures, increased surveillance, and increased the severity of penalties associated with Boko Haram terrorist attacks [Donahue, 2001].

First, the National Assembly (NASS) initiated a legislative process aimed at criminalising terrorism via the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act in 2002. The ineffectiveness of this process led to the presentation of Terrorism Prevention Bill to the Senate in 2006 that was subsequently defeated. Its re-introduction in 2008 has passed the second reading but has being hindered by the debate over the appropriateness or otherwise of some provisions, which sought to include the struggle for resources control in the Niger Delta as terrorist act. This shows that government's efforts between 2002 and 2008 to enactment an anti-terrorism legislation is aimed specifically at the Niger Delta region [Sankore, 2008] and not the Northern Boko-Haram.

It is pertinent to note that the sect was considered to be an evil with strong capability and evil intention that need to be checked through the application of sufficient strength to deter or defeat the sect. Consequently, government arrested several members of the group largely in Bauchi during its massive five days uprising. The arrest exacerbated the uprising, orchestrated further wide spread attacks, which led to violent confrontation between government forces and the sect that led to the deaths of about 700 people [Nossiter, 2009]. This led to a more organised and sophisticated military campaign against the sect that calumniated in the declaration of state of emergency in three states where they are primarily based and majority of their attacks were launched.

This forced many members of the sect into exile in neighbouring countries like Chad, Niger etc. The operations of the joint task force set up to ensure peace and security in the state of emergency zones have not succeeded to wipe out Boko Haram attacks completely but they have reduced their attacks drastically and to an infinitesimal level compared to earlier operations. The joint task force has equally being intercepting and confiscating illegally imported arms and ammunitions, discovering and destroying Boko Haram weapon production centres/laboratories, discovering and seizing stock piles of arms and ammunitions, and destroying the sect's training camps and hideouts scattered all over the Northern region. At the height of these military operations, circumstances revealed the obscure fact that some top government functionaries and members of the armed forces, traditional rulers, business magnets and frustrated politicians from the Northern Nigeria were the major sponsors of the sect.

In addition to the above, the federal government has proposed amnesty for all Boko Haram members that reject violence. In pursuance of this, the government has set up amnesty and reconciliation committee [Brock, 2012:2; Johnson, 2012:14]. Therefore, one can innocuously conclude that government response to Boko Haram activities or operations in Nigeria has achieved a reasonable degree of success.

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c) Summary

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country with over 350 ethnic nationalities that has been divided into two parallel groups following the Othman Dan Fodio jihad, and whose drive or struggle to control the political system is principally or fundamentally structured by religion since 1914. The predominance of Muslims in the North and Christians in the South orchestrated the un-ending North-South struggle that has come to define public policies, development programmes, the rules of political process and regime change in Nigeria. The hegemonic drive of the core Northern Muslims to control the political system, which is the instrument of capital accumulation and class formation in Nigeria – a drive perpetuated for about four decades out of five decades of Nigeria's independence through military dictatorship, has been the cause of political instability in Nigeria. The entrance of civil rule from 1999 and power shift to the South led to the emergence of Boko-Haram as an insurgent sect.

This paper observed that the primary objectives of Boko Haram as an Islamic sect are jihad and overthrow of the non-Islamic government headed by southerners since 1999. The sect silently stockpiled weapons /ammunitions between 2002 and 2007 when transition or regime change was expected to favour the North and in preparation for jihad and overthrow of the incumbent government if it does not. The security forces were unable to detect this secret military preparation because the sect was sponsored by many Northern retired and serving military personnel and politicians. These facts explains the reasons why the entire Boko Haram insurgent actions were targeted against government institutions, Christian churches, Southerners, their business concerns, and habitations. These attacks are broad, scientific and mostly successful until government initiated anti-terrorist actions against the sect in 2013. This paper equally observes that there is no functional anti-terrorism law in Nigeria. Thus, the government of federal republic of Nigeria adopted a multiple approach to countering Boko Haram insurgency. Security Agents detect, seize and/or destroy various forms of ammunitions that were either imported or stockpiled by the Boko Haram sect. Security Agents equally uncovered and destroy many Boko Haram training camps and hide-outs.

Supplementing these efforts, government embarked on amnesty and human empowerment programmes particularly for the almageris. A high powered amnesty committee was set by the federal government, which has being visiting, discussing and negotiation with key stakeholders in the North and assumed members of the Boko-Haram sect. The inability of these to influence the sect to stop its attacks led to the declaration of state of emergency in three core Northern states where they operate. This neutralized and reduced both the temerity and regularity of the sect's attacks and brought back relative peace in Northern Nigeria.

The scenario is not without disastrous consequences for the socio-economic, political, and international personality of Nigeria. The insurgency has led to forced and unprepared external and internal migration of people out of many major Northern cities/states; increased unemployment, poverty, and anti-social behaviours particularly among migrants; heavy lose of government revenue, private and public property, and thousands of human lives; hindered foreign investments and tourism in Nigeria; exacerbated the pre-existing ethno-cultural and religious schisms and phobism in Nigeria; and created high level of insecurity of lives and property in Nigeria.

Consequently, the following recommendations are offered as a means of countering terrorist activities in Nigeria:

1. Government should enact punitive anti-terrorism laws that meets the international template and devoid of ethnic sentiments.
2. Security officials aiding and abating Boko Haram insurgency in terms of arms acquisition, transportation or movement, operations should be charged with treason.
3. The current state of emergency policy and its associated operations should be sustained as anti-terrorism strategy in Nigeria.

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