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## Relationships between Bourdieu and Moscovici to Rethink Teacher Education

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RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BOURDIEU AND MOSCOVICI TO RETHINK TEACHER EDUCATION

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## INTRODUCTION

This text is the outcome of studies conducted within the scope of the International Center for Studies in Social Representations and Subjectivity–Education (CIERS-ed), the Carlos Chagas Foundation/FCC, and the UNESCO Chair on Teacher Professionalization. Its main objective is to systematize principles and concepts of the theory of action (BOURDIEU, 1997, 1998a, 1998b) and the theory of social representations (MOSCOVICI, 1961, 1978, 2012), to rethink the field of education and, in particular, teacher training. The goal is to understand the “map of relationships and social interests,” according to Moscovici (1978, p. 27), to give new meaning to it as an “object of struggle, both in its representation and in its reality,” as Bourdieu teaches us (2002, p. 29).

Thus, it is a matter of “deciphering” or “reading” the clues of these two theories. It is, as Moscovici (2003, p. 16) would say, making “bread available to the intellect.” In other words, it would be trying to build, as Bourdieu says (1998b, p. 55), a “space of interaction,” which, to him, is “the place where the intersection between the different fields is updated.”

We understand, here, that one of these fields may be that of education, and, above all, of teacher training, which intertwines with the others, and which,

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like the others, results from “objective relationships,” which are “symbolic relationships of force that manifest themselves in the form of rhetorical strategies” (BOURDIEU, 1998b, pp. 56-57).

In this perspective, this study seeks, first, to present a brief systematization of the principles and founding concepts of the theory of action, in Bourdieu (1997, 1998a, 1998b), to then identify a few central elements of the theory of social representations (TRS), in Moscovici (1961, 1978, 2012), to weave a few approximations/relationships between them, addressing the contribution these theories have made to teacher education.

## 1. PRINCIPLES AND NOTIONS IN BOURDIEU

To rethink the field of education and, in particular, that of teacher training, we consider the structuring principles/notions of Bourdieu’s philosophy of action (1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1998a, 1998b), selecting those that allow us to gain a better understanding of this conception matrix: The *objective structures* (of the social fields) and the *built-in structures* (of the *habitus*).

In this sense, we consider it necessary to raise a few points that we believe to be essential: 1<sup>st</sup> this author rejects (MICELI apud BOURDIEU, 1998a, p. XL) the theory of action “as a mere execution of the model (in the double sense of norm and of scientific construction)”; 2<sup>nd</sup> there is, then, Bourdieu’s effort to think about the *practice*, which results from the “dialectical relationship between a structure – through *habitus as modus operandi* – and a conjuncture understood as the conditions for updating this *habitus* and that it is nothing more than a particular state of the structure” (p. XL); 3<sup>rd</sup> Bourdieu (1998b) also begins from the need to construct the object, and, for that, he highlights that “it is necessary to question pre-constructed objects” (p. 21), which is, above all, to “break away from common sense” (p. 34); 4<sup>th</sup> he also emphasizes that it is “necessary to think relationally” (p. 28), and, in this sense, creates a “relational analysis” (p. 29), and 5<sup>th</sup>, he points to the need to “understand the social genesis of a field and to apprehend what makes the specific need of the belief that sustains it, of the language game that is played in it...” (p. 69). To bring clarity to these statements, we highlight, below, a few Bourdieusian principles and notions/concepts. A fundamental principle of the philosophy/theory of action, in Bourdieu (1997, 1998b), is the *principle of*

*relationship*. According to him (1998b, p. 31), what is “real is relational,” and it is necessary “to think relationally” (p. 28). And that means thinking about a social space in which agents or groups are distributed according to their position, formed by objective structures, which the author calls *social fields* and embedded structures, i.e., the *habitus*. To him, the most global social space is considered a *field*. Also called the *field of forces* or field of power struggles, “[...] within which agents face each other, with different means and ends according to their position in the structure of the field of forces, to conserve or transform it” (BOURDIEU, 1997, p. 50). The *principle of relationship*, explains Bourdieu (1997, p.18), is the first condition for an adequate reading of the analysis of the *relationship* between social positions (relational concept), dispositions (or *habitus*), and the taking of positions, that is, the “choices” that social agents make in the most different domains of practice.

We also highlight another principle, that of *difference or differentiation*, which completes the meaning of the relational principle to the extent that it is registered in the very structure of social space. According to Bourdieu (1997, p.19), there are two related principles of differentiation in societies: *Economic capital* and *cultural capital*. To clarify, he illustrates using the following example: Teachers, who are relatively richer in cultural capital than in financial capital, are opposed to entrepreneurs, who are relatively richer in economic capital than in cultural capital. In the name of this distinction, there is a more generic expression that the author calls *symbolic capital*. To him (1998b, p. 145), symbolic capital “is nothing other than capital, whatever it may be, when perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception resulting from the incorporation of the structure of its distribution, that is, when known and recognized as something obvious.”

It is clear that agents hold specific powers based on the capital they assume and in proportion to the recognition of the group to which they belong (BOURDIEU, 1998b, p. 145) since what is at stake is the power to impose a vision of the world. As for the *principles of vision, division, and identity*, Bourdieu (1998b, p. 113) highlights that the struggle for identity involves “the power to impose a vision of the social world through the principles of *division* which, when imposed on the group as a whole, bring about the meaning and consensus on meaning and, in particular, on the identity and unity of the group.”

Also, together with the author, it is necessary to understand the specific logic of the practices: The *principle of reality*. This principle guides the relationship between the agents’ positions and dispositions, translated, by Bourdieu (1997, p. 208), as the *principle of disposition or habitus*, which “guides action in the manner of a logical necessity.” Therefore, it is through the agents’ personalities that potentialities, registered in

the positions, are realized. The confrontation between *positions* and *provisions*, between the effort to build the “post” and the need to get used to the “post” (BOURDIEU, 1996a, p. 303), and the resulting *position taken* vivify the principle of reality. To think about this principle is also to reflect on two others: *relevance* and *historical action*.

The *principle of relevance* or of *belonging* to reality, allows us to position ourselves in a given field, to constitute it, thus occupying a place in the structure of distribution of specific symbolic capital and having some autonomy to make a few decisions.

Belonging to a group is to incarnate a little of the social world, the fruit of historical movement. Therefore, this is the *principle of historical action*. As Bourdieu (1994, p. 40- 41) says, “it resides neither in consciousness nor in things, rather in the relationship between two states of social, i.e., between History objectified in things, in the form of institutions, and History embodied in bodies, in the form of these systems of durable dispositions,” which he calls “habit.” In other words, “the body is inside the social world, but the social world is inside the body” (p. 41).

Indeed, the principles set out here – *relational, difference, vision and division, disposition, reality, relevance, and historical action* –, didactically linked, had the intention, although incipient, to think about the theory/philosophy of action proposed by Bourdieu (1997, 1998a, 1998b). To us, the question of principles underlies a possible consensus about the meaning of the world. More than that: It opens up a space “of what is possible, conceivable, within the limits of a certain field” (BOURDIEU, 1996a, p. 267).

There is no doubt, however, that when delineating this space of possibilities about the issue of principles, we are convinced that it is the *principle of alchemy* that stands out because, as the author reveals to us (1997, p. 89), it is “the one who transforms the appetite for recognition into an interest in knowledge.” It gives meaning to the production of belief and symbolic power in the conception of specific fields. However, to better understand this space of relationships, characterized by these structuring principles, we consider it necessary to make an incursion into some of Bourdieu’s (1997) notions, taking them as “an instrument of rupture with an enchanted and mystifying vision of human conduct” (p. 137).

Among the *notions*, we emphasize that three of them are considered fundamental to Bourdieu (1998b, p. 23-34) and underlie, as mentioned, “thinking relationally.” As this author (1997, p. 10) reveals, his philosophy, sometimes called *dispositional*, is “condensed into a small number of fundamental concepts – *habitus*, field, capital – and it has as its central point the two-way relationship between the objective structures (of the social fields) and the incorporated structures (of the *habitus*).”

Reinforcing what has already been written, habitus would be, according to Bourdieu (1998a, p. 349), a “system of internalized schemes that allow engendering all thoughts, perceptions, and actions characterized by a culture” (p. 349). To this author, *habitus* also means “generating and unifying principle” (BOURDIEU, 1997, p. 21-22).

*Field* can be described as a global social space, “that is, at the same time, as a field of forces, whose necessity is imposed on the agents who are involved in it, and as a field of struggle, within which the agents face each other, with different means and ends according to their position in the structure of the force field, thus contributing to the conservation or transformation of its structure” (BOURDIEU, 1997, p. 50). To Bourdieu (1997), the notion of *capital*, whether economic, cultural, educational, or social, reinforces the principle of difference or differentiation, as already mentioned. Also, the author draws attention to *symbolic capital*, stating that it is any type of capital and is “perceived according to the categories of perception, the principles of vision and division, the classification systems, the classificatory schemes, the cognitive schemes, which are, in part, the product of the incorporation of the objective structures of the considered field, that is, of the capital distribution structure in the considered field” (p. 149).

In addition to this conceptual triad, Bourdieu develops several notions, among which we have selected a few, starting with the idea of *interest*. According to the author (1997), there is always a reason for agents to do what they do, “a reason one has to discover to turn a series of apparently incoherent, arbitrary behaviors into a coherent series...” (p. 138). In this regard, agents do not perform impersonal, disinterested acts.

The idea of interest is opposed to that of disinterest, and to that of indifference. It is being involved, being stuck in the game. It is having the illusion of playing. That is, the notion of *illusion* (*illusio*), “a Latin word that comes from the root *ludus* (game)” (p. 139), reinforces the sense of interest as a social game, perceived by those involved, those who “are in it.” It should also be mentioned that the notion of interest has two other dimensions: That of *investment*, in the psychoanalytic and economic sense, and that of *libido*, which turns drives into specific, socially constituted interests, as stated by Bourdieu (1997).

Another concept that arises from interest is the notion of *interaction*. According to the author (1998b, p. 55), *interaction* can be understood as the visible and purely phenomenal result of the intersection between agents in the struggle to make their view of the world and the relationship of forces of their respective positions recognized. According to Bourdieu (1998b, p.

55), the space of *interaction* functions as a “linguistic market situation,” which: 1<sup>st</sup> is a pre-built space, as the group’s constitution is already determined; 2<sup>nd</sup> has group formation laws, defining who is excluded and those who exclude themselves; 3<sup>rd</sup> in it, it is possible to exercise (or not) a form of domination over a game space, imposing norms of “objectivity” and “neutrality,” and 4<sup>th</sup> is the place where the intersection between the different fields is updated (depending on the degree of belonging).

It is also essential to revisit the idea of *difference*, which is the base of the principle of differentiation. According to Bourdieu (1998b, p. 98), “differences in attitudes and differences in position [...] are at the origin of differences in perception and appreciation and, therefore, of genuine divisions.” *Difference* allows us to understand the social space, in itself a structure of differences, of a “distribution of forms of power” (BOURDIEU, 1997, p. 50).

Another idea that is linked to the others is that of *strategy*. The author sees it as a practical action inspired by stimuli of a particular historical situation. *Strategy* also involves a “bet (in the sense of committing oneself)” (BOURDIEU, 2002, p. 196); that is, risk in the game of life. At the same time, “it aims to limit the insecurity that correlates with unpredictability” (p. 197).

Finally, a broader concept is that of *representation*, which includes the previous and other notions related to the complex system of symbolic and non-symbolic relationships that permeate the conditions of material existence. As Bourdieu (1998b, p. 129) emphasizes, it is necessary to recognize the “contribution given to the construction of that which is real by the representation that agents have of what is real, and also to understand the real contribution that the collective transformation of collective representation makes to the transformation of reality.” From this perspective, reality is, first, *representation*, and “depends very deeply on the knowledge and recognition” (p. 108) that one has on the organization of the symbolic field.

We chose these notions to operate our hypotheses concerning what was possible to systematize regarding the principles/notions of Bourdieu’s philosophy/theory of action (1997, 1998a, 1998b) so that it is possible to identify a few structuring structures - *spaces of the possibilities* (BOURDIEU, 1997). In this sense, the questions that arise are: To what extent does this philosophy/theory contribute to reflecting on the field of teacher training? Given that, what could be the possible relationships between Bourdieu’s theory of action (1997, 1998a, 1998b) and his relational analysis and Moscovici’s (1978) theory of social representations and his dimensional analysis whose elements we will present below?

## II. CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF MOSCOVICI'S THEORY

To Moscovici (1978, p. 26), "social representation is a particular type of knowledge whose function is building behaviors and communication between individuals." Given this, and as we did about the Bourdieusian theory, we seek to point out a few of the founding points of the theory of social representations so, at a later time, we can reflect on the relations/approximations between these two authors and highlight to what extent they contribute to fostering discussions on the field of education and teacher training.

We believe it necessary, therefore, to highlight that Moscovici (1978): 1<sup>st</sup> considers that representations "have a constitutive function of reality" (p. 26) and that "a social representation is, alternatively, the sign and reproduction of a socially valued object" (p. 27); 2<sup>nd</sup> recognizes the existence of social representations as a characteristic form of knowledge, that is, "as one of the ways of apprehending the concrete world, circumscribed in its foundations and consequences" (p. 44); 3<sup>rd</sup> thus, he highlights the "symbolic function" and the "power of construction of the real" of social representations (p. 14); and 4<sup>th</sup> he also formulates the "hypothesis that each universe has three dimensions: Attitude, information, and the field of representation or image" (p. 67). To us, such concepts and dimensions will theoretically support his "dimensional analysis."

Therefore, starting from the notion of *social representation*, it was also necessary to understand, according to Moscovici (1978), that representation maintains an opposition between two aspects: *Perception*, which implies the object's presence; and *concept*, its absence (p.57). To the author, it is a logical construction, in which the structure of representation "unfolds" and "has two sides as inseparable as the front and back of a sheet of paper: The figurative face and the symbolic face" (p.65). And, "on this basis, a kind of genetic development was described that goes from the perceived to the conceived, passing through the represented" (p. 65).

Faced with these questions proposed by Moscovici (1978), we consider it necessary to expose the "map of social relationships and interests" (MOSCOVICI, 1978, p.27) and to understand the processes at stake, which have the following function: "[...] to duplicate a meaning by a figure, therefore, objectify, on the one hand [...] - and a figure by a sense, so, *consolidate* on the other [...] - the materials that go into the composition of a given representation" (p. 65). In other words, Moscovici (1978, p. 110) thus considers that there are "two fundamental processes: Objectification and anchoring," and he explains that the objectification process takes place in three

moments: Selective construction, schematization, and naturalization.

*Selective construction* is when information, beliefs, and ideas about the object of representation undergo a process of selection and decontextualization. The second moment is called *schematization*, or better, *structuring schematization*. The third is *naturalization*. Now, it is a matter of understanding how these concepts "retained in the figurative scheme and the respective relationships" constitute themselves as natural categories and gain materiality (MOSCOVICI, 1978, p. 467).

A second category of processes associated with the formation of representation is, according to Moscovici (1978), *anchoring*, which occurs when the "lag between the mass of words that circulate and the objects that accompany them is reduced... (this has to do with coupling the word to the thing)" (p.112). Anchoring takes place when the unfamiliar becomes familiar, when it becomes an organizer of social relations, also stating that anchoring, as a process that follows objectification, refers to the social function of representations and their social effectiveness. In sum: Moscovici (1978, p. 174) emphasizes, in a word, that "objectification transfers science to the domain of being, and mooring (or anchoring) delimits it to the domain of doing to circumvent the barring of communication."

We also seek to understand that these "senses," constituted by "universes of opinion," as Moscovici (1978, p. 67) would say, could be taking on the same three dimensions he described: Attitude, information, and the field of representation or the image.

To the author, attitude is the most lasting dimension in representations. It presented itself as a previous evaluative dimension, that is, preceding the other two. It is a structured dimension relative to the object, which integrates the affective and emotional levels of the subject. Information concerns the subject's knowledge about the represented object. It varies based on the social group and the means of access to reach it. This dimension reminds us of the quality and quantity of information the subjects possess and of its characteristics. And the field of representation or image constitutes the hierarchical organization of the elements that make up the social representation. In this dimension, social coordinates, space, and time are integrated; in short, all ingredients needed to contextualize the represented object.

Thus, social factors form representations. In this sense, Moscovici (1961) states that, to understand the evolution, the organization of the content, and the extent of a social representation, one must: 1<sup>st</sup> perceive it as an element of the social dynamics "determined by the structure of the society in which it develops" (1961, p. 337); 2<sup>nd</sup> consider that the social structure includes

cleavages, differentiations, relations of domination, which will be reflected in the construction of different social representations of the same object; 3<sup>rd</sup> consider that differences in the social field are registered at two levels: a) the level of socioeconomic conditions, and b) the level of guidance systems, which include more persistent norms and values, as well as specific attitudes, motivations, and should not be reduced to the former or considered independent of it.

It is also essential to consider what Moscovici (1961) considered relative to the three conditions that affect the emergence of social representation: a) the dispersion of information, which leads us to a lag in available quantitative and qualitative data, and the information that is necessary for understanding the object to be analyzed; b) focus, which is one of the conditions for quality analysis to be carried out, and depends on the involvement of the subjects, on the resources to be used, and on either professional or ideological interests, and c) the pressure for inference, which is materialized by the need for action, for taking a position to get recognition or adhesion from others.

As we have seen, social representations, for being multidimensional, have a diversity of functions. As systems of interpretation, they guide the individual's relationship with the world and with other subjects, organizing, as we have already mentioned, communicative behaviors and interactions. From this perspective, social representations take on four functions, according to Moscovici (1961): 1<sup>st</sup> *significant organization of the real*: This is the function that gives meaning to objects and social events, contributing to making the interpretation system more perceptible and coherent; 2<sup>nd</sup> *organization and orientation of behaviors*: As we know, most of the individual's behaviors are conditioned and guided by their representations; 3<sup>rd</sup> *Communication*: Social representations are essential in the interaction and communication processes among individuals and groups, and communication acts constitute not only acts of sharing consensus, but also of discussion and argumentation and refer to the genesis of representations, and 4<sup>th</sup> *social differentiation*: Social representations also intervene for the social differentiation of interacting groups.

Thus, we focus on the “degree of coherence” of the information, the field of representation, and on attitude, according to Moscovici (2012, p. 69), also considering that: “[...] we inform ourselves and represent something only after having taken a position, and according to that position.” And this led us to consider the thought of Bourdieu (1997, p. 82), when he states that “the meaning of the movements that take subjects from one position to another [...] is defined in the objective relationship between the meaning of these positions at the moment considered within an oriented space.”

### III. CLUES TO PROBLEMATIZE THE FIELD OF TEACHER TRAINING

The task ahead of us now is to identify *clues* in the Bourdieusian and Moscovician theories that, in addition to drawing them together, can effectively problematize a few of the elements presented above. But the logic here is to prepare, as Moscovici (1978, p. 28) would say, “an organized *corpus* of knowledge” and to release the “powers” of “imagination.” Or, as Bourdieu (1997, p. 202) would say, begin from a “fundamental epistemological question mark, because it is directed to the epistemic posture itself.” In this sense, we decided to distinguish three clues that offer us a *space of possibilities*, as Bourdieu (1997, p. 72) would say, so we can reflect on the field of teacher education.

#### a) *Assume either a position or an attitude based on intentions*

Where do Bourdieu and Moscovici begin? We would say that there is an approximation in the *intentions* of each of the proposed theories. For example, Moscovici (2011, p. 557) makes this clear when he states that both psychology and sociology “[...] have as their main basis and procedures to naturalize the original sin in the modern world, showing that nothing happens in it innocently and without *intention*, often an intention to harm” (emphasis added).

On this *intentional* plane, the two authors indicate where they start. Bourdieu (1997, p. 27) begins from the *social space*, which, according to him, “is the first and last reality because it commands even the representations that social agents may have of it.” He explains that this social space encompasses us as a “point,” which is a “point of view, the principle of an assumed vision” (p. 27). This indicates a “perspective defined in its form and content by the objective position from which it is assumed” (p. 27). Moscovici (2012, p. 71), in turn, also proposes to qualify a social representation not based on the agent that produces it, as he emphasizes that “knowing *who* produces these systems is less instructive than knowing *why* they are produced” (MOSCOVICI, 1978, p. 76, emphasis added). On this path, he seeks to reflect on “the knowledge that individuals and groups have and use about society, others, the world, and also the specific organization of this knowledge” (p. 80-81).

Thus, we can observe a certain approximation in the *intentions* and their forwarding, as both turn to the social space, considering the position and assuming a position of the agents/actors in the world; however, without neglecting the social structure, which includes relations of domination, differences in socioeconomic conditions, in the guidance system (norms and values), and in attitudes, as both authors emphasize.

This *first* relationship between the two theories leads us to bring up a few aspects (other clues) to think about teacher training, based on the premises that:

1<sup>st</sup> Every activity the teacher conducts either in the classroom or in other moments of reflection on their training and teaching profession is based on an *intentionality* that has already been outlined through their training, professional experience or their social representations about these issues. According to Bourdieu (1996a, p. 267), this intentionality then opens a space “of what is possible, conceivable, within the limits of a certain field”;

2<sup>nd</sup> The teacher has information, beliefs, and practices, and, as Moscovici (1978) points out, assumes social representations about the field of his or her education/profession that are revealed through a particular “doctrine,” which we call “theories,” and which guide and try to “facilitate” the “task of deciphering, predicting, or anticipating their acts” (p. 27);

3<sup>rd</sup> In the field of teacher training, one cannot, however, consider that everything is resolved with “good intentions,” even more so at the personal level. We believe that it is necessary to put these intentions at the service of more collective work projects, “toward safer, more established possibilities, or toward the most original possibilities among those that are already socially constituted, or even possibilities created from nothing” (BOURDIEU, 1997, p. 63).

To us, then, the *space of possibilities* takes place, first, by taking on a position and/or attitude from the moment we intend to follow a certain path, and when we become aware of the necessary ruptures so that the actions that are conducted can have sense/meaning. Even more, when in these difficult times, still in a context of a pandemic and unstable political and social movements, we need to consider relationships of uncertainty and exclusion, which plagues us, but which also makes us reflect on which strategies to use to overcome these educational challenges (ABDALLA, 2021).

In addition to the aspects developed here, it is also necessary to think about the meaning of the teachers’ actions relative to the intentions they propose to their students in training. To us, this implies understanding the second clue to follow.

b) *Make the relationship between theory and practice a construction of sense/meaning*

The *second* relationship between these two authors certainly has to do with the task with which they explain their respective theories, indicating the paths of research and proposing a systematization for the analysis, whether it be *relational*, as shown by Bourdieu (1997, 1998b), or *dimensional*, in the case of Moscovici (1961, 1978). This also helped us to think

relationally/dimensionally, trying to decipher the clues offered by these two authors in the pursuit of “building a coherent system of *relations* (emphasis added), which must be put to the test as such,” as announced by Bourdieu (1998b, p. 32).

In this sense, we put a set of principles and notions to the test in Bourdieu, which contributed to thinking about the need to understand the principles that generate and unify a system of relationships, which takes place, as shown by Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron (1999, p. 72), in “satisfaction with the demands of rigor in the order of proof and of fecundity in the order of invention, these being, in fact, characteristics that define a theoretical construction.”

Meanwhile, it was possible to reflect on what Moscovici (2012) suggests when he discusses the need for a theoretical examination of social representation to “distinguish two of its essential aspects: The description of the formation processes and the cognitive system that is proper to it” (MOSCOVICI, 1978, p. 288). We seek, therefore, to describe the processes that form social representations - *objectification and anchoring* – and announce a network of meanings around the theory of social representations, emphasizing the concept of *social representation*. This allowed us to understand the words of this author when he says that *social representation* (289).

In this perspective, the two authors come together once again. They agree that this whole system of relationships and interpretation penetrates and impregnates the “social representation of a scientific theory” (MOSCOVICI, 1978, p. 290).

Given this “theoretical conversion made possible by theoretical reflection on the theoretical point of view and the practical point of view,” according to Bourdieu (1997, p. 205-207), because of the “practical research operations” (p. 206) and, in particular, the “orientation of change” (p. 63) in the “field of possibilities” (p. 64). We thus establish a “map of relationships,” revealing a more or less structured network of meanings, but one that, above all, allows for structuring possibilities. This involves reflecting on theoretical-methodological transpositions, new placements/displacements: The transformation of the *habitus*, in the words of Bourdieu (1997, 1998b), or the understanding of a *cognitive polyphasia*, in Moscovici’s terms (1978, 2012).

These theoretical-practical relationships between these two authors also give us other clues that make us think about the coordination of theory and practice in construction of sense/meaning, as we understand that:

1<sup>st</sup> There is, according to Moscovici (1978, p. 290), a “partially automatic system of interpretation and, therefore, an integral part of real and symbolic behavior.”



2nd The teacher would need to take a position on this system, and when entering this game, as Bourdieu (1997, p. 64-65) would say, “he tacitly accepts the limitations and possibilities inherent to the game, which present themselves to him and to all those who perceive this game as ‘things to do,’ ways to create, ways to invent, in short, as possibilities endowed with a greater or lesser ‘aspiration to exist’.”

3rd It is necessary to determine that the relationship between theory and practice, and often the mismatch either between theory and practice or between theorists (those who think about education) and practitioners (those who carry it out), do not depend only on understanding the system/school/classroom to which the teacher is connected, instead that there is an entire context that involves other issues.

4th Also consider that other aspects need to be considered; because, in addition to the relationship between theory and practice, there must be, according to Abdalla (2017, p. 188), “[...] changes in working and remuneration conditions.” These conditions often threaten teachers “[...] to lose their values and the meaning of their goals as teaching professionals” (ABDALLA, 2017, p. 189).

Indeed, in this regard, it is more than urgent to also reflect on the relationships between language, thought, and communication to understand how the interactive processes take place in the formation of new representations, which can lead to a “psychosocial approach to education as an epistemological stance” (ABDALLA; VILLAS BÔAS, 2018, p. 18-24), and, thus, to a social change.

c) *Establish a relationship between language, thought, and communication*

A *third* approach involves how these two authors explore the relationship between language, thought, and communication to form representations. In Bourdieu (1998b, p. 55), we locate the notions of *interest* and *interaction*, which condition spaces of communication and the “strength of representation” to the extent to which they function as linguistic market situations and which allow (or not) one to either make effective or update the degree of belonging of the subjects involved. In other words, in a situation of linguistic exchanges, on the one hand, there are the dispositions of the subject that speaks (linguistic *habitus*) and “which imply a certain propensity to speak and say certain things (expressive *interest*),” and on the other hand, “the structures of the linguistic market that impose themselves as a system of specific sanctions and censorship” (BOURDIEU, 1996b, p. 24).

What Bourdieu (1996b) highlights, and seems fundamental to us, is that “one must not forget that linguistic exchanges – communication relations par

excellence – are also symbolic power relations where the relations of strength between the speakers or their respective groups are updated” (p. 23-24).

In this sense, there are several points in common with Moscovici (1978, p. 234) since this author also understands the extent to which language contributes as a “means of building a representation of reality” (p. 241). As he says: “Word games are part of our most tenacious habits” and “their consequences should not be underestimated” (p. 241). Moscovici (1978, p. 241-242) also emphasizes that “language is the mediator par excellence, the most important and most precise instrument for attaining and constructing a true world of objects.”

To these authors, representations are part of the processes of interaction and communication between individuals and groups. They collaborate with the process of forming social representations, as they constitute acts either of sharing consensus or conflicts and enable the genesis and dynamics of the groups involved.

In this line of thought, Bourdieu (1998b, p. 118) would say it is possible “to grasp, at the same time, what is instituted, without forgetting that it is only the result, at a given moment, of the struggle to make exist or *not exist* what exists.” Therefore, the author understands that the *representations* are “performative enunciations” that enunciate and give back “[...] at the same time, the objective structures, and the relationships to these structures, beginning with the intention of transforming them” (BOURDIEU, 1998b, p. 118).

We understand that these theories’ most significant contribution to teacher training has to do, above all, with the construction of critical social thinking that makes it possible to understand and problematize:

1<sup>st</sup> The meaning of symbolic power, in Bourdieu (1998b), is to understand the social space – *field of forces and struggles* – in which the teacher exists because we know that it is this symbolic power (strength of representation) that makes them learn to know their professional reality.

2<sup>nd</sup> The phenomenon of social representations, as Moscovici (1978) teaches us, because social representations not only make us understand the world but also guide us within it, giving dimensions to our attitudes, information, and the field of representations and images, affecting behaviors and the communications that are established in the field of education.

3<sup>rd</sup> The possibility of recovering the meaning of training as transformation and of endowing the social representations of subjects with meaning/intention, as Bourdieu would say (1997, p. 63): “Toward possibilities that need to be created from nothing.”



#### IV. CONCLUSION

By outlining a map of relations between Bourdieu and Moscovici, the text systematized principles and concepts of their respective theories, seeking contributions to education, especially teacher training. In this perspective, clues were identified, which include the need for the teacher to take either a position or attitude based on their intentions, to make the relationship between theory and practice construction of sense/meaning, and to establish a relationship between language, thought, and communication. Such clues can also help us to rethink the collective struggle of teachers when they come up against contradictions and disillusionments. And this reminds us of the words of Moscovici (1978, p. 62) when he teaches us that: "It is only in this condition that the mental and real-world always becomes another and remains somewhat the same: The uncanny penetrates the gap of the familiar, and the familiar opens cracks in the uncanny."

Thus, socially constructed possibilities are guided, Bourdieu (1997) says, in a movement between the real and the mental world, permeated by complex relationships between objective structures and subjective constructions. To us, these *possibilities* should undoubtedly go through 1<sup>st</sup> The establishment of policies that can effectively contribute to the training and professional development of teachers in search of an education that is more democratic and has more social quality; 2<sup>nd</sup> The rupture with the task of managing educational reforms from the outside in, and from top to bottom, far from the reality of the schools and of the actors that work in them, and 3<sup>rd</sup> The promotion of material and working conditions in higher institutions and school units, increasing resources and means that can ensure training and professional performance of sense and meaning for all those involved.

Finally, we consider that understanding the principles and concepts of the theories addressed to rethink teacher education also becomes a space of possibilities, in order to defend a professional project that gives support to reflections and collective discussions in the whole of educational practices. And these practices must be committed to a fairer, more democratic, and more humane education because this is our struggle as educators!

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