

1 The Relation among Paradigms and Psychoanalytical Clinics:
2 Narcissism and Death Drive as Main Operators in
3 Psychoanalytical Psychopathology By Sissi Vigil Castiel

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7 **Abstract**

8 From the concept of paradigm and the paradigm of hyper complexity itself, the present paper
9 seeks to find within the notions of narcissism and of death drive, both theoretical and
10 technical elements that may assist in the understanding and in the clinics of non neurosis.

12 **1 Introduction**

13 Considering the contemporary subjectivities in which we perceive the mark of destructiveness, of cruelty, of psychic
14 pain, of anxiety and melancholy, psychoanalysis fits with theoretical and technical propositions in its abilities to
15 listen and to treat pathologies that present such marks. To address the psychoanalytical understanding of these
16 frameworks and their clinical model, I intend to make use of the concept of paradigm and of the hyper complex
17 thought of Edgard Morin in order to, later on, take psychoanalytical conceptual elements that would allow the
18 understanding of these pathologies to be expanded.

19 As regards to the first question, Paradigm is a concept by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific
20 Revolutions ??2003). For the author the sciences evolve through paradigms. The latter is defined to be a model
21 for solving problems related to the field of action of a science that shall function as a problem-solver of certain
22 types through these models of solutions that constitute the paradigms. It is attained by these exemplary cases
23 that allow generalizations. A new paradigm is formed when there is an epistemological break in a preexisting
24 level, where there is a break with the hitherto prevailing to a new way of looking at certain problem. Thus, in
25 Physics, along the time, different paradigms exist, the geocentric theory of Ptolemy, subsequently the heliocentric
26 theory of Copernicus, and so on.

27 The work of Kuhn made it possible to differentiate sciences and their theoretical objects, and also functions as
28 an answer to the matter of scientific character of the unnatural sciences. Hence, my reading is that psychoanalysis,
29 as an unnatural science, has its theoretical object on the concept of the unconscious. However, before that same
30 theoretical object, the various facets with which the pathologies present themselves put the need of distinct
31 clinical models and meta psychological formulations, forming different paradigms.

32 Joel Birman (2014) speaks of the different paradigms in psychoanalysis, saying that these were forged on
33 the basis of successive historical periods which enabled the emergence of different forms of subjectivities that
34 propitiate the identification of different paradigms in Freud.

35 Thus, the author affirms that the concepts of hysteria and neurosis, as well as those of the first topic and the
36 first instinctual duality, all belong to a first Freudian model -that of the repression of sexualityand that they also
37 allow to outline the technique centered on neurosis. On the other hand, the concept of narcissism, death drive,
38 the second topic and the second instinctual duality all together belong to another historical moment -that of
39 violence and cruelty -and now these concepts allow a glimpse at melancholic and psychotic subjectivities.

40 I find myself totally on common ground with Birman's postulations. I would add on that this first model is
41 based on the case studies of Dora, Little Hans and The Rat Man, which all make part of this same historical,

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45 theoretical and technical moment. Whereas the second model finds its anchors on the case stories of Schreber
46 and The Wolf Man (Castiel, 2012a).

47 In that sense, Birman (2014) affirms that the post-Freudian authors, in among which he highlights Melanie
48 Klein, Lacan and Winnicott, all belong to a different historical moment than that of the repression of sexuality,
49 but a moment that is actually related to violence and cruelty. Thus, their research lines are grounded on psychosis.
50 Melanie Klein takes the paranoid-schizoid position as a model whereas Lacan holds up paranoia as his model. In
51 addition I would note that, more recently, Andre Green dedicated his work to theoretical and clinical models for
52 borderline states as well as for non neurosis.

53 Nowadays the subjectivities also emerge from a scenario of violence, cruelty and helplessness. So the existence
54 of these different paradigms make us think that psychoanalysis finds the theoretical elements that allow us to
55 propose theoretical and technical tools to manage the non neurosis, borderline states and pathologies of narcissism
56 on Freud's second model, as well as on its contemporary authors. In face of such situations some questions arise:
57 to which clinical model do these frameworks respond? What weight does a history of mistreatment, abandonment,
58 with regard to healing have? Which paradigm does give account of the theoretical and technical elements facing
59 these situations?

60 First of all, these considerations take us to the paradigm of hyper complexity of Edgard Morin (1996). To
61 the author, there are complex systems that have a measurable number of components, function with a linear
62 causality and do not receive help or modification from another system as the time goes by, and so tend to entropy.

63 On the other hand, the hyper complex system has a number of measurable components only by order
64 of magnitude or whose number of components establishes a number of relations that cannot be measurable.
65 Therefore, the components of the system necessarily product errors, work with the errors, despite the error and
66 from the error. The perspective of growth occurs according to the reuse of that, in order to produce a reordering
67 system. The hyper complex systems with multiple paradigms coexist and have indeterminacy as causality.

68 Considering the subject of the analysis from the hyper complex point of view, in which there is indeterminacy,
69 and there is not linearity and determination, lead us to think about the roll that the history of the patient plays
70 inside the analytical experience. Luis Hornstein (2000) has been dedicated to these matters, which I am totally
71 in agreement with. The history of the subject seen from the point of view of indeterminacy means that his/her
72 experiences are not a destiny, as new encounters may enable reorganizations of him/herself. Among these new
73 encounters there is the analyst, which also means that there is not only one interpretation of the history, all
74 ready, to be communicated by her/him to the patient. It is about sharing the history in the analysis, through
75 transference, that takes the patient to new symbolization. In the words of Morin, it is possible to re ordinate the
76 system from the error.

77 In that way, it would be as the American historian Carl Shorske (200) has said that contemporary historians,
78 different to the others, should think with history and not about history. In psychoanalysis it is also needed to
79 think with the history of the patient that is shared in transference and that is not determined by it. To think
80 of the transforming ability that lay within encounters is to reflect about the status that is given to transference.
81 It is also to give the clinics its potential as a place to generate transformation of what is destructive within a
82 subject. Once released from determinism, theories make way to difference as a factor of creation or change.

83 From the perspectives of the hyper complexity and of the various splits which Freudian works of the second
84 topic offer us, along with post-Freudian concepts, we may think of theoretical concepts and clinical models that
85 will handle destructive aspects and frames of anxiety, as contemporary clinics confront us with graves neurosis,
86 rooted on narcissistic issues, borderline cases and melancholy. The psychoanalytical work with such cases put the
87 statements of meta psychology to judgment. We must rethink them, before the puzzles that the clinical practice
88 with these patients imposes us, in order to find ways towards some transformation.

89 The complete work of Freud is open to new readings that may reconfigure psychoanalytical theory and practice.
90 If I take the text On narcissism of 1914 as a starting point, my hypothesis is that there is a great possibility to
91 match the concepts of narcissism and those of death drive of 1919 for a light to be thrown upon the understanding
92 of depressions, melancholies and borderline cases. Those are frames that the subjects whose action, in the sense
93 of acting-out, is a mark of his/her condition of being. Such subjects have their discharge of excitement without
94 means of symbolization, and their behavior can be more or less self destructive. The expressions of destructiveness
95 appear as impasses in the analytical process and call us upon, as psychoanalysts, to take position before its baleful
96 effects. (Castiel, 2013) As I mentioned above, Freudian work On narcissism (1914) is a start for the comprehension
97 of pathologies beyond neurosis, considering the impossibility presented in such pathologies for the subject to come
98 out of a narcissistic condition and to invest in objects. Although Freud has not continued thinking specifically
99 about narcissism to write his later texts, the concept allows openings on the meta psychology and became the
100 model to many Post-Freudian elaborations. Lacan (1948Lacan (/1998) departs from narcissism and its relation
101 with the formation of the ego to support his conception of mirror stage. Green (1993b) questions narcissism
102 in relation to the drive and to the object. Moreover, he points out that although Freudian formulation about
103 melancholy could indicate the existing relation between the death drive and narcissism, that same relation is yet
104 to be discovered. That is so that the author postulates the existence of a negative narcissism, a death narcissism
105 that opposes itself to a positive one, a life narcissism. Green emphasizes the Freudian idea that the objective of
106 life drive is the objectalizing function, in the sense of connection, in the capability to invest new objects which may
107 promote drive satisfaction after the separation from the primary object. While the purpose of the death instinct

108 would be the deobjectalizing function that is characterized by disinvestment and deobjectalization. Freud (1914
109 postulates narcissism as the investment of the drives in the ego, and that that investment constitutes the ego. Such
110 investment happens before that the libidinal cathexis are channeled to objects and so it is overshadow during the
111 libidinal development. Subsequently pathological states would bespeak a narcissism that comes from the libidinal
112 cathexis withdrawals from the objects of the world. This would be a secondary narcissism superimposed upon a
113 primary one.

114 There are two Freudian statements that seem fundamental in the sense that they may be essential elements to
115 think of a paradigm that handles theoretical and technical proposals on melancholies, pathologies of narcissism,
116 etc. The first, at the end of the second part of the text, refers to the need of the subject to leave narcissism in
117 order not to become ill. Freud considers it to be necessary surpass the limits of narcissism -by attaching libido to
118 objects. The "dammed-up" libido in the ego might become pathogenic. As to the second affirmative, in the third
119 part of the writing, it is about the formation of an ideal as a conditioning factor to repression, considering that
120 the real ego, that is seen as the ideal for the subject in his/her childhood, will be substitute for ideals which will
121 become the milestone of the self-love. Therefore, what the subject projects before him/herself, as being his/her
122 ideal, is actually the lost narcissism of his/her childhood, when he/she was his/her own ideal. It can be noticed
123 that Freud states a difference on the treatment of the ideals: an initial moment, when the child is his/her own
124 ideal, and after the lost narcissism, when the ideals become milestones to be achieved by him/her. The possibility
125 to accede to the second position, called ego ideal, is given with the end of narcissism.

126 Freud also says that idealization occurs both in the sphere of ego libido as of the object libido. Therefore, this
127 Freudian idea allows us to suppose the ego as an object and as a result we can say that the idealization relates
128 to the field of narcissism. Moreover, the idealization relates to the cling of the libido to the object that is, in this
129 case, the own ego. So the reading I propose here about Freud's formulation is that this cling of libido to the ego,
130 which composes narcissism, also prevents the formation of an ego ideal, as far as this would be the substitute for
131 the lost narcissism. In the case of narcissism, the ego is the ideal itself. Thus the pathologies which are based on
132 narcissism, the ego is the ideal of the subject and its relationship with the objects occurs from the idealization,
133 as in the relationship between subject and object happens with the ego as the center, what the subject wants is
134 the recognition of the object. Therefore, the idealization of the self as an object occurs at the expense of other
135 objects.

136 My proposal is that these theoretical links that are made possible by the concept of narcissism could be
137 problematized and expanded, considering the opposition in Freud (1920) between Eros and the death drive.
138 Therefore I understand that it is from the relationship between narcissism and the death drive that one can get
139 to a understanding paradigm for subjectivities grounded on narcissism, as well as arrive at a clinical model to
140 work with them. In Freud (1920) Eros is compatible with the binding, ie, with the ability to invest. While in
141 the opposite way the death instinct is characterized by disinvestment, by unbinding. The disinvestment implies
142 increasing destructiveness, in which unbinding processes triumph over the generation of sources of pleasure or
143 over the development of creative potential (Castiel, 2012b).

144 All that is discussed more specifically, already taking the second topic into consideration, in The Ego and the
145 id. There Freud (1923) states that the two classes of instincts bond and fuse, so that the destructive impulse can
146 be neutralized, being diverted to the outside world through the muscular apparatus. Thus, the two classes of
147 instincts bond and function together or split up. The libido is a binding factor, a factor of instinctual fusion while
148 aggressiveness is a factor of drive defusion. The higher the prevalence of aggressiveness, the more instinctual
149 fusion tends to crumble. Conversely, the more the libido prevails the more the merger will take place. Therefore,
150 the postulation of the second drive theory and the idea of instinctual fusion-defusion allow thinking about the
151 combined operation of the sexual and death instincts, as they appear merged or diffused in the subject.

152 Therefore Freud (1923) believes that a neutral energy can be added to erotic or destructive impulses, defining
153 whether this increase of energy would lead to instinctual fusion or defusion. However, still within the context of
154 the fusion-defusion of instincts, there is in The Ego and the id (1923/1980) a Freud affirmative on the withdrawal
155 of object-cathexes characteristic of the death drive that appears to broaden the understanding of the destructive
156 phenomena. He says in the text:

157 "The transformation (erotic libido) in ego-libido naturally involves an abandonment of sexual aims, a
158 desexualization. Anyway, it sheds light on an important function of the ego in its relationship with Eros.
159 Thus taking over libido cathexis of the object, erecting in single love object and desexualizing or sublimating
160 the libido of the id, the ego is working in opposition to the goals of Eros and placing itself at service of opposing
161 instinctual impulses." (Freud, 1923 ??Freud, /1980, p. 61) , p. 61) I would highlight some issues of the Freudian
162 formulation: if the energy that serves both types of Volume XIV Issue VI Version I 15 (A)

163 drives is neutral, which will determine if it is sexual or death is the direction to the object or to the ego, ie,
164 a cathexis process becomes deadly because it disinvests the objects. These questions allow me to consider that
165 the instinctual defusion entails that the ego is transformed into a single love object -as Freud says -it relates
166 to narcissism, ie, the result of defusion is narcissism, destructiveness relates to narcissism. It is important to
167 note that it is the statement of Freud in The Ego and the id (1923) which allows me to assume a link between
168 narcissism and destructiveness, so between the death drive and narcissism. If the ego is the only object of love,
169 this happens due to a disinvestment of objects. And therefore, the subject is destructive to him/herself according
170 to the disinvestment of objects, and also to the narcissistic position that such disinvestment entails.

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171 And finally, this postulation of Freud brings technical implications for a clinical model able to cope with the
172 restlessness that is placed by subjectivities which present the disinvestment of objects and destructiveness. As for
173 the transformation of the death drive depends on its merger with Eros, this means that there are possibilities
174 of transformation of what is destructive in a subject, insofar as possible to maximize the clinic as the place
175 capable of generating such transformation through the transference. (Castiel, 2007) This passage in Freud's text
176 provides elements for understanding the destructiveness, in that it poses as central aspects of destructiveness both
177 disinvestment and narcissism. Freud has not made this link, leaving us with the burden of working the condition
178 of openness and incompleteness, vital for the duration of his legacy. Indeed, the specificity of the relationship
179 between narcissism and destructiveness was crafted by leading authors of contemporary psychoanalysis. Among
180 them stands André Green (1993a) who shows that in extreme cases the dominant mechanism is the insurmountable
181 grief and the defensive reactions it raises as a result of a negative narcissism.

182 In this line of reasoning, Green (2010) raises the hypothesis of the role of destruction by disinvestment. The
183 author reports a negative narcissism, expression of the deobjectalizing function, which is the disinvestment that
184 undoes what the investment had managed to build. The negative narcissism is a kind of extreme measure which,
185 after having disinvested objects, carries itself on its own ego and disinvests it.

186 The deobjectalizing function cannot be confused with mourning, for it is opposed to the work of mourning.
187 Here, the relationship with the object is attacked and the ego is also attacked, in that it becomes the sole object
188 of investment since the unbinding of the objects. The formulation of Green is emphasized as far as it is possible
189 to find there support to understand the destructive actions as a result of the process of disinvesting within the
190 deobjectalizing function (Green, 2008).

191 On the other hand, the narcissistic position of the subject confirms a continuing disappointment in the
192 encounter with the other, increasing self-destructive actions. It is therefore also because of the disappointment of
193 the subject on what he/she expects from the object which leads him/her to disinvestment and self-destruction.
194 It is in this sense that ??acan (1953 ??acan (-54/1983), based on the importance of the mirror stage for the
195 constitution of subjectivity, and also considering that it is through mirroring oneself in relation to the other
196 that the subject acquires the image of him/herself, posits paranoia as a constituent element of subjectivity. I
197 understand that that is clear, because if the person depends on what the other says, it is obvious that he/she will
198 search on his/her look for approval or disapproval. Which brings us to the idea that these pathologies, where the
199 subject is wedded to narcissism (and thus disinvesting the object as such), there is a paranoid attitude toward
200 objects in the sense of expectation of the subject in reading attitudes of approval or disapproval coming from
201 them. Bearing in mind that the actions of the object are not always directed to the subject, the approval of the
202 object over the subject is always relative, and this may lead to resentment and anger and might also generate
203 disinvestment of the object, as in a vicious circle.

204 These considerations allow an ascertainment that is the relevance of the object to the psychic economy of the
205 subject. Such affirmation comes from a conception of destructiveness that contextualizes the intersubjective field
206 experiments together with their instinctual repercussions. Under such conditions the object occupies a position
207 of prominence in the life of the subject and there is an endless complaint about the objects. Therefore, the speech
208 is a complaining about the lack of recognition of the object over the subject. So there is an idealization of the
209 object, that is often magnified, not in the sense of exaltation, but in the sense of its power in relation to the
210 subject, which creates and increases anger and resentment felt for the subject towards the object.

211 Thus, having in mind pathologies grounded on narcissism and before the need for a paradigm that takes into
212 account the theoretical elements as operators that would extend the possibilities in the clinics, I understand that
213 the link between narcissism and the death drive seems essential. The contextualization of the self-destructive
214 actions and of the characteristic disinvestment of the death drive within a narcissistic perspective resizes clinical
215 practice in the sense that destructiveness may be analyzed from the disappointments with the objects and
216 subsequent narcissistic withdrawal. Likewise, it also opens up space for possibilities of instinctual fusion from the
217 place the analyst occupies in the transference. From a hyper Volume XIV Issue VI Version I 16 (A) complex
218 view of the subject traversed by indeterminacy, the encounter with the analyst is a possibility of transformation
219 of the death drive in Eros. Among the suffocation of the subject with respect to the objects, the analysis may
220 be an essential space for creation.

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