

1 Should Turkey Excluded from NATO or she Should Quit it Itself

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4

5 **Abstract**

6 Introduction -The humiliation targeted to the founder of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal
7 Atatürk, and the President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an portrayed as enemies of the alliance in the
8 NATO exercise ?Trident Javelin? held in Norway in November 2017, has created sound
9 indignation either within the public and mass media or government in Turkey.

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11 *Index terms—*

12 **1 Introduction**

13 he humiliation targeted to the founder of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the President Recep
14 Tayyip Erdo?an portrayed as enemies of the alliance in the NATO exercise "Trident Javelin" held in Norway
15 in November 2017, has created sound indignation either within the public and mass media or government in
16 Turkey. In the same token, it was opened a chat account under the name of Recep Tayyip Erdogan shown him
17 as a collaborator with a "leader of an enemy state" according to the scenario (AFP, 2017). Ultimately, Turkish
18 participants pulled out of the drill, and NATO Secretary-General immediately extended apologize to Ankara.
19 However, it created a great deal of disappointment all over Turkey against NATO solidarity. This event, probably,
20 would be registered in NATO history as a first scandal disquieting one of its member states.

21 Furthermore, this event reinitiated the discourse that Turkey should secede from the NATO or not. In this
22 context, the highest discourse that was given on twitter by the Nationalist Movement Party leader, Devlet Bahçeli
23 (Hurriyet, 2017) (tr. sputnik news, 2017). Yalcin Topcu, President Erdogan political adviser, also came up with
24 that Turkey should quit NATO claiming that "it had supported every military coup in Turkey and said it was
25 time to question Turkey's NATO membership" (Idiz, 2017) ??Aksam, 2017). President Erdogan assessed this
26 scandal as an "outward expression of a skewed attitude toward Turkey that we have been observing for some
27 time" (Idiz, 2017) ??NTV, 2017). But above all those statements, any official announcement from government
28 took place in the agenda even to imply of quitting NATO. Turkish high-level authorities in government seemed
29 to be very cautious on this highly sensitive issue not to give any leverage to those, some members alliance, that
30 has claimed that Turkey should be forced to leave NATO (Bandow, 2016).

31 On the other hand, some contradictory discourses have arisen by the western media, in the course that Turkey
32 adopted the presidential system saying that "Turkey has been moving toward the authoritarian one-party state
33 and Ankara undermines alliances' security then it is membership in NATO becomes more incompatible. A divorce
34 in civilized way would be best for all parties" (Bandow, 2016) (Griffiths, 2016).

35 The reason why that issue emerged between the USA and other NATO members in Europe and Turkey has
36 depended on firstly, the USA has experienced the problem which create the rifts between both countries. Secondly,
37 the problem of Ankara with the individual European countries, also NATO members, and Eastern Mediterranean
38 security crises between them.

39 The problem with the USA and Turkey has emerged within four-folds. One of them is the divergency on
40 Syrian issue to solve between the USA and Turkey. First, the decision of the USA to use PYD/YPG, which
41 Turkey considers as a terrorist organization affiliated with PKK, against the ISIS. This problem deteriorated
42 during the "Operation Euphrates Shield" undertaken right after the failed coup 2016 in al-Bab region/Syria.
43 At the beginning of 2018, Turkish Armed Forces began to operate "Olive Branch Operation" to prevent possible
44 emergence of a terrorist state on its borders, after that announcement that the USA plans to form a 30.000strong
45 Kurdish-led border security force in Syria, create anxiety within both countries (Akal, 2018). And since the
46 beginning of the conflict in Syria, two allies disagree on Iran to take place effectively in Syria. While Washington
47 was strictly against Iran involvement in Syria, in contrast, Ankara was less opposite to Iran since it has flourishing
48 trade relationship (Phillips, 2012).

3 DETERIORATING RIFTS BETWEEN

49 Another issue of strain is about Mr. Gulen, who lives in the US, is blamed by Ankara for July 15, 2016, failed
50 coup attempt. Ankara officially requested to hand over Mr. Gulen to Turkey, an idea that Washington dismissed
51 (Reuters, 2017).

52 The one other problematic field between two allied members is Reza Zarrab case. This case has strained
53 relations between Ankara and Washington.

54 There are one another event created trouble between NATO and Turkey is that Ankara's decision to buy
55 Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system, in favor of the American Patriot or Franco-Italian SAMP/T systems, because
56 western army suppliers had not offered either reasonable price alternative or transfer of know-how in line with
57 Turkey's desire. The Pentagon expressed its concern to Ankara about the deal (Dolan, 2017).

58 The Second issue that problems with European Union and European NATO members; In March 2017, Justice
59 and Development Party (JDP) members attempted to visit Germany and Nederland to make campaigns there
60 before a referendum on constitutional changes to expand presidential power blocked by two countries. Following
61 these reactions, JDP leaders accused Germany using Nazi application caused of undesirable rifts between two
62 states and Ankara (Smale, 2017). On the top of it, other crisis had emerged when soldiers, diplomats, judges
63 and other government officials living in Germany and at NATO facilities in Germany had requested to asylum in
64 Germany after facing persecution following the failed coup on July 15, 2016. Nevertheless, application for asylum
65 had been made by the Turkish government officials who worked all over the EU countries such as Belgium, Greece
66 (Deutsche Welle, 2017a). President Erdogan extended official requisition officially to extradite all asylum seekers
67 in a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. However, it was rejected due to that is not a political
68 decision but decision of The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Deutsche Welle, 2017b).

69 The last issue emerged as an Eastern Mediterranean security concerns of EU and Turkey since new natural gas
70 resources were exploded on the offshore of Israel, Southern Cyprus Government and Greece, and Turkey, would
71 be the center of crises for ongoing days.

72 All events we put on caused mutual lack of confidence between Turkey and the USA and western European
73 countries reflect automatically to NATO and its other alliances. Even though, as a higher authority, NATO
74 Deputy Secretary-General Rose Gottemoller has reaffirmed the alliance's commitment to Turkish security saying
75 that "NATO stands in solidarity with Turkey in the fight against terrorism" (Cebul, 2018), the question that
76 Turkey should leave NATO has been brought by the member states mass media such as the USA, Germany and,
77 Nederland. That means troubles between those countries and, Turkey has been reverberated by those western
78 countries to NATO (The Economist, 2018).

79 In this article, a study will be held to find answers two different but relevant questions. The first question
80 has two pillars, one is "Do western countries want that Turkey must secede from NATO" and the other is "Does
81 Ankara really eager to quit NATO". The second question is about NATO "as an organization does NATO
82 seriously contemplate leaving Turkey out of NATO".

83 2 II.

84 3 Deteriorating Rifts Between

85 Washington and Ankara a) Crises on the Syrian Civil War Turkey did not immediately react against the Syrian
86 crisis that broke out after 2011. At the first stage, Prime Minister Erdo?an tried to convince the US and the
87 West that he could influence Assad in the desired direction because of his close relations. Therefore, the Foreign
88 Minister Davuto?lu and various authorities visited Damascus and tried to convince Assad so that he would carry
89 out the demanded reforms (Ye?ilmen, 2011). It was clear that these visits did not have any effects when Assad
90 made some statements. Following that, Ankara sent a message indicating that it "lost its patience" (Bakri, 2011).
91 When it was November 2011, the Prime Minister Erdo?an, supporting the initiative by the Arab League and the
92 UN's plan, called for Assad to abdicate (Ba?ci, 2015) (Arsu, 2011). Afterward, Ankara backed up the opponents
93 in military terms and began to take steps for overthrowing the Assad regime together with the USA (Cumhuriyet,
94 2013) (Weiss, 2012). Turkey declared many times that it attached great importance to the territorial integrity
95 of Syria (Bilici, 2013).

96 Since 13 August 2011, Ankara has shifted its policy to support the US, NATO, and the UN. In October 2011,
97 the UN Security Council could not issue a resolution against Syria due to the veto by Russia and China (Adams,
98 2015) (Council, 2011). In February 2012, the bloody incident in Hama, in which 500 people died, took place
99 (Arnold, 2012).

100 After June 2012, the Turkish-Syrian relations have deteriorated. Thereafter, Syria shot down a Turkish jet,
101 and Turkey requested an evaluation meeting at NATO, on the grounds of the 4th Article (Al Arabiya, 2012).
102 Following the bombing in Reyhan? in May 2013, Turkey demanded from the US and NATO for intervention
103 in Syria (Bagci, 2015). NATO was reluctant to intervene because that Syria would require considerably more
104 NATO resources than Libya did (Phillips, 2012). For that reason, NATO Foreign Ministers decided on December
105 4, 2012, that NATO would "augment Turkey's air defense capabilities to defend the population and territory of
106 Turkey and contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along the Alliance's border." Patriot Missiles batteries
107 contributed by the USA, Netherlands, Italy and, Germany deployed to Turkey soils under NATO command and
108 control on February 15, 2013(NATO, 2013)(NATO, 2016). Spanish troops joined in January 2015, replacing a
109 Dutch unit (NATO, 2015). Thus, "NATO Support to Turkey" defensive action started (NATO, 2018c). NATO

110 Secretary-General Rasmussen said on December 2012 in Brussels "we stand with Turkey in the spirit of strong
111 solidarity. ?To the Turkish people, we say, we are determined to defend you and your territory. To anyone
112 who would want to attack Turkey, don't even think about it". ??Such a deployment would contribute to the
113 de-escalation of the crisis along NATO's south-eastern border." (Dempsey, 2012). In other words, the existence
114 of Patriots did not mean NATO wish to intertwine in Syria (Dempsey, 2012).

115 Nevertheless, Ankara would like to declare a "no-fly zone" that USA considering reluctantly to impose it ("Syria
116 crisis: US and Turkey consider no-fly zones," 2012), however, it was not supported by the USA(Cooper & Gordon,
117 2014)(Report, 2015). And NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen emphasized that the deployment of Patriots not
118 for the support of "no-fly zone"; "The Turkish government has supported Syria's opposition, and as an alliance
119 member had requested that NATO provide the U.S.-built Patriot air defense system to deter further threats to
120 its territory. NATO officials stress that use of the missiles will be purely defensive". Rasmussen emphasized that
121 the Patriots will never be used to support a no-fly zone over Syria, as Turkey proposed (Simeone, 2012). As a
122 result, Turkey's demand for establishing no-fly zone did not consider in a part of the plan applied on Syria either
123 by the USA or NATO in 2012 and 2015, even though, France agreed on this issue(RNW, 2012).

124 Beginning in August 2011, IS's presence in Syria has become more evident (Jasser, 2014). As IS made headway,
125 there were some claims that Ankara supported this organization (Gürsel, 2014) ??Akinci, 2015). Ankara rebuffed
126 these allegations (Al Jazeera, 2015b). The bombing incidents by the IS in Ankara, in August 2015, and in Suruç,
127 on 20 July 2015, resulted in the death of so many people (BBC, 2015). Following these, Turkey participated in
128 the coalition formed by the US and provided the necessary support through air force (Tuysuz & Bilginsoy, 2015).
129 It was brought forward that the US and the West should counter-action against the IS's strategy of expansion
130 in the Syrian territory and of spreading terror on the global scale. At the first stage of the uprisings in Syria,
131 the US and Turkey had only one aim; overthrowing the Assad and establishing instead, a democratic regime
132 as demanded by the people (Falk, 2014) (Ayhan, 2011). When the IS came out, the priorities of the US and
133 the West changed. The US has altered its strategic target as primarily eliminating from Syria the IS, which is
134 considered an extremist religious terrorist organization. At the beginning of September 2014, President Obama
135 declared that a coalition consisting of 10 countries was formed against the IS. Turkey, at first, abstained from
136 getting involved in this coalition (Sanchez, 2014). Turkey had some reservations; first was that there were no
137 limitations of striking the Syrian regime; second was that a security corridor through a "no-fly zone" would not
138 be provided; and the last one was the demand for supporting the moderate opponents for the military operation
139 against both the IS and the Assad regime. This new approach caused a dissent with Turkey.

140 The second significant rift erupted between US and Turkey upon the failure of "train and equipped" (Dohery
141 & Bakr, 2012) aimed for organizing and training the opponents (McLeary, 2015), the US began to look for new
142 elements to utilize for the ground operation ??Ahmed, 2015).

143 The USA has decided to avoid from intervening to Syria directly by using its troops made impact on the United
144 Kingdom parliament not to authorize British military involvement in Syria civil war (Pierini, 2016). Then US
145 president Barrack Obama is labeled by various media outlets as a "reluctant warrior" (Pierini, 2016). Utilizing
146 the military wing (YPG) of PYD due to its organization and experience could not be prevented by Turkey's
147 loud objections ("Erdo?an Obama'ya resti çekti! Orta??n kim?", 2016) (Yegin-su, 2016). President Recep Tayyip
148 Erdogan said Washington "Are you on our side or the side of the terrorist PYD and PKK organizations?"
149 (Yegin-su, 2016). Turkey in fact recognizes PYD as a terrorist organization and the extension of PKK in Syria.
150 The reasons are below. Turkey argues that if the US and the West recognize PKK as a terrorist organization,
151 then they should consider PYD in the same manner. Nonetheless, the US declares that it does not consider PYD
152 as a terrorist organization and that their cooperation will be maintained ??banet, 2016). Turkey is isolated on
153 this issue ??Pierini, 2015). Even though these problems were prevailing between both countries, the decision has
154 been taken in NATO Summit on 4-5 December 2012 to augmentation of Turkey's air defense capabilities upon
155 the request of Turkey (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). And since January 2013, five Allies,
156 Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and, the United States, have contributed missile batteries to deploy just
157 along with the Syrian border (NATO, 2016). In May 2015, SCEUR, Gen. Philip Breedlove paid a visit to greed,
158 a Spanish Patriot Unit (Bush, 2015).

159 In 2012, as the regime forces retreated from the north of Syria, the PYD forces filled in the gap, and the good
160 relations with Damascus tried to be maintained. Because of PYD's connection with PKK and the Assad regime,
161 Ankara, from the beginning, objected to PYD's being an influential force in the north of Syria.

162 In September 2015, Russia began military intervention after an official request by the Syrian government to
163 fight on the side of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad against all rebel groups and IS (Aji and Deeb 2015).
164 This attempt would end Ankara's desire to establish a buffer zone in Northern Syria. However, it had a long
165 time to persuade Washington of the need for (Doha Institute 2016).

166 On November 24, 2015, the downing of Russian fighter plane by Turkish forces broke ties with Moscow (Tisdall,
167 2015). Although Russia put some sanctions on Turkey, Russian President Putin was one of the first to condemn
168 the coup attempt and declare support for the elected government of Turkey right after the 15 July 2016 coup
169 attempt that begun to flourish bilateral relations of both countries. Following this initiative, on 28 June 2016,
170 the letter has been sent by President Erdogan to Russian President Vladimir Putin, to extend his condolences
171 and regret over the downing of the Russian fighter plane (Daily Sabah 2016). On 6 August 2016, President

4 ACCORDING TO THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY STATEMENT, "THE MAIN REASONS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRITICAL SITUATION IN THIS PART OF SYRIA WERE THE PROVOCATIVE U.S. STEPS AIMED AT THE SEPARATION OF REGIONS WITH PREDOMINANTLY KURDISH POPULATIONS".

172 Erdogan paid a visit to Russia and said in a press conference in Kremlin palace at St. Petersburg that Ankara
173 "will not support the US in its Mid East policy". (Akyol, 2016).
174 In December 2016, Turkey and Moscow with Russia signed a political accord to end the
175 Syrian war. Leaving the U.S. on the sidelines which have been sought to proceed the conflict in accordance with
176 their interests (Hubbard and Sanger 2016). With this attempt, Ankara has tried to take counteraction against
177 that the U.S. will go on to support PYD under the Trump administration. On January 2017, Turkey sought a
178 contribution to the Syria peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan.

179 ~~THE UNCONTROLLED DELIVERY OF MODERN WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE REPORTED DELIVERY OF MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, BY THE PENTAGON TO THE PRO-U.S. FORCES IN NORTHERN SYRIA, HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE RAPID ESCALATION OF TENSION IN THE REGION AND RESULTED IN THE LAUNCH OF THE SPECIAL OPERATION BY TURKISH TROOPS" (YETKIN, 2018A).~~

180 Before Operation Euphrates Shield, President Erdogan visits Moscow on 9 August to end the crisis between
181 two countries and strengthened his hand for such military intervention in Syria (Akyol, 2016).

182 In early 2016, Turkey's Euphrates Shield military operation, targeted Islamic State and YPG, was completed
183 in Afrin region (Akyol, 2016). Before YPG operation, Turkey and US had a memorandum of understanding (MoU) called the

184 ~~DESPITE PRESIDENT ERDOGAN'S REITERATED CALLS SEVERAL TIMES ON US PRESIDENTS TO WORK TOGETHER AS TWO NATO ALLIES (YETKIN, 2018A).~~

185 On January 20, 2018, Turkey commenced an attack in Afrin region (Operation Olive Branch), in northwest
186 Syria just near the Turkish border, after the US announcement that it will set up a 30,000 strong border security
187 force with YPG (Hacaoglu & Syeed, 2018).

189 4 According to the Russian Defense Ministry statement, "The
190 main reasons contributing to the development of the critical
191 situation in this part of Syria were the provocative U.S.
192 steps aimed at the separation of regions with predominantly
193 Kurdish populations". "The uncontrolled delivery of modern
194 weapons, including the reported delivery of man-portable
195 air defense systems, by the Pentagon to the pro-U.S. forces
196 in northern Syria, has contributed to the rapid escalation
197 of tension in the region and resulted in the launch of the
198 special operation by Turkish troops" (Yetkin, 2018a). Wash-
199 ington collaboration with the PKK-affiliated Syrian Kurdish
200 People's Protection Units (YPG) has continued since 2014,
201 despite President Erdogan's reiterated calls several times on
202 US presidents to work together as two NATO allies (Yetkin,
203 2018a).

204 On Afrin operation, NATO announced on Jan 21, 2018, that "every country has the right to selfdefense." However,
205 US Defense Secretary, James Mattis told reporters on January 21, "Turkey is a NATO ally. It's the only NATO
206 country with an active insurgency inside its borders. And Turkey has legitimate security concerns", "They warned
207 us before they launched the aircraft that they were going to do it. We are very alert to it. Our top levels are
208 engaged and were working through it" (Lewis, 2018). Nevertheless, France has brought this issue to the UN
209 Security Council to discuss the humanitarian situation in Afrin region (Kenyon, 2018). In return for that, Turkey
210 sent a letter to the UN Security Council on the justification for Military intervention in Syria on January 22,
211 2018, as self-defense in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter (Behles, 2018).

212 President Erdogan said "We shattered the terror corridor being formed on our southern border with these
213 operations. ? Our soldiers,?, are ready for a new mission" (Reuters & Brown, 2018).

214 On April 14, 2018, US-led air-strikes together with Britain and France, targeting as an "appropriate response"
215 to Bashar Assad regime facilities in retaliation for a suspected chemical attack. Ankara welcomed this operation
216 considering that as a humanitarian intervention. Minister of Foreign Affairs said in a statement, "We welcome
217 this operation which has eased humanity's conscience in the face of the attack in Douma, largely suspected to
218 have been carried out by the regime", "The Syrian regime, which has been tyrannizing its people for more than
219 seven years, be it with conventional or chemical weapons, has a proven track record of crimes against humanity
220 and war crimes" (hurriyet daily news, 2018b). Even though, Incirlik airbase, allocated to the USA, was not used
221 in the course of operation, The USA has informed Ankara about the air strikes in advance (DW, 2017a).

222 Ankara announced that it would continue a military operation to Manbij, after that Operation Olive Branch to
223 Afrin region, where US troops are stationed, and risking confrontation between NATO allies. President Erdogan
224 demanded that the US administration withdraw its troops from Manbij province. Saying that "We will continue

225 this process until we completely abolish this corridor. ?One night, we will suddenly enter Sinjari? President
226 Erdogan revealed Turkey's determination to eliminate all YPG forces exist in Manbij, Raqqa, and Hasaka region
227 in Syria (Sayed, 2018). On the contrary, US General Josph Votel, the head of US Central Command, pointed
228 out "withdrawing from Manbij is not something we're looking into," "wherever US troops are, they're going to
229 be able to defend themselves" (Hacaoglu & Syeed, 2018). At the beginning of 2018, mutual meetings were held
230 between Washington and Ankara to reach "understanding" to normalize ties (Onum, Kutlugun, & Dikme, 2018).
231 On press conference held on the occasion that Rex Tillerson, US Secretary of State, visits to Ankara Mevlut
232 Cavusoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said "We clearly expressed [to the U.S. side] our expectations with regard
233 to the fight against FETO and the PKK terrorist organizations, and the U.S. support for the YPG. ? We agreed
234 to establish some mechanisms which will cover and evaluate all the issues?. We should be sure that the YPG
235 crossed to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, and we should see its execution together". Thus, Cavusoglu
236 put emphasize to prioritize Manbij issue to coordinate with the USA. (Aliriza, 2018). As a result, According
237 to The US Embassy and Consulate in Turkey statement, The Turkish and US Working Group on Syria met in
238 Ankara and published joint statement following May 25 talks in Ankara, saying that "The two sides outlined the
239 main contours of a Road Map for their further cooperation in ensuring security and stability in Manbij". Foreign
240 Minister Çavu?o?lu and Secretary Pompeo will meet on June 4 to consider the recommendations of the Working
241 Group" (Statement, 2018). However, this roadmap has been explained in Hurriyet Dailynews article as, "The
242 draft plan oversees the withdrawal of the Syrian-Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) militants from Manbij
243 in northern Syria and the security of the region to be maintained by Turkish and U.S. soldiers"(hurriyedailynews,
244 2018c).

245 **5 b) Gulen's Coup Attempt**

246 On the night of July 15, 2016, Turkey was surprised and shocked by an outrageous and bloody coup attack
247 attempted by Gulenist terror organization (Keyman, 2017). This attack was to accomplish to topple down the
248 current Justice and Development Party government and Grand National Assembly, and President Recep Tayyip
249 Erdogan as well. However, this attempt failed thanks to the wisdom and common sense of the Turkish people.
250 And, Turkish unity displayed by Turkish citizens, in the name of protecting democracy over insurgents of Gulen
251 organization. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkish government accused Fetullah Gulen of orchestrating
252 the coup attempt along with the CIA, FBI, and demand for the extradition of Gulen, even though, Gulen denied
253 any involvement in the coup attempt (Spetalnick & Harte, 2017). Shortly after the suppressing uprising, the
254 Turkish government sent official request to the US administration to prove Gulen's involvement in it. Even,
255 President Erdogan demanded directly from US President Donald Trump in his official visit to the USA, May
256 17, 2017. But before that he sent two top officers, Chief of General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces Hulusi Akar
257 and Chief of Intelligence Hakan Fidan, to hold talks with senior US officials on this issue (Al-jezeera, 2017). In
258 September 2017, Turkey detained a US pastor and suggested to free him if Washington handed over Fetullah
259 Gulen to Ankara. However, Washington seemed to dismiss this swap (Reuter, 2017). Washington has denied
260 repeated demands of Ankara for Gulen's extradition, citing a need for evidence of his involvement in the coup
261 was one of the causes of the main tension between two NATO partners(DW, 2017b).

262 **6 c) Reza Zarrab Case**

263 In March 2016, US authorities accused Reza Zarrab and three others of participating in a broad conspiracy
264 to violate the US' sanctions against Iran (Weiser, 2017) and arrested Reza Zarrab, a businessman who has
265 both Iranian and Turkish citizenship, for breaching US sanctions against Iran (TRT World, 2018). After a
266 while, Reza Zarrab case turned on against Hakan Atilla, former deputy CEO of Turkey's public bank, due to
267 that Zarrab agreed with the New York prosecutor to become the witness. The case angered Turkish President
268 Erdogan and Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gul said, the verdict "an attack on Turkey's judiciary and sovereignty".
269 And, Presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said, "This case is a conspiracy with the purpose of complicating
270 Turkey's internal politics and intervening in Turkish internal affairs." According to Al-Jazeera news, "The case
271 against Atilla was built on the testimony of Turkish-Iranian gold trader Reza Zarrab, who cooperated with
272 prosecutors and pleaded guilty to charges of leading the operation to evade US sanctions on Iran. Zarrab
273 all and that's to Turkish officials including Erdogan, all of them in the Turkish cabinet in the end."

8 III. TROUBLES WITH EUROPEAN UNION AND

284 to obtain "know-how" to domestic production, that NATO member countries did not agree to transfer of such
285 technology to Turkey. Nevertheless, US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo has warned Ankara to underscore the
286 seriousness of the US concerns that Ankara could face sanctions if Turkey would purchase this system(Radio Free
287 Europe, 2018). S-400 missiles were delivered on July 2018 by Russia, is a great concern for the USA claiming
288 that they will pose a security threat to NATO military system in Turkey since this missile system has counter-
289 measures against F-35's stealth technology. U.S. concern on this issue, on the one hand, that Turkey wants
290 to connect the F-35 systems with the Turkish Air Force information network (HvBS-Hava Bilgi Sistemi) would
291 create a risk that data collected by the advanced Joint Strike Fighter's sensors may end up being transmitted
292 to Russia (Fergus, 2019). On the other hand, the flight of F-35 in Turkey could be detected by its S-400 radar
293 systems, and that data would send to Russia to improve and targeting of the stealthy F-35 (Fergus, 2019).

294 As is known, Turkey is the partner country in the F-35 program, even some parts of it are produced in
295 Turkey (Joe, 2019). Nevertheless, the objections put forward in the U.S. Congress introducing the bill by some
296 of the Senators saying that "It concerns that Turkey would seek close defense cooperation with Russia, whose
297 authoritarian ruler seeks to undermine NATO and U.S. interests at every turn?the Kremlin is an adversary of
298 the United States and many of our NATO allies. The prospect of Russia having access to U.S. aircraft and
299 technology in a NATO country, Turkey, is a serious national and global security risk" (Joe, 2019). Supreme
300 Allied Commander Europe for NATO and the head of American forces in Europe, U.S. Army General. Curtis
301 Scaparotti said that the F-35 sale to Turkey should be canceled if Turkey buys the S-400. However, Turkish
302 President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced immediately to local tv. Channels that Turkey will stick to its S-400
303 acquisition program, and even it might go further to have more advanced S-500 in the future (Joe, 2019).

304 Since Turkey obviously is interested in a missile technology transfer and joint production of the ballistic
305 missile defense system that she will purchase. And the U.S. and other NATO allies who have that of rejected
306 such request but Russia accepted (Fergus, 2019).

307 This purchase has brought some other challenges with Turkey and the USA that the US put some restrictions
308 even to sell some rifles due to concerns of the US Congress, under the Countering America's Adversaries Through
309 Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which was signed by the US President last August(??T News, 2018).

310 This event has two folds; one of them is the tensions escalate between Ankara and Washington. The other
311 is NATO's different stance that NATO Secretary-General did not say anything about Turkey cannot buy S-400
312 system. On the contrary, He told ally ever has the right to purchase any system (Jones, 2019). According to the
313 NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg Press release to remain Conference release following the meeting of the
314 North Atlantic Council in Foreign Minister's session, NATO tries to remain unbiased leaving this issue between
315 Ankara and Washington to solve with compromise. (NATO Press Release, 2019) Nowadays, even though, it is
316 witnessed that Ankara and Washington are in the process of negotiation to solve all problems between themselves.
317 However, there is not sound result yet. Both sides should make concessions mutually without making any sacrifice
318 from their national interest particularly on Syria issue vital matter for Turkey to preserve its sovereignty and
319 solidarity with NATO.

320 8 III. Troubles with European Union and

321 European Nato Members a) Some, particularly striking evens took place between Ankara and Germany to strain
322 diplomatic relations between two ancient friends after the first quarter of 2016.

323 First strain emerged between two countries due to that German comedian and satirist Jan Böhmermann's
324 defamatory poem about Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on March 31, 2016. President Erdogan sued
325 him, but German prosecutors eventually dropped the charges on October 4, 2016, that was the first case to
326 spark a diplomatic strain between Ankara and Berlin (Staudenmaier, 2018). On June 2, 2016, the resolution
327 recognizing 1915 Armenian Genocide passed unanimously in German Parliament, in response that Ankara recalled
328 its ambassador in Berlin and the Turkish community in Germany held protest in several German cities. Ankara
329 accused Berlin and other NATO allies of not taking a clear stand against the failed coup attempt in On July 15,
330 2016 the Turkish authorities purged the governmental institutions such as army and judiciary, detaining some
331 of them caused to criticize of German politicians. On the top of it, another crisis had emerged when soldiers,
332 diplomats, judges and other government officials living in Germany and at NATO facilities in Germany had
333 requested to asylum in Germany after facing persecution following the failed coup on July 15, 2016. Nevertheless

346 pre-accession EU funds in October 2017. German politicians criticized "Operation Olive Branch" in Afrin region
347 also allowed mass protest of Kurdish communities in Germany, on 20 January, 2017 (Staudenmaier, 2018). Now,
348 in Germany, foreign politicians are banned from election campaigning for up to three months ahead of the vote
349 in their home country. Netherlands and Austria have also made similar moves (MacKenzie, 2018). On March
350 2017, Cavusoglu called Netherlands "the capital of fascism" (MacKenzie, 2018).

351 Nevertheless, On February 2018, Turkish Prime Minister, Binali Yıldırım paid a visit to Germany and started
352 in Berlin with face-to-face talks between German Chancellor Angela Merkel to revive relations again (Jurgens,
353 2018). In response, the formation of the new grand coalition in Germany by the leadership of Angela Merkel
354 made an attempt bringing an end to the icing period in Turkish-German relations (Yetkin, 2018b). In May
355 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel with other German leaders gathered in Düsseldorf met with Turkish
356 political leaders, including Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, on the 25th anniversary of a neo-Nazi
357 arson attack in Solingen that killed five members of a Turkish-German family on 29, 1993. This action
358 taken by German Chancellor should be assumed a good-will intention to the de-icing and re-improve mutual
359 interest of both countries (DW, 2018). According to Aksam newspaper in Turkey, Der Spiegel magazine on June
360 addition claimed that German government reviewed its approach to FETO (Fetullah Gulen organization) and
361 has taken Turkey's warning into accounts on that FETO members fled to Germany had attended the failed coup
362 attempt on July 15 (Aksam, 2018). This policy changing should inevitably be a positive effect on Ankara-Berlin
363 relations without any doubt.

364 All those events happened with Germany, which is the most influential member of the EU and NATO eventually
365 affected relations between the EU, NATO, and Turkey. EU leaders and Germany made a meeting to reevaluate
366 and discussed Turkey position and avoid making any rash decisions that could reduce its engagement with the
367 country and its ability to offer support to civil society and other pro-democratic and pro-EU actors in Turkey
368 (Paul, 2017).

369 According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlut Cavusoglu, expressed in an exclusive interview on DW's
370 top political interview show Conflict Zone, "Europe and the West are showing "double standards" over democracy
371 and their treatment of Turkey"(MacKenzie, 2018).

372 9 b) The last issue emerged as an Eastern Mediterranean 373 security concerns of EU and Turkey,

374 Turkey has a great deal of impact and an exclusive role for the Eastern Mediterranean Energy security mainly in
375 two different but intertwined aspects. Firstly, in the second decade of the 2000's, hydrocarbon energy resources
376 exploited in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea region, just near the offshore of Israel, Egypt, and southern Cyprus.
377 This development has brought new aspect to geostrategic importance of Turkey because its proximity to the
378 research area of particularly to Cyprus region, regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is overlapping.
379 Exploding new natural gas resources on the offshore of Israel, Southern Cyprus Government and Greece, and
380 Turkey would be the center of crises for ongoing days. Secondly Turkish territory has a unique location as transit

13 SO TURKEY DOES A LOT FOR OUR ALLIANCE, DESPITE FACING SERIOUS SECURITY CHALLENGES" (NATO, 2018B).

393 10 d.). According to the Hardem Attorneys at Law assessments
394 "Due to the current situation of Middle East and geographical
395 position of Israel the transmission of Israeli Gas is a
396 critical issue with regards to security so that it is obvious
397 that pipelines should be constructed through the Mediterranean Sea if Turkey achieves to solve politic problems with
398 Cyprus because in the event of transmission of Israeli gas,
399 most probably the pipeline route would be planned through
400 Cyprus. Given that the fact that Turkey does not recognize
401 Cyprus as a state, it can be easily predicted that challenging
402 negotiations are close at hand for Turkey."

404 In a website of Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Energy Profile and Strategy," Turkey's role in the regional
405 energy trade has been explained as follows; (MFA Turkey, n. d.)
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407 11 (E)

408 The "East-West" gas pipeline projects which are envisaged to bring gas from Caspian and the Middle East regions
409 to Europe through Turkey are referred to as "Southern Gas Corridor" (SGC). South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP),
410 Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline (BTE), Turkey-Greece Interconnector (ITG) are existing pipelines
411 while the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans-Adriatic-Pipeline (TAP) are planned
412 projects within the context of Southern Gas Corridor. The delivery of gas to Turkey through TANAP will start
413 in mid-2018 and to Europe in 2020".

414 In this article, recently explored hydrocarbon sources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea will be taken under
415 consideration, but the others in which Russia, Iran, and other gas and oil producer states put aside.

416 The most economical way for transporting gases from Israel to European market is neither to carry it with huge
417 transatlantic cargo ships or with the pipeline along with Israel to Italy via Cyprus and Greece, but using Turkish
418 territory as a transit hub from Cyprus, to convey Europe which costs approximately 4.7 billion US dollars, while
419 the others costs would be much more respectively (Sand?kl?, 2016) .

420 As a result, geographically Turkish territory is most an appropriate and reasonable transportation route to
421 convey Mediterranean natural gases to European markets primarily, in respect to the project costs, constructions,
422 and maintenance and operation point of views.

423 12 IV. Relations with nato and Turkey

424 After that Syrian Civil War a) Syria is the cradle of a "proxy war" currently, with regional and international
425 actors arming one side or another.

436 14 "NATO is unwilling to become involved as an alliance in
437 fighting the so-called Islamic State, and with good reasons:
438 fears of being dragged into a prolonged conflict, fears of
439 retaliation by the Islamic State in other European countries,
440 and no clear post-military goal." NATO countries are also
441 not prepared to boost the defenses of the organization's
442 Southern members, which are vulnerable to the Islamic
443 State-and now to Russia too, given Moscow's increasing
444 presence in the

445 Mediterranean" (Dempsey, 2015).

446 Syrian Democratic Forces were formed on October 2015 by the military support of the USA and "Turkey
447 is geographically located between energyproducing countries of the Region with more than 75% of the world's
448 proven oil and gas reserves and the well-developed European energy consumer markets. This privileged natural
449 bridge position provides Turkey with both opportunities and responsibilities in term of energy security. ? In
450 this regard, while developing its energy strategy, Turkey aims to strengthen its position between East-West and
451 South-North Energy Corridors.

452 provided Washington with the opportunity to deepen its relationship with PYD, considered as terror group
453 affiliated with PKK, to occupy a large area in the guise of fighting Daesh. Moreover, Meanwhile, PKK is listed
454 as a terrorist group by Turkey, the USA, and the EU, Washington has considered the YPG/PYD a key ally
455 of it in fighting against Daesh in Syria (Anadolu Agency, 2017) (Winter, 2017). The USA provides explosives
456 and weapons to the PYD in Syria are also used by PKK terrorist in Turkey. In this framework, some of the
457 Turkish media assess that The United States is obviously in default of its obligations under Articles 3, 4, and
458 5 of the NATO treaty by giving a hand the PYD/YPG terrorist groups in the fight against Daesh in war-torn
459 Syria (Anadolu Agency, 2017).

460 Article 3 of the NATO charter states: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the
461 Parties, separately and jointly, using continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop
462 their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

463 Article 4, The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity,
464 political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

465 Article 5, asserting the principle of collective defense, says: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against
466 one or more of them ? shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an
467 armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defenses recognized by
468 Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
469 individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
470 force to restore, and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." (NATO, 1949) Moreover, NATO's New
471 Strategic Concepts define in the title of "Core Task and Principles" as Collective defense, Crises management
472 and Cooperative security (NATO, 2010). Collective defense, "NATO members will always assist each other
473 against attack, by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO
474 will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they
475 threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole". And Cooperate security, "?
476 NATO is remaining the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the
477 territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington
478 Treaty. ?" The security environment depicted in the new concept, "?Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders
479 can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal
480 activities ?"(NATO, 2010) Turkey's approach to current NATO policy on Middle East issue was nothing much
481 beyond the discourse of the government authorities to give some massages to the United States as a NATO

15 B) ENERGY SECURITY FOR NATO

494 Even Though, according to Collective security principle of the New Concept of NATO pointed out that the
495 members will always assist each other against attack,⁷ and, that commitment remains firm and binding. NATO
496 member states especially, Washington has a different strategic and political comprehension in Syria, in spite
497 that above-mentioned article stated clearly "that commitment remains firm and binding," and seems to apply a
498 double standard regarding to Turkey's integrity coming from beyond its and NATO borders which are cooperative
499 security. The USA and European members of NATO hypocritically ignoring the threat that Turkey faces due
500 to the fact that the severe distinction of perception between Ankara and Washington on the YPG/PYD, which
501 Turkey considers as a terrorist organization to threat and the USA counts as an ally to fight with against Daesh,
502 constitute a significant inconvenience that retains the chance of NATO consensus in Syria. NATO army to
503 directly engage -and unsurprisingly crush -it in Jarablus in northern Syria. A prospective regrouping of Daesh is
504 now being prevented by the dedicated work of a coalition that includes Turkey, which maintains the largest no-
505 entry list of foreign terrorist fighters and runs the world's biggest civilian anti-Daesh security operation?⁷ In this
506 sentences, Mr. Cavusoglu put emphasize Turkey's position as a NATO member very and coalition attentively.
507 That means Turkey is proud of its membership in NATO on the contrary to all claims against it.

508 In a statement, "A point of discord with the United States is its policy of arming the PKK/YPG to act as foot
509 soldiers, even as they have a history of terrorism. This (policy) is a legally and morally questionable policy that
510 was prepared by the Obama administration in its waning days and somehow crept into the Trump administration.
511 The United States has played into the hands of all its critics and opponents by deciding to ally with terrorists
512 despite its values and its 66-year-old alliance with one of their primary targets, Turkey.⁷ I have been pleased to
513 see many NATO allies distance themselves from this U.S. policy, which flies in the face of our alliance's values.
514 It also runs against our common interests in the region and beyond. ? ." (Cavusoglu, 2018) Turkish Minister of
515 Foreign Affairs put Washington strategic approach to handle the Syrian issue could not be accepted by Turkey
516 in any case. And, Ankara announced once again its happiness that most of the NATO allies do not approve of
517 this U.S. policy without and doubt.

518 15 b) Energy Security for NATO

519 Today, NATO is not only a military organization but also political organization after that the end of the cold
520 war. Addition to that its mission against potential Russian threat, especially, its security concern beyond the
521 military affairs has taken priority, regarding protecting the national interest of allied members, covering out of
522 NATO borders as well as that of within its borders.

523 In Except for the USA, Canada, Norway, Montenegro, and Turkey, all NATO countries are also members of the
524 EU. All European countries either being a member of the EU or NATO are not only depending on Russia for their
525 oil and natural gas needs in Russia, but also depending on the Middle East, Middle Asia and, Northern Africa.
526 Meanwhile; all those countries would like to diversify finding some other resources and transit hub in order to free
527 their dependence, particularly to Russia since Moscow has greater leverage as an energy power. (Beehner, 2006)
528 In this point, Turkey, as a NATO member, has undertaken a new strategic role as an energy transit hub for the
529 transportation of hydrocarbon reserves from its neighboring regions to NATO member countries and the UE as
530 well. Turkey's Geopolitical location gives the privilege to be driving force due to its proximity to natural resources
531 reserves, especially in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. In this framework, Turkey could contribute
532 to enhancing the European and NATO "energy security" concerns as a NATO member offering a relatively safe
533 "transit route" for these resources. (Biresselioglu, 2011) NATO, aware of this subject, has established its pipeline
534 system funded by NATO Security Investment Programs, 10.000 km long and runs through 12 NATO countries,
535 including Turkey and has a storage capacity of 4.1 million cubic meters.(NATO, 2017) NATO pipeline System
536 consists of eight national pipeline systems and two multinational systems. And the Turkish Pipeline System
537 (TUPS), which comprises two separate pipeline systems known as the Western Turkey Pipeline System and the
538 Eastern Turkey Pipeline System. That means Turkey has undertaken an important role in this respect (NATO,
539 2017).

540 On December 2005 and January 2006, a natural gas crisis experienced between Ukraine and Russia has made
541 mainly to be Turkey, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, France and Romania, impact on most of NATO member states.
542 This subject has been taken as main security problems that affect the NATO energy security concerns and

555 Turkey's importance to the joint defense of the alliance, to look at the map is enough to recognize the country's
556 value, amid rising criticism of Turkish actions in the media and Western capitals (Demirtas, 2018).

557 Nevertheless, in joint press conference on April 17, 2018, a question asked to the Secretary-General Stoltenberg,
558 "some NATO Allies have stated that Turkey should be excluded from NATO" and about "Turkey-Greece
559 increasing tension on Greece flags on some islands which are not knowing who own." Secretary-General
560 Stoltenberg's respond to the first questions in line with Turkey's contribution on NATO is highly valuable.
561 And going on putting emphasize that "And I would like to underline that all NATO Allies welcome Turkey
562 as a highly valued Ally. We understand the importance of having Turkey in the Alliance. Turkey has been a
563 committed Ally for decades, and we would like to continue to work with Turkey, especially in the more demanding
564 and challenging security environment as we see today" (NATO, 2018a). On the Turkey-Greece tension, he opted
565 for not stepping in or interfering in such bilateral problems between Allies. Ultimately, he would like to keep his
566 neutral position as a Secretary-General. This neutral position could be assessed that NATO is reluctant to take
567 sides on the problems emerged natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, between Turkey, Greece, and
568 Southern Cyprus. Meanwhile, European Union unconditionally supports Greece, and Southern Cyprus claims
569 on this issue.

570 As is seen clearly, NATO would like to take any sides either Ankara-Washington relations or that of Ankara-
571 Athens and the same goes Turkish relations with other NATO members such as Germany and Netherland.

572 When we consider the energy security necessities of NATO in comply with its "The New Concept," Turkey
573 has gained much more weight than it had during the Cold War era.

574 V.

575 16 Conclusions

576 In this article, either Western countries, particularly the USA and EU countries or Turkey's approach to Turkey's
577 membership to NATO was studied by analyzing empirically of the experienced problems between them. To find
578 an answer both of the question that "Do western countries really want that Turkey must secede from NATO" and
579 "Does Ankara really eager to quit NATO organization", the second question is about NATO; "as an organization
580 is NATO seriously contemplate leaving of Turkey out of NATO" are not very difficult. Since, most of the problems
581 with the Washington and Turkey and with some European countries like Germany and Turkey are exclusively
582 the issues relevant to their relations individually, but not whole NATO concerns.

583 There are four major conflicting issues between Ankara and Washington as NATO allies, as it is mentioned
584 above. The major problem emerged on Syrian issue that the USA has insisted to cooperate with PYD/YPG, a
585 terrorist organization affiliated with PKK, which Ankara considers as a threat aiming to sovereignty right and
586 territorial integrity of Turkey. And this partnership with PYD/YPG creates non-negotiable and un-accepted
587 situation against Turkish unification as a sovereign country. The recent development of diplomatic negotiations
588 with high-level authorities between both countries in Manbij region has been brought a common understanding
589 that the USA should leave the cooperation with PYD/YPG. Instead, Washington and Ankara would act together
590 to fight "Turkey is a highly valued ally. Turkey is important for our shared security. Not least in the fight against
591 terrorism because Turkey has provided infrastructure basis for the efforts to the global coalition to defeat [the
592 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] ISIL. We are grateful for Turkey for that," "It's enough to just look at the
593 map and see the strategic geographic location of Turkey, bordering Iraq and Syria, bordering the turmoil and
594 violence that is a threat to Turkey and to all other NATO allies," "As you know, NATO is not present on the
595 ground in Syria, but some allies are (there). For me, the important thing is that the U.S. and Turkey now talk,
596 have contacts, and see how they can deal with the situation in northern Syria in a coordinated way. I welcome
597 this dialogue between Turkey and the U.S," "We recognize that Turkey is the NATO ally that has suffered
598 most from terrorist attacks. Turkey, of course, has the right to protect itself, and we expect it to be done in a
599 proportionate way (proportional). Turkey has the right to protect itself because Turkey has suffered from many
600 terror attacks." On the question of growing tension between Turkey and Greece, he said; "There are differences
601 between Turkey and Greece related to issues in the Aegean Sea. I hope these differences can be solved in the
602 spirit of dialogue and I welcome that the Greek prime minister and the Turkish prime minister have spoken to
603 address these issues. It's only through this kind of dialogue that these differences can be solved. I have spoken of
604 course with both the Turkish and the Greek authorities. I welcome the fact that these issues are being addressed

16 CONCLUSIONS

617 the Chancellor of Germany, the most influential member of EU and NATO, eventually would contribute the
618 improvement of relationships between Ankara and Berlin, which would make a positive impact of and improve
619 Turkish relations with NATO and the EU as well.

620 Erdo?an government has never put agenda that Turkey should leave NATO Organization. On the contrary,
621 Ankara reiterated several times that NATO should give hands to Turkey to fight with the terrorist threat to its
622 territorial integrity. But NATO is reluctant to intervene in Syria. Meanwhile, Turkey's NATO membership
623 questioning by some journalist or some opposition against Turkey's operation in Syria to protect its vital
624 national interest in the expense of United States leadership in the course of Washington's strategy in partnership
625 with PYD/YPG. This is what Turkey would not agree in any case even as a member of NATO. For that
626 reason, Washington must respect Turkey's very delicate and vital issue on that matter. According to the latest
627 diplomatic initiatives, the common understanding could be established between Washington and Ankara, in line
628 with Turkey's indispensable and vital necessities.

629 The latest event that escalates tensions between Turkey and the United States over the procurement of Russian
630 S-400 missile systems has brought a question that Turkey has turned its face to Russia, ignoring NATO ally.
631 As Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said: "we (Ankara) will not allow the questioning of Turkey's
632 position in NATO since Turkey has a word in all decisions as a NATO member" (Jones, 2019). Against all odds,
633 "Russia is not alternative to Turkey", as said professor Bagci in his interview to Voice of America. "Turkey will
634 not look to Russia as a trusted ally. It is not the case and will not be. Turkey always uses Russia as a balance of
635 power. as leverage. Turkey will not leave NATO? ." (Jones, 2019) Moreover, this idea was strongly advocated by
636 the prominent diplomat and former ambassador Sukru Elekdag in his interview, in Sozcu newspaper, was made
637 by Ugur Dundar recently.(Dundar, 2019a) Mr. Elekdag also added that 'In case that Turkey leaves NATO not
638 only the relations with the U.S.A. but also that of with EU would be cut. ??Dundar, 2019b) Regarding NATO
639 concern on Turkey's position. On the one hand, NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg stated very clearly
640 that Turkey's membership is very valuable for NATO. That means there is no official statement that Turkey
641 should be excluded from NATO, and it is out of the question. On the other hand, NATO has the determination
642 that it would like to remain in a neutral position on the problem of Turkey and Greece just as its role on the
643 Cyprus issue.

644 In summary, there is an inconvenience that NATO concerns about Turkey membership. While NATO as an
645 organization put a great value of Turkey's membership and contribution to it. Some alliances try to use Turkey's
646 membership as leverage to direct Ankara's foreign policy in parallel with their requirements. The United States
647 and some other European countries using some of the mass media, spend efforts to force Ankara in line with their
648 desire, to create an agenda that Turkey's NATO membership is in question since Ankara follows the independent
649 foreign policy to fulfill its sovereignty requirements. Such initiatives have created anxiety in Turkish public
650 opinion and cause a counterreaction in Turkish media. Despite all those negative pressures, the government of
651 Ankara has never brought that matter, which Turkey would leave NATO, on the international agenda officially.
652 Ankara always put emphasize that NATO has a double standard when Turkey needs NATO contributions. This
653 is what the Turkish government and people believe by heard. ¹

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