

1 Global Journal of HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: H 2 Interdisciplinary

3 Dr. John Maszka¹

4 ¹ Al Ain Mens College

5 *Received: 7 December 2017 Accepted: 2 January 2018 Published: 15 January 2018*

6

7 **Abstract**

8 Introduction-What "causes" terrorism? Myriad attempts have been made to categorize and
9 explain the various causes of terrorism. Countless books and journal articles in every academic
10 discipline imaginable have been published, associating terrorism with a litany of variables
11 including poverty, illiteracy, inequality, democracy, authoritarianism and mental illness-to
12 name just a few. This article addresses many of the so-called "causes" of terrorism to debunk
13 the myth that structural, cultural or institutional factors operate as independent variables to
14 generate terrorist violence. There are no "causes" of terrorism. Like most violence, terrorist
15 violence is merely a tactic-employed by virtually anyone-as part of an overall strategy to
16 obtain a particular goal. The causes of terrorist violence can be categorized various ways. For
17 example, Taylor (1988) suggests a 3-part typology based on legal, moral and behavioral
18 factors. Others argue that terrorism occurs in waves.

19

20 *Index terms—*

21 **1 Introduction**

22 hat "causes" terrorism? Myriad attempts have been made to categorize and explain the various causes of terror-
23 ism. Countless books and journal articles in every academic discipline imaginable have been published, associating
24 terrorism with a litany of variables including poverty, illiteracy, inequality, democracy, authoritarianism and
25 mental illness-to name just a few.

26 This article addresses many of the so-called "causes" of terrorism to debunk the myth that structural, cultural
27 or institutional factors operate as independent variables to generate terrorist violence. There are no "causes" of
28 terrorism. Like most violence, terrorist violence is merely a tactic-employed by virtually anyone-as part of an
29 overall strategy to obtain a particular goal.

30 The causes of terrorist violence can be categorized various ways. For example, Taylor (1988) suggests a 3-part
31 typology based on legal, moral and behavioral factors. Others argue that terrorism occurs in waves.

32 The wave analogy is common among social scientists. For instance, scholars refer to democratic transition
33 as occurring in waves (Huntington 1993;McFaul 2002). Economic cycles are also often referred to as waves
34 (Goldstein 1985). Scholars have used the wave analogy to categorize periods of terrorist activity as well (Rapoport
35 2004;Shughart 2006). The most famous use of the wave analogy in reference to terrorism is Rapoport's (2004)
36 four waves of modern terrorism typology, which breaks the periods of terrorism into four categories: (1) anarchist,
37 (2) national liberation and ethnic separatism, (3) left-wing, and (4) religious.

38 According to Rapoport, the terrorist organization known as Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) sparked the first
39 wave of terrorism in 1878. This "Anarchist Wave" spread outward from Russia to Western Europe, Asia, the
40 Balkans, and even America. Also known as the "Golden Age of Assassination," the first wave peaked in the
41 1890s but extended well into the 1920s. Rapoport includes the assassination of the American president, William
42 McKinley, in September 1901 in this wave.

43 Rapoport's second wave lasted from the 1920s to the end of WWII as anti-colonial sentiment fueled the
44 resentment of ethnic and religious groups suffering political marginalization due to the creation of purely artificial

1 INTRODUCTION

45 nation-states. The terrorism in this wave was marked by Arbitrary borders were drawn by the victors of WWI
46 as they carved up the former Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and German empires, and also the African continent
47 and elsewhere. Ironically, Wilson's doctrine of self-determination ultimately only applied to "hitherto sovereign
48 countries conquered by Germany, Italy, and Japan" and therefore excluded colonies such as Algeria, Cyprus,
49 Cochin China, Ireland and others ??Hoffman 2013, p.47).As a result, nationalist and ethnic separatists in these
50 regions resorted to terrorist tactics, demanding the self-determination denied them by the great powers. Rapoport
51 defines the third wave of terrorism as new left terrorism, which spanned from the end of WWII to 1979. The
52 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and PLOaffiliated groups drove international terrorism to its heyday.
53 Opposition to the war in Vietnam created strong anti-American and anti-establishment sentiment, causing left-
54 wing terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades and the Red Army Faction in Europe, and the Weathermen in
55 America, to wage terrorist campaigns consisting of bombings, hijackings, and political assassinations.

56 Finally, the fourth wave in Rapoport's typology consists of religious terrorism. This wave begins with the
57 Iranian Revolution in 1979 and continues to this day. The pan-Islamic vision of the late Osama bin Laden
58 defined this final wave. More accurately, however, while bin Laden's international franchise has contributed to
59 the terrorism of this period, local and regional groups such as those in Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East,
60 the Philippines, Indonesia, Kashmir, and Chechnya commit the lion's share of terrorist attacks. Given that
61 these groups are local in purpose and vision, international terrorism comprises only a tiny percentage of total
62 terrorist activity in the fourth wave. Siddique's (2009) analysis is useful here. Dividing terrorist extremism in
63 Pakistan according to the target of an attack, Siddique creates a four-part typology of terrorist organizations in
64 Pakistan. Type I organizations mainly target the West, Type II target Afghanistan and India, Type III target the
65 government and security forces of Pakistan itself, and Type IV organizations are sectarian. Siddique found that
66 groups operating in Pakistan focus primarily on local and regional targets. Tinnes (2010) observes a similar focus
67 on domestic targets in her study of contemporary terrorist organizations throughout Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq,
68 and Saudi Arabia. Tinnes notes that while the presence of American troops in this region has brought the far
69 enemy much closer to home, it has also brought to light the many doctrinal and strategic differences between the
70 various local jihadist groups that have assembled to fight that enemy. Since most groups' tactical and strategic
71 goals are localized, these clashes have resulted in minimal cooperation between groups, if any. Thus, according
72 to Tinnes, the threat of a unitary, pan-Islamic breed of terrorism is not as dire as was perhaps once believed.

73 Hegghammer (2010) agrees with Tinnes. He compares and contrasts Saudi Islamist militant groups with a
74 variety of other jihadist movements and concludes that most are locally focused and share little in common with
75 one another. Salafist groups such as Islamic State (IS) view the purging of Islam as the first step in global jihad.
76 Therefore, the elimination of apostate groups is a priority (Wood 2015).

77 The ongoing differences between IS and al-Qaeda demonstrate the local and territorial nature of these groups.
78 Hegghammer supports his argument by pointing out thatal Shabaab and Boko Haram, though claiming to be
79 loyal to either (or both) al Qaeda and IS, have demonstrated no practical relationship with either of them.
80 Furthermore, both al Shabaab and Boko Haram continue to experience infighting and division over issues of
81 power and control of territory and resources.

82 The diffusion effect offers a round-about explanation as to why both al Shabaab and Boko Haram have pledged
83 allegiance to groups such as al Qaeda and Boko Haram yet appear to have little or no real working ties to either.
84 The perception of affiliation may serve to translate a success for one as a success for the other. This phenomenon,
85 of course, is not the copycat effect that Sedgwick refers to, but it is related to it.

86 The obvious question that Sedgwick's assertion creates is if the perception that terrorism is successful leads
87 rational individual utility maximizers to engage in it, why have such a relatively few chosen such a path? Another
88 well-known typology is the grievance typology, which loosely structures the causes of terrorism into broadly
89 defined categories such as socioeconomic marginalization, social-identity marginalization, religious fanaticism,
90 and political grievance (Leuprecht et al. 2010).

91 Piazza's (2011) work, which explores the link between minority economic discrimination and domestic
92 terrorism, is a prime example of the body of scholarship on socio-economic marginalization. Piazza concludes
93 that poverty per se is not the critical factor, but economic discrimination against minority groups that sparks
94 them to choose terrorism over the status quo. The terrorist violence in the Niger Delta fits within this category.

95 A representative piece of social-identity marginalization literature is Brinkerhoff's (2008) study investigating
96 the potential for violence in socially marginalized diaspora groups. Brinkerhoff concludes that there is a potential
97 risk among the most socially marginalized members of diaspora groups to join terrorist organizations. Bryden
98 (2014) suggests that al Shabaab was particularly successful in attracting young Somalis from the diaspora for
99 this reason. Hoffman (1995)delivers a compelling discussion of religious fanaticism and terrorism, concluding that
100 religion affords us a much more palatable justification of violence than any political position ever could. Mere
101 justification aside, however, Hoffman also points to the apocalyptic vision that drives some religious fanatics to
102 commit violence because they prioritize eternal life over temporal human life here on earth.

103 In the case of Islamic terrorism, however, scholars and policy makers need to acknowledge the difference
104 between Islamists who seek the return of the caliphate (often through the democratic process) and jihadists who
105 reject the idea of separation between religion and politics (Turner 2012;McCants 2015). A proper understanding
106 of the religious ideology that drives al Shabaab and Boko Haram reveals much more about their respective
107 political objectives (as well as why these two groups have chosen to employ violence to obtain them) than a mere

108 political analysis alone. While the question of why an actor engages in violence (i.e., motive) is not as crucial to
109 the strategic theorist as what that actor hopes to achieve (strategic objective), a potential bridge between the
110 two is the Machiavellian concept that the ends justify the means. No doubt, in addition to Rapoport's waves and
111 Sedgwick's diffusion effect, the majority of actors also condoned their violence by the ends that they ultimately
112 pursued (Bassioni 1975). Again, while strategic theory bypasses the need to legitimize violence altogether, it
113 suggests that scholars address the question of how well the means serve the ends on a case by case basis rather
114 than as a generalization.

115 Religion does not explain everything, however. As Heck (2007, p.8) asks, "is it fair to blame 1.4 billion Both
116 Rapoport and Sedgwick offer useful descriptive analyses of the history of terrorism. However, neither provides
117 much in the way of explanatory or predictive insight regarding why such a relatively small number of terrorists
118 choose to break with the status quo while the majority of the population does not.

119 The Usual Suspects: Debunking the Myth about the "Causes" of Terrorism Sedgwick (2007) builds upon
120 Rapoport's typology by proposing that the diffusion effect explains increases in certain types of terrorism at
121 certain times (Rapoport's waves). Simply put, the perception that terrorism is successful leads other rational
122 individual utility maximizers to engage in it toward the achievement of their own goals. and more than 200
123 million Arabs for the malevolent handiwork of an ideologically deviant few?" The answer is, of course not. Not
124 only is it unfair, but it also makes for poor scholarship as well.

125 For example, it was political grievances that sparked Boko Haram's terrorist violence in the first place.
126 McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) conclude that political radicalization stems more from the perceived political
127 grievances of groups than from individual political dissatisfaction.

128 There is an abundance of literature linking a myriad of grievances to acts of violence and terrorism. Stern
129 (2003), for example, explores the various grievances that induce individuals to choose terrorism over the
130 status quo such as poverty, unemployment, lack of better opportunities, exploitation, etc. Stern also reveals
131 the disillusionment faced by many young recruits as they become aware of the practical realities of militant
132 organizations such as ambition, corruption and the criminal activities that fund them and allow them to thrive.

133 The benefit of the grievance typology is that it attempts to identify a reason for discontent. In this respect,
134 it is a bit more explanatory than Rapoport's wave typology which descriptively divides terrorist violence into
135 four dispensations. However, one would naturally assume that most individuals who choose to engage in acts of
136 violence have compelling reasons to do so. Critical to any analysis of terrorism is not necessarily the perpetrators'
137 grievance, but identifying the strategic objective and assessing whether violence offers a sound strategy to address
138 it.

139 The main problem with the typologies listed above is that they employ theoretical models that artificially
140 separate terrorist violence into classifications that are highly oversimplified. The real world is never so neatly
141 compartmentalized. Therefore, pinpointing specific causes of terrorism remains an elusive endeavor.

142 As Richardson (2007) puts it, there are two reasons why terrorism is so difficult to explain. One, there are so
143 many terrorists, and two, there are so few terrorists. On the one hand, individuals who engage in terrorism come
144 from such diverse backgrounds that it is difficult to generalize about them with any assurance of accuracy.

145 Scholars maintain that those who engage in terrorist violence tend to be younger (Russell and Miller
146 1977;Combs and Hall 2003), poorer (Kepel 1985), and less educated (Bergen and Pandey 2005) today than
147 they were in the 1960s. However, even demographic generalizations such as these require agreement on what
148 constitutes an act of terrorism.

149 In the next section, I will slice the data somewhat differently to look at four broad categories of factors that
150 experts often cite as causes of terrorism: structural, cultural, institutional and rational.

151 2 a) Structural Explanations of Terrorism

152 Viewing individuals as embedded in socioeconomic realities, structuralists look for causal mechanisms in large
153 socio-economic forces rather than in the preferences of individual actors (Hay and Wincott 1998). By far, the
154 most common alleged structural cause of terrorism is poverty. And while this claim resonates intuitively with
155 most reasonable individuals, it does not hold up empirically.

156 For instance, Krueger and Male?ková (2003) explore poverty and poor education as causes of terrorism among
157 Palestinian suicide bombers and find that, not only were the bombers themselves from diverse socio-economic
158 and educational backgrounds, but those who expressed support for suicide bombings as a response to Israeli
159 occupation were as well. Ahmed (2005) supports this conclusion by observing that the overall sense of humiliation,
160 bitterness, and anger among Palestinians transcends income, education and social class. Ahmed contends that
161 suicide bombings are commonly viewed by the Palestinian public as justified given the barbaric Israeli occupation.

162 Krueger and Laitin(2008) consider poverty and civil liberties as causes of terrorism. They conclude that among
163 states providing equal protection from the law, developing states do not experience higher rates of terrorism than
164 wealthy countries. Instead they suggest that political repression generates terrorists who then, in the case of
165 suicide bombers, often target more developed and more democratic nations. Abadie (2004) argues that poverty
166 is not a statistically significant variable but the level of political freedom is. Abadie also points out that domestic
167 terrorism continues to account for the lion's share of attacks. For example, in 2003 international terrorism
168 constituted only 240 out of a total of 1,536 terrorist attacks. Of course, how one defines terrorism is critical in
169 this type of data collection. Piazza (2006) looks at ninety-six countries between 1986 and 2002 and finds that,

2 A) STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS OF TERRORISM

170 rather than low economic development, "social cleavage theory" offers a better explanation of terrorism. 1 Piazza
171 uses the theory to measure the level of social division in society. Greater numbers of political parties equate to
172 increased social division and hence, a more probable likelihood of political violence.

173 In another study, while conceding that there is no evidence of a direct causal relationship between structural
174 factors and individual acts of terrorism, Piazza (2010) notes a correlation between an overall reduction in global
175 poverty and a corresponding decline in global terrorism. Piazza, therefore, suggests that there is a direct
176 correlation between low economic performance and terrorism at the systemic level even if no evidence can be
177 found to consistently link individual acts of terrorism to poverty at the sub-systemic level. Similarly, Robison,
178 Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006) identify a positive correlation between increased foreign direct investment and a
179 long-term overall reduction in terrorism.

180 Berman's model (??03) also suggests that systemic poverty and economic inefficiency indirectly aid terrorist
181 organizations by allowing them to win the allegiance and loyalty of their members through the provision of public
182 goods and services that would not otherwise be available. The fewer the market opportunities and government
183 provision of public goods, the easier it is for terrorist organizations to secure such loyalty.

184 According to Berman, individual and collective loyalty to such groups in exchange for economic benefits is
185 rational. And while groups that benefit from such loyalty may then attract other members who are not desperate
186 for economic benefits (e.g., the nineteen hijackers in the 9/11 attacks), these latter members constitute the elite
187 among the group rather than the rank and file. They constitute the exception not the rule. As Berman points out,
188 al Qaeda would hardly send illiterate members to flight school in America when it had more qualified individuals
189 at its disposal. Therefore, according to Berman's model, the single most effective way to eliminate support for
190 terrorism is to improve the economic opportunities of local populations to reduce their dependence on the benefits
191 provided by terrorist organizations.

192 Berman's model is also applicable to wealthier states with rapid population growth such as Saudi Arabia.
193 Though wealthy now, the population in Saudi Arabia is projected to increase from its current level of
194 approximately 27 million to over 41 million in 2025 and 60 million in 2050, making its abundant resources
195 increasingly scarce (Ehrlich and Liu 2002).

196 Both al Shabaab and Boko Haram have benefitted from lagging economic conditions by recruiting from among
197 the desperate and unemployed. Still, neither group would likely elect to lay down their arms should economic
198 realities improve in their respective regions as their strategic focus is the implementation of sharia rather than a
199 larger slice of the economic pie.

200 Utilizing a more localized group level of analysis, other scholars have noted a correlation between economic
201 downturns and increases in terrorism (Angrist 1995; Honaker 2004; Blomberg et al. 2004). For example, Angrist
202 (1995) notes that the early 1980s witnessed a rise in education among Palestinians. However, economic downturns
203 also caused a significant increase in unemployment across socio-economic levels. High levels of unemployment led
204 to dissatisfaction and social unrest. Is it a mere coincidence that this economic downturn coincided with the First
205 Intifada? Honaker (2004) draws a similar connection between unemployment and terrorism in Northern Ireland.
206 Ehrlich and Liu (2002) and Urdal (2006) find a positive correlation between population growth and terrorism,
207 especially when increasing numbers of unemployed youth are involved. Finally, Bowman (2008) reports that the
208 U.S. military paid former al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) detainees roughly \$200 per month after their release to deter
209 them from returning to AQI. Most were young, unemployed males who accepted jobs with AQI purely for the
210 money rather than for political ideology or religious conviction.

211 Bueno de Mesquita(??05) utilizes an individual level of analysis to parse out the various causal factors
212 involved in this phenomenon. While agreeing that economic factors play a significant role, Bueno de Mesquita
213 argues a more complex relationship than the standard linear correlation. Acknowledging that individuals on the
214 lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder are more inclined to volunteer for terrorist missions-particularly those
215 individuals harboring discontent towards the government-Bueno de Mesquita argues that terrorist organizations
216 only want to recruit the most qualified individuals. When economic contractions increase unemployment, terrorist
217 organizations have a more qualified pool of volunteers from which to choose.

218 This inexpensive pool of highly-qualified candidates leads to an increased number of attacks because harsh
219 government crackdowns often generate popular support which offsets the cost of future operations through a
220 surplus of donations and recruits, and the cycle continues.

221 Hence according to Bueno de Mesquita, it is not poverty per se that drives terrorism, or even economic
222 inequality, but economic downturns that create a surplus of highly qualified individuals who are angry enough
223 and desperate enough to view terrorism as a viable alternative to the status quo. The question remains, however,
224 how does one explain terrorism during periods of economic boom?

225 As this section demonstrates, the structural approach to explaining terrorism focuses on economic conditions
226 that are beyond the control of individuals. These conditions escalate frustration and desperation for the
227 multitudes they affect. Economic conditions also directly affect the choices individuals make by limiting the
228 alternatives available to them. Finally, those who engage in terrorism may use economic realities to justify
229 their actions or take advantage of desperate economic conditions to further their agenda as otherwise law-abiding
230 citizens may be tempted to pursue illicit alternatives during cycles of economic downturn. However, the economic
231 conditions alone do not explain why some choose terrorism over the status quo while others do not. I will now
232 examine the cultural approach to comprehending terrorism.

233 3 b) Cultural Explanations of Terrorism

234 Culturalists strive to understand the social context from which values, norms, and identities that govern human
235 behavior emerge. Therefore, culturalists argue that an understanding of political processes first requires an
236 understanding of cultural factors ?? Culturalists suggest that religion can sometimes be absolute and unyielding,
237 and it is often in these occasions that religious convictions (particularly those associated with monotheistic faiths)
238 can spark violence when confronted with contrary belief systems or practices. 2 When dealing with terrorism,
239 culturalists search for social conventions that might serve to institute violence as a culturally viable option (e.g.
240 3 Taylor (1988) asserts that as far back as the sixteenth century, Muslims faced two choices: either embrace
241 those aspects of the West that made it so successful or return to the pure faith of the past. According to Taylor,
242 adherents of the two alternatives have been at odds ever since. In more contemporary times, the twentieth
243 century witnessed the rise of secular nationalism and the neo-fundamentalist ideology that opposed it. 4 Kepel (
244 Payne (1989, p. 121) insists that "violence has been a central, accepted element, both in Muslim teaching and in
245 the historical conduct of the religion. For over a thousand years, the religious bias in the Middle Eastern Culture
246 has not been to discourage the use of force, but to encourage it."

247 Unfortunately, moral majority leaders such as Jerry Falwell, Franklin Graham, and Pat Robertson advance
248 this misguided view of Islam by asserting that Islam is inherently evil, and therefore, the source of modern-day
249 jihadist violence. However, anyone who wishes to look at the facts objectively can easily discredit this assertion.

250 Like all religions, Islam can be a unifying force. But of course, not all variants of Islam are the same, so Islam
251 can also be a dividing force as well. However, this doesn't make it evil. Nor is mainstream Islam behind so-called
252 "Islamic terrorism" (Esposito 2003).

253 2004) contends that this phenomenon is divided between the nationalist Islamist political parties in
254 predominantly Muslim countries and the internationally-oriented Islamists living elsewhere. According to Kepel,
255 most Islamist movements in predominantly Muslim states have adopted a more nationalist agenda in the post-
256 cold war era, and therefore religiously-motivated violence in these regions has increasingly been replaced by more
257 politically-motivated violence. In contrast, Kepel insists that religiously-motivated Islamist violence has increased
258 over the same period in the Diaspora, and particularly in the West, where some ten million Muslims reside in
259 Western Europe alone. Roy (2004) attributes this increase in politically-motivated violence in predominantly
260 Muslim states to the highly politicized terrorism of al Qaeda, whose interpretation of jihad as a personal duty
261 breaks with the more traditional notion of jihad as a collective, and primarily defensive, duty. 5 Venkatraman (
262 Roy also points to the increasingly individual nature of Islam in the West. Roy maintains that while the West
263 may not politicize Islam as much as its Middle-Eastern counterpart, its increasing focus on individualism lends
264 itself to radical views.

265 2007) argues that according to the Quranic principle of ijihad, Muslims are free to interpret Islam individually
266 and choose their Islamic practices as they wish provided they seek the will of God within an Islamic community. So
267 whether it is due to the politicization of Islam in predominantly Muslim regions or the influence of individualism
268 in the West, many scholars agree that there has been both an increase in politically-motivated conflict in Muslim
269 states and an increase in religiously-motivated Islamist violence in the West. 6 Others consider the practice of
270 honor killing as a culturally-specific social convention that institutes brutality(An excellent example is al Shabaab
271 which initially opposed the Ethiopian military, the Somali forces Ethiopia propped up, and any outside militants
272 that assisted them. While the group espouses a religious ideology, al Shabaab's fight was at one time primarily
273 a nationalist cause-though it has successfully drawn Muslims from other states around the world to fight the
274 "infidel crusaders" who have invaded Muslim soil (Vidino, et al. 2010). Kulwicki 2002). While this practice is
275 horrific, it in no way represents an exclusively Muslim disposition towards violence as domestic violence against
276 women is a global problem (Watts and Zimmerman 2002).

277 Examples of religiously motivated violence abound from the Christian Crusades to Muslim/Hindu conflicts and
278 even Buddhist/Hindu conflicts. Scholars can hardly claim any one religion as the exclusive domain of violence,
279 nor can they conclusively demonstrate that any religion causes violence (Martin 1997). Furthermore, religious
280 violence in any society is almost always accompanied by some level of ethno political tension and struggle over
281 limited resources, making this type of analysis particularly problematic (Barber 2001).

282 Despite the increase in Islamic terrorism, it is extremely challenging to demonstrate a direct correlation between
283 the religion of Islam and extremist violence. Pearce (2005) concludes that no religion displays a significantly higher
284 or lower propensity to violence than the others. Rather than attribute terrorism to any one religion, Wade and
285 Reiter (2007) find a positive correlation between the number of religious minority groups in a given state and its
286 overall level of terrorist activity. Thus, the search for culturally-specific causes of terrorism remains elusive.

287 In addition to citing specific cultures as prone to terrorist violence, others maintain that cultural differences
288 produce conflict. The most famous of these is Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Theory which maintains
289 that, since the end of the Cold War, intrastate war along cultural lines has replaced interstate aggression. While
290 his general observation concerning the rise of intrastate war is accurate, scholars have attacked Huntington's
291 theory for several reasons. Of primary concern to most critics is Huntington's focus on Turner (1993, p. 412)
292 warned that by attempting to equate culture with clearly delineated boundaries, scholars "risk essentializing
293 the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group or race." Similarly, Benhabib (2002, p.5) warns against
294 such a reductionist approach to understanding culture. She reasons that the attempt to conceive of culture as a
295 "clearly delineable whole" is derived from the desire to understand and control outgroups. Benhabib contrasts

5 D) POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR TERRORISM

296 this approach with how most people view their own culture, not as an undisputed reality, but more as "a horizon
297 that recedes each time one approaches it." From this perspective, culture is an elusive concept. We must not
298 attempt to apply iten masse to rigidly defined groups of people.

299 Huntington's concept of "cleft" countries is particularly salient to a cultural analysis of conflict in states such
300 as Nigeria and Sudan (during its civil war years). Huntington defines cleft countries as states divided between
301 civilizations. Conflict occurs when those belonging to one civilization attempt to impose their norms, mores, and
302 laws upon those belonging to another. Huntington attributes the civil war in Sudan between Muslims in the
303 North and Christians in the South to Sudan's status as a cleft state. Likewise, conflict in Nigeria could arguably
304 be viewed as a result of tensions between its Christian South and Muslim North.

305 However, even in religiously dichotomous regions such as Nigeria and the former state of Sudan, such simplistic
306 explanations prove insufficient. Closer analysis reveals that in both states the North/South divide is just the
307 tip of the iceberg. Each state has also witnessed various struggles between groups of very similar cultural and
308 religious identities.

309 In Nigeria for example, local groups have clashed with each other over control of resources for decades. Also
310 during the civil war in Sudan, Southerners battled each other just as fiercely as they fought the Northern
311 forces over the question of unification or independence. Therefore, cultural differentiation and ethnoreligious
312 fragmentation are not always the cause of conflict.

313 Nor does the absence of such diversity guarantee peace. For example, conflict has plagued Somalia-a largely
314 ethnically and religiously homogenous state. 7 In fact, there is increasing skepticism concerning whether we
315 can even consider discrete ethnic groups as the basic building blocks of society Singh 2010 &2012). A more
316 satisfactory explanation suggests that stable, effective governance has more to do with peace than an absence of
317 cultural diversity (Zubaida, 1989).

318 If ethnic or religious fragmentation were a significant cause of conflict, one could expect to see more consistent
319 results. But the fact is, many countries in Africa score high for either ethnic fragmentation, religious fragmentation
320 or both (Lane and Ersson 1994). 8 Finally, any discussion of a correlation between cultural factors and terrorism
321 needs to address the hegemony of discourse contested by critical thinkers such as Said (1976Said (, 1978, , All
322 have experienced very mixed results concerning violence within their borders.

323 There has always been?and there continues to be?conflict and violence in every culture (both across cultural
324 lines and within them). Therefore, cultural explanations alone offer limited understanding as to why acts of
325 terrorism occur in one place and not in another.

326 1985, 1997), who argue that Orientalism was devised to establish European imperial domination, and despite
327 its claims of neutrality, the Academy continues to perpetuate a mere caricature of the East as inferior to the West
328 rather than a representation of the East as different from the West (see also Derrida 1974;Deleuze and Guattari
329 1977;Foucault 1980;Bhabha 1983;Fairclough 2013). 9

330 4 c) Institutional Explanations of Terrorism

331 I have lived, studied and taught in North America, Europe, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Asia, and the
332 Middle East. I can attest from my own experience that many university students in these regions have been fed
333 a steady diet of neo-Orientalism from their youth. Thus, many readily accept an international hierarchy that
334 places them at the very bottom. Western scholars are no less susceptible. Indeed, like fish in water, Westerners
335 are often so immersed in neo-Orientalism that many hardly notice its existence. Given this vulnerability, scholars
336 need to be particularly careful when applying cultural explanations to terrorism as they are often laden with
337 stereotypes on the one hand and a slew of unanswered questions on the other. In the next section, I will discuss
338 institutional explanations of terrorism.

339 Institutionalism asserts that institutions shape both the preferences of individuals as well as the acceptable
340 means for attaining those preferences 8 Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire,
341 Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo
342 and Uganda. 9 Consider Said's academic (and what appeared to be personal) tit for tat with Bernard Lewis
343 (e.g., Said 1976; Lewis 1982). (Wildavsky 1987;Koelble 1995;Bowles 1998;1999;Persson 2002). Institutions can
344 be formal such as a state's laws, regulations, educational systems, economic policies and government (Stiglitz
345 2000;Bratton 2007). Institutions can also be informal arrangements of all kinds to include corruption, clientelism
346 or something as simple as people allowing pregnant women and the elderly to go to the front of the line at the
347 bank (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Grzymala-Busse 2010). As is the case with other systemic factors, institutional
348 explanations for terrorism abound.

349 5 d) Political Explanations for Terrorism

350 There is broad disagreement concerning which type of political regime is more likely to experience terrorism.
351 Some studies link terrorism to democracies while others tie it to authoritarian regimes. One view is that due to
352 increased political representation and participation, democratic societies are less likely to spawn terrorism than
353 authoritarian regimes (Schmid 1992;Gurr 2003).

354 Others conclude just the opposite, however, positively correlating political rights and civil liberties with
355 terrorism (Ross 1993;Eubank and Weinberg 2001). Drakos and Gofas (2006) contend that non-democracies

356 likely only appear to experience fewer terrorist incidents due to underreporting. Eyerman (1998) finds that new
357 democracies are especially prone to terrorism because they reduce both the cost and risk. Li (2005) claims
358 that democracies with proportional representation experience fewer incidents of terrorism than democracies with
359 majoritarian or mixed electoral systems because proportional representation generally creates more political space
360 for new parties. Li's conclusion contradicts Piazza's (2008) findings (mentioned above) that tie terrorism to social
361 cleavages.

362 Data from empirical studies also suggest an inverted U-shaped correlation between terrorism and both
363 authoritarian states and democracies (Abadie 2004). Terrorism scholars refer to this correlation as the democracy
364 curve. It is premised upon the idea that while authoritarian states are able to crush internal threats, democracies
365 tend to experience fewer contingencies. The democracy curve in no way asserts that autocratic states deal with
366 all forms of terrorism or that democracies never face the scourge of terrorism. One would have to ignore a myriad
367 of realities to make such an assumption (e.g., the Chechen Wars, the Uighurs, 9/11 and the resulting decade-plus
368 GWOT).

369 The democracy curve notes fewer incidents of terrorism in both democratic and authoritarian societies. This
370 observation leads some to conclude a positive correlation between semi-democracies and terrorism due to a lack
371 of civil liberties such as freedom of the press (Sawyer 2005) and transparent legal systems (Kreimer 2007).

372 Beyond regime type, other institutional phenomena that are purported to open the door for terrorist influences
373 are poorly integrated party systems and endemic corruption. In Lebanon, for example, Hezbollah has been able
374 to take advantage of the fact that there are few established political parties in the country (Norton 2007). In
375 contrast, the endemic corruption of Fatah opened political space for Hamas in Gaza (Milton-Edwards 2007). But
376 again, poorly organized party systems and malfeasance merely represent opportunities for terrorists to exploit
377 (Shelley 2004; Shinn 2004). Neither demonstrates a consistent correlation with terrorism. In fact, many developing
378 states possess both phenomena without experiencing a high incidence of terrorism (Diamond 2002). Mohammad
379 (2005) looks instead at a regime's overall legitimacy as the primary factor for terrorism among Arab states in
380 the Middle East. After testing for other factors such as literacy rates, socio-economic development, regime type
381 and support for Islamic extremism, Mohammad concludes that none contribute to violence as consistently as
382 the perception that a regime is propped up by the West and that it is supportive of American foreign policy.
383 Similarly, Savun and Phillips (2009) maintain that states are more likely to experience terrorism depending upon
384 the type of foreign policy they pursue. The more isolationist the foreign policy, the lower the probability that a
385 state will experience terrorist violence.

386 6 e) The Mass Media as an Explanation for Terrorism

387 The mass media is another institution that has been linked to terrorism as it sometimes serves the interests of
388 terrorists (Nacos 2016). Exposure to the mass media is perhaps the most critical asset terrorists enjoy when
389 it comes to generating popular support and attempting to propagate their ideology (Hoffman 2013). Without
390 media coverage, terrorists fail to publicize their actions beyond the immediate victims. The lack of an audience
391 reduces terrorism to acts of random violence (Nacos 2007).

392 Take the recent media coverage of the Islamic State (IS) for instance. The group is, without doubt, a threat.
393 However, IS has been active since 1999 under a variety of names with little global attention since the death of
394 al-Zarqawi (Zelin 2014). The recent events concerning IS are newsworthy. However, one also has to take into
395 account the tremendous benefit that IS garners from publicity (Giroux 2016). Wilkinson (1997) asserts that in
396 democracies, where freedom of the press is supposed to be upheld, a symbiotic relationship often develops between
397 the terrorist organizations seeking publicity and the media outlets that profit from sensational news stories. This
398 relationship is offered as one reason why terrorism thrives in democracies more so than in authoritarian states.
399 Wieviorka (1988) denies the existence of such a simplistic, straightforward relationship, pointing to instances
400 where terrorist organizations have targeted journalists and news outlets. 10 Others point out that such publicity
401 has a mixed record regarding the amount of popular support it generates (And while democratic governments are
402 usually slow to resort to censorship, many have enacted anti-complicity statutes that prohibit media organizations
403 from lending support to terrorist organizations through publicity. Murphy et al. 2004). Not only do mass media
404 outlets publicize the terrorists' cause, but they also expose the atrocities committed by the group and such
405 "publicity" often backfires. For instance, Funes (1998) examines how media coverage of the attacks perpetrated
406 by the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna "Basque Homeland and Liberty" caused a significant loss of popular support for
407 the group. Some scholars argue that terrorists do not need their actions to be publicized as government reactions
408 to terrorist attacks are often enough to incite public outrage. For instance, Bloom (2004) discusses how the media
409 coverage of the harsh retaliatory crack-downs initiated by the Israeli government and military forces has served
410 to outrage the Palestinian public, thus generating widespread support for Palestinian terrorist activity.

411 So while terrorist organizations attempt to use the mass media to raise awareness and support, regimes
412 publicize the criminality of terrorism and thereby delegitimize the group in the eyes of the public. Both, however,
413 run the risk of losing public support for their use of violence.

414 **7 f) Madaris as an Explanation for Terrorism**

415 Another debatable issue surrounding institutions is that of madaris (plural for madrasa) and the radicalization of
416 school-age children. For example, the 9-11 Commission describes madaris as "incubators of violent extremism"
417 (Commission 2004, p. 367). However, this depiction is inflammatory and not entirely accurate. In Arabic,
418 "madrasa" means "school." Many madaris serve the impoverished, and as charitable organizations, prove to be
419 harmless. In Somalia, for example, the formal education system ceased to function after 1991. Privately funded
420 madaris were the only option available for low-income Somali children (Botha and Abdile 2014).

421 Much of the concern over the perceived link between madaris and Islamic terrorism stems from the fact that
422 as many as 10,000 madaris in Pakistan, and thousands more around the world, are funded by Saudi Wahhabi
423 groups (Armanios 2003; Benoliel 2003). However, the quality of education should also be considered (Botha and
424 Abdile 2014).

425 Since the 9/11 attacks, madaris have received a disproportionate amount of attention among Westerners as
426 training centers for radical jihadists. However, Siddique (2009) argues against this conception. While it is true
427 that madaris are known to offer religious education, by and large, according to Siddique, militant madaris are the
428 exception rather than the rule. Siddique concludes that to the extent that madaris are militant at all; they are
429 much more likely to support local and regional extremism rather than international. Interestingly, none of the
430 nineteen perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were educated at madaris.

431 Similarly, Bergen and Pandey (2006) examine the profiles of 79 terrorists involved in the five worst anti-West
432 terrorist attacks in recent history (the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 attacks against the two U.S.
433 embassies in Africa, 9/11, the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing, and the 2005 London bombings). They conclude
434 that, unlike the average terrorist engaged in attacks against domestic/cross-border targets, the average global
435 terrorist is highly educated. Bergen and Pandey further determine that the level of technological sophistication
436 required to orchestrate a terror attack against a Western target is not provided in most madaris.

437 Puri (2010) also concludes that militant madaris in Pakistan play a relatively minor role in the overall equation
438 of cause and effect. Not only are a very tiny proportion of Pakistani students exposed to such madaris, those who
439 do attend militant madaris lack the necessary skills to engage in high-tech terrorist attacks. Stern (2000) insists,
440 however, that the relatively few militant madaris in Pakistan encouraged their students to engage in jihad and
441 sent them to jihad training camps. Likewise, Magouirk et al. (2008) report that madaris proved an integral part
442 of the equation in securing recruits for Jemaah Islamiyah.

443 While many madaris around the world are funded by Saudi sources, Coulson (2004) argues that the real blame
444 for the existence of militant madaris in Afghanistan is to be laid at the feet of the Reagan administration which
445 invested some \$51 million towards textbooks that incite jihad against Soviet troops. These textbooks depicted
446 extremely violent "lessons" such as math problems asking students to calculate the length of time it will take a
447 mujahid's bullet to reach a Russian's head. This covert plan to indoctrinate, fund, and arm the mujahidin was
448 part of the larger \$3.2 billion Operation Cyclone (Davis 2002). After the Soviets left Afghanistan, the Taliban
449 movement emerged and was mainly comprised of students (the word "taliban" is Pashto for "students") influenced
450 and trained by the very mujahidin the U.S. backed in the 1980s. Mazzetti et al. (2010) also suggest that the
451 Pakistani government, which continues to receive over \$1 billion per year from Washington for its part in the
452 GWOT, also funds certain madaris toward similar ends.

453 But here again, the focus is on local and regional rather than international terrorism.

454 The perception of madaris as training centers for radical jihadists, while meriting consideration, is at best
455 misguided and incomplete, and at worst blatant propaganda. The alarm generated over madaris stems from the
456 funding they receive by Wahhabi groups in Saudi Arabia. However, as noted above, U.S. funding has been linked
457 to militant madaris as well. While some madaris may incite hatred, very few students who attend such madaris
458 will ever obtain the technical ability and financial means necessary to orchestrate a terrorist attack against the
459 West.

460 One can see that, as with structural and cultural factors, institutional explanations alone prove incomplete.
461 While institutions may shape both the preferences of terrorists and the opportunities available for them to exploit,
462 they do not explain why only a tiny percentage of the population within a given institutional design choose to
463 engage in or support acts of terrorism. Nor do they further our understanding of whether such actors are likely
464 to achieve their strategic objectives through violence.

465 Finally, scholars also cite systemic causes as the culprits behind terrorism. However, the sheer randomness of
466 terrorism suggests that something much more specific also needs to be considered. Hence, I will now explore the
467 role of rational explanations as a potential key to understanding this phenomenon.

468 **8 g) Rational Explanations of Terrorism**

469 Scholars in this camp analyze individual strategic interactions as the primary causal factors of political outcomes
470 (Fiorina 1995; Kiser 1996; Levi 1997). Thus, it is possible to distinguish rational choice scholars from structuralists,
471 culturalists, and institutionalists by the level of analysis that they employ. Rationalists tend to approach
472 problems deductively rather than inductively. They are more interested in broad generalization than deep
473 understanding. The deductive method is evident by the three fundamental assumptions of the rational-choice
474 approach. First, all individuals have fixed and ranked preferences. Second, all individuals are self-interested and
475 strive to maximize their goals. Third, all individuals are interdependent and therefore act strategically based

476 upon their expectations of what others will do. Rational choice scholars apply these three assumptions to all
477 cases regardless of individual circumstances.

478 The rationalist camp in the body of terrorism literature attempts to understand terrorism via the preferences,
479 incentives, and choices of individual utility maximizers who act deliberately toward the most efficient means to
480 an end based upon their perception of what other actors will do (Enders and Sandler 2000; Berman 2003; Frey
481 2004).

482 9 Volume XVIII Issue IV Version I

483 10 (H)

484 For example, kidnapping is a rational act provided there is reasonable cause to believe that someone will comply
485 with the perpetrator's demands. While this crime is sometimes used to raise awareness or to negotiate the release
486 of political prisoners, it would not be employed for these purposes if there were zero expectation that the media
487 outlets or governments involved would comply.

488 Kidnapping also raises a substantial amount of money. It is estimated that the 409 international incidents
489 perpetrated between 1968 and 1982 yielded some \$350 million (roughly \$850,000 per victim), generating significant
490 revenue for the perpetrators and therefore constituting a rational act (Rapoport 2004).

491 Still, no one kidnaps homeless children in Manila. Nor does anyone make demands in exchange for the safe
492 return of a hostage possessing insufficient political or emotional value to those negotiating. Kidnappers only
493 target victims likely to generate a ransom. Thus, it is an example of a purely rational act engaged in only when
494 the perpetrator(s) perceive it to be the most expedient means to a desired end. Likewise, acts of terrorism can
495 be understood more clearly when one adds the rationalist lens to the looking glass.

496 One could argue that terrorism is not entirely rational in that the fruits of terrorism are also a public good
497 because any political concessions achieved are shared by all regardless of whether they participate in the act or
498 not. While this is true, it in no way precludes terrorism from being rational. Berman (2003) argues that terrorist
499 organizations gain tremendous popularity despite the destruction they cause if the public goods they provide
500 exceed those provided by the government. In this respect, even the provision of public goods is rational as it
501 benefits the organization.

502 Even in the extreme case of suicide terrorism, any potential benefits are almost entirely in the public realm,
503 making the rationality of suicide terrorism for the individual a particularly challenging idea. Still, suicide terrorism
504 is rational if the bomber believes that there are rewards to be had in the next life. What is more, the bomber's
505 family also often benefits from the support of the group sponsoring the act (Zakaria 2007).

506 Petter ??2004) elaborates on the rationality argument by identifying four distinct terrorist profiles in a typical
507 jihadist cell-each with their rationale for membership: (1) the entrepreneur, (2) the protégé, (3) misfits, and (4)
508 drifters. The entrepreneur is carving out a niche and making a name for him or herself. For the entrepreneur,
509 terrorism is a business. The protégé sees an opportunity to utilize his or her ability. Finally, misfits find a place to
510 belong while drifters obtain a convenient, albeit temporary, economic opportunity. 11 Unsurprisingly, Rosendorff
511 and Sandler (2010) find that supporters will join terrorist organizations if they stand to gain more from their
512 participation in the cell than from other economic opportunities available to them. Therefore, as real earnings
513 from wages rise, so do the opportunity costs for engaging in terrorist activities. This point is so intuitive that it
514 hardly merits mention.

515 However, Rosendorff and Sandler also suggest that in addition to fewer acts of terrorism, policymakers can
516 also expect more egregious types of terrorism in times of economic prosperity. The reason there are often more
517 suicide bombings and other particularly lethal attacks during times of economic prosperity is that terrorist leaders
518 hope to provoke the government into overreacting. Harsh retaliation by the government generates support for
519 the terrorists' cause and therefore lowers the group's cost of engaging in terrorism through increased financial
520 support, approval, and volunteers.

521 This tactic works particularly well against liberal democracies since elected officials respond to political pressure
522 to do something. Harsh retaliation on the part of the state, in turn, generates support which then allows the
523 terrorist organization to continue to operate even in times of economic prosperity ??Bloom 2004, Rosendorff
524 and Sandler 2010). ??nders and Sandler (2005) propose that individuals can choose how they respond to systemic
525 factors such as the economy and the political structure, thus specifying their models with the individual's choice
526 as the independent variable. This distinction is particularly salient in the post 9/11 era.

527 The United States and its allies targeted al-Qaeda and its affiliates, captured or killed roughly twothirds of the
528 leadership (along with some 3,400 operatives), and froze more than \$135 million in assets. Al Qaeda responded
529 by decentralizing its network and thereby adapting to the new economic and political realities.

530 Decentralization renders the larger organization more resilient against infiltration and attacks as each local
531 cell is much more independent than before the GWOT. If one cell is infiltrated and the leadership is captured
532 or killed, the entire organization is no longer compromised. Likewise, the nature of the new design makes it
533 exponentially harder to track and freeze the organization's financial assets as (ideally) each cell is financially
534 independent of the other.

535 This resilience on the part of al Qaeda demonstrates that it is a rational actor. It does more than simply react
536 to systemic forces. It strategically adapts and responds according to its preferences. Rosendorff and Sandler

537 (2010) further contend that terrorists can the reason(s) an individual initially engages in terrorist activity is not
538 necessarily the same as the reason(s) that person continues. Nor is it always relevant to the decision to cease
539 terrorist activity.

540 choose to manipulate the government's response. 12 For example, in addition to the ideas mentioned earlier,
541 Gurr This is different from the many approaches that specify the terrorists themselves as the dependent variable.

542 (1970) advances relative deprivation, and Tilly (1978) promotes his theory of political opportunity. While
543 Gurr investigates the link between economic distribution and political violence, Tilly considers the level of state
544 oppression as the factor in determining how much conflict will be tolerated. Both theories offer compelling
545 arguments and have spawned large bodies of literature, yet neither views the terrorists themselves as the
546 independent variable.

547 Likewise, Lichbach (1987) introduced a rational actor model with three propositions: (1) Government
548 repression of nonviolent opposition will result in more violent resistance. (2) The factor that determines whether
549 an opposition group will increase or decrease all resistance activities is the government's accommodation policy
550 toward that particular group. (3) It is not repression per se that increases violent resistance, but inconsistency
551 in government policy toward opposition. While offering a rational explanation of sorts, Lichbach essentially
552 sidesteps the human agency of the terrorists altogether by specifying the state as the independent variable.

553 11 II.

554 12 Conclusion

555 This article has considered many of the socalled "causes" of terrorism to debunk the myth that structural, cultural
556 or institutional factors operate as independent variables to generate terrorist violence. There are no "causes" of
557 terrorism. Like most violence, terrorist violence is merely a tactic-employed by virtually anyone-as part of an
558 overall strategy to obtain a particular goal. In this sense, it is entirely rational.

559 However unlike pure cost-benefit analyses, actors who engage in terrorism often do so as more than mere utility
560 maximizers. Structural, cultural, and institutional factors, no doubt, affect actors' circumstances and influence
561 the resources available to them. These, in turn, affect the decision whether to utilize violence as a tactic or
562 not. At the heart of the matter is not what is causing terrorist violence, but the strategic objective(s) behind
563 the violence-what do the actorsinvolved hope to accomplish through the violence? There are no cookie-cutter
formulas that we can apply en-masse. Every incident is distinct and demandsan in-depth strategic analysis.^{1 2}



Figure 1:

Figure 2:

¹The Usual Suspects: Debunking the Myth about the "Causes" of Terrorism

²In the cases of al Shabaab and Boko Haram (and indeed, many other jihadist groups), one obvious explanation for the increase in violence is the belief that democratic forms of government are haram (prohibited) under sharia (Schacht 1959). Thus, they rebel when outsiders impose this foreign and (in their eyes) unlawful institution upon them.³ For an excellent bibliography see, Haynes (2005).

³(Ajami, 1978) offers an excellent discussion of secular nationalism and pan-Arabism in the wake of the Six Day War.⁵ For more on the individual conception of jihad, see Lahoud (2010a; 2010b).

⁴Selengut (2008) offers a comprehensive treatment of the rise of religious violence.

⁵There are, of course, linguistic and other differences that diversify the Somali population. For example, see Solomon (2015).

⁶Year 2018 © 2018 Global JournalsThe Usual Suspects: Debunking the Myth about the "Causes" of Terrorism

⁷Horgan (2005) makes a somewhat related point in his discussion of the complexity of human behavior, stating the need to understand that

⁸(See also Celestino and Gleditsch 2013) who conclude that nonviolent opposition to authoritarian governments substantially improve the chances for a democratic transition while violent resistance increases the likelihood of another dictatorship.

⁹© 2018 Global JournalsThe Usual Suspects: Debunking the Myth about the "Causes" of Terrorism

566 .1 Year 2018

567 The Usual Suspects: Debunking the Myth about the "Causes" of Terrorism
568 [Publishers] , Rowman & Littlefield Publishers .
569 [Macmillan] , Palgrave Macmillan , UK .
570 [October] , October .
571 [WW Norton company] , *WW Norton & company*
572 [New York Times (2014)] , http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/14/opinion/14bergen.html?_r=0
573 New York Times 14 June. 2014. (Accessed 12 May)
574 [Deleuze and Guattari ()] , G Deleuze , F Guattari . 1977. *Anti-Oedipus*.
575 [February ()] , February . 2016.
576 [Newsweek (25 February)] , <http://www.newsweek.com/isis-threatens-facebook-zuckerberg-and-twitters-d>
577 Newsweek 25 February.
578 [Lahoud (2001)] '2010(b). The strengths and weaknesses of jihadist ideology'. N Lahoud . *Combating Terrorism*
579 *Center at West Point* October, 1.
580 [Urdal ()] 'A clash of generations? youth bulges and political violence'. H Urdal . *International Studies Quarterly*
581 2006. 50 (3) p. .
582 [Levi ()] 'A model, a method, and a map: rational choice in comparative and historical analysis'. M Levi .
583 *Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure*, 1997. 28 p. 78.
584 [Murphy et al. ()] 'A preliminary study exploring the value changes taking place in the United States since the'.
585 E F MurphyJr , J D Gordon , A Mullen . *Journal of Business Ethics* 2004. September 11. 2001. 50 (1) p. .
586 (terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in)
587 [Davis ()] 'A" is for Allah'. C Davis . *J" is for jihad*. *World Policy Journal* 2002. p. .
588 [Mccormack ()] 'An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa'. D Mccormack . *Occasional Papers Series*
589 2005. 2 (4) .
590 [Shughart ()] 'An analytical history of terrorism'. I I Shughart , WF . *Public Choice* 2006. 1945-2000. 128 (1-2)
591 p. .
592 [Turner ()] 'Anthropology and multiculturalism: what is anthropology that multiculturalists should be mindful
593 of it?'. T Turner . *Cultural anthropology* 1993. 8 (4) p. .
594 [Said ()] *Arabs, Islam and the dogmas of the West*? *The New York Times Book Review*, E Said . 1976. p. 31.
595 [Gopin ()] *Between Eden and Armageddon. The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking*, M Gopin
596 . 2000.
597 [Laue ()] *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking: The*
598 *Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking*, D M G J H Laue . 2000. Oxford University Press.
599 [Giroux ()] *Beyond the spectacle of terrorism: global uncertainty and the challenge of the new media*, H A Giroux
600 . 2016. (Routledge)
601 [Vidino et al. ()] 'Bringing global jihad to the Horn of Africa: Al Shabaab, Western fighters, and the sacralization
602 of the Somali conflict'. L Vidino , R Pantucci , E Kohlmann . *African Security* 2010. 3 (4) p. .
603 [Wildavsky ()] 'Choosing preferences by constructing institutions: a cultural theory of preference formation'. A
604 Wildavsky . *American Political Science Review* 1987. 81 (01) p. .
605 [Ahmed ()] 'Coexistence and/or confrontation? Towards a reappraisal of Christian-Muslim encounter in
606 contemporary Ethiopia'. H Ahmed . *Journal of religion in Africa* 2006. 36 (1) p. .
607 [Lane and Ersson ()] *Comparative politics: an introduction and new approach*, J.-E Lane , S O Ersson . 1994.
608 Polity Press Cambridge.
609 [Haynes ()] 'Conflict, conflict resolution and peace-building: the role of religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and
610 Cambodia'. J Haynes . *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 2009. 47 (1) p. .
611 [Magouirk et al. ()] 'Connecting terrorist networks'. J Magouirk , S Atran , M Sageman . *Studies in Conflict &*
612 *Terrorism* 2008. 31 (1) p. .
613 [Tinnes ()] 'Counting lives in a theater of terroran analysis of media-oriented hostage takings in Iraq, Afghanistan,
614 Pakistan and Saudi Arabia'. J Tinnes . *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2010. (5) p. 4.
615 [Said ()] *Covering Islam: how the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world*, E Said .
616 1997. London: Vintage.
617 [Fairclough ()] *Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language*, N Fairclough . 2013. (Routledge)
618 [Solomon ()] 'Critical terrorism studies and its implications for Africa'. H Solomon . *Politikon* 2015. 42 (2) p. .

12 CONCLUSION

619 [Frey ()] *Dealing with terrorism: stick or carrot?*, B S Frey . 2004. Edward Elgar Publishing.

620 [Savun and Phillips ()] 'Democracy, foreign policy, and terrorism'. B Savun , B J Phillips . *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2009. 53 (6) p. .

622 [Lichbach ()] 'Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of repression and dissent'. M I Lichbach . *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1987. 31 (2) p. .

624 [Persson ()] 'Do political institutions shape economic policy'. T Persson . *Econometrica* 2002. 70 (3) p. .

625 [Martin ()] *Does Christianity Cause War*, D Martin . 1997. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

626 [Wade and Reiter ()] 'Does democracy matter? regime type and suicide terrorism'. S J Wade , D Reiter . *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2007. 51 (2) p. .

628 [Li ()] 'Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents'. Q Li . *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2005. 49 (2) p. .

630 [Blomberg et al. ()] 'Economic conditions and terrorism'. S B Blomberg , G D Hess , A Weerapana . *European Journal of Political Economy* 2004. 20 (2) p. .

632 [Coulson ()] 'Education and indoctrination in the Muslim world'. A Coulson . *Policy Analysis* 2004. p. 29.

633 [Krueger and Male ?ková ()] 'Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal connection?'. A B Krueger , J Male ?ková . *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 2003. 17 (4) p. .

635 [Bowles ()] 'Endogenous preferences: the cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions'. S Bowles . *Journal of economic literature* 1998. 36 (1) p. .

637 [Barber ()] 'Evolving approaches to jihad: from self-defense to revolutionary and regime-change.Political Violence'. B Barber . *Chi. J. Int'l L* 2001. 2007. 8 p. 119. (Jihad versus McWorld: terrorism's challenge to democracy)

640 [Shinn ()] 'Fighting terrorism in East Africa and the Horn'. D Shinn . *Foreign Service Journal* 2004. 81 (9) p. 40.

642 [Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States Commission ()] 'Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States'. *Commission* 2004. US Government.

645 [Bratton ()] 'Formal versus informal institutions in Africa'. M Bratton . *Journal of Democracy* 2007. 18 (3) p. .

646 [Celestino and Gleditsch ()] 'Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies'. M R Celestino , K S Gleditsch . *Journal of Peace Research* 2013. 50 (3) p. .

648 [Tilly ()] *From mobilization to revolution*, C Tilly . 1978. New York: McGraw-Hill.

649 [Piazza ()] 'Global poverty, inequality, and transnational terrorism: a research note'. J A Piazza . *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2010. (4) p. 1.

651 [Roy ()] *Globalized Islam: the search for a new ummah*, O Roy . 2004. Columbia University Press.

652 [Berman ()] 'Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish underground: an economist's view of radical religious militias'. E Berman . *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research* 2003. 2008. 8 (1) p. . (National Bureau of Economic Research.Brinkerhoff, J. M.)

655 [Milton-Edwards ()] 'Hamas: victory with ballots and bullets'. B Milton-Edwards . *Global Change, Peace & Security* 2007. 19 (3) p. .

657 [Norton ()] *Hezbollah.a short history*, A R Norton . 2007. Princeton University Press.

658 [Hoffman ()] 'Holy terror": the implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative'. B Hoffman . *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 1995. 18 (4) p. .

660 [Bergen ()] *Holy war, inc.: inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden*, P Bergen . 2002. Simon and Schuster.

661 [Perry ()] *Huntington and his critics: the West and Islam. Arab studies quarterly*, G E Perry . 2002. p. .

662 [Robison et al. ()] 'Ideologies of violence: The social origins of Islamist and leftist transnational terrorism'. K K Robison , E M Crenshaw , J C Jenkins . *Social Forces* 2006. 84 (4) p. .

664 [Drakos and Gofas ()] 'In search of the average transnational terrorist attack venue'. K Drakos , A Gofas . *Defence and Peace Economics* 2006. 17 (02) p. .

666 [Piazza ()] 'Incubators of terror: do failed and failing states promote transnational terrorism?'. J A Piazza . *International Studies Quarterly* 2008. 52 (3) p. .

668 [Helmke and Levitsky ()] 'Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda'. G Helmke , S Levitsky . *Perspectives on politics* 2004. 2 (04) p. .

670 [Hoffman ()] *Inside terrorism*, B Hoffman . 2013. Columbia University Press.

671 [Sedgwick ()] 'Inspiration and the origins of global waves of terrorism'. M Sedgwick . *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 2007. 30 (2) p. .

673 [Lieberman and Singh ()] 'Institutionalized Ethnicity and Civil War' E S Lieberman , P Singh . *Paper presented
674 at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, 2010.

675 [Enders and Sandler ()] 'Is transnational terrorism becoming more threatening? A time-series investigation'. W
676 Enders , T Sandler . *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2000. 44 (3) p. .

677 [Moore ()] *ISIS threatens Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg and Twitter's Jack Dorsey*, J Moore . 2016.

678 [Omar ()] 'Islam and violence'. A R Omar . *The Ecumenical Review* 2003. 55 (2) p. .

679 [Etienne ()] 'Islam and violence'. B Etienne . *History and Anthropology* 2007. 18 (3) p. .

680 [Milton-Edwards ()] *Islam and violence. In Islam and violence in the modern era*, B Milton-Edwards . 2006. p. .

681 [Armanios (2003)] *Islamic religious schools, madrasas: Background*, F Armanios . <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf> 2003. 17 September, 2014.

682 [Petter ()] 'Jihad in Europe-a survey of the motivations for Sunni Islamist terrorism in postmillennium'. N Petter
683 . *Europe. FFI Rapport* 2004. p. . Norwegian Defence Research Establishment

684 [Hegghammer ()] *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: violence and pan-Islamism since 1979*, T Hegghammer . 2010.
685 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

686 [Silverman ()] 'Just war, jihad, and terrorism: a comparison of Western and Islamic norms for the use of political
687 violence'. A L Silverman . *Journal of Church and State* 2002. 44 (1) p. .

688 [Goldstein ()] 'Kondratieff waves as war cycles'. J S Goldstein . *International Studies Quarterly* 1985. p. .

689 [Krueger and Laitin ()] *Kto kogo?: A cross-country study of the origins and targets of terrorism. Terrorism,
690 economic development, and political openness*, A B Krueger , D D Laitin . 2008. p. .

691 [Sageman ()] *Leaderless jihad: terror networks in the twenty-first century*, M Sageman . 2011. University of
692 Pennsylvania Press.

693 [Nacos ()] *Mass-mediated terrorism: mainstream and digital media in terrorism and counterterrorism*, B Nacos
694 . 2016. Rowman & Littlefield.

695 [Nacos ()] *Mass-mediated terrorism: the central role of the media in terrorism and counterterrorism*, B L Nacos
696 . 2007. Rowman & Littlefield.

697 [Mazzetti et al. ()] M Mazzetti , J Perlez , E Schmitt , A W Lehren . *Pakistan aids insurgency in Afghanistan,
698 reports assert. The New York Times*, 2010. p. 25.

699 [McCauley and Moskalenko ()] 'Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism'. C McCauley
700 , S Moskalenko . *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2008. 20 (3) p. .

701 [Kepel ()] *Muslim extremism in Egypt: the prophet and pharaoh*, G Kepel . 1985. Univ of California Press.

702 [Zubaida ()] *Nations: old and new comments on Anthony D. Smith's 'The myth of the "modern nation" and the
703 myths of nations*, S Zubaida . 1989.

704 [Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (ed.) ()] *of Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Trans. Robert
705 Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (ed.) 1972. New York; Viking. 1.

706 [Derrida ()] *Of grammatology*, J Derrida . 1974. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

707 [Said ()] *Orientalism reconsidered. Cultural Critique*, E W Said . 1985. p. .

708 [Said ()] *Orientalism: western conceptions of the Orient*, E Said . 1978. New York: Random House.

709 [Stern ()] 'Pakistan's jihad culture'. J Stern . *Foreign Affairs* 2000. p. .

710 [Ahmed ()] *Palestinian resistance and 'suicide bombing': causes and consequences. Root causes of terrorism:
711 Myths, reality and ways forward*, H H Ahmed . 2005. p. .

712 [Bloom ()] 'Palestinian suicide bombing: Public support, market share, and outbidding'. M M Bloom . *Political
713 Science Quarterly* 2004. 119 (1) p. .

714 [Lipset and Rokkan ()] *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, S M Lipset , S Rokkan . 1967. Free PressNew York.

715 [Pye and Verba ()] *Political culture and political development*, L W Pye , S Verba . 1965. Princeton University
716 Press.

717 [Dawson et al. ()] *Political socialisation*, R Dawson , K Prewitt , K Dawson . 1969. Boston; Little, Brown.

718 [Piazza ()] 'Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism'. J A Piazza . *Journal of Peace
719 Research* 2011. 48 (3) p. .

720 [Abadie ()] 'Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism'. A Abadie . *National Bureau of Economic
721 Research* 2004.

722 [Foucault ()] *Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings*, M Foucault . 1980. p. . (Pantheon)

723 [Russell and Miller ()] 'Profile of a terrorist'. C A Russell , B H Miller . *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 1977. 1
724 (1) p. .

725

12 CONCLUSION

726 [Botha and Abdile (2014)] *Radicalization and al Shabaab recruitment in Somalia*. Institute for Security Studies,
727 A Botha , M Abdile . 2014. September. 266.

728 [Fiorina ()] 'Rational choice, empirical contributions, and the scientific enterprise'. M P Fiorina . *Critical Review*
729 1995. 9 (1-2) p. .

730 [Kreimer ()] 'Rays of sunlight in a shadow war: FOIA, the abuses of anti-terrorism, and the strategy of
731 transparency'. S F Kreimer . *Lewis & Clark Law Review* 2007. 11 (4) p. .

732 [Haynes ()] *Religion and development*, J Haynes . 2007. Palgrave Macmillan.

733 [Haynes ()] *Religion and international relations after '9/11'*. *Democratization*, J Haynes . 2005. 12 p. .

734 [Silberman et al. ()] 'Religion and world change: violence and terrorism versus peace'. I Silberman , E T Higgins
735 , C S Dweck . *Journal of Social Issues* 2005. 61 (4) p. .

736 [Kalu et al. ()] *Religion, history, and politics in Nigeria: essays in honor of Ogbu U*, O Kalu , O Nnaemeka , C
737 J Korieh , G U Nwokeji . 2005. Kalu. University Press of America.

738 [Venkatraman ()] 'Religious basis for Islamic terrorism: The Quran and its interpretations'. A Venkatraman .
739 *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 2007. 30 (3) p. .

740 [Haynes ()] *Religious fundamentalism and politics. Major world religions: from their origins to the present*, J
741 Haynes . 2003. London: RoutledgeCurzon. p. .

742 [Pearce ()] 'Religious rage: a quantitative analysis of the intensity of religious conflicts'. S Pearce . *Terrorism
743 and political violence* 2005. 17 (3) p. .

744 [Piazza ()] *Rooted in poverty?: terrorism, poor economic development, and social cleavages 1. Terrorism and
745 Political Violence*, J A Piazza . 2006. 18 p. .

746 [Mohammad ()] *Roots of terrorism in the Middle East: Internal pressures and international constraints*, A Y S
747 Mohammad . 2005. p. . (Root causes of terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward)

748 [Selengut ()] *Sacred fury: understanding religious violence*, C Selengut . 2008. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

749 [Stiglitz ()] *Social capital: A multifaceted perspective*, J E Stiglitz . 2000. p. . (Formal and informal institutions)

750 [Funes ()] 'Social Responses to Political Violence in the Basque Country Peace Movements and Their Audience'.
751 M J Funes . *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1998. 42 (4) p. .

752 [Ehrlich and Liu ()] 'Some roots of terrorism'. P R Ehrlich , J Liu . *Population and environment* 2002. 24 (2) p.
753 .

754 [Benoliel ()] *Strengthening education in the Muslim world: Summary of the Desk Study*, S Benoliel . 2003. US
755 Agency for International Development

756 [Ross ()] 'Structural causes of oppositional political terrorism: Towards a causal model'. J I Ross . *Journal of
757 Peace Research* 1993. 30 (3) p. .

758 [Hay and Wincott ()] 'Structure, agency and historical institutionalism'. C Hay , D Wincott . *Political studies*
759 1998. 46 (5) p. .

760 [Rosendorff and Sandler ()] 'Suicide terrorism and the backlash effect'. B P Rosendorff , T Sandler . *Defence and
761 Peace Economics* 2010. 21 (5 -6) p. .

762 [Juergensmeyer ()] *Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence*, M Juergensmeyer . 2003.
763 Univ of California Press. 13.

764 [Stern ()] *Terror in the name of God: why religious militants kill*, J Stern . 2003. New York; Ecco.

765 [Schmid ()] 'Terrorism and democracy'. A P Schmid . *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1992. 4 (4) p. .

766 [Eubank and Weinberg ()] *Terrorism and democracy: Perpetrators and victims*. *Terrorism and Political Violence*,
767 W Eubank , L Weinberg . 2001. 13 p. .

768 [Eyerman ()] 'Terrorism and democratic states: Soft targets or accessible systems'. J Eyerman . *International
769 Interactions* 1998. 24 (2) p. .

770 [Gurr ()] *Terrorism in democracies: When it occurs, why it fails. The new global terrorism: Characteristics,
771 causes, controls*, T R Gurr . 2003. p. .

772 [Combs and Hall ()] *Terrorism in the twenty-first century*, C C Combs , P Hall . 2003.

773 [Sawyer ()] 'Terrorism, press freedom, and democracy: a nuanced relationship'. J Sawyer . *International Studies
774 Association* 2005.

775 [Kean ()] *The 9/11 commission report: Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the
776 United States*, T Kean . 2011. (Government Printing Office)

777 [Appleby ()] *The ambivalence of the sacred: Religion, violence, and reconciliation*, S R Appleby . 1999.

778 [Grzymala-Busse ()] 'The best laid plans: the impact of informal rules on formal institutions in transitional
779 regimes'. A Grzymala-Busse . *Studies in Comparative International Development* 2010. 45 (3) p. .

780 [Almond and Verba ()] *The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in five countries*, G Almond , S Verba
 781 . 1963. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

782 [Benhabib ()] *The claims of culture: equality and diversity in the global era*, S Benhabib . 2002. Princeton
 783 University Press.

784 [Angrist ()] 'The economic returns to schooling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip'. J D Angrist . *The American
 785 Economic Review* 1995. p. .

786 [Ajami ()] 'The End of Pan-Arabism'. F Ajami . *Foreign Affairs* 1978. 57 (2) p. .

787 [Rapoport ()] *The four waves of modern terrorism. Attacking terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy*, D C
 788 Rapoport . 2004. p. .

789 [Mcfaul ()] *The fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship: noncooperative transitions in the postcommunist
 790 world*, M Mcfaul . 2002. (Unpublished manuscript)

791 [Zakaria ()] *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, F Zakaria . 2007. (Revised Edition)

792 [Lieberman and Singh ()] 'The institutional origins of ethnic violence'. E S Lieberman , P Singh . *Comparative
 793 Politics* 2012. 45 (1) p. .

794 [Mccants ()] *The ISIS apocalypse: the history, strategy, and doomsday vision of the Islamic State*, W Mccants .
 795 2015. Macmillan.

796 [Taylor ()] *The Islamic question in Middle Eastpolitics*, A R Taylor . 1988. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

797 [Lahoud] *The jihadis' path to selfdestruction*, N Lahoud . C. Hurst. (2010(a))

798 [Bergen and Pandey ()] *The madrassa myth*, P Bergen , S Pandey . 2005.

799 [Bergen and Pandey ()] 'The madrassa scapegoat'. P Bergen , S Pandey . *Washington Quarterly* 2006. 29 (2) p.
 800 .

801 [Wiewiora ()] *The making of terrorism*, M Wiewiora . 1988. University of Chicago Press.

802 [Wilkinson ()] 'The media and terrorism: a reassessment'. P Wilkinson . *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1997.
 803 9 (2) p. .

804 [Koelble ()] 'The new institutionalism in political science and sociology'. T A Koelble . *Comparative politics*,
 805 1995. p. .

806 [Bhabha ()] 'The other question -the stereotype and colonial discourse'. H Bhabha . *Screen* 1983. 24 (6) p. .

807 [Puri ()] 'The Pakistani Madrassah and Terrorism: Made and Unmade Conclusions from the Literature'. N R
 808 Puri . *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2010. 4 (4) .

809 [Almond and Coleman ()] *The politics of the developing areas*, G A Almond , J S Coleman . 1960. Princeton:
 810 Princeton University Press.

811 [Kulwicki ()] 'The practice of honor crimes: a glimpse of domestic violence in the Arab world'. A D Kulwicki .
 812 *Issues in mental health nursing* 2002. 23 (1) p. .

813 [Bueno De Mesquita ()] 'The quality of terror'. E Bueno De Mesquita . *American Journal of Political Science*
 814 2005. 49 (3) p. .

815 [Lewis ()] 'The question of Orientalism'. B Lewis . *New York Review of Books* 1982. 29 (11) p. .

816 [Fox and Sandler ()] 'The question of religion and world politics'. J Fox , S Sandler . *Terrorism and Political
 817 Violence* 2005. 17 (3) p. .

818 [Bryden (2014)] *The reinvention of Al Shabaab: A strategy of choice or necessity?* Center for Strategic and
 819 International Studies, M Bryden . 2014. February.

820 [Yates ()] 'The resurgence of jihad & the specter of religious populism'. J J Yates . *SAIS Review of International
 821 Affairs* 2007. 27 (1) p. .

822 [Kiser ()] 'The revival of narrative in historical sociology: what rational choice theory can contribute'. E Kiser .
 823 *Politics & Society* 1996. 24 (3) p. .

824 [Horgan ()] *The social and psychological characteristics of terrorism and terrorists. Root causes of terrorism:
 825 Myths, reality and ways forward*, J Horgan . 2005. p. 44.

826 [Arena and Arrigo ()] *The terrorist identity: Explaining the terrorist threat*, M P Arena , B A Arrigo . 2006.
 827 NYU Press.

828 [Huntington ()] *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*, S P Huntington . 1993. University
 829 of Oklahoma Press. 4.

830 [Shelley ()] 'The unholy trinity: transnational crime, corruption, and terrorism Brown'. L Shelley . *J. World Aff*
 831 2004. 11 p. 101.

832 [Zelin (2014)] *The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global jihadist movement*, A Y Zelin .
 833 2014. June. Washington Institute for Near East Policy

12 CONCLUSION

834 [Kepel ()] *The war for Muslim minds: Islam and the West*, G Kepel . 2004. Harvard University Press.

835 [Fukuyama (2001)] 'Their target: the modern world'. F Fukuyama . *Newsweek* 2001. Dec. 17 p. .

836 [Bowman (2008)] *U.S. offers training, pay as it frees iraqi detainees*, T Bowman . <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90506939> 2008. May 16. 2014. (Morning Edition, NPR News. Accessed 11 June)

837 [Honaker ()] *Unemployment and violence in Northern Ireland: a missing data model for ecological inference*, J Honaker . 2004. (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the MidWest Political Science Association)

838 [Esposito ()] *Unholy war: terror in the name of Islam*, J L Esposito . 2003. Oxford University Press.

839 [Turner ()] 'Untangling Islamism from jihadism: opportunities for Islam and the West after the Arab Spring'. J Turner . *Arab Studies Quarterly* 2012. 34 (3) p. .

840 [Watts and Zimmerman ()] *Violence against women: global scope and magnitude. The lancet*, C Watts , C Zimmerman . 2002. 359 p. .

841 [McCormick ()] 'Violence: religion, terror, war'. P T McCormick . *Theological Studies* 2006. 67 (1) p. .

842 [Siddique ()] *Weapons of mass instruction?: a preliminary exploration of the link between madrassas in Pakistan and militancy*, Q Siddique . 2009. (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt)

843 [Wood ()] *What ISIS really wants. The Atlantic*, G Wood . 2015. 3.

844 [Richardson ()] *What terrorists want: understanding the enemy, containing the threat*, L Richardson . 2007. (Random House LLC)

845 [Heck ()] *When worlds collide: exploring the ideological and political foundations of the clash of civilizations*, G W Heck . 2007. Rowman & Littlefield.

846 [Gurr ()] *Why men rebel*, T R Gurr . 1970. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

847 [Payne ()] *Why Nations Arm*, J Payne . 1989. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

848 [Diamond ()] *Winning the new cold war on terrorism. Institute for Global Democracy Policy Paper*, L Diamond . 2002.

849