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Using the Nine-Consciousness Concept of Vijñ?nav?da in Moral Judgment

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Abstract

Amalavijñ?na has often been interpreted as an attempt to forge links between Yogacara and Tath?gatagarbha thought-that is, to synthesize the two major strands of Chinese Mahayana Buddhist doctrine (Mahayana and Vijñ?nav?da).In this article, amalavijñ?na is used to build a nine-consciousness model that relates to an understanding of consciousness itself from the Vijñ?nav?da perspective. The nineconsciousness model comprises the first five consciousnesses (seeing, hearing, smell, taste, and bodily sensation), the conscious mind, the manas, the ?layavijñ?na, and the amalavijñ?na. Herein it will be explained how the nine-consciousness model can increase our understanding of ethical decision-making and develop a perspective that can facilitate enlightenment.The nine-consciousness model can distinguish judgment from moral judgment, explain the intuition source, integrate cognitive and emotional influences, interpret the reasons of moral failure and postulate how emotions and cognition work together.

Index terms— amalavijñ?na, consciousness, ethical decision, manas, vijñ?nav?da.

1 Introduction a) Background

The Shiba kong lun (????, or Treatise on Eighteen [Kinds of] Emptiness) states: Question: ?given that there is no impurity by essential nature, there should also be no purity by essential nature. How can it be ascertained that the dharma-realm is neither pure nor impure? Answer: Amalavijñ?na is the aboriginal pure mind. It is only because it is tainted by adventitious dirt that we speak of it as impure; because of adventitious dirt, we establish that it is impure. his means that if people have neither impure nor pure selves, how can they judge what is evil or good in the universe? The answer is that people have amalavijñ?na to discern right from wrong and good from evil.

Vijñ?nav?da is a mainstream school of Chinese Mah?y?na Buddhism (Kaag 2012). According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religion, Vijñ?nav?da is an alternative name for the Yog?c?ra school. The name Vijñ?nav?da emphasizes its adherents' interest in the workings of consciousness (vijñ?na) and its role in creating the experience of sa?s?ra. In the Vijñ?nav?da tradition, conceptual knowledge appears at the level of mental consciousness (the sixth consciousness), which is determined by the manas (the seventh consciousness). The manas is seen as a process of subliminal thought that organizes data from the six consciousnesses into the experience of a meaningful world (Harvey, 2013). It is the basis for both correct judgments and misperceptions of reality **??**Harvey, 2013, p. 131). Because the manas obscures a person's true nature with the ego or "I" (Clark, 2011), it is responsible for the errors perpetrated by the individual self (Nedu, 2015). Such errors also characterize any form of conceptual knowledge that appears at the level of mental consciousness. Thus, the theory accounting for the conditioning of decision-making finds that it stems from two factors. On the one hand, decision-making is conditioned by the manas of individuality; on the other hand, it is conditioned by the seeds existing within the ?layavijñ?na (the eighth consciousness) (Nedu, 2015). The ethical decision-making (EDM) process has been widely discussed by practitioners using various approaches, such as the rationalist and the intuition frameworks (Haidt, 2001;Jones, 1991;Rest, 1986;Sonenshein, 2007). However, theoretical and empirical

studies are presently being conducted without an understanding of or interest in metaphysics and philosophy (Williams &Gantt, 2009). The absence of a well-developed theoretical methodological foundation has given rise to various challenges within this field, such as the lack of a standardized research method that enables scholars to present consistent findings **??**Pan &Spark, 2012) and the inability to account for complex neurocognitive-affective variables (Schwartz, 2016).

2 b) Objectives

Vijñ?nav?da originated in India and developed in a Chinese cultural context that produced and explored many practices of consciousness through the systematic training of attention. In contrast, the dominant methods of investigating the mind in Western cognitive science have emphasized observation of the Because much of the understanding and practice of ethics in the psychology of perception and action arose from dialogue with Buddhist traditions (Finnigan, 2011;Harvey, 2000), we lay the groundwork for EDM cognitive science by using the psychology framework of the Vijñ?nav?da school-the Nine Consciousnesses-as a lens to examine contemporary cognitive science conceptions of consciousness. At the same time, understanding the conceptual frameworks of the Buddhist teachings can help scientists refine the theoretical frameworks they bring to research on meditation and consciousness.

Our aim, however, is not to give an historical account of what these concepts meant at any point in the development of Buddhist thought, and we make no claim that anyone in the Buddhist tradition, early or late, actually understood this model in the way we suggest. Furthermore, we do not treat these battles as occurring within a different Buddhist school, but rather focus only on the central, basic accounts of the Vijñ?nav?da.

3 c) Contribution to the field

This nine-consciousness model is explored here as a potential theoretical resource that can guide insight, knowledge, and enlightenment. This article shows how the nine-consciousness model can increase our understanding of EDM and develop a perspective that can facilitate enlightenment. When due consideration is made for the action and intention that happen in the mind, however, it is clear that these investigations represent the transformation of consciousness into wisdom.

4 II.

5 Literature Review a) Types of ethics and moral judgment

Several types of ethics have been defended by philosophers and theologians, including utilitarian ethics, virtue ethics, and value ethics (Barbour, 2014). Utilitarian Ethics asserts that decisions are judged entirely by their consequences, not by intentions, motives, rights, or duties. One such criterion is the principle of "the greatest good to the greatest number," maximizing the total good. Virtue Ethics has been influential in considering ethics within a family, church, synagogue, or community. Character education occurs within particular religious or secular traditions. Value Ethics is a broad goal sought in individual and social life. Values can be defended on either religious or secular grounds and then applied as shared criteria in policy choices. Value can be individual values (food and health, meaningful work, personal fulfillment), social values (social justice, participatory freedom, economic development), or environmental values (resource sustainability, environmental protection, respect for all forms of life (Barbour, 1993(Barbour, , 2014)).

Ethical decision-making is defined as the evaluation of events, persons, or acts, according to the laws, obligatory virtues, and cultural norms that constitute the standards of the larger community (Haidt, 2001;Jones, 1991). Therefore, if one's judgment conflicts with or violates laws, virtues, or cultural norms, one would be said to making an immoral judgment. The paper will use the terms "ethical" and "moral" and "moral judgment" and "ethical decision-making" interchangeably.

There have been three general moral-judgment models in previous research: (a) rationalist-based; (b) non-rationalist-based; and (c) the integrated approach. Although rationalist approaches have tended to include a belief that intuition or emotion could play a role in EDM, they do not consider moral intuition to be a determination of moral judgment (Schwartz 2016). Nonrationalist approaches, on the other hand, do accept that moral intuition influences moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). Integrated approaches assert that there is a concurrent interaction between intuition (impulse) and reason (reflection) when making moral judgments (Schwartz, 2016).

6 b) Question regarding the rationalist approach

There has been experimental work on the rationalist approach, such as that of Kohlberg (1971) on cognitive moral development and that of Rest and Johns on the four distinct process components and moral intensity **??**John, 1991;Rest, 1986). Rest's four processes included moral awareness, judgment, intent, and behavior. Many recent many research efforts have focused on the relationship between moral judgment (i.e., judgments of moral and unethical acts), moral intention (i.e., the intention to do something that is moral or that is unethical), and moral actions (i.e., moral or immoral behavior).

While Singhapakdi, Rao, and Vitell (1996) and Singhapakdi, Vitell, and Kraft (1996) found that moral awareness was correlated with moral judgment, Valentine and Fleischman (2003) did not find such a correlation.

Similarly, Fleischman and Valentine (2003) found that awareness was related to decision outcomes, and in a second paper they found little evidence of such a relationship (Fleischman and Valentine, 2003). Empirical findings also link moral judgment to moral intentions (Barnett, 2001). Wagner and Sanders (2001) linked moral intention with moral behavior.

As indicated by these research results, moral awareness may lead to moral decisions or it may not. Thus, one can wonder, is there any metaphysical reason to explain why the results of these empirical studies have been mixed? c) Question regarding the non-rationalist approach After decades of rationalist dominance under the auspices of a cognitivist paradigm (Kohlberg, 1971), moral psychology has undergone an emotional turn (Sauer, 2012). Studies on mental disorder and brain lesions suggest that emotions are critically necessary for moral judgment (Blair, Mitchell, and Blair, 2005; **??**oenigs et al., 2007). Evidence from neuroimaging suggests that an important part of moral cognition is shaped by automatic emotional reactions (Greene et al., 2001;Greene et al., 2004;Singer, 2005;Sauer, 2012). On top of that, recent studies have shown that we arrive at moral verdicts based on quick, often emotionally charged intuitions, rather than through controlled reasoning and conscious deliberation (Haidt, 2001;Uhlmann et al., 2009).

Emotional and intuitive processes are the kind of subsets of automatic processes. Empirically minded philosophers have thus taken the aforementioned findings to support a broadly sentimentalist account of moral judgment and cognition, and to provide the building blocks of an empirical refutation of rationalist models of moral judgment (Nichols, 2004;Prinz, 2007). These philosophers argue that moral judgments are not based on critical reflection and the proper weighing of reasons, but on uncontrolled, emotionally charged states of intuitive (dis)approval. One question raised here is about what specific emotion(s) can induce moral or immoral judgment.

7 d) Question regarding the dual-process model

It is now becoming increasingly popular to understand decision-making in terms of a dual-process model of cognition **??**Kahneman, 2003). Proponents of this model hold that judgment and behavior are based on two mental subsystems (often referred to as Systems I and II) that are different in at least four important respects and work upon entirely different principles (for an overview, see Evans, 2003Evans, , 2008)). System I processes are said to be evolutionarily old (age), operate quickly and effortlessly (speed), their workings remain un-or pre-conscious (accessibility), and they process information holistically and often emotionally rapid (mode of function) as opposed to the evolutionarily recent, controlled, effortful, conscious, and analytical step-by-step reasoning characteristic of System II.

However, which of the two systems is responsible for moral judgment? Do these two systems work sequentially and distinctly, or at the same time?

8 e) Proposing a New Model

It seems that to a surprising extent, judgment formation and action are based on processes that remain largely unconscious **??**Wilson, 2002;Dijksterhuis, 2006). People often do not have access to what really drives their behavior **??**Wegner, 2002;Sie, 2009), and do not know what triggers a certain judgment or behavioral response (Nisbett and **??**ilson, 1977, 1978;Langer, Blank, and Chanowitz, 1978). However, the link between some individual factors, such as the philosophical orientation of a person and moral judgment, has been more conclusive. Idealism was found to influence ethical judgment (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer, 1998;Elias, 2002; **??**im, 2003). We propose the nineconsciousness model of Buddhist Vijñ?navada to provide a deeper explanation of the complex press of moral judgment.

The middle era of Mahayanist Buddhism, which took place from about the third to the fifth century BC, was a period when another ancient Buddhist psychology, known as Vijñ?navada (consciousness-only doctrine Buddhism), gained popularity. The concept of alayavijñ?na and amalavijñ?na in this type of Buddhist teaching is often compared to the idea of the unconscious in psychoanalysis (Kato, 2016). If we have a clearer idea of the conscious processes that can enable us to make ethical judgements, we can better prepare ourselves as individuals and can better work with others to develop our collective ethical expertise. Therefore, from the perspective of contemplation, we argue that the nine-consciousness model should be applied to current EDM theory.

9 III.

10 Understanding the Nine Consciousnesses a) Mind dharmas vs. dharmas that interact with the mind

In Buddhism, the six roots, six dusts and six consciousnesses (see Table 1) are very important parts of Buddhist cognitive philosophy (Chen and Lin, 2002). After adding the seventh consciousness (manas), the eighth consciousness (alayavijñ?na), and the ninth consciousness (amalavijñ?na), these nine conscious-nesses form a well-constructed cognitive model (Chen et al., 2002).

Yogacara posits 100 dharmas, which can be divided into five categories. According to Shastra on the Door to Understanding the Hundred Dharmas (???????), all dharmas may be generally grouped into five categories: 1. mind dharmas; 2. mind co-arising dharmas; 3. form dharmas; 4. mind non-coarising dharmas; and 5. unconditioned dharmas. They are in this sequence because the first are supreme, the second interact with the

first, the third are the shadows manifest by the previous two, the fourth are the positions in which the previous three are not found, and the last are revealed by the previous four. We mainly manipulate "mind dharma" (1) and "mind co-arising dharmas" (2) to construct the nine-consciousness model.

The first category, mind dharmas, is eight consciousnesses, which will be addressed later. The second category, mind co-arising dharmas, includes 51 dharmas. These 51 dharmas are further divided into six sub-categories: (1) the five universally interactive; (2) the five particular states; (3) the 11 wholesome; (4) the six fundamental afflictions; (5) the 20 derivative afflictions; and (6) the four unfixed (see Table 2).

11 b) The first five consciousnesses

The first five consciousnesses comprise the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile senses. These senses arise from the perceived division of the eighth consciousness. They can appear in any order or all at once, depending on the situation; for instance, an illness or shock can stop their operation. The first five consciousnesses interact with the 31 "mind co-arising dharmas" (see Table 2) and work in conjunction with the sixth consciousness, which processes their input to construct a mental picture of reality.

After perceptions from the first five consciousnesses are assimilated in the sixth consciousness, they are introduced into the seventh consciousness, which transfers them into the eighth as though the latter were a real "self." This continual process plants more karmic seeds in the eighth consciousness. None of the five perceptual consciousnesses contain the potential for making moral distinctions (Zim, 1995).

12 c) The sixth consciousness

Cognition and perception take place in the sixth consciousness (the mental consciousness), which has three moral natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate). The sixth consciousness interacts with all 51 mind co-arising dharmas (Table 2). When the activity of the sixth consciousness is wholesome, it is accompanied by 11 wholesome dharmas; when its activity is unwholesome, the vexations arise in conjunction with it. Because the basic vexations (i.e., greed, anger, stupidity, arrogance, doubt, and improper views) are always involved in the sixth consciousness, it colors incoming sense data and interprets it as we desire (Clark, 2011). The sixth consciousness distinguishes between good and evil and makes moral determinations about the input of the preceding five consciousnesses.

13 d) The Seventh Consciousness

The seventh consciousness (manas) coordinates the thoughts and information received from the first six consciousnesses and is capable of reflecting, considering, and making judgements (Clark, 2011). It is important to note that the seventh consciousness obscures a person's true nature with the ego, or "I." This ego is not a real entity, but only a perishable element of the equally perishable act of cognition (Tola & Dragonetti, 2005). It represents a constant process of selection and choice of what is best for the self (Clark, 2008). Buddhists see the ego itself as the problem or obstacle in the path to enlightenment. Thus, it is also known as the defiling/transmitter consciousness because of the illusions it promotes. It defiles the first six consciousnesses by obscuring them with its concept of self, and defiles the eighth consciousness by attributing to it the characteristics of a real self that exists in space and time (Zim, 1995) .

Manas was seen by the Yog?c?ras as a process of subliminal thought that organizes data from the first six consciousnesses into the experience of a meaningful world. It contains the basis both for correct judgments and for misperception of reality, and for both skillful and unskillful karma, which are generated by volitions accompanying the six consciousnesses. Manas and the six consciousnesses represent only the surface of the mind; they are devoid of purposive activity and only indistinctly aware of objects, being an underlying unconscious level of mind known as ?layavijñ?na, the "storehouse consciousness."

14 e) The eighth consciousness

The eighth consciousness (?layavijñ?na) is the storehouse consciousness that is the basis of the seven preceding aspects of mind. The eighth consciousness is known as the repository of impressions, because from it arises all our ideas of self, ego, and their respective functions in the external world. The eighth consciousness is beyond the dualisms of subject and object or existence and non-existence (Tripitaka Master Xuanzang, 1998), and so it has no purposive activity and is unaware of objects. Because it does not make distinctions and is neither good nor bad, the eighth consciousness is said to have a state of equanimity. The eighth consciousness is the karmic storehouse that contains the seeds generated by our unenlightened actions. Although it does not create karma, the ?layavijñ?na functions as the subject of retribution for past intended deeds. Among the great flood of seeds in the ?layavijñ?na, these impregnating seeds are especially favorable potentials of wisdom in the stream of dharmas. These seeds form clusters that augment those already in our dharma stream and produce insight. The impregnating seeds are called the seeds of the dharmakaya, the true body of the Buddha (Clark, 2008).

15 f) The ninth consciousness

Paramartha's (??, 499-569) notion of consciousness, amalavijñ?na, occupies an important place in the common understanding of the development of East Asian Buddhist thought. In particular, it is frequently linked to claims about the "sinification," or "making Chinese," of Buddhist ideas. It has also often been interpreted as an attempt to forge links between Yogacara and Tath?gatagarbha thought-that is, to bring about a synthesis between these two major strands of Mahayana Buddhist doctrine (Radich, 2008). The term amalavijñ?na, in its original meaning, is "consciousness without taint." Yet, some modern scholars observe that Param?rtha tends, whether in its translation or commentaries, to interpret the connotation of amalavijñ?na as containing some of the qualities of Tath?gatagarbha or being Tath?gatagarbha itself. Shi (2011) tried to analyze the conception of amalavijñ?na according to Param?rtha's translations as well as the commentaries. He found, in works such as Jueding zang lun (????), Zhuanshi lun (???), and San wuxing lun (????), that the conception of amalavijñ?na contains the meaning of "conversion of the basis" (??rayapar?v?tti) and the idea of "the nonconceptual awareness" (nirvikalpajñ?na), which means consciousness and its objects are all vanished. The term also encompasses the meaning of a fundamentally pure mind (prak?tivi?uddhacitta) in the Shiba kong lun (????). According to these texts, Shi (2011) thought that Param?rtha, based on the doctrine of the Yog?c?ra, translated the "conversion of the basis" as amalavijñ?na to mean the state of non-conceptual awareness when consciousness and its objects are all absent. In the Shiba kong lun, Param?rtha explained the emptiness (??ynat?) by referring to amalavijñ?na as "fundamentally pure mind." In terms of the historical development of Buddhist texts, the usage of emptiness, explained as the idea of "the light and purity of the mind's nature" in the Prajñ?p?ramit? S?tra, is no different from the thought of the Yog?c?ra school. Shi (2011) thus concluded that Param?rtha's use of the term amalavijñ?na is similar to the thought of the Yog?c?ra school on this point.

16 g) Five aggregates

Buddhist psychology has a very long history. Its beginnings date back to the classification of the mind as the five aggregates laid down by Gautama Buddha about 2,500 years ago. Since at least the era of sectional (Abhidharma) Buddhism, this ancient Buddhist psychology has been the subject of professional study by monks, and it is still learned and practiced today, primarily in Theravada Buddhism (Kato, 2016).

The five aggregates (skandhas) are as follows: i) rupa (form or matter); ii) vedana (sensation or feeling); iii) samjna (perception); xi) samskara (mental formation or volition); and x) vijnana (consciousness) (Harvey, 2000;Boisvert, 1995). Vedana can be seen as the first of the five consciousnesses; samjna as the sixth consciousness; samskara as the seventh consciousness, and vijnana as the eighth consciousness (Chen and Lin, 2002).

17 IV. The Nine-Consciousness Model of edm a) Input process: From the first five consciousnesses to the eighth consciousness

The first five consciousnesses-those of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body-are posited on the basis of valid straightforward cognition solely by means of faculties of the bodily senses (Figure 1) (Zim, 1995). These five consciousnesses always arise together with the sixth consciousness. The sixth consciousness distinguishes all incoming data, using advanced analysis, induction, and other mental operations, based on the mental objects reflected by the states of the five sense objects. Because the sixth consciousness possesses the mental function of wisdom, it reduces sentient beings to a state of confusion. The sixth consciousness is then fed into the seventh consciousness (manas) together with all its sense data (Clark, 2008).

The seventh consciousness is constantly making judgments while clinging to the attributes of the eighth consciousness as its inner self. The eighth consciousness is the origin of all dharmas; being nonimpeded and morally neutral, it stores all good, bad, and neutral karmic seeds. It receives the karma of each sentient being (Fan &Chou ,2016).

18 b) Output processes i. Output processes: From the eighth to the first five consciousnesses

The seventh consciousness is constantly evaluating, discriminating, and making judgments while clinging to the attributes of the eighth consciousness as its inner self. Conceptual knowledge and actiondirection manifests in the sixth consciousness, which is determined by the seventh consciousness. Finally, physical action follows the demands of the mental consciousness. ii. Karma and the dharmas ? Karma. Karma is the result of our intentional actions.

The consequences of these actions remain as seeds planted in the eighth consciousness. These seeds germinate over time and generate more seeds. The karmic process has three stages: 1) becoming deluded in the sixth consciousness, whose actions lead to activity and therefore to karma; 2) creating karma and planting seeds in the eighth consciousness (see Figure 1)-the ongoing cycle life, death, and rebirth draws the eighth consciousness back into the six levels of existence; and 3) finally undergoing retribution as the germination of the karmic seeds (Tripitaka Master Xuanzang, 1998).

19 ? Dharmas.

Dharmas are basic interdependent patterns of lived experience within the overall flux of reality. Each dharma is a mental construct with a specific process that consists of a stream of momentary events. Dharmas arise as a consequence of our attachment to an illusory reality, and interact with all eight consciousnesses. According to the Great Vehicle Hundred Dharmas (???????), there are six fundamental afflictions (e.g., greed, anger, etc.) and 20 derivative afflictions (e.g., deceit, jealousy, torpor, lack of shame, etc.) that interact with and affect consciousness (Zim, 1995). Afflictions can be seen as emotions. Table 2 above lists each consciousness and its related afflictions. iii.

The delusion source of each consciousness "Delusion" is defined by Webster's Dictionary as "a false conception and persistent belief unconquerable by reason in something that has no existence in fact." Haidt defined "rationalist delusion in ethics" as "the belief in a reliable faculty of reasoning, capable of operating effectively and impartially even when self interest, reputational concerns, and intergroup conflict pull toward a particular conclusion" (2012, p867). The Shurangama Sutra (??ç¶?") explains the delusions that give rise to each consciousness:

? The illusion source for eighth consciousness is upside-down minutely subtle thinking. The Shurangama Sutra stated: If you do not open and unite your six sense faculties so that they function interchangeably, this false thinking will never cease. That's why your seeing, hearing, awareness, and knowing are presently strung together by subtle habits, so that within the profound clarity, existence and nonexistence are both unreal. This is the fifth kind of upside-down, minutely subtle thinking."

? The illusion source for the seventh consciousness is subtle and hidden. The Shurangama Sutra stated:

The metabolic processes never stop; they progress through subtle changes: your nails and hair grow, your energy wanes, and your skin becomes wrinkled. These processes continue day and night, and yet you never wake up to them.-Your formations skandha continues in thought after thought without cease. It is the fourth kind of false thinking, which is subtle and hidden.

? The illusion source for the sixth consciousness is interconnectedness. The Shurangama Sutra stated: ? When you are awake, your mind thinks. When you are asleep, you dream. Thus, your thinking is stirred to perceive false situations. This is the third kind of false thinking, which is characterized by interconnectedness.

? The illusion for the first five consciousnesses is clarity. The Shurangama Sutra stated: ? Due to that cause, feelings arise and affect your body, so that at present you pursue pleasant feelings and are repelled by unpleasant feelings. These two kinds of feelings that compel you are brought about by the second kind of false thinking, which is characterized by illusory clarity. ? The source of the illusion for the first five organs and six dusts is solidity. The Shurangama Sutra stated: When you think of walking along a precipice, the soles of your feet tingle. Since the precipice doesn't exist and there isn't any vinegar, how could your mouth water at the mere mention of vinegar, if it were not the case that your body originated from falseness? Therefore, you should know that your present physical body is brought about by the first kind of false thinking, which is characterized by solidity.

V.

20 Implications of the Nine-Consciousness Model for edm a) Judgment and moral judgment

The differences between the methodologies used in current theories of EDM versus the nineconsciousness model can be conceptualized by examining one critical difference: the function of judgment. Current EDM theories typically emphasize deliberative and analytical judgment (Zhong, 2011), although EDM will either be consciously available through effortful reasoning or unconsciously generated intuition (Haidt, 2001;Sonenshein, 2007). However, in the nine-consciousness model, the manas is consciously making a judgment (Nedu, 2015). The manas is the home of all thinking, willing, considering, and judging; it reasons, plans, and evaluates all aspects of human consciousness (Clark, 2011). Although the manas makes judgments, moral judgments are made by the amalavijnana because of its purity.

21 b) Intuition

EDM theory describes intuition as a product of the evolutionary development of the human brain (Salvador & Folger, 2009) or as arising from the experience of practical knowledge (Haidt, 2001). In the nine-consciousness model, knowledge belonging to the seventh consciousness is a fallacy caused by its innate attachments. Because the seventh consciousness bases its decisions on relative, defiled knowledge drawn from the discernment, it is built on false assumptions that impart to it the four fundamental afflictions (greed, anger, doubt, and improper views) and eight subsidiary afflictions (e.g. laziness, distraction, and lack of faith). Vijñ?nav?da claims that all kind of experience, including knowledge, is mere ideation, devoid of any objective value. Concept knowledge appears at the level of the sixth consciousness, which, in its turn, is determined by the seventh consciousness (manas). Thus, the experiences of the operational consciousnesses are entirely subjective, because they are determined by the manas.

22 c) Integrating of Cognitive and Emotional Influences

Research in the past decade has highlighted the importance of the cognitive and emotional aspects of moral judgment. Unfortunately, some of the research contributions suggested or implied an either of perspective. The rationalists argued for the dominance of cognition while the intuitionist argued for the dominance of emotions.

When people face a moral dilemma and need to make a moral judgment, the eye collects data and the mental consciousness analyses the information. The manas deals immediately with all the imported data and makes a judgment. Mental consciousness then acts, obeying the decision of the manas. The ?layavijñ?na will then possess all the seeds, gather the karmic maturation, and become the support for other consciousnesses (Nedu, 2015). Thus, the nineconsciousness model could form the basis for a criticism of current EDM theory as relying overmuch on mental consciousness (i.e., the sixth consciousness). EDM holds that judgment relies on a rationalistic and deliberative process but suppresses the reactions of the manas or the ?layavijñ?na in making moral decisions.

In this study EDM is analyzed as a sequential dual-process model. In such a model, the eight consciousnesses cooperate very quickly in shaping and regulating moral judgments and decisions. In evaluating moral consequences, it is important to note that deliberative decision-making does not always lead to negative outcomes. Rather, it depends on the nature of the manas as well as its inherent and defiled afflictions.

23 d) Interpreting the reasons of moral failure

Prior conceptualization of moral judgment explains moral failures in terms of failures of cognitive capability, moral awareness, or moral sensitivity. **??**onin, Pizzaro, and Beer (2007) argued that the contemporary model of moral judgment should permit an understanding of moral failures in cases where the individual knew what was right and wrong but did what was wrong anyway. When such moral failings occur, they are due to what is also called a failure of will-power, which is linked to emotional processes. The nine-consciousness model enables us to explore three possible sources of bad moral judgment: delusion, vexation, and karma.

? First, delusion and vexation could identify the decision-maker as a less salient aspect of a situation rather than being situations that need to be considered by a decision-maker. In such a case, a bad moral decision would be made because the emotional processes were not sufficiently trained to recognize and respond to the more salient aspects of a situation. ? Second, good emotions (wholesome dharmas-see Table 2 above) may well respond to the salient aspect of a situation, but do so in a suppressed manner. In other words, the emotions respond to the important salient issue in a situation but do so in a "flat" manner. For example, an individual who has broken the law several times may recognize the potential of being imprisoned as a salient risk, but his or her attitude concerning the issue might be one of deemphasizing the risk that is associated with a bad moral choice. ? Similarly, the karma process could be the cause of a bad moral judgment. For example, an individual might focus primarily on his/her own interests and goals and end up making bad moral judgments. Second, the focus on the cognitive aspect of a situation could result in the enforcement of moral rules that are disproportionate to the nature of a crime, its context, and the intent of the wrongdoer. In all these cases, bad moral judgments are caused by a disruption in the cognitive or emotional processes.

24 f) How to make a moral decision

As the Shurangama Sutra stated, "you should gain a thorough understanding of the origin of this false thinking ?. Let them recognize this falseness and naturally give rise to deep disdain for it. Let them know of Nirvana so that they will not linger in the Triple Realm." In order for amalavijñ?na to show up to judge good or evil, people should find and gain a thorough understanding of the origin of this illusion. We must recognize this falseness and naturally acquire a deep disdain for it, causing all those cultivators to know that the falseness of delusional thinking comes from ourselves. If we clearly understand its source and pattern, we become disgusted with it.

25 VI.

26 Limitation and Suggestions

To ensure that this ECM is readable and easy to understand, we have based this paper on a basic concept of the Vijñ?nav?da school and do not explore whole esoteric doctrines. The current contribution of ECM does not mention how justice and well-being complement responses to human evil that arise from delusion. Furthermore, this model does not address how decision-makers, who often are not educated in Buddhist training, can acquire enough knowledge of Buddhist psychology to combine it with the experience and wisdom of their own traditions in order to be able to exercise moral and spiritual leadership in diminishing human evil and enhancing human good.

The Buddhist five-aggregates model parallels a number of distinctions drawn in cognitive science and therefore serves as a useful theoretical resource for developing a cross-cultural cognitive science of consciousness. In the future, combining the eightconsciousness and five-aggregates models can offer both a way to understand more precisely the roles of attention and consciousness, and to bridge the gap between moral judgment and moral action.

27 VII.

28 Conclusion

We conceive of the discussion that we have undertaken here as one tentative step in a larger project of developing a cross-cultural cognitive science of Buddhist psychology and EDM. One way to build on our discussion would be to develop a cognitive science perspective on the Buddhist claim that moral judgment counteracts not only knowing by increasing awareness of presently arising stimuli but also counteracts knowing wrongly by attenuating the emotional distortions of attention and perception. In particular, building bridges between the nine-consciousness model and EDM can offer a way to understand more precisely the roles of emotion, illusion, and unconsciousness in moral judgment. Like the dual-process theory, a recent shift in EDM towards viewing intuition as a valuable object of scientific investigation (Braboszcz et al., 2010) reveals that the different levels of intuition that should be clearly separated (i.e., manas, ?layavijñ?na, Buddha nature) are often confused due to a lack of understanding of Vijñ?nav?da.

As was noted in the introduction, these texts allow for multiple interpretations, and the conception of Vijñ?nav?da employed herein may not line up neatly with traditional interpretation thereof ascribed to by the Yog?c?ra school. We suggest that the proposed relation between the nine consciousnesses and moral judgment be treated as a testable hypothesis. For example, intuition from amalavijñ?na is positive correlated with moral judgment; intuition from ?layavijñ?na or manas is not positive correlated with moral judgment. Whatever values our model may present influence its ability to suggest fruitful directions for future work in the crosscultural cognitive science of consciousness.

Considering that the nine-consciousness model comprehensively describes decision processes that take place in the mind, it not only provides a guideline for moral judgment but is also helpful in instructing and teaching mindfulness. To sum up, we have highlighted a future decision strategy that weighs both reason and intuition and stresses the importance of understanding the concept of emptiness and the eight consciousnesses. [1]

1

	Consciousness (six consciousness: from eye to mind)	Cognitive organs (six organs: from eye to body)	Physical sight to thought) Form (six dusts: from	Judgment	Dharmas with the Mind	interactive
The first five consciousness (Vedana in the five aggregates)	Eye Consciousness Ear Consciousness Nose Consciousness Tongue Consciousness Body Consciousness	Eyes Ears Nose Tongue Body	Sights Sounds Smells Tastes Feeling		Five universal active dharmas; five situation-specific dharmas; 11 wholesome dharmas; three primary vexations (greed, anger, stu	
Sixth consciousness (Samjna in the five aggregates)	The Mind Consciousness	Mind	Thought	Judgment, but not always	All	
Seventh consciousness (Samskara in the five aggregates)	Manas	Mind	Self-grasping	Continuous judgment	Five universal active dharmas (discernment, greed,anger, ignora false views); eight derivative vexations	
Eighth consciousness (Vijnana in the five aggregates)	Alayavijnana	Mind	Memory	Continuous non-	Five universal active dharmas	

Figure 1: Table 1 :

2

		The first five consciousnesses	Sixth consciousness (mental consciousness)	Seventh consciousness (manas)	Eighth consciousness (alayavijñana)
	Attention	o	o	o	o
The five universally interactive dharmas	Contact	o	o	o	o
	Feeling	o	o	o	o
	Conception	o	o	o	o
	Volition	o	o	o	o
	Desire	o	o		
The five situation-specific dharmas	Resolution	o	o		
	Recollection	o	o		
	Samadhi	o	o		
	Discernment	o	o	o	
	Faith	o	o		
	Diligence	o	o		
The 11 wholesome dharmas	Conscience	o	o		
	Shame	o	o		
	Non-greed	o	o		
	Non-anger	o	o		
	Non-ignorance	o	o		

Figure 2: Table 2 :

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