

Morocco's Readmission in to the African Union: Implications on Collective Security

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Abstract

This study focused on understanding the implications of Morocco's readmission into the African Union (AU). Morocco was readmitted into the AU in January 2017 without any changes to the previous circumstances after its withdrawal from the AU in 1984. The discontentment of other countries such as Algeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe over Morocco's readmission is also discussed. As part of the readmission requirements, Morocco was requested to relinquish its hold on Western Saharawi. The admission and readmission criteria and membership requirements should be well spelt and adhered to by all the AU Member States.

Index terms— readmission, collective security, member states, dispute.

1 Introduction

The United Nations (UN) is viewed as a custodian of the principle of collective security as mandated by the United Nations Charter Article 1.1 where it is required to 'maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace' (UN, 2011).

Collective security therefore, implies that States need to come together and find a common solution to end the problems affecting the peace and security arrangements. Baylis (2002) notes that the United Nations at its inception was mandated to promote and uphold security collaboration at the international level. Member States also have a shared belief that regional collaboration in exercising collective security is more efficacious in eliciting security. This paved way for the creation of regional organizations to pursue regional security collaboration. Some of the regional security organizations included the European Union (1957), Organization of American States (1948), the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) (1963) In order to qualify as collective security organization, countries are required to employ the principles of consensus and commitment to peace and collective response that are fundamental to the collective security concept (African Union, 2017). The European Union (EU) uses voting by consensus to make decisions while the AU uses the majority vote rule to effect decisions. This implies that all States have to comply for the benefit of regional security (Baylis, 2002).

From 1984 to 2016 Morocco was the only African country which was not a member of the AU. McNamee, Mills and Pham (2013) highlighted that Morocco formally withdrew from the OAU in 1984 over the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a full member of the organisation. Morocco claimed that SADR was part of its territory dating back to the eleventh century while SADR claimed sovereignty over the whole territory of Western Sahara. Tadlaoui (2015) confirms that the dispute between Morocco and SADR had impaired its relations with all African countries and created serious divisions within the AU. Imenyi (2015) notes that Morocco actively lobbied for international acceptance of its claim to the territory of SADR, while Algeria and Libya sought recognition for SADR. This dispute saw several reversals with formal recognition extended and withdrawn by foreign governments. All this was despite the founding core values of the OAU which sought to eliminate any vestiges of colonialism on the African continent. McNamee, Mills and Pham (2013: 5) maintains that Morocco's continued absence from the AU did not only threaten to create a permanent rupture in the

4 III. MOROCCO AND WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE

44 organization but also limited the catalytic role in Africa's economic development. This is because of Morocco's
45 relative sophistication and depth of amalgamation with Europe, the Mediterranean, and Atlantic basins.

46 From 2000 Morocco made determined efforts to re-engage with AU on several fronts despite claiming that
47 SADR was part of its territory. Pham and Laremont (2014) indicated that Morocco re-opened several diplomatic
48 representations both resident and nonresident. It reinforced its presence in several African related forums such as
49 the Franco-African summits and the first Euro-Africa summit in 2000. King Mohammed VI of Morocco announced
50 a debt forgiveness plan and removal of customs duty to other African countries. Morocco was readmitted into
51 the AU on 30 January 2017. 39 out of 54 AU countries voted in favour of Morocco's readmission (Sasa, 2017).
52 He avers that ideally AU was not supposed to allow Morocco's readmission into AU if Western Sahara was still
53 colonized by Morocco because the readmission flouted some of the guiding principles of AU as a collective security
54 organization. Hicks (2017) however, argued that Morocco's readmission was a small victory.

55 2 II.

56 3 Literature Review

57 Collective security is primarily aimed at maintaining peace by continuously reaffirming States of their mutual
58 commitment to both the idea and framework for non-coercive international interactions (Johnson, 2010). The
59 term collective security has been associated with threats to peace and security of States. Proponents of
60 collective security argue that it fosters interaction among state and non-state actors in attaining peace. It is
61 a much more effective approach to security than individual countries trying to act alone and collective security
62 arrangements encourage international cooperation (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995; Anderson, 2009). Collective
63 Security guarantees the security of States against any forms of war or aggression. It is like an insurance system
64 in which all the nations are bound to protect the victim of an aggression or war by neutralizing the aggression
65 or war against the victim (Ebegbulem, 2011).

66 Collective security reflects the growing interdependency among States and constructs a view of international
67 relations which focus on change and produces a language set of justifications for policy makers to pursue particular
68 policies which are favorable. Collective security is a concept that applies during the times of external aggression
69 of other States. It relates to tampering with threats to peace. Bull (1995) argued that a viable collective security
70 system lies in the practical ability of all States joining forces to prevent one another from using coercion to gain
71 advantage. Claude (2009) indicated that collective security refers to the coming together of States to provide
72 insulation to aggression. According Mwangabi (2012) the concept of collective security is misguided and naively
73 unrealistic. While the goal of collective security is to rationalise human behavior and interaction, it cannot escape
74 the normative dilemma of prioritizing some values over others (McEntee, 2004).

75 Collective Security wrongly assumes that in the event of an aggression against any nation, the aggressor
76 and the nature of its aggression can be really and easily identified. While in practice it is very complicated to
77 determine and name the aggressor as well as to identify the nature of aggression. In most cases the aggressor
78 acts in the name of self-defense and justifies aggression as a defensive action. Martin (2009) noted that the idea
79 of collective security seems to be a good plan, but very idealistic and not practical because it is difficult for
80 politicians to explain why their country should intervene somewhere while the country has no benefit. Collective
81 security becomes essentially an idealist conception that stability can be obtained through the consent of member
82 countries.

83 4 III. Morocco and Western Sahara Dispute

84 Morocco claims Western Sahara as part of its sovereign territory while Western Saharan nationalists led by
85 Polisario Front an organization representing the indigenous Sahrawi people claim the right to independence
86 through self-determination (McNamee, Mills and Pham, 2013). The Western Sahara dispute was the reason
87 why Morocco left the OAU in 1984. Western Sahara has been at the centre of a dispute between Morocco and
88 the Polisario Front since the 1970s. Morocco annexed the territory in 1975 after withdrawal by Spain. This
89 prompted the Polisario Front to launch a guerrilla struggle that continued until 1991, when the United Nations
90 brokered a ceasefire (Mundy, 2010). The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara did little to resolve
91 the issue. At the regional level, the Western Sahara dispute saw an interlocking conflict between Morocco and
92 Algeria which originated in 1963 over a border dispute. Algeria is known for throwing its weight behind Polisario
93 Front. The Western Sahara conflict saw Western countries supporting Morocco while the AU and Non-Aligned
94 Movement were in support of Western Sahara. At the heart of this intractable conflict lay sharply contrasting
95 interpretations of key historical events, which shape the opposing communities' identities as well as their sense
96 of justice and what is rightfully theirs (Desmidt, 2016).

97 Since 1991 Morocco and Polisario Front have been arguing over the criteria for voter eligibility in a proposed
98 UN referendum. The UN Plan comprised a transitional period, repatriation of refugees, exchange of prisoners
99 of war and the setting up of an international peace-keeping force to monitor the cease-fire, planning, and the
100 organization of a referendum. The identification of eligible voters for the self-determination referendum became
101 a permanent stumbling block as both parties rejected alternating referendum proposals in which their putative
102 voters were at a numerical disadvantage (Mundy, 2010). The identification programme altered the process of

103 oneness. People started to be conscious of their tribal ties and the power relations among the different tribes
104 that could jeopardise the project of an equal society (Woldemariam, 2017).

105 The conflict in Western Sahara has been described as the conflict for the independence of the 'last colony'
106 (Mundy, 2007). It is a struggle for the sovereignty over a territory. The Moroccan government claims the
107 sovereignty justifying it with the ancient bond of the eleventh century empire (Mundy, 2007). Morocco is now
108 manipulating history to justify the common roots of Morocco and Saharawi (Mundy, 2010). Pham and Laremont
109 (2014) noted that UN General Assembly considers Morocco's presence in Western Sahara as an occupation and
110 recognises the right to self determination and independence of the Western Sahara with the Polisario Front as their
111 legitimate representative. In 2016, Ban Ki Moon the UN General Secretary described Morocco as an occupying
112 force (Reuters, 2017). It has to be noted that Western Sahara has never been an independent State such that
113 the King of Morocco calls it 'Sahara province of Morocco.'

114 Currently there are over 140 000 Saharawi refugees in Algeria who claim that they were forced to flee their
115 homes and leave their families in the Western Sahara (Desmidt, 2016.) Driven by Moroccan planes, phosphorus
116 and cluster bombings, the Saharawi became the political casualties of Morocco's desire to reach out for empire.
117 Since 1984, the Saharawi's are still pushing from the desert where the Algerian government has given them
118 some autonomy for an independent State (McNamee, Mills and Pham, 2013). Besenyo (2010) indicates that
119 there were also hundreds of Moroccan prisoners of war in refugee camps supervised by Polisario Front. Most
120 of these refugees were captured in the 1970s. The Moroccan Government demanded their release on various
121 forums but rejected the possibility of prisoner exchange or ransom. When the cease-fire agreement was signed
122 in 1991, it was indicated in the settlement plan that after the referendum all the prisoners would be released.
123 The referendum however, failed to materialise (Mundy, 2010). The Moroccan soldiers held captive according to
124 the Red Cross who inspected the prisoners' living conditions reported that, most of the prisoners were weak, ill
125 and did not receive proper care. Contrary to the international regulations the prisoners were subjected to hard
126 labour. Polisario Front used to release a few of them from time to time as a sign of benevolence. Besenyo (2010)
127 noted due to the intensified pressure coming from the international community, Polisario released the last group
128 of 404 Moroccan prisoners on 18 August 2006. Unfortunately, unlike the Moroccan prisoners, the Saharawian
129 prisoners' and refugees' cases remain unsolved. Woldemariam (2017) confirms that there are still hundreds of
130 prisoners of war and civilian prisoners in Moroccan prisons without any hope for gaining freedom.

131 Gaffey (2017) noted the critical role that Algeria plays on the conflict between Morocco and Western Sahara.
132 Algeria is accused of fuelling the conflict because it is currently housing Saharawi refugees and nothing concrete
133 has ever been said about their future. Algeria was the first country to recognise SADR as a State in exile.
134 Polisario Front is enjoying the conflict and refugee status of Saharawi citizens because Morocco established a
135 program for this and houses were built for repatriated refugees in the cities of the occupied territories. However,
136 most of the houses are empty since Polisario Front does not let the inhabitants of the refugee camps to resettle
137 in territories governed by Moroccan authorities and many of them are forced to stay in the camps. Polisario
138 AU Morocco was avoiding its isolation in Africa at a time when Algeria had turned its back on Morocco, Libya
139 is in ruins, while Tunisia and Egypt are struggling. Hence Morocco seeks to rely on the African bloc in order to
140 dialogue and cooperate more effectively with other African countries. Morocco's readmission into AU has major
141 ramifications. It is a key country in Africa and has strong relations and a considerable impact in Africa (Ennaji,
142 2017). Morocco is not only central on political and economic levels, but from a cultural and religious perspective
143 as well. A few Muslim countries in Western Africa eulogize the king of Morocco during their Friday prayers as
144 their 'Commander of the Faithful' (Ennaji, 2017).

145 The return of Morocco into the AU shows its desire to exercise influence and seeks to challenge the presence
146 of SADR (Sasa, 2017). Several countries including Algeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe reportedly wanted to
147 make Morocco's readmission to the AU contingent on it recognizing Western Sahara's borders. Contrary Western
148 Sahara reportedly welcomed Morocco's readmission calling it 'a chance to work together' on organizing a long-
149 promised referendum on the territory's status. This is bound to then open a new era in the Moroccan struggle to
150 defend its territorial integrity and in Morocco's relations with the African continent. By rejoining AU Morocco
151 possibly reverted to its role as a political and economic leader and corrects its previous errors (Reuters, 2017).

152 The readmission of Morocco goes against South Africa's interests because Morocco's presence in the AU will
153 mean all AU proceedings will no longer be influenced by South Africa and Algeria in the way it was before
154 (Reuters, 2017). South Africa, Zimbabwe and Algeria initially stressed their disapproval of Morocco's bid to
155 rejoin the AU. These countries were concerned with the simultaneous debate on the question of the Western
156 Sahara and the status of the SADR in the AU. The return of Morocco to the AU raises a plethora of issues
157 within the field of Statehood. Desmidt (2016) indicated that Morocco's membership to the AU has a practical
158 effect on the SADR's claim of Statehood. It is also relevant to note that the AU Constitutive Act does not provide
159 for the expulsion of members and that their suspension is only considered in cases of unconstitutional regime
160 change. The latter entails that in the event of a Moroccan bid for suspension, exclusion or expulsion of the SADR,
161 the Court of Justice of the African Union (African Court of Justice and Human Rights) would be entrusted with
162 deciding the question dealing with the 'interpretation arising from the application or implementation of this Act'
163 (AU Constitutive Act, article. 26). Hence the readmission of Morocco can be viewed as an implicit recognition
164 of the SADR and its statehood status by Morocco (Reuters, 2017).

165 It can therefore be argued that by joining the AU, Morocco would adhere to the principles established in

7 D) WHY AU MEMBER STATES VOTED FOR MOROCCO'S READMISSION?

166 Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act. These principles include respect for borders existing on achievement
167 of independence, peaceful resolution of conflicts, prohibition on the threat or use of force, non-interference in
168 internal affairs, and peaceful co-existence of Member States (Reuters, 2017). It would therefore be very difficult
169 for Morocco to disregard the above principles in its relations with SADR without the approval of all Member
170 States of the AU.

171 5 b) Morocco 1984-2016

172 Pham and Laremont (2014 Pham and Laremont (2014) indicated that several diplomatic missions were opened.
173 This reinforced its presence in several African related forums, such as the Franco-African summits and the first
174 Euro-Africa summit in 2000. Morocco's King Mohammed VI announced a debt forgiveness plan for Africa's least
175 developed countries, and the eradication of the custom duties to be levied on imported products. Morocco signed
176 19 economic agreements with Rwanda and 22 with Tanzania. Tanzania and Rwanda traditionally backed the
177 Western Sahara's quest for decolonisation. Nigeria and Morocco have also signed a total of 21 bilateral agreements,
178 a joint venture to construct a gas pipeline that will connect the two nations as well as some other African countries
179 to Europe. Woldemariam (2017) argued that these economic agreements signaled Morocco's leverage in its
180 campaign to return to the AU and dealt a blow to Western Sahara's aspirations for self-determination. After its
181 readmission into AU, King Mohammed VI visited South Sudan where he signed nine bilateral agreements which
182 established Morocco's commitment to build South Sudan's new capital. In addition Morocco also established a
183 field hospital providing care to more than 4000 people daily (Reuters, 2017.)

184 6 c) What led Morocco to seek readmission into AU?

185 Mundy (2016) noted that Morocco feeling the increasing pressure of isolation had to re-evaluate its stance to
186 join the AU. He further argued that most European countries that were not recognising Morocco's occupation
187 of Western Sahara were now rejecting products from Western Sahara. Reuters (2016) reported that on 21
188 December 2016, the Court of Justice of the EU passed a judgement indicating that Western Sahara was a non-
189 self governing territory but not part of Morocco. This meant that all the products and resources which were
190 coming from Western Sahara were no longer allowed some EU markets. In his analysis, Tadlaoui (2015) indicated
191 that Morocco wanted to end its relative diplomatic isolation with other African countries. King Mohammed VI
192 adopted the strategic use of 'religious diplomacy' where he presented Morocco as a religious authority. Morocco's
193 religious diplomacy promoted religious cooperation and deepened security cooperation between the countries
194 in North Africa. These efforts were meant to thwart terrorism and ensured broader regional stability. Mundy
195 (2016) argued that SADR and Algeria were strategic in Morocco's quest to develop stronger ties with other
196 African countries. Tadlaoui (2015) noted that growing opposition over the case of Western Sahara also forced
197 Morocco to seek readmission into the AU. EU countries were also pushing for a prompt resolution to the Western
198 Sahara conflict. During the period 2013 and 2014, Morocco was against an American proposal to expand UN
199 monitoring of human rights in the Western Sahara and it discarded the idea of an AU envoy to the Western
200 Sahara.

201 Hicks (2017) indicated that the decision by Morocco to leave the AU in 1984 was a 'strategic mistake' because
202 Africa was Morocco's natural home. Morocco had left an organization and not the continent (Africa Renewal,
203 2017). Hicks (2017) noted that Morocco was also avoiding its isolation especially in North Africa. Algeria was
204 in support of SADR, while Libya, Tunisia and Egypt were in a humanitarian crisis. Morocco sought to rely
205 on the AU in order to dialogue and cooperate more effectively with other African countries. It wanted to use
206 its re-admission as pedal to exert further control over the SADR. Gaffey (2017) avers that after rejoining AU,
207 Morocco would work from inside to push for SADR's expulsion from the AU.

208 Rwengabo (2015) opined that the AU faces a serious challenge of resources and therefore Morocco would
209 provide the required financial assistance to run the organization. Its continued absence threatened to create
210 a permanent rupture in the organization and also limited the catalytic role in Africa's economic growth given
211 its relative sophistication and depth of integration with Europe and the Mediterranean and Atlantic basins
212 (McNamee, Mills and Pham 2013). Mogherini (2017) argued that Morocco's absence had repercussions on the
213 continent's security. Fertilizer production units in Ethiopia and Nigeria were established whose benefits will
214 extend to the entire African continent (Gaffey, 2017).

215 7 d) Why AU member states voted for Morocco's readmission?

216 The Emerging Markets Monitor (2017) indicated that Morocco has the resources to be recognized as a regional
217 leader. Morocco is the sixth largest economy in Africa. Its population is the eleventh biggest in Africa while its
218 military budget is ranked fourth. It therefore has the capacity to significantly reinforce a weak AU by providing
219 funding to development programmes and troops to peace-keeping missions. Therefore Morocco's resources are
220 obviously welcome for AU programs. These factors were a central element in some African states' decision to
221 support Morocco's readmission into the AU. Morocco's reasons for readmission into the AU are purely economic.
222 The Emerging Markets Monitor (2017) indicated that several Moroccan companies were betting their growth on
223 sub-Saharan Africa. Just like America, Europe and Asians, Morocco is interested in Africa because of its growth
224 potential. Some African countries voted in favour of Morocco's readmission, optimistic that the referendum

225 on SADR self-determination would finally take place. Ennaji (2017) noted that in 2016 Morocco regularized
226 the situation of tens of thousands of Sub-Saharan undocumented migrants, and commissioned the Moroccan
227 religious scholars to African Muslim countries for the strengthening of moderate tolerant Islam and the fight
228 against religious extremism. Morocco's recent admission to the AU can be seen as an inferred recognition of the
229 SADR and its statehood (Ennaji, 2017). The African Renewal (2017) claimed that the readmission of Morocco
230 into the AU can be seen as a de facto recognition of SADR.

231 Connolly (2016) noted that Morocco will benefit from its readmission since AU had survived without it for
232 more than three decades. The African continent already contributes most of the troops to UN peacekeeping
233 missions. African countries make up more than half of the top twenty global contributors of uniformed personnel
234 to UN peacekeeping missions. Al-Monitor (2017) viewed the readmission to be beneficial to Morocco since it is
235 likely to break the African consensus in support of the Polisario Front and protect Moroccan interests in Africa.

236 8 e) Implications of Morocco's readmission to SADR call for 237 self determination

238 While addressing the 72 nd Session of UN general assembly in New York 2017, Robert Mugabe former President
239 of Zimbabwe said that:Year 2018 Volume XVIII Issue III Version I (G)

240 The continued denial of the right to selfdetermination to the people of Western Sahara who are living under
241 colonial and foreign occupation is immoral and an urgent matter for those seeking peace and security of this
242 time.

243 He called on the Security Council to demonstrate its authority in ensuring urgent holding of an independence
244 referendum for Western Sahara (UN, 2017). Pham and Laremont (2014) supported Morocco's continued
245 occupation of Western Sahara arguing that Morocco was a major contributor to African solidarity and an ardent
246 supporter of various liberation movements across the continent. Its withdrawal from the OAU in 1984 was
247 occasioned by the fact that OAU had acted perversely against its own founding charter, which stipulated that,
248 the territoriality of states, was a sine qua non condition for their membership. This position was not fair to
249 Morocco as it felt that the Polisario Front was never recognized by the OAU as an African liberation movement
250 and that SADR was not a sovereign and independent state with over its territories. Morocco's official narrative
251 was that Western Sahara was 'an ineluctable part of Morocco' (McNamee, Mills, Pham, 2017).

252 Kimenyi (2015) acknowledged the strategic role of Morocco to Africa. He argued that AU was actually
253 alienating one of the most ancient and important states in Africa. Morocco is known for championing pan-
254 Africanism, south-south cooperation, and promoting development programs and strategies in every field, much
255 sought-after technical expertise and competence in international peace and security matters. AU would stand to
256 lose all these benefits if it has refused to readmit Morocco into AU. McNamee, Mills and Pham (2013) emphasized
257 that Morocco was not a peripheral figure in Africa's emancipation struggle. Morocco stood at the forefront of
258 the decolonization process and anticolonial endeavors of the entire continent, asserting its own right to complete
259 decolonization while respecting its national unity and territorial integrity.

260 Khadad (2017) noted that the majority support that Morocco received from other African states is a clear
261 demonstration of its strategic contribution to the AU. In his expression of anger over AU's support for SADR,
262 King Mohammed VI said:

263 "That immoral fait accompli, that coup against international legality, led the Kingdom of Morocco to seek to
264 avoid the division of Africa, and the price Morocco had to pay was the painful decision to leave its institutional
265 family" (Africa Renewal, 2017). The recognition of SADR by a few African States was an insufficient pretext for
266 admitting a phantom state without the requisite attributes of sovereignty. The government of Morocco indicated
267 that it was never going to recognize Western Sahara, and that AU membership would not change Morocco's stance
268 that Western Sahara was an integral part of Moroccan territory (Moroccan World News, 2017). Morocco's failure
269 to recognize Western Sahara's sovereignty is based on the fact that it is not a member of the UN. Western Sahara
270 does not have any administering power and therefore should be under Moroccan sovereignty. SADR's membership
271 to the AU was a tactic to seek full recognition of her independence and also a means to force Morocco to recognise
272 that position (Daily Maverick, 2017). Morocco's position was that SADR was admitted into the OAU against
273 Article IV of the OAU Charter. Khadad (2017) noted that SADR had no symbol of sovereignty and therefore it
274 had no case against Morocco. SADR therefore should pull out of the AU and seek for its sovereignty status from
275 outside.

276 The UN General Assembly recognises Morocco as the occupying power in Western Sahara. Shelley (2015)
277 argued that SADR was established in 1976 as a process of establishing the state of Saharawi led by the Polisario
278 Front. This position was recognized by some African countries. Shelley (2015) indicated that the history of
279 Morocco had been manipulated to justify its occupation of Saharawi. AU should assist SADR and Morocco to
280 change their contrasting interpretations of key historical events which shaped their identities and sense of justice
281 to what is rightfully theirs.

282 Morocco indicated that it suspended its AU membership to pressure African countries to withdraw their
283 recognition of SADR. Unfortunately despite great strides to force African states to withdraw recognition of
284 SADR, the then AU Commission Chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma reaffirmed the AU's support for Western

10 CONCLUSION

285 Sahara's independence in 2016. The continued denial for self-determination to Western Saharawi was the central
286 argument for the fifteen AU member states who voted against Morocco's readmission (Africa Renewal, 2017).

287 The decision regarding the admission of a member state into the AU is the preserve of AU Member States.
288 In support of this view Hicks (2017) indicated that there is need to revisit admission and readmission criteria.
289 Hicks (2017) further indicated that there are prospects of enlarging the AU membership by including the African
290 Diaspora. Given this possibility, the AU should subject each applicant state to a process that assesses its ability
291 and willingness to comply with the union's norms, the likely obstacles to compliance, and the feasibility of
292 assisting the applicant state to redress its shortfalls.

293 Fagbayibo (2017) also support the above argument by indicating that it's time for the AU to look beyond
294 geography and a simple majority vote. It must start demanding strict adherence to fundamental democratic
295 values. From the time Morocco submitted its application until its formal admission, the question of Western
296 Sahara was swept aside. Morocco easily met the AU's admission criteria. It's geographically located within
297 Africa and was voted in by more than a simple majority. Morocco's admission into AU was a mistake as it
298 actually squandered a good chance to discourage Morocco's aggression against Western Sahara. In addition,
299 Fagbayibo (2017) argued that AU had failed to assess the situation of Morocco effectively. Morocco is notorious
300 for forcing dissidents serve long prison terms after unfair trials for purely political reasons. The failure to consider
301 democratic values as part of the AU's admission process continues to have a number of negative effects. Mundy
302 (2016) also concurs that the absence of strict pre-conditions for membership has made it difficult for the AU to
303 manage delinquent behaviour among member states.

304 9 f) Implications of Morocco's readmission on collective security

305 A viable collective security system lies in the practical ability of 'all states joining forces to prevent one of
306 the numbers from using coercion to gain advantage' (Bull 1995:231). Al Monitor (2017) agrees that Morocco
307 actually adopted the stick-and-carrot in the dispute over SADR. Firstly it threatened to withdraw its troops
308 from peacekeeping missions in Africa and secondly it pressured countries to it to mobilize for the expulsion of
309 SADR from the AU. However, countries such as Algeria, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Nigeria were against the
310 expulsion of SADR from the AU.

311 Morocco's request to rejoin the AU might provide a new opportunity to negotiate for its withdrawal for SADR
312 thus fostering collective security initiatives. The AU general secretariat noted that maybe Morocco wanted to
313 return in order to argue the SADR issue from within the AU. It further commended that 'Of course the African
314 family welcomes Morocco's return, but no one wants any debates or diplomatic disputes between member states.
315 We want to work together for the benefit of the continent' (AU, 2017).

316 IV.

317 10 Conclusion

318 The readmission of Morocco into the AU was a welcome move. As part of readmission, Morocco was tasked
319 to make sure that it relinquishes its hold on Western Sahara. Morocco's readmission into the AU conforms to
320 realism in the sense that it sought favor with individual member states who then respected their bilateral relations
321 more than the case of SADR during the voting process. Wolfforth (1988:23) argues that 'states employ strategies
322 whose benefits exceed the expected loss thus making rational choices'. The readmission of Morocco sanctifies the
323 common thread in international relations that 'there are no permanent enemies but only permanent interests
324 in politics'. AU member states were more concerned with what their personal relationship with Morocco could
325 do to their national interest rather than sticking to the principles which guide collective security. Wohlforth
326 (1988:23) also adds that 'states are self regarding and they look out for their own security and well-being and
327 they are not likely to equate their well-being for others'. AU Member States were pushed to act on the impulse of
328 national interest or individual foreign policy objectives. Nyathi (2017) argued that Morocco should not mistake
329 being voted back into the AU as automatically voting SADR out of the organization. SADR has the support
330 of AU despite the fact that Morocco was readmitted. There is need to change the admission criteria because
331 this will reduce cases of flouting AU principles in future if a need to admit other possible members of African
332 background arise. Morocco's readmission contravenes the Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000 hence if not well
333 articulated this will likely destroy the collectivism in providing collective security of AU. Future readmission will
334 refer to Morocco's readmission as an example to contravene the principles of AU, thus killing the whole purpose
335 of having AU in the first place. From the study, it was identified that there are no effective checks and balance
336 initiatives by AU to make sure that states are actually adhering to the principles and norms of AU. There is
337 need for stricter rules and well coordinated funding so that those in breach of the AU principles will not exploit
338 others in the context of funding or promoting programs. ¹

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Figure 2:

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