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Framing France's Domestic Response to the November 2015 Paris Attacks-Insights from Al Jazeera English

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Keywords: *AL jazeera, framing, french muslim minorities, parris attacks, terrorists.*

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I. Introduction

Media has a significant influence on the workings of the everyday politics in the 21st century, as the media frames incidents in various ways depending on the national interest, geo-political settings, the influence of owners, their mission, and so on. The 9/11 attack in the United States (US) and the anti-terrorism operation that it brought changed the framing, categorization and focalization of news of incidents of media as interstate conflicts have declined while conflicts within states have risen (Dexter, 2008: 57; Kaldor, 2013: 80; Luckham, 2009: 5; Oberschall, 2010: 179). These conflicts within states are what Khaldor deemed as 'new wars' which include terrorism particularly homegrown terrorism (Kaldor, 2013: 80) – 'happening on [US and] Europe's doorstep' (Dexter, 2008: 57).

During the aftermath of 9/11, the Media started to demonize and marginalize the Arabs in general and Arab immigrants living in the West in particular. Moreover, the places where Muslims worship began to be considered as a place for the recruitment of extremists. As Cesari (2012: 439) writes, 'media coverage and anti-terrorist operations contribute to promoting the idea that mosques are places for radicalization and recruitment of future terrorists'.

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There exists a number of electronic and print media organizations that we can choose from based on our interests and criterion for validity. I took the process of writing this article as an opportunity to learn more about Al Jazeera English (AJE) and delve into its framing of the news of the French government's domestic reaction to the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks. I wondered how AJE – a media organization based in the Middle East and criticized by the West as 'a mouthpiece or a vehicle through which opponents of the West get their views across' (Zayani, 2005: 22) – framed the French government's domestic response to the 13 November 2015 attacks in Paris. The article examines the way AJE framed the French government's domestic response to the attacks. To this end, three website news articles which were published within 52 days after the attack are purposefully chosen as data to examine the way AJE framed France's domestic response to the attack. The three articles are qualitatively analysed using the qualitative textual analysis method.

Although categorization, framing and focalization are the analytical tools used in this article, I prefer to focus on framing, since 'applying frames to a crisis situation, such as a terrorist attack, may serve as a strategy with which to identify main causes and responsible agents, make moral judgments, and, finally, to suggest policy responses to the event' (Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2008: 54). With framing being the focus of the analysis, this article therefore explores the way AJE framed the French government's internal response to the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks. The objective of the article is to study the way AJE framed the French government's domestic response to the attacks by unpacking the way AJE framed France's domestic reaction. Though France swiftly responded to the attacks both internally and externally, the scope of this article is delimited to the internal reaction of French authorities. I start from the hypothesis that AJE's framing of the news of incidents which happened on 13 November 2015 in Paris is not only critical of France's measures, but that the network voices the views of Muslim minorities in France, since it is a 'pan-Arab' media outlet (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2015; Hammond, 2004: 2).

Aiming to provide an overview of the background of AJE and the socio-political context within which the attack happened, the article provides a

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glimpse of the media and socio-political context of the incident before jumping to the November 2015 attacks in Paris.

II. Media Context

Being accessible across most of the globe, AJE is a news and discussion channel stationed in the Middle East. It is, according to Zayani (2005: 1), is a '24-hour satellite news and discussion channel beamed out of the tiny Gulf peninsula of Qatar' – a country 'once one of the poorest Gulf states, is one of the richest countries in the region today' from the income it gets from its huge stockpile of gas reserves (BBC, 2015). As Eliades (2016: 8) states, 'between 40 and 50 million Arabs watch Al Jazeera, taking into account 3 million in Europe and a few hundred thousand in the US. They go on to add that in times of crisis this figure doubles'. However, there are viewers from African, Asian, and Latin American countries, who are not included in this figure, since there is free online access to the network. The network reaches a truly global audience, since anyone who wishes to access the network may do so, and it covers news topics in every corner of the world. This fits into the network's claim to reach 'more than 270 million households in over 140 countries across the globe' (Al Jazeera, n.d.).

The Qatari government, headed by Emir Tamim bin Khalifa al-Thani, provides the sponsorship of the channel (Eliades, 2016: 12). The Emir has silenced the channel from embarking on any criticism against his government and has used the channel to control the Qatari people and silence opposition against his monopoly. The network 'serves as a propaganda tool, an extension of state power and a mouthpiece for state policies, and control of such an apparatus ensures that dissident voices do not have access to the public' (Zayani, 2005: 14). Moreover, while the Emir, who came to power in 1995 in a bloodless coup (Carney, 2016: 3; Eliades, 2016: 3), starts to bring liberal elements into Qatar, this channel has significantly helped him to influence the nation. According to Zayani (2005: 11), it 'is a showpiece of the Emir of Qatar and a symbol of his resolve to modernize his country'.

Although the network criticizes governments in the Gulf region, it is not bold enough as such to criticize the Qatari government (Eliades, 2016: 13) for the media 'are never completely independent from prevailing notions of what is in the national interest' (Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2008: 203). It discusses issues that are very sensitive and considered 'untouchable' (Eliades, 2016: 7) and 'taboo subjects' (Carney, 2016: 1) for public discussion in the region. It, according to Zayani (2005: 2), 'enjoys an unprecedented margin of freedom which makes it a heaven for free speech in the Arab world. It is popular precisely because it openly discusses sensitive topics and tackles controversial issues'. This puts Qatar's relations with its neighbors in a critical condition (Eliades, 2016: 9-11) since some states in the region 'have denied Al Jazeera permission to open a bureau or closed its bureaus temporarily. While some Arab states have rebuked the network, others have banned its reporters or refused them visas' (Zayani, 2005: 3). Despite this, it is believed to play a significant role for the transformation and rise of Qatar (BBC, 2015; Hammond, 2004: 2).

Al Jazeera, which is an Arabic word translated as 'The Peninsula' – referring particularly to the Arabian Peninsula – promotes equality, rights, and justice for those who are oppressed, marginalized and excluded in general and for the Arab world in particular. It is a 'Pan-Arab' channel (BBC, 2015; Hammond, 2004: 2) which is critical of the Western 'misrepresentation and misinterpretation' of the Orient (Said, 2004: 869). The channel 'has come to play an important role in broadening Pan-Arab interaction' (Zayani, 2005: 7). It is within this media context that AJE presents its news.

III. Socio-political Context of the Incident

a) The post 9/11 measures and the depiction of Islam in the Western Media

After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, European states, intending to securitize their republics and citizens, took bold measures. Among others, there is increased surveillance on Muslims living in the West; European states imposed restrictions on migration; states promulgated new laws which gave authorities the to monitor moderate Muslims making life very difficult for them and compromising their human and democratic rights (Cesari, 2012: 430-432; Edmunds, 2011: 73 and 76). Specifically, in France, as Cesari (2012: 431), writes, 'the 2001 Law on Everyday Security expanded police powers by permitting officials to stop vehicles, search unoccupied premises, and monitor or record electronic transactions without notice as part of anti-terrorism investigations'.

European states procured such sweeping powers in the name of securitization – 'exceptional measures and procedures outside the rule of law, justified by emergency situations that threaten the survival of political community' (Cesari, 2012: 432-433) – seemingly on behalf of the citizens of their countries. However, this securitization is often criticized for marginalizing and excluding Muslim minorities living in the West equating them with terrorists. Particularly, the Western Media began to associate terrorism with members of the minority religion. Following the 9/11 attacks, Abdulla (2007: 1063) wrote, 'Islam and Muslims started to come to the forefront of the Western media, albeit not for very positive reasons'. Furthermore, Edmunds (2011: 67) states that 'a new form of governmentality identifies signs of religious belief, such as the hijab, as a potential threat to national identity and

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security'. This marked the time that Huntington's dictum 'Islam has bloody boarders'– the thesis behind the war on terror after the 9/11 attack – got momentum in the West (Huntington in O'Gorman, 2011: 27; Luckham, 2009: 5). Since the 9/11 attacks 'were partially planned in Hamburg, and there were at least twenty Europeans among the individuals imprisoned by the United States in Guantanamo Bay', according to Cesari (2012), 'European Muslims are often viewed as 'foreign enemies', a classification that implies a much lower level of legal and social rights and privileges'.

Besides the further marginalization and exclusion of moderate Muslims that has been occurring in the West since 9/11, there has been a growing anti-Islamic sentiment across the globe. For instance, 'several mosques in Europe and Australia were petrol-bombed by individuals who believed they were 'doing the U.S. a favour'' (Abdulla, 2007: 1066). In France, they were considered as 'strangers within' (Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 341) and they 'have been 'cast out' of the political community in the period following 9/11'(Edmunds, 2011: 76). Furthermore, Edmunds (2011: 75) writes that 'they [Muslims] have become the current 'other' in public discourses'. Though extremist elements exist in other religions, for example in Myanmar where extremist Buddhists are involved in massacring Muslim Rohingya, this is largely absent from Western discourses and Western Media. Cognizant of this, June Edmunds (2011: 74) succinctly wrote, 'Islam alone is judged, in the media, to be fundamentalist, and other religions, which also contain fundamentalist strands, are absent from discussions of religious radicalization'. This leads the media to disseminate a distorted and imbalanced view on the Muslim religion and its followers. Such distortion and imbalances that equate the religious institution with terrorist organizations results in a backlash towards the West and increases the anti-US and anti-Europe sentiment among Muslims in the Middle East and across the globe, 'since Arabs felt that the U.S. insisted on dealing with Islam as an enemy' (Abdulla, 2007: 1078). As Abdulla (2007: 1079) notes, 'Arabs feel that the U.S. media are unduly focused on Islam as a breeding ground of violence and terrorism and that the media refuse to pay attention to moderate voices'.

b) Islamophobia in the West – equating Muslims with terrorists

The already distorted and imbalanced image of Islam in the west before 9/11, as Abdulla (2007: 1065) puts it, 'took a turn for the worse after the criminal attacks' on the World Trade Centre in US. The attack resulted in further marginalization and exclusion of moderate Muslims in the West. This has arisen from the wrong understanding or perception that Muslims are equated with terrorists even though 'all Arab countries condemned the attacks, for the most part, voices communicated through the mass media still failed to differentiate between Arabs and Muslims, on one hand, and terrorists, on the other' (Abdulla, 2007: 1065). The media's actions contributed to the spread of Islamophobia in the West. Considering Christensen's claim on the distorted and imbalanced image of Islam in the West, as Abdulla (2007: 1064) states, the reason why the marginalization and exclusion of Islam increased in the West is because of the "distorted and imbalanced media coverage. . . Western news stories', he says, 'tend to show a mosque, a minaret, or a veiled woman regardless of the nature of the story, even when the story is about terrorism'. However, this doesn't mean that all media outlets are responsible for the demonization of Islam in the West by associating it with terrorism. There is media coverage which frames incidents in a fair way giving balanced views without bias. For instance, Le Monde, according to Abdulla (2007: 1067),

> focused its analysis on the importance of understanding the other and acquainting oneself with foreign civilizations. It stressed that the issue is not one of a clash of civilizations, but rather a clash between extremists and moderates within each civilization and across ethnicities and religions worldwide. In this light, the newspaper argued, France should support the U.S. not in a war against Islam but in a war against the terrorists who carried out these attacks on humanity.

As it is noted from the above text, Le Monde has tried to distinguish Islam from terrorism. It calls for the support of France to stand in solidarity with US to fight terrorism not Islam. There is a clear and distinct view of Islam and terrorism in Le Monde's framing.

During the post 9/11 period, the frequency of contact between young Muslim immigrants and French police increased because of police's claim that they are required to check the identities of immigrants so that they can secure the citizens and the republic. This develops a sense of mistrust between the police and young Muslim immigrants (Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 334). Moreover, during identity checks by the police, harassment and biases were reported (Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 340). As Walklate and Mythen (2016: 342) note, immigration is viewed as one of France's social problems in 2014 besides its levels of unemployment and its economic situation. Particularly, non-Christian immigrants are perceived as a threat. Such a perception, they argue, puts 'the socially excluded in France, minority Muslim communities susceptible to extremism' (Walklate and Mythen 2016: 342).

Doha and Paris have a harmonious relationship despite Al Jazeera's critical standpoint towards France. 'Qatar', Hammond (2004: 10) writes, 'developed close links with France' particularly during the reign of

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President Nicolas Sarkozy – 'which paid off with co-operation over Libya and Syria and Qatari investment in the Paris property market'. It was in such socio-political context that the November 2015 attacks happened in Paris.

IV. The 13 November 2015 Paris Attacks – a Quick Glance

Paris was calm on the evening of Friday the 13th of November 2015 until eight individuals, grouped into three teams, attacked six locations resulting in devastating casualties. This attack was the fifth terrorist incident in Paris in 2015 alone (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism [IICT], 2015: 3; Yeo, 2015). The 13 November 2015 simultaneous attacks, which took the lives of more than 130 people and left 350 injured (Belkin, 2015; Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 334; Yeo, 2015), shocked not only France – a liberal state that banned the Muslim face covering (Cesari, 2012: 444) and participated in the US-led war against terrorism in the Middle East – but also other Western countries.

France is one of the 60 countries attacking the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq (Belkin, 2015; McInnis, 2016: 1). This participation in the war against terror and the 'marginalization' of the Muslim minorities in France was taken as a reason for the attacks. According to Walklate and Mythen (2016: 341), it is also important to refer back and link the attack with 'the military conflict engagement—then disengagement—of the West [– which France was a part –] in Iraq and Afghanistan has fuelled anger'.

The attacks, for which ISIL 'has claimed responsibility' and tried to instigate fear across Europe for more attacks on what it calls the 'crusaders' (Belkin, 2015; IICT, 2015: 3-6; Yeo, 2015; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center [MAITIC], 2015: 1 and 12), were the 'worst' and 'deadliest' one in Europe that ISIL has ever committed (Belkin, 2015; MAITIC, 2015: 1; IICT, 2015: 2; Yeo, 2015). According to the MAITIC (2015: 2-3) and the IICT (2015: 2), three teams that involved eight attackers committed the attack separately in six different places. The first team, consisting of three attackers, attacked the Bataclan Theatre after they managed to get in and opened fire which killed 89 people. The second team, which involved three suicide bombers, occurred at Stade de France – where there was a soccer match occurring between France and Germany to which French President Francois Hollande was in attendance. The third team, which involved two perpetrators, occurred at 'the center of Paris where they carried out three shooting and a suicide bombing attack' (MAITIC, 2015: 2-3). These separate, simultaneous and coordinated attacks killed 130 and wounded 350 civilians (Belkin, 2015; IICT, 2015: 2; MAITIC, 2015: 2-3; Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 334; Yeo, 2015). The attackers had a link with the Jihadists in Belgium and Syria. While it was 'planned, directed and supported by ISIS in Syria' (MAITIC, 2015: 4, IICT, 2015: 3), it got a 'logistic backup' from members of the cell of this attack in Belgium, particularly in Molenbeek (MAITIC, 2015: 4, Belkin, 2015; IICT, 2015: 3).

The French Government swiftly responded to the attack both internally and externally. While it intensified its attack on ISIL in Syria and Iraq externally, the internal response, on which this paper focuses, began by trying to secure Paris and its residents from further attacks. This reaction included requesting the residents of Paris (and French citizens across the country) to stay inside their homes, closing its borders, universities, and some public transportation systems like the tram, train, and government offices through the state of emergency it declared in the aftermath of the attacks (IICT, 2015: 5-6). Soldiers also continued hunting the perpetrators who had escaped and raided homes of Muslim residents that they thought had links with the perpetrators. The soldiers and the police conducted 'a wave of detentions, apprehending 23 individuals suspected of terrorism and placing 104 under house arrest' (Belkin, 2015; MAITIC, 2015: 4-5).

V. Materials and Methods

The existence of different ways of presenting incidents via the news media leads to the existence of multiple categorizations, framing and focalizations peculiar to the relative media pertinent to reality. As Meijer (1993: 368) rightly points out, 'the 'real' world is constantly being transmitted and created through textual and visual discourses'. Hence, textual representation and reality are two sides of the same coin, as the two 'cannot be divided into two separate realms' (Meijer, 1993: 368). Though analytical tools such as categorization, framing and focalization, which I have used in this article, are relevant to unpack the way Al Jazeera framed the effects of the French government's domestic reaction to the 13 November 2015 attacks in Paris, an emphasis is given to the framing of the incident.

Framing is formulating an account of a real event in a way that specific media intends the event to be conceived by audiences. It is understood as 'the way events and issues are organized and made sense of' (Reese in Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2008: 204-205). In relation to this fact, Papacharissi and Oliveira (2008: 54) also claim that 'frames guide the conceptual union of words and images and thoughts upon which individuals rely to make sense of their surrounding environments'. Specifically, it is 'to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation' (Entman in Papacharissi

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and Oliveira, 2008: 53). Al Jazeera's framing of the news is influenced by the national and regional politics, religion, culture etc. within which it is situated, since framing of the news 'is influenced by the national [and regional] political context' (Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2008: 205).

Considering Iyengar's account that 'most news coverage adopts episodic or thematic frames' according to Papacharissi and Oliveira (2008: 58), this article looks into whether thematic frames or episodic frames dominate Al Jazeera's framing of the news. While episodic frames focus 'on describing single events or occurrences and tended to involve the use of negative stereotypes', thematic frames present 'more in-depth coverage that emphasized context and continuity and detracted from negative stereotyping' (Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2008: 58).

Though this article focuses on examining the way Al Jazeera framed France's domestic reaction to the attacks, it will also address the channel's categorization and focalization of the event. Categorization is classifying actors based on some kind of characteristics that one deems the members or the actors share in common. At this juncture, it is important to bring forth the membership categorization approach (MCA) that Leuder and her colleagues describe. MCA, according to them, 'stresses situated aspects of categorizing, and focuses on how it is done in talk in activities' (Leudar et al. 2004: 244). On the other hand, focalization is about 'the perspective from which the story is told' (Meijer, 1993: 375).

A qualitative textual analysis is the methodology used in this article to examine Al Jazeera's framing of the domestic response for the incident in question using three news articles. Since AJE's satellite broadcast has an online stream and the online steam includes and uses textual news articles in its online live coverages, the three news articles are chosen from AJE's website. The news articles are chosen for their focus on the effect of France's reaction to the attack within the country to answer the question 'How does Al Jazeera frame the French Government's domestic reaction to the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks in its news?' The first article, which was published on 14 November 2015, is entitled 'Fear and confusion in Paris after deadly attacks'. The second article is entitled 'Activists decry mosque closures in France'. It was published on 3 December 2015 – 21 days after the incident. The third article is named 'From Charlie Hebdo attacks to a state of emergency' and was published on 6 January 2016. This article was chosen for its comprehensive and retrospective coverage of the Charlie Hebdo attack which happened on 7 January 2015 – few days before the November attacks. Considering that the four images in these three news articles require independent visual analysis, it is preferred to focus only on the textual analysis of the texts in the selected news articles.

VI. Results and Discussions

The results and discussions are lumped together and presented based on the analytical tools – *categorization, framing and focalization* – employed in the study. Yet, an emphasis is given to *framing*.

a) Categorization – France, French Muslim minorities and ISIL

The first article (see Appendix-I) clearly indicates the 'us' and 'them' categorization. These two categories in this article are France and 'ISIL'. While the article delineates ISIL as 'bad guys' providing attributes like 'attackers', 'killers' and 'terrorists', it depicts France and its citizens as 'good guys' who suffered from the attack. The 'us' category includes French authorities in different departments. The 'victims' – 'the 128 killed', the '200 people' who 'were injured' are also in the 'us' category. Furthermore, the 'us' category includes the US, Britain, and Germany who condemn the attacks and express their support to France in the wake of the attack. Three categories are visible in the second article (see appendix-II). These three categories include: French Muslim minorities, French authorities and ISIL. The third article (see Appendix-III), which provides a critical and comprehensive analysis of the attacks, also creates three categories: France, ISIL and Muslim minorities in France. Generally, though there are clear and broader categories of 'us' and 'them' in the three articles, French Muslim minorities, the French authorities and ISIL are the three dominant categories in the three articles. These categories, which AJE uses to distinguish Muslim's from the perpetrators, are dominant and consistent across the three news articles.

b) Framing

Though the first news article mentions that France reacted swiftly 'to ensure that no new attack can take place', the framing of the article somehow links to the lack of attention and concern for the same incidents happening daily in the Middle East and in sub-Saharan Africa. As the following quote from the first news article indicates,

> Speaking to Al Jazeera from Pennsylvania, Malcolm Nance, a security and intelligence consultant, said it was likely that either ISIL or al-Qaeda was behind the attacks. "We shouldn't lose sight of the fact that this is actually an occurrence almost every day throughout the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. We just had an attack in Beirut which killed almost 40 people; we had a bombing of a Russian airliner over Egypt," he said.

Referring to the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa through Malcolm Nance, who is an authority (professional) whom the network chose to justify its frame, Al Jazeera framed the incident in a way that suggests that the West considers the lives of its citizens

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to be worth more than the lives of those in the Middle East. It shows that this kind of incident is what is experienced in countries in those regions on an everyday basis. Yet there was no international condemnation for these attacks and little cooperation with the countries in these regions. However, this news article, under its sub-heading 'international condemnation', shows that there is international condemnation for the attacks in Paris. The network, in the news article, states,

> US President Barack Obama called the attacks in Paris "outrageous" and said the US was united with France. "Once again, we've seen an outrageous attempt to terrorize innocent civilians," Obama told reporters at the White House. "We stand prepared and ready to provide whatever assistance that the government and the people of France need," he said, and pledged to "bring these terrorists to justice and go after any terrorist networks" involved. "Those who think that they can terrorize the people of France or the values that they stand for are wrong," Obama said. British Prime Minister David Cameron said he was "shocked" by the events in Paris. "Our thoughts and prayers are with the French people. We will do whatever we can to help," he wrote on Twitter. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said she was "profoundly shocked" by the attacks.

As it is indicted in the above quotation, influential world leaders of countries of the West such as the US President Barack Obama, British ex-Prime Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel – who denounced the attack and confirmed their solidarity with Paris – were cited to show the international condemnation for the Paris attacks.

The first news article further reports "[t]hese mass-casualty attacks are hallmarks of al-Qaeda and the ISIL organization. It appears now that the battlefront has moved from the Middle East and is now at the forefront of the Atlantic Ocean". This not only makes al-Qaeda and ISIL responsible for the attacks, but it also warns French authorities that the battle is at the forefront of French soil fitting Dexter's (2008: 57) view that terrorism is at 'Europe's doorstep'.

Citing rights groups and activists, including the Collective Against Islamophobia organization, the second article frames France's measure of closing mosques using the emergency rule as unable to guarantee peace and security and in violation of religious rights and freedoms of French Muslim minorities. From its inception, the title of the article – Activists decry mosque closures in France – indicates a discontent and condemnation of the measure of closing mosques. Particularly, the usage of the word 'decry' in the title of the article indicates strong disapproval of the French authorities' move to close mosques. The network deliberately used this word in the title to indicate the pressure under which Muslim minorities are suffering.

> The following text from this news article reads, Closing mosques in France that authorities say foster extremism will not prevent people from becoming 'radicalised' and could heighten a sense of alienation among the Muslim minority, rights groups and activists have said. At least three mosques have already been closed under France's extended emergency rule, which allows authorities to shut down places of worship that show a "pattern of radicalisation". A French Imam, meanwhile, said that between 100 and 160 more mosques are likely to be closed as part of the security campaign.

This not only shows closing mosques is inappropriate but it also warns that the measure will further increase the problem creating 'alienation' and marginalization of minority groups. The network, mentioning that French authorities are prepared to close 'between 100 and 160' mosques after they have already closed 'three', also shows the further marginalization and exclusion of Muslim minorities. The closing of such number of mosques, as the network highlights, implies the way that French authorities perceive their Muslim Minorities – equating the minority group with terrorists. In this frame, Al Jazeera not only tries to counter the narrative that mosques are places of radicalization and extremism (Edmunds, 2011: 75; Cesari, 2012: 439) but also aims to show that '[western] media coverage and anti-terrorist operations contribute to promoting the idea that mosques are places for radicalization and recruitment of future terrorists' (Cesari, 2012: 439).

AJE, being critical of France's identification of mosques with radicalization in its news, shows that French Muslim minorities became the 'target of 'retaliatory' violence' during the state of emergency. As it is stated in the second news article,

> "Experts have proven that terrorists do not come from organized communities," Samia Hathroubi, a French-Tunisian human rights activist, told Al Jazeera. She added that there was a disconnect between what French President Francois Hollande says to reassure Muslims that they are not being "singled out", and the reality of raids under emergency law which have "largely targeted mosques and activists from Muslim communities". "I feel we should be very cautious in France with civil rights and our freedoms which are jeopardized by the state of emergency."

As the above quote indicates, French Muslim minorities are 'singled out', their 'civil rights' are violated and their 'freedoms' are 'jeopardized', and are facing the 'denial of religious freedom'. The article indicates how mosques are a peaceful place of worship and prayer but French authorities are unable to see such differences. Quoiting Yasser Louati, from the Collective

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Against Islamophobia group, AJE writes, 'If you listen to anti-terror judges, they will tell you that radicalization takes place outside of mosques. It happens in jails or clandestine circles or via the internet'. At this point, Al Jazeera, in a very subtle way, indicates the place where extremism originates which the network claims to indicate the failure of French authorities to view mosques as a peaceful place of worship and prayer that is different from 'jails or clandestine [circles]' – where radicalization occurs, or, according to the network, mostly 'via the internet'. Furthermore, the network, with the phrase 'we were already lacking a huge number of mosques to cope with demand', voices the concern of French Muslim minorities about the inadequacy of the existing mosques which are unable to cope with the number of French Muslims – estimated 'between 5.5 million and 6.2 million' – about '7.6 per cent of total population' of France.

The article, considering French authorities' reaction to be 'brutal', warns that such 'brutal' measures will bring unprecedented consequences like 'humiliation', 'alienation' and 'resentment' towards the French authorities in the long run. As it is indicated in the text 'with this brutality, we may be sewing the seeds of radicalisation for the next 20 years. . . the effect could be further humiliation, alienation and resentment towards the government', and here the network bluntly threatens French authorities for the anti-terror operation they are undertaking.

Being critical of the state of emergency, which provides 'extra powers [to French authorities] to conduct raids and detain people on suspicion', that France declared immediately after the attacks, AJE framed the third news article in such a way that indicates how French Muslim minorities, whose 'homes, restaurants and mosques' are 'raided' by French authorities, are suffering from Islamophobia. The article claims that French Muslims are erroneously depicted as 'public enemies' using the warning from the spokesman of the Collective against Islamophobia in France. The news article, under its sub-title 'Charlie Hebdo attacks and Islamophobia', states that

The majority of the raids have been conducted on Muslim homes, businesses and places of worship. Yasser Louati, spokesman for the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, has warned that: "The Muslim minority in France feels like it's being treated as the public enemy."

Despite its claim that the majority of the raids were conducted towards Muslim communities, individual cases and experiences of what it calls 'unfair raids' were presented to support the framing of Islamophobia and Muslim marginalization – which, according to the network, are mounting after the attacks. It tries to justify this frame citing 'Muslim group', 'civil liberties group' and 'about 100 organizations – including France's Human Rights League' which denounced the move as violations of religious rights and freedoms. It also shows the continuation and threat of these 'unfair raids' towards the Muslim communities quoting the interior minister Bernard Cazeneuve who says 'It's just a start, these operations are going to continue, the response of the republic will be huge, will be total. The one who targets the republic, the republic will catch him'. Moreover, like the second article, the network in the third article warns French authorities over the measures they are taking on moderate French Muslim minorities. AJE, being supportive of Muslim minorities, views the French authorities' anti-terror operations as a 'dangerous path' as indicated in the text, 'civil liberties groups have warned the French state has embarked on a dangerous path after the Paris attacks'.

Though both episodic and thematic frames prevail in the framing of the three articles, thematic frames dominate in the articles since it links the attacks with the US-led war on terror in Syria and Iraq and 'Charlie Hebdo, target of a deadly attack by gunmen in January'. Moreover, this framing dominates since the articles provide 'context and background for the issue at hand', 'emanates from specific instances', is 'less descriptive and more analytical' and tends to provoke societal attribution of responsibility (Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2008: 65). Yet, the stereotyping and marginalization of the French Muslim minorities, onto which the network tries to shed light, shows the existence of episodic frames.

c) Focalization

The focalization of the first article is based on the view of those people who are suffering from similar attacks on a daily basis in the Middle East and sub-Saharan African regions – where international condemnation is missing. The second news article is presented from the perspectives of Muslim minorities in France whose religious rights and freedoms are violated, who lacks places of worship, and who are marginalized and targeted in retaliatory violence. Like the previous article, the positions of Muslim minorities in France is the dominant perspective from which the third article is presented. It attempts to voice the marginalization and unfair treatment that French Muslim minorities have been experiencing which fits exactly into AJE's aim to 'voice the voiceless'. Thus, moderate Muslims in the Middle East and sub-Saharan African regions and France's Muslim minorities are the focalization of the three news articles.

VII. Conclusion

The endeavor to embark on this article was to answer the question 'How does AJE frame the French Government's domestic reaction to the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks in its news?' Making Muslim minorities, French authority and ISIL the three dominant categories, AJE framed France's internal response as a

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threat to the country's Muslim minorities. Dominated by thematic frames, the network in its frames tried to distinguish terrorism from Islam. AJE is also critical of the domestic reaction of French authorities in the wake of the attack. The framing shows that the anti-terror operation and the state of emergency taking place in the aftermath of the attacks marginalizes and excludes the French Muslim minority who are already suffering from Islamophobia since the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in US and the Charlie Hebdo attack. It contested the French authorities' assumption that mosques are places where radicals are found and recruited and warns of the danger of marginalizing, excluding, and targeting the minority. Moreover, it cautions a backlash that such marginalization and targeting of the minority groups will result in, indicating the rise of homegrown terrorism – a challenge that many European countries are facing these days.

In its attempt to distinguish Muslim minorities from ISIL, the network ends up voicing the opinion of France's Muslim minorities, who it views as being marginalized and whose religious rights and freedoms are jeopardized. This is in line with the political perspective that it promotes and the pan-Arab views that it stands for. This leads the channel not only to categorically differentiate Muslims from terrorists but also to contest such dominant media discourses that perceive and broadcast the two as being identical to one another.

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Appendices

Appendix I: News article one: Fear and confusion in Paris after deadly attacks (November 14 2015) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/reports-shooting-restaurant-central-paris-151113211237312.html

Appendix II: News article two: Activists decry mosque closures in France (December 3 2015) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/activists-decry-mosque-closures-france-151203182605655.html

Appendix III: News article three: From Charlie Hebdo attacks to a state of emergency (January 6 2016) http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/01/charlie-hebdo-attacks-state-emergency-160106125210613.html

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