

1 The Politics of Labeling in International Relations: The Case of
2 the So-Called "Coup d'Etat of March 2009" in Madagascar

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6

7 **Abstract**

8 The consecutive and unconstitutional transfers of power which occurred in Madagascar on
9 March 17, 2009, between, on the one hand, President Marc Ravalomanana and the Military
10 Directorate, and on the other hand, the Military Directorate and Andry Rajoelina, have been
11 labeled and condemned as a "coup d'état" by the great majority of the members of the
12 international community. However, despite this quasi-unanimity, the different members of the
13 international community adopted different responses in dealing with this so-called coup
14 d'état. Using the labeling approach, this study analyzes the rules and procedures of the
15 relevant members of the international community in dealing with a coup d'état in general and
16 their actual responses in the particular case of Madagascar. This study finds, on the one hand,
17 that the rules and procedures of the relevant members of the international community in
18 dealing with a coup d'état were completely different, on the other hand, that their actual
19 responses were usually inconsistent with their own rules and procedures.

20

21 *Index terms*—africa, madagascar, coup d'état, andry rajoelina, marc ravalomanana, labeling approach.

22 **1 Introduction**

23 In December 13, 2008, President Marc Ravalomanana's government decided to shut down VIVA Television, a
24 private television station owned by Andry Rajoelina, who was then an up-andcoming mayor of the capital city
25 Antananarivo. The reason behind this decision was that VIVA Television aired a few days earlier an interview
26 of former President Didier Ratsiraka, the archrival of Ravalomanana who was living in exile in Paris (France)
27 at that time. However, instead of bowing down to this sanction, Rajoelina defiantly issued a twenty-five day
28 ultimatum to the government to reopen his television station. Otherwise, he would organize street protests. As
29 expected, Ravalomanana's government did not back down from its decision.

30 Consequently, Rajoelina initiated on January 17, 2009, the street protests, dubbed "Orange Revolution," which
31 led to a long period of instability and crisis and ultimately resulted in the overthrow of Ravalomanana and his exile
32 to South Africa. 1 Indeed, following weeks of violent protests, marked by massive looting (January 26, 2009)
33 and the killing of several protesters by the Presidential Guards (February 7, 2009), a small group of soldiers and
34 officers from the unit known as CAPSAT, 1 While there seemed to be a quasi-consensus on the application of
35 the label of "coup d'état" in the case of Madagascar in March 2009, the actual responses of each member of
36 the international community in dealing with this case were totally different. For instance, some countries, like
37 China and Turkey, among others, continued to do business with Madagascar as usual; other countries, like the
38 US, categorically refused to recognize what was called "de facto government" of the country and suspended their
39 non-humanitarian aid to the country. In addition, despite the application of the label of "coup d'état" in this
40 case, the ensuing political instability and crisis were treated as a political conflict between, on the one hand, the
41 alleged based in the military camp of Soanierana (on the outskirts of Antananarivo), started a mutiny on March
42 8, 2009, which spread quickly to other military camps throughout the country the following days. In the night
43 of March 16, 2009, the mutineers of CAPSAT took control of Ambohitsorohitra, one of the presidential palaces

3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

44 located in the center of the city. The following day, instead of transferring his power to the President of Senate,
45 as provided by the Constitution, President Ravalomanana decided to transfer it to a Military Directorate led by
46 Admiral Hyppolite Ramaroson before fleeing the country to Swaziland and then to South Africa. Nevertheless,
47 by the end of the same day, Admiral Ramaroson and the two members of the Military Directorate were forced by
48 the mutineers to hand over power to Rajoelina, who was quickly sworn in as the President of a High Authority
49 of the Transition (HAT) on March 21, 2009. By then, the great majority of the members of the international
50 community had already labeled and condemned the consecutive and unconstitutional transfers of power as "a
51 coup d'état," and the supporters of Ravalomanana were already organizing daily street protests against the
52 transitional government set up by Rajoelina.

53 Additionally, Madagascar was suspended by regional organizations such as the Southern African Development
54 Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), and sanctioned by major donors such as the United States
55 (US), the European Union (EU), and the Bretton Woods institutions.

56 "coup perpetrators," Rajoelina and his supporters, and on the other hand, the alleged "victims of the coup,"
57 Ravalomanana and his supporters. As a result, whereas the rules and procedures of the AU banned the coup
58 perpetrators from participating in any government of transition resulting from a "coup d'état," in Madagascar, on
59 the contrary, the transitional government since March 2009 was under the control of Rajoelina and his supporters.
60 Besides, the alleged "victims of the coup d'état" were forced, not only to negotiate but to reconcile with their
61 alleged "persecutors."

62 This article focuses on the relevant members of the international community that had significant influences on
63 the political and economic development of Madagascar, including the United Nations (UN), the AU, the SADC,
64 the EU, France, and the US. With the exception on the UN, all of these international organizations and states
65 used the label of "coup d'état" in the case of the consecutive and unconstitutional transfers of power in March
66 2009. In this sense, the main purpose of this article is to analyze how the label of "coup d'état" was used in this
67 case. Specifically, this article attempts to find out whether these members of the international community had
68 standing rules and procedures in dealing with a coup d'état in general, whether they were consistent with their
69 rules and procedures in the particular case of Madagascar, and whether they were able to achieve their policy
70 objectives.

71 The article relies primarily on the news reports related to the events occurring in Madagascar and published
72 by different local and international news agencies. It also takes into consideration the press releases and official
73 statements made by the official representatives of states and international organizations involved in these events,
74 as well as several studies published by different scholars and think tanks.

75 2 II.

76 3 Conceptual Framework

77 The labeling approach has been used for some time in other social science disciplines, such as sociology and
78 psychology. However, it was only in the 1980s that some political scientists discovered its usefulness, particularly
79 in the study of the interactions between international donors and developing countries. Indeed, compared to
80 other approaches, the labeling approach allows researchers to ask questions, not only about the labels used by
81 international donors but also about their motivations in using these labels.

82 Originally, Howard S. Becker, one of the pioneers of the labeling approach, talks about labeling in connection
83 with social deviance. As he puts it,

84 The main idea from Becker (1963) is that, at the national level, social groups create rules (or codes of conduct)
85 and label deviants or outsiders those who violate them. This idea also implies that these deviants or outsiders
86 were supposed to be excluded or banned from the groups. Since Becker's publication, other sociologists and
87 psychologists used the labeling approach, which was also known as "interactionist theory of deviance," and came
88 up with other concepts, approaches, and theories, including stigma, stereotyping, discrimination, etc. (among
89 many others, Oboler, 1992; Downs, Harrison & Robertson, 1997; Link and Phelan, 2001; Staum, 2003; Gray, 2010).

90 In the field of political science in general, and in international relations, in particular, it was only in the 1980s
91 that some scholars have been interested in using the labeling approach. Geoff Wood, one of the pioneers in the
92 use of labeling approach in political science, justified his choice of this approach as follows: Thus, following Wood
93 (1985), the use of labeling approach in the case of the so-called "coup d'état" of March 2009 in Madagascar allows
94 us to ask questions, not only about this label used by the majority of the members of the international community
95 but also about their motivations in using it. After reviewing the rules and procedures of the relevant members of
96 the international community in dealing with a coup d'état in general, this article analyzes their actual responses
97 in the case of Madagascar to find out whether they were consistent with their own rules and procedures in this
98 particular case and whether they were able to achieve their policy objectives.

99 Volume XVII Issue I Version I Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes
100 deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view
101 deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others
102 of rules and sanctions to an 'offender.' The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied;
103 deviant behavior is behavior that people so label. ??Becker, 1963: 9) The purpose of our focus on labelling
104 [sic] is to reveal processes of control, regulation, and management which are largely unrecognized even by the

105 actors themselves. It is our conviction that the significance of labelling has been underestimated as an aspect
106 of policy discourse, and especially for its structural impact (through creation, reinforcement, and reproduction)
107 upon the institutions and their ideologies through which we are managed. Since the process of labelling affects
108 the categories within which we are socialized to act and think, the object of our concern is fundamental rather
109 than peripheral. Of course, it is not a simple matter to prove the significance of such processes. However, it
110 is possible to set out a theory of labelling (and its connection with politics) through which the significance of
111 familiar material can be re-interpreted. ??Wood, 1985: 347) Year 2017 III. The Rules and Procedures of the
112 Relevant Members of the International community in Dealing with a Coup D'état Among the relevant members
113 of the international community that have significant influences in the case of Madagascar, only the AU, the EU,
114 and the US had standing rules and procedures in dealing with a coup d'état in general. In fact, it was the
115 AU's rules and procedures that took precedence in this case, and the SADC (which was in charge of leading
116 the negotiations to end the political crisis starting in June 2009) and the other members of the international
117 community were referring to these AU's rules and procedures.

118 a) The AU and its "Zero Tolerance Policy" against Unconstitutional Changes of Government

119 The AU established a tradition of "zero tolerance policy" against unconstitutional changes of government in
120 1997 with the case of Sierra Leone (African Union, 2000). This tradition has been backed up by three legal
121 documents stating clearly the rules and procedures to follow in case of unconstitutional changes of government,
122 including coup d'état. These If the condemnation and the call for a speedy return to constitutional order failed,
123 the next step for the AU is to impose sanctions not only on the state where the unconstitutional change has
124 occurred but also on the perpetrators of such a change. The main sanction against the state is its suspension
125 from the organization (African Union, 2000).

126 Nevertheless, despite this However, given the fact that the SADC is considered a subsidiary body of the AU
127 and that all SADC's member states are also members of the latter organization, it can be assumed that the SADC
128 and its member states are obligated to follow the AU's rules and procedures in dealing with unconstitutional
129 changes of government. Thus, as we will see in the next section on the actual responses of the relevant members
130 of the international community in the case of Madagascar, the SADC, and its member states adopted to some
131 extent the AU's rules and procedures.

132 4 c) The EU and the Cotonou Accord

133 The legal framework for the EU in dealing with a coup d'état occurring in a member state of the ACP-EU
134 organization is the so-called "Cotonou Accord" (ACP-EU, 2000). Under this accord, the main procedure consists
135 of dialogue and consultation between the EU and the member state where a coup d'état occurred. If the dialogue
136 and consultation failed, the organization might eventually sanction the member state where the coup d'état
137 occurred. Thus, as stipulated in Article 96 of the of the Cotonou Accord, (a) If, despite the political dialogue
138 regularly conducted between the Parties, a Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfill an obligation
139 stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law referred to in paragraph 2
140 of Article 9, it shall,except in cases of special urgency, supply the other Party and the Council of Ministers
141 with the relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a
142 solution acceptable to the Parties. To this end, it shall invite the other Party to hold consultations that focus on
143 the measures taken or to be taken by the party concerned to remedy the situation. The consultations shall be
144 conducted at the level and in the form considered most appropriate for finding a solution. The consultations shall
145 begin no later than 15 days after the invitation and shall continue for a period established by mutual agreement,
146 depending on the nature and gravity of the violation. In any case, the consultations shall last no longer than 60
147 days. If the consultations do not lead to a solution acceptable to both Parties, if consultation is refused, or in
148 cases of special urgency, appropriate measures may be taken. These measures shall be revoked as soon as the
149 reasons for taking them have disappeared. (ACP-EU, 2000, Art. 96, 2.(a)) Furthermore, concerning the sanction
150 against the state and perpetrators, Article 96 of the Cotonou Accord provides that:

151 The "appropriate measures" referred to in this Article are measures taken in accordance with international
152 law, and proportional to the violation. In the selection of these measures, priority must be given to those which
153 least disrupt the application of this agreement.

154 It is understood that suspension would be a measure of last resort. (ACP-EU, 2000, Art. 96, 2.(c))

155 d) France as a Member State of the EU

156 The analysis of French government statements on recent coups in Africa (Niger, Guinea, Mali and particularly
157 Madagascar) demonstrates that France does not have rules and procedures in dealing with a coup d'état. In
158 other words, at least at the national level, there is no legal framework that would obligate the French officials to
159 label, condemn or sanction any coup d'état anywhere in the world. This fact led, for instance, Sawyer Blazek to
160 suggest that the French approach to the case of Madagascar in March 2009 has been "pragmatic," as opposed to
161 the "principled approach" of the US (Blazek, 2010).

162 Nevertheless, since France is a member state of the EU, one can assume that France would follow the EU's
163 rules and procedures. Indeed, as we will discuss below, after adopting what has been described by some observers
164 as "ambiguous position," the French government did, in fact, align its position with that of the EU in labeling
165 and condemning the consecutive and unconstitutional transfers of power in Madagascar as a "coup d'état."

166 e) The US and its Foreign Aid Policy Some observers referred to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961,

8 A) THE AU'S RESPONSES

167 and particularly to its Section 508, as the "foundational legal framework authorizing and defining U.S. foreign
168 aid" ?? In line with these continuing resolutions, it is the responsibility of the president to determine whether
169 a coup had occurred or not, and also to certify to the "Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the
170 termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office" (Zilberman, July 03, 2013).
171 Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that at least since 2005, the UN has adopted the principle of "Responsibility
172 to Protect" (R2P) "to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity
173 by preventing them from taking place or taking remedial action when necessary" (Albright and Williamson, 2013,
174 p. 5). This principle allows the world body to intervene in some cases of internal affairs of member states, but
175 its application has been limited so far.

176 5 f) The UN and its Nonintervention in 177 6 IV. The Actual Responses of the Relevant

178 Members of the International Community in the Case of the socalled Coup D'etat of March 2009

179 7 in Madagascar

180 This section analyzes how the relevant members of the international community responded to the particular case
181 of the consecutive and unconstitutional transfers of power in Madagascar in March 2009.

182 8 a) The AU's Responses

183 On March 17, 2009, as the consecutive and unconstitutional transfers of power occurred in Madagascar, the AU
184 issued a statement "condemning what it called an attempted coup d'état" (Burgis, March 17, 2009). The label
185 of "attempted coup d'état" was changed later to that of outright "coup d'état," when the AU decided to suspend
186 Madagascar from the organization on March 20. In the meantime, the AU also called for an "immediate return
187 to constitutional order" (International Crisis Group, 18 mars 2010). September 2011). At every step of the
188 negotiations, the AU endorsed not only the SADC's general approach but also every agreement reached by the
189 parties, including the Roadmap, which allowed Rajoelina, not only to stay in power but also to participate in
190 the future presidential elections. Indeed, the Roadmap in its Article 3 clearly states that "Andry Rajoelina is
191 the President of the Transition. In this quality, he exercises the functions of the Head of State." Furthermore,
192 in its Article 14, the Roadmap indicates that the President and the members of the transitional government
193 may participate in the presidential and legislative elections, but they would only have to resign before running
194 (Southern African Development Community, 13 September 2011).

195 In sum, the facts that the AU negotiated with Rajoelina and his supporters, allowed them to stay in power
196 throughout the transition and participate in the presidential and legislative elections are all violations of the
197 AU's own rules and procedures concerning the perpetrators of unconstitutional changes, as stated in Article
198 25 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (African Union, 2007,
199 Art. 25 parag. 4). It is true that the AU and the other members of the international community managed to
200 prevent Rajoelina from participating in the 2013 presidential election. However, this was based on a technicality
201 (Rajoelina having submitted his application Madagascar as "an attempted coup d'état," Kgalema Motlanthe,
202 South African President and chair of the SADC, was still expressing his concern over "the unconstitutional
203 attempts undertaken by the opposition that led to the resignation of the democratically elected president" (Burgis,
204 March 17, 2009). The following day, Zambian Foreign Minister Kabinga Pande told a news conference in Lusaka
205 that "Zambia rejects the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar" (BBC News, March 18, 2009).
206 Finally, on , the SADC itself issued a statement condemning "in the strongest terms the circumstances that led to
207 the ousting of a democratically-elected president of Madagascar" (BBC News, . In the same statement, the SADC
208 also refused to "recognise Madagascar's new leader, Andry Rajoelina, who on Tuesday ousted the democratically-
209 elected president" (BBC News, . The SADC's early statements seem to indicate that the organization was
210 reluctant to use the label "coup d'état." Nevertheless, similarly to the AU, the SADC also suspended Madagascar
211 from the organization on March 30, 2009 (Lanz & Gasser, 2013), while at the same time calling for "an immediate
212 return to constitutional order" (International Crisis Group, 18 mars 2010).

213 However, despite the condemnation, nonrecognition, and suspension, the SADC participated in May 2009 in
214 "the multilateral negotiations seeking to establish a neutral, peaceful and consensual transition in Madagascar"
215 (African Union et al., May 22, 2009). As mentioned earlier, these "negotiations seeking to establish a neutral,
216 peaceful and consensual transition," which would include not only the alleged "victims of the coup d'état"
217 (Ravalomanana and his supporters), but also the alleged "perpetrators of the coup d'état" (Rajoelina and his
218 supporters), constituted a violation of the AU's rules and procedures, which ban the perpetrators of the coup
219 d'état from holding "any position of responsibility in political institutions of their State" (African Union, 2007,
220 Art. 25, parag. 4).

221 Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the SADC was given the responsibility of leading the negotiations, after
222 the failure of the early negotiations in May 2009. These negotiations led to different agreements (such as Maputo
223 I and II, Additional Act of Addis Ababa and the Roadmap) between the political alliances (known as mouvements
224 in French) affiliated with the alleged "victim of the coup d'état" (Ravalomanana), the alleged "perpetrator of the

225 coup d'état" (Rajoelina), and the two former presidents, Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy. Most importantly, 226 in flagrant violation of Article 25 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 227 Governance, each one of these agreements allows Rajoelina, not only to stay in power during the transition but 228 also "participate in elections held to restore the democratic order."

229 c) The EU's Responses According to news reports, the EU was the first to use the label of "coup d'état" in 230 the case of Madagascar officially. Indeed, on , one day before the suspension of Madagascar by the AU, Karel 231 Schwarzenberg, Czech Foreign Minister, speaking for the Presidency of the EU, told a press conference that 232 "there was a coup d'état [in Madagascar], it was not a democratic election" (LeMonde.fr, 20 mars 2009). This 233 official statement of the EU was followed the next day by that of the US, which also labeled and condemned 234 what happened as "a coup d'état" (Wood, March 20, 2009).

235 In the immediate aftermath of this so-called coup d'état, the EU seemed to have followed to some extent its own 236 rules and procedures in dealing with a violation of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law referred 237 to in Article 96 of the Cotonou Accord. Thus, on May 19, 2009, the EU representatives in Madagascar initiated 238 a dialogue with the transitional government. Following this initial dialogue, the EU representatives issued a 239 statement, in which they gave thirty days to the transitional government to hold a consensual dialogue among all 240 Malagasy political parties, and 120 days to implement the decisions made during this consensual dialogue. The 241 EU's decision to suspend its assistance to the country would depend on the results of this consensual dialogue 242 (Bill, 22 mai 2009). In the meantime, the EU did not participate in "the multilateral negotiations seeking to 243 establish a neutral, peaceful and consensual transition" initiated by the AU, the SADC, the OIF and the UN 244 (African Union et al., May 22, 2009). On the contrary, it held a formal consultation with the transitional 245 government in Brussels in July 2009. At the end of this consultation, the EU refused the proposal presented by 246 the transitional government to resolve the political crisis unilaterally (Ilonaia, 7 juillet 2009).

247 However, when the SADC became officially in charge of the Malagasy political problem in June 2009, the EU 248 completely put aside its own rules and procedures and deferred the resolution of the political problem to the 249 SADC. As a result, the EU endorsed not only the SADC's approach but also all of the agreements it was able 250 to reach with the Malagasy parties, including the Roadmap of September 17, 2011, which left Rajoelina as the 251 president of the transition and allowed him to participate in the future elections.

252 **9 d) France's Ambiguous Responses**

253 Being the former colonial power of Madagascar, France has always tried to maintain close diplomatic relations 254 with its former colony since independence in 1960. However, the relations between the two countries deteriorated 255 since 2002, when Ravalomanana came to power. 2 These difficult relations between the two countries in recent 256 years led many observers to suspect that France might have been the instigator of the socalled coup d'état of 257 March 2009 (Deltombe, mars 2012). Consequently, the position of France has been scrutinized very carefully by 258 many observers.

259 The first public statement of the French government on March 18, 2009, did not refer to, nor condemn any 260 "coup d'état" happening in Madagascar (BBC News, March 18, 2009). On the contrary, the spokesperson of 261 France's foreign ministry stressed that "France would continue its aid to the island and maintain its policy of 262 co-operation" (BBC News, March 18, 2009). However, following the meeting of the EU on March 19, the French 263 President, Nicolas Sarkozy, was constrained to align the French position to that of the EU, by referring to what 264 happened as a "coup d'état," and by calling for elections as soon as possible (Lexpress.fr, 20 mars 2009).

265 Nevertheless, in Madagascar, France was seen as the main supporter of the transitional government led by 266 Rajoelina. Indeed, France sent its new ambassador to Madagascar the very next day after the so-called coup 267 d'état, and this new ambassador was the first foreign diplomat to meet with Rajoelina (International Crisis 268 Group, 18 mars 2010).

269 Furthermore, after aligning its position to that of the EU, France also had to endorse the approach taken by 270 the SADC and every agreement that this regional organization was able to reach with the Malagasy political 271 leaders, including the Roadmap of September 2011.

272 **10 e) The US' Principled Responses**

273 The US seemed to be the only relevant member of the international community that has been consistent with 274 its initial position in the case of Madagascar. Indeed, after having labeled and condemned what happened as "a 275 coup d'état" (Wood, March 20, 2009), the US announced that it would "suspend all nonhumanitarian assistance 276 to Madagascar" (Wood, March 20, 2009). Furthermore, it did not participate in "the multilateral negotiations 277 seeking to establish a neutral, peaceful and consensual transition in Madagascar" (African Union et al., May 22, 278 2009).

279 However, these principled responses led the US to hold some contradictory positions. Indeed, on the one hand, 280 the US made different statements supporting the efforts of the SADC in resolving the crisis (Tananews, 07 août 281 2012). Yet, on the other hand, it disagreed with some of the agreements reached by the regional organization 282 with other actors involved in the resolution of the crisis. For instance, it never recognized the transitional 283 government resulting from the application of the Roadmap, which included representatives of Ravalomanana's

11 CONCLUSION

284 political alliances. Furthermore, while the SADC and the AU decided to prevent Ravalomanana and Rajoelina
285 from running for president in 2013, the US issued a statement rejecting this decision (Tananews, 07 août 2012).

286 f) The UN's Responses Consistent with its own rules and procedures, the United Nations, as represented by
287 its Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, did not label, nor condemn the consecutive and unconstitutional transfers
288 of power in Madagascar as a "coup d'état" (Lee, March 18, 2009). Nevertheless, the UN representatives in
289 Madagascar participated in "the multilateral negotiations seeking to establish a neutral, peaceful and consensual
290 transition in Madagascar" (African Union et al., May 22, 2009). Furthermore, when the SADC became officially
291 in charge of the Malagasy political problem, the UN deferred the resolution of the political conflict to the SADC,
292 and endorsed not only the SADC's approach, but also all of the agreements it was able to reach with the Malagasy
293 parties, including the Roadmap of September 17, 2011.

294 The use of the labeling approach allows us to think that, in the same as the members of social groups at
295 the national level, those of the international community are also "making rules whose infraction constitutes
296 deviance," and they apply "label" to the "deviant behavior" of some of its members. In the case of Madagascar,
297 the consecutive and unconstitutional transfers of power which occurred on March 17, 2009 were labeled and
298 condemned as a "coup d'état" by the vast majority of the members of the international community. However,
299 the analysis of their existing rules and procedures in dealing with a coup d'état in general along with their
300 actual responses in the particular case of Madagascar reveals that, on the one hand, they had different rules and
301 procedures; and on the other hand, most of the times, their responses in the particular case of Madagascar were
302 inconsistent with their own rules and procedures.

303 Among the relevant members of the international community which labeled and condemned the consecutive
304 and unconstitutional transfers of power as a "coup d'état," the AU and the EU had comprehensive rules and
305 procedures in dealing with a coup d'état. Nevertheless, these two entities failed to follow their own rules and
306 procedures in the particular case of Madagascar consistently. In this sense, on the one hand, in total violation
307 of the Article 25 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the AU negotiated with
308 those who were supposed to be the "perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government" (Rajoelina and his
309 supporters) and allowed them to stay in power through the whole transitional period; on the other hand, despite
310 the initiation of consultation with the transitional government unilaterally set up by Rajoelina, the EU decided
311 to put aside its own rules and Year 2017 V.

312 11 Conclusion

313 procedures and deferred the resolution of the conflict among the Malagasy political leaders to the AU and the
314 SADC.

315 Finally, the French approach to the case of Madagascar has been diversely interpreted either as "ambiguous"
316 or "pragmatic." That of the US has been seen as "principled," but it led to some contradictions in the end. ¹ ²
317 ³ ⁴ ⁵

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⁴CAPSAT stands for "Corps d'Administration des Personnels et des Services de l'Armée de Terre" (Army Corps of Personnel and Services

⁵Year 2017

deliberately excluded explicitly political, and hence peace and security, issues from its agenda, concentrating stated in Article 25 paragraph 3 of The African Charter on

economic development”

(Cawthra,

2010, on

p. 10),

until the adoption

in 2001

of the

Protocol

on

Politics,

Defence

and

Security

Coop-

eration

(Southern

African

Devel-

opment

Com-

munity,

2001).

”notwithstanding the suspension of the State Party, the

Democracy, Elections, and Governance,

Union shall maintain diplomatic contacts and take any

initiatives to restore democracy in that State Party”

(African Union, 2007, Art. 25, parag. 3).

Furthermore, concerning specifica

perpetrators of the coup d'état, Article 25 of The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance gives the following list of sanctions:

? The perpetrators of unconstitutional change of

government shall not be allowed to

? Perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government may also be tried before the competent court of the Union. ? The Assembly shall impose sanctions on any Member State that is proved

perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government

Year 2017

10

Volume

XVII Issue

I Version I

(F)

Global

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Social

Science -

11 CONCLUSION

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