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The Cult of Honor

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This paper also advances the view that the concept of 'sportsmanship' mirrors what the cult stands for, and what public expectation both requires and demands. Characteristics of some thirty cults throughout three primary types of office are shown to reflect the concept.

Keywords: *honor, cult, office, ritual, sport, sportsmanship, game, dignity.*

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I. Introduction

The cult of honor is a ritualized expression of a social ideal, specifically of traits that can be termed 'honorable'. We call it a cult not because a cult is necessarily good or bad, but because it is just what it is, a slice of the culture accordingly edited and stylized – ritualized. Active participation in a cult of honor presupposes prestige attaching to the unique and elevated quality of the cult's activities (through its offices). With special relevance to the cult, "prestige is construed as an ideology through which principles embedded in deep structure may be realized in action" (Riches, 1984, p.234). We can summarize these ideas applying criteria used by Romano (1960, p.974) in a related context: *The cult of honor "expresses the major outline of the community's…prestige system".*

Riches (op. cit, p.236) calls upon the assumption "that people who promote particular values…must also represent these values as relating to the (different) interests of the community at large. To this end, other broader ideas which the community holds as important must be cited and the values at issue must be referred to them." Prestige is what it is because the community has already valued its principles. Such is the case with the cult of honor. We summarize (Romano, ibid.): *The cult of honor "highlights those facets of community life which are of supreme importance in the lives of the [concerned] population."*

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The traits of honor participated in are sourced from within or without. It is typical of volunteerism, for example, to project desired ideals upon the field in which one wishes to make a difference. Most find the honor external to themselves and desire to identify with it through participation. The cult is an *office*. For these purposes an office is an expression of sincerity aimed at ideals that stewardship protects, and prerogatives that allow independent judgment in order to express the ideals at an appropriate level of quality and safety. Historian Norman Cantor(1991: 103) urged the office as Rome's greatest legacy to posterity. To summarize (Romano, ibid.): *The cult of honor "provides a basis for the analysis of the internal dynamics of everyday life in the community."*

By their nature, offices ritualize activities otherwise not performed through an office, accomplishing this in mainly two ways: 1) through oaths of office establishing heightened scrutiny of mis-steps and questionable conduct (compare the national anthem prior to sporting events and the heightened public scrutiny of unsportsmanlike conduct), and 2) iconizing material and human resources – that is, by enhancing, maximizing and generally valorizing methods and practices otherwise not available to activities performed in the absence of an office. As this description makes painfully obvious, it is not easy to reify the concepts of office and ritual in so many easy words. It all seems somehow amorphous or even nebulous.

Given the recondite nature of the cult, "what justification is there for saying they exist?" – asks Foster (1961, p.1175), speaking of his 'dyadic' relationships (also offices). Their reality is established because those participating in the cult know when the topic changes. The god-parent relation is perhaps the most oft-mentioned example of the type. The cult of honor is revealed in the efforts to assure a child of all the fruits his culture at its best may bestow, by the gracious assistance of one who appreciates the finer points of that culture. The 'compadre' will do right by the child that the child may do right by parents and compadre. Ceasing the relationship is a concrete fact to the participants.

We are today accustomed to 'mature' offices that are platforms for the exercise of granted authority. We don't call these relationships contractual but they do share a lot with contacts all the same. In terms of cultural history this is actually the most recent of three types –

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1) ad hoc; that is, an office that materializes only upon select circumstances and lasts only as long as the exceptional circumstances do;
2) early civic; by which we include both appointive and elective. These were originally established to manage socially significant events or programs requiring those with circumspection and upright character, and
3) mature civic; a grant of authority, exercised by an officeholder on behalf of public utility. We often consider this to be the so-called 'modern' office yet is by our reckoning more on the order of ancient history. The idea behind this office is to allow for concentrated power to effectuate for society what otherwise could not have been accomplished.

The ad hoc offices feature persons or groups able to represent the social stake in honor; such offices come about from a momentary opportunity to put social ideals on display, or to exercise exemplary norms of honor in the occasional event requiring them (many effectuated in accordance with law or custom). All of the ad hoc activities, from dance to sport; from poetry to invocation, can be viewed as exercises collectively known as *ritual*. They all carry the subtext of prayer. Honigmann [1963, p.52], for example – "activities like dancing and [ritual] running also constitute praying." The reason: ritual is, like the office itself, quasi-public even when privately performed (see discussion section). Wherever a paramount source of honor and esteem grounds conduct, the ideals represented and pointed to presuppose the cult of honor. Of this office each participant in ritual holds a portion (a synecdoche) and thus shares in upholding the ideals identified through honor.

Ad hoc offices fulfill a mere barebones version of a full modern office (such as a profession). But these offices are ubiquitous throughout history and throughout the world, both early and modern. Thus chivalry was in full flush in Medieval times as a regularized discussion as to prowess, manliness and women. It was anything but an ad hoc office. We still today have chivalry, but now only as an office that has diminished in its fullness having lost much of the 'discussion' literature that kept alive the relationships between honor, prowess and love. If today the chivalry of old is more merely than opening a door for a woman or serving her first in formal dining, it is because there is less and less argument that men can be manly in treating women justly in all senses of the word. By winning a fair share of its battle, chivalry has lost much of its salience.

Early civic offices were treated as leadership positions and were offered as quasi-rewards for exemplary social service. That is, the office was still properly a service position but the reward of status always suggested the office as a position for which status was the payment and the unpaid office the means. As society got more and more complex, requiring many trustworthy people to engage their skills and honor on behalf of the community, early civic offices saw to the bureaucratization of society. These officeholders were initially appointed, then later subject to election under the well-known principle that "succession to rank position may be fixed; or it may be flexible and open to competition [i.e. elective]…" [Rosman and Rubel, 1972, p.659]). These offices often became institutionalized and a part of custom or law. The office giving rise to Greek ostracism became an example of 'public law' under Roman suzerainty, later becoming English (and then American) 'impeachment' procedure.

The mature office grew out of the bureaucratic, at least insofar as this writer perceives matters. In the end, we find the public represented by the leadership that grants the authority to offices on behalf of the public, where in the early bureaucratic phase they likely acted on their own as leaders. The office is an institution of which Whitehead (1961, p.54) remarked, "It is not yet understood in its full importance. Social philosophy has not grasped the relevant principles, so that even now each case is treated as a peculiar fact." It is less well understood than it might be that the mature office required forethought of the public interest.

Ad hoc
Exigency, Ethics, Art, Sport, Elocution, Merit

Early civic
Occasional events
Recurrent events

Mature civic
Professional
Personal

Fig.1: The Offices

The reason for public concern over the evolution of the modern office concerns the immense concentration of power which did not as often obtain before. It counts as a reminder of the earliest small groups and bands in which leaders were allowed no actual 'power', only the respect owed their authority. The publics were fearful of strong personalities who could achieve a following and arrogate unwarranted power and influence.

In the cult of honor context, the 'professional' subclass of the mature office entails not merely identification with the ideals but being as well a vocational component of that very system.

At any rate, when we refer to a cult of honor as a celebration and emulation of social values on behalf of

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social forms, we are speaking of several types predicated upon stages of growth: we summarize them in Figure (1), above.

II. Ad Hoc Rituals

What we wish to do is offer an overview of these early cults while observing parallels with modern equivalents.

a) Elocution

i. *Leadership*

On Tuesday, 18 September 2006, Gorge W. Bush delivered what amounted to an anti-extremism/terrorism, pro-democracy/freedom speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations. He was followed the next day by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who offered his listeners an anti-injustice (aggression, occupation, etc.), pro-justice speech. I performed a content analysis of the speeches, categorizing selected words into positive and negative references in Table (1). My summaries of the results are quoted below in part (2010, pp.4-6):

The Iranian President's speech highlights the extent to which aspects of worth, value and ideal are wrapped about a single word, justice (f = 27). Bush also used that word, precisely once. … Practically every positive word of importance to Ahmadinejad"s message will strike the Westerner as broadly "spiritual". There was no mistaking the intent to portray himself the representative of a faith-abiding nation, in which virtually every act and consideration is suffused with the highest possible motivation. To the Westerner who follows the news with regularity, this inevitably smacks of bald-faced hypocrisy.

President Bush's remarks, by contrast, are heavily weighted to portray a man bent on securing world peace (f = 25). And precisely who, you can almost hear him asking, is going to disagree with that as a foreign policy objective? Of course there is a problem, for in this he opens himself up to charges of both cynicism and hypocrisy by those who see his policies as deliberately fomenting anger, discord, death and destruction. The remainder of his positive references point toward Western concepts of worth—which is to say, the political rather than the spiritual—democracy, elections, rights. On the negative side we observe the carbon copy of his rival, so that half of his words appear chosen to suggest motives of ill repute, and the rest directing us to the presumed consequences: extremism begetting terrorism, ideology begetting propaganda.

Borgström (1982, p.313) asks questions relevant to this exercise: "Analysis raises the problem of the connexion and similarity between politics and ritual. Allied with this is the question of under what circumstances speech can become an autonomous force that shapes the power structure beyond the control of the speaker." Bloch (1975) addresses these questions in ways we wish to modify. His 'ritual' presentation entails formalized language; his 'political' presentation confirms established social hierarchies. Rather than treat these as separate elements of which a choice is required, we find that the cult of honor necessarily incorporates *both* of these options. It must be stylized and so lose embellishing verbiage; it must also play to the understood prestige system and honor-related activities of society. Only thus can it become the ritualized cult. We agree that speaking from the ad hoc office and applying this mode of ritual can become that 'autonomous force' shaping opinion beyond the lecture forum.

Table 1: Frequencies of Select Words

Ahmadinejad's Speech (Cont.= Contrast with the other speaker)				Bush's Speech			
Rank	Positive	Freq.	Cont.	Rank	Positive	Freq.	Cont.
1	Just/Justice	27	1	1	Peace/Peaceful	25	13
2	Peace/Peaceful	13	25	2	Freedom/Liberty	21	1
2	Love/Compassion	13	- -	3	Democracy/-atic	13	- -
3	God	10	1	4	Elections	10	- -
4	Respect	9	4	5	Moderates/-ation	9	- -
5	Dignity	6	1	6	Hope/-ful	8	- -
6	Almighty (the)	5	- -	7	Reform/-ers	7	2
6	Virtue	5	- -	8	Respect	4	9
6	Spirituality	5	- -	9	Rights	3	?
7	Ethics	4	- -	9	Empower/Destiny	3	3
8	Perfect/-ion	4	2	10	Tolerance	2	- -
8	Righteous	3	- -	11	Independence	1	- -

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8	Truth	3	- -	11	Justice	1	27
9	Reform	2	7	11	Dignity	1	6
10	Free	1	21	11	God	1	10
Rank	Negative	Freq.	Cont.	Rank	Negative	Freq.	Cont.
1	Aggress'n/Transgr'n	11	1	1	Extremism/-ists	16	- -
2	Occupation	10	2	1	Terror/ism/-ists	16	- -
3	Oppressed/-ion	8	- -	2	Ideology	2	- -
3	Injustice	8	- -	2	Fear	2	- -
4	Threats	3	- -	2	Propaganda	2	- -
5	Domination	2	1	2	Oppression	2	8
5	Arrogate	2	- -	2	Corruption	2	1
5	Decadence	2	- -	2	Misery	2	- -
5	Coercion	2	- -	3	Domination	1	2
6	Disregard	1	--	3	Contempt	1	- -
6	Usurpation	1	- -	3	Genocide	1	- -
6	Corruption	1	2	3	Brutal	1	- -
6	Exploitation	1	--	3	Horrendous	1	- -
6	Imposition	1	- -	3	Unspeakable	1	- -
6	Interference	1	- -	3	Hatred	1	- -
6	Exclusion	1	- -	3	Desperate	1	- -

By way of summary, each of our two leaders volunteered upon ad hoc offices in which for that occasion their responsibility was to summarize at the very height of literary ability the finer points of their respective cultures. Each spoke through participation in a cult of honor. Each felt his culture under attack by the other, thus reemphasizing the need to express the 'Sunday best' of their respective cultures. Each indirectly spoke to the opposite audience as a manner of assuaging inherently opposed notions of right and wrong, good and bad. It was a duel of contrasting cultural types, the honor-based (Iran) and dignity-based (U.S.).

ii. *Poetics and Bards*

Abu-Lughod (1986, p.233) asks, "Why do individuals in Bedouin society appear able to express through poetry the sentiments of weakness that violate the honor code and the sentiments of romantic love that violate the modesty code without incurring the opprobrium of the community or losing the self-esteem derived from embodying the moral ideals of their society?" Honor-based societies do not as a rule deny humanity, they simply establish what of humanity is fit for public consumption and what not.

Thus Abu-Lughod's answer to her own question (p.235): "Insofar as the poems through which these sentiments are revealed are private and confidential, they are like secrets: secrets function to exclude those who do not share them and to closely bind those who do. Thus, categories of equals gain cohesion and divisions between nonequals are intensified, reinforcing the structures of Bedouin society." Not only can ritual open the floodgates to cultural ideals, it can – from the collective purveyance – actually nudge culture further along its ideal paths.

Before the era of British inroads into India, royal bards held status (Snodgrass, 2004, p.277) "as arbitrators of disputes, witnesses to contracts and agreements, protectors of hostages, educators of kings and their offspring, composers of history, and indeed establishers of truth…." Such status presupposes their capacity "to make or break kingly reputations, to guard or besmirch kingly honour, and thus literally to forge royal identity" (ibid, p.274).

Today, the descendants of kingly bards, the Bhats of Rajasthan, "bards of former untouchables…still speak so persistently of kings and royal bard ship." In doing so they quest for the continued identity with a distant tradition no longer valued or honored apart from a historical artifact and reminder of cultural past glory. The ideals aback a given cult of honor need not be present tense realities; it is enough to entertain them in the mind with real ties to real history with real meaning to culture back in the day.

Reliving a cult of honor by retaining aspects of the bardic lifestyle and reminding others of their esteemed cultural history should surely count as a cult of honor in and of itself. It is no different than attempting

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to emulate the honor spoken of by the most famous bard of Western literature, Homer (see also below, §2.6.1.). These modern bards project their understanding of the past into the present, feeling satisfied to identify with values which they actively promote in order to revive for others the glories of a past but significant cultural reality.

b) Art

i. *Dance*

To this day in Greece dancing under certain circumstances activates an ad hoc office that in turn is tantamount to a cult of honor. It becomes what it is in part because of audience participation (representing cultural honor) as each dancer comes and leaves. While they are dancing the idea is to be unique in dance moves while meeting traditional requirements expected of the dancer. The audience urges it along and judges the performance critically. Cowan (1990: 135), herself of Greek ancestry, explains: "By presenting themselves and the [dance] they have organized as oriented…to the collective good, those in charge attempt to control the process as social ordering and to suppress 'illicit' manifestations of competition." The cult of honor as young men must envision it is tested and observed in their dance performances (see also Segal and Handler, 1989, pp.322-3).

Without the influence of public participation, dance is difficult to demonstrate (Pollenz, 1949) as the expression of an honor cult, combining as it does motions and vocalizations that are typically knowable only to native speakers. Often even anthropologists are helpless in the interpretation of these important events. It turns out, however, that in Hindi and Hawaiian cultures matters are far more satisfactory (Pollenz, 1948, p.654): "Hindu dancers are rigorously trained from childhood, and function almost as a separate caste. Hawaii, of all Polynesia, was the only possessor of schools for hula dancers, and was the only one to possess professional troupes."

What makes these dances special in themselves is the use of stylized hand gestures that permit one to 'read' the dance with accuracy, thus permitting an evaluation of the extent to which idealized traits consistent with an honor cult are in evidence – as doubtless they are given the special attention given to their training and cultural relevance. Demonstrating appreciation of these stereotyped productions keeps alive the undergirding values of a prestige system as if struggling to remain meaningful and vibrant.

ii. *Tea Ceremony*

The now quite famous author of The Book of Tea, Kakuzo Okakura, begins his essay (1989, pp.29-30) adopting some of our language. "Teaism," he says, "is a cult", where by 'cult' he means precisely as do we with the 'cult of honor'. He implies connoisseurship in allowing all tea aesthetes to be "aristocrats in taste". In essence, however, it "expresses conjointly with ethics and religion our whole point of view about man and nature. … Our peasants have learned to arrange flowers, our meanest labourer to offer his salutation to the rocks and waters" (ibid.).

Almost effortlessly we realize how and why the tea cult mirrors and identifies with the honor cult that is the Japanese aesthetic; for honor in this instance signifies the utmost respect to what has long earned the highest public esteem. Tea certainly meets the criteria. For a very different but not out of sorts approach, Kondo (1985, p.288) notes that, "First and foremost, the tea ceremony is a highly ritualized version of the host/guest interaction, and a heightened expression of the emphasis on etiquette in Japanese culture in general. It embodies the appreciation of formalized social interaction the importance, for example, of learning *tatemae*, the graces necessary to maintain harmonious social interaction. The theory is that mere good intentions are insufficient; one must know the proper form in order to express one's feelings of hospitality effectively."

iii. *Karate-do*

What follows below (Fantaousakis, 2010) are tied-together excerpts from a website devoted to karate.

If there is one man who could be credited with popularizing karate, it is Gichin Funakoshi. … One thing is certain: he found more honor in avoiding a fight than in starting one, and he believed there was more courage in fleeing a confrontation than in defeating an enemy. … It was that 'true spirit of karate' that Funakoshi spent his entire life trying to achieve. Mas Oyama, who later created kyoku shinkai karate, once trained under Funakoshi, but quit because Funakoshi's karate was 'too slow' and seemed more like a lesson in etiquette and discipline. But this was how Funakoshi wanted it. He taught that karate should not be used for self-defense – even as a last resort – because once karate was used, the conflict became a matter of life or death, and somebody was going to get injured. Funakoshi always remembered the proverb Soken Matsumura taught him: 'When two tigers fight, one is bound to be hurt. The other will be dead.'

This is nothing if not evidence of a stewarded office in which quality is maintained and scrutinized; where trustworthiness in the office by the public is maintained and protected; and where proactive measures are taken to avoid harm to others on account of the office. Hassell (1982, p.56) establishes the link to the cult of honor by centering the activity around Japanese culture: "What the Japanese call *true* karatedo arose from a culture whose every facet was in some measure a reflection of the philosophy of Zen. From architecture to flowers and food [including the tea ceremony], Japan's culture is a Zen culture, and karate do is a reflection of that culture." Participating in the

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martial arts from their more philosophical orientation allows identification with the honor these activities represent.

c) Merit and Exigency

Merit breeds power and influence, and is for this reason potentially dangerous in honor-based societies having few resources apart from public unanimity to counter such influence. In consequence, those of great merit and equally great esteem are by that very fact established in an ad hoc office in which their conduct is under surveillance for continuing deservedness of the honor in which the public is an interested stakeholder. Even today our famed sports and entertainment figures feel the impress of this mystical office. The principle involved is quite general; de Heusch (1997, p.213) explains:

Through a special ritual of enthronement, a particular person, whose political power varies enormously, in conferred with a unique property best understood by considering that the holder is transformed into a 'fetish-body'. These persons…may not in fact rule over any kingdom and their authority may simply consist of an enhanced moral status.

A part from merit, exigency also reflects fear, as when powerful individuals gain control of governance, as for example the Greek tyrants – often usurping their way into power. Here, also, they are presumed under examination for their conduct suitable to the honorable ideals of the community. Whether from merit or exigency, a failure to maintain correct observances of honor brought forth what the Greeks called 'ostracism': an exercise in public law where citizens decided whether the leader should be demoted and then banished for ten years. The Greeks took this stuff in deadly earnest.

The role served by these ad hoc offices, one for the leadership and the other for the citizenry, was to orient the gaze of leaders to the ideals of society which they should consider themselves duty-bound to uphold. They were put on notice that the cult of honor – as representing these ideals – was that against which their conduct would be measured.

During the age of tyrants ostracism was typically used to rid a community of its tyrant. But the evidence that the whole system revolved about (concerns over fitness to deserve any significant power and influence) comes from instances when merit alone was the source of office and ostracism. Such was the case with the most famous ostracism of all, that of Themistocles, the famed Athenian general responsible for the Greek victory over the Persians at Thermopylae. His failure rested upon defects that many traditional societies have dealt with in similar ways. In brief, Themistocles not only achieved envious power (even without being *the* leader) but was also increasingly arrogant and self-conceited, attributes that disqualify normals for respect and regard let alone those with the capacity to greatly harm society. Themistocles didn't have to do anything 'wrong'; he was not being punished per se, but through his evident failures in conduct the public restated its ideal of the cult of honor at his expense.

It is because this is no 'typical' office; because it becomes a ritualized affair owing to public involvement; because of continual scrutiny of conduct (such as we will occasionally require of famous sports figures) – all of these establish the office as a cult of honor, unasked for but required all the same, as with many instances of kingship and other variations on the theme of authority.

d) Ethics

i. *Bargaining*

Many highly regarded anthropologists have treated bargaining in traditional societies as low and mean-spirited and generally unsociable "because it is always conducted with varying degrees of cunning, guile, stealth, and sometimes violence" (Khuri, 1968, p.698). This ethnocentric approach, if factual, is of course unfortunate; the more realistic approach of Khuri (ibid.) tells us this:

Bargaining takes place…where prices fluctuate and where buyers and sellers meet with opposed economic interests. It brings order to such markets by enabling the buyer and the seller to develop lasting economic relationships between them, based on mutual trust. Should the bargaining…fail to establish such trust by the use of culturally determined polite formulas, conflict then arises.

Another reality is simply that the cunning and etc. so complained of are not so much complained of by the bargainers themselves; for these are more often than not quite acceptable and expected applications of honor in these circumstances. Honor despises weakness and dependency, and negotiations present a risk for exposing both, whence the added charms otherwise so disliked. In fact, the properly conducted bargain is the very expression of the honor cult as it relates to these exchanges.

"In bargaining, the social status of the bargaining partners is at stake. They attempt to neutralize this status by following the strict rules of bargaining etiquette. But bargaining is not used only to neutralize positions, but also to improve them. If either party to the bargain, seller or buyer, is unusually successful in his approach, he earns social recognition among his group by developing the reputation of knowing how to 'handle' people and subsequently affect their choice behavior" (ibid, p.704-5).

Some will point to the fact that (ibid. p.700) "men of honor and prestige in the Middle East do not bargain, even when they realize that the goods they have bought have been overpriced. This is because bargaining, like penny-pinching, does not go with prestige." Such are a small portion of the population and

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thus do not reflect aspects of honor common to ordinary folk (who of necessity bargain). But the point, after all, is always the context – which need not be culture-wide and in fact rarely is. Thus the ideals of bargaining reflect the ideals of honor and etiquette *for the marketplace*.

Still, there are relationships to be drawn from bargaining into the broader culture. Whitehead saw it like this (1961, p.31): "They examined the theory of trade, and they construed its interactions in terms of competition, mitigated by 'higgling'." Fanslow (1990, p. 251) summarizes the issue for which bargaining is a partial solution: "In Geertz's terms, 'the man' who is passing on goods in return for money is far more certain of what he receives, then 'the man' who is passing on money in return for goods." But this asymmetry of information is a problem in the very nature of the office, any office whatever.

The client in an office is in 'adverse reliance': he is at an inherent disadvantage and must rely on the better scruples of the officeholder to prevent adverse consequences. At least in the marketplace, bargaining resolves some or much of this issue. One can at the very least drive the best bargain that cunning may devise. (For an approach based more on power options than adequacy of information, see Alexander and Alexander, 1991.)

ii. *Samaritanism*

By 'Samaritan' is meant the person voluntarily creating an ad hoc office for the purpose of rescuing a stranger from a difficult entanglement or accident. It is expected that such assistance may entail a risk and/or expense (the latter, if significant, can reasonably be requested from the subject/victim – who also joins the office – failing which a court may intervene, but see below). This distinguishes the Samaritan from the volunteer who we will consider offers herself short of generating risk to self or other as a cost of assistance (which will not exclude, however, risk on behalf of a close friend or family member, and will not presume recovery of expense incurred).

Like volunteerism (below, § 4.2.2.), Samaritanism is presumed to include itself as part of a projected reality of idealized values able to be realized if enough were to become 'good Samaritans'. Not every concerned institution is as sanguine (Dagan, 1999, p.1154): "In most cases, good samaritans are described by the courts as 'mere' strangers, volunteers, officious meddlers, intermeddlers, or interlopers. Needless to say, use of these derogatory epithets usually indicates that the plaintiff's claim is doomed to fail."

The participation in service is at the same time participation in a cult of honor provided a rationale is met for considering the situation as a risk to honorable ideals and/or the example set by assistance would if followed improve or extend the existing system of honor at issue (thus in Table 4 this example is shown as both internally and externally provenanced).

e) Sport

i. *Archaic – Chariot Race (and Olympics)*

We can learn more by focusing on the sports aspect. In Homer we have the example par excellence of a cult of honor. It is expressed in dialogues between heroes and gods, the former able to exercise the lesser or greater instincts of mankind, the latter who offer judgments upon these characteristics. Sport occupies a very important niche in communicating the ideals of the cult of honor. Here is a representative example from Homer, *The Iliad* 23.256-24.6:

"Antilochos, you used to play fair, but what you have done now? You have besmirched my *arête*, you fouled my horses by throwing your own in front of them, even though yours are inferior. … Come here, Zeus-natured Antilochos, and do what is right. Stand in front of your horses and chariot…and swear by Poseidon the Earth holder and Earth shaker that you did not foul up my chariot with a dirty trick."

Then Antilochos, once more the sportsman, answered him: "Enough now. I am much younger than you, lord Menelaos, and you are my elder and better. You know how greedy transgressions sprout up in a young man, for his mind races on, but his judgment is lightweight. Please be patient with me. I will give you the mare which I won.

He spoke, and led up the mare and gave her to Menelaos whose anger softened. He said: "Antilochos, although I was angry I will now give way to you, since you were not flighty or lightheaded before now. Your youth got the better of your brain. You will not play tricks on your betters another time."

Euripides, who wrote plays critical of the reigning aristocracy, was not opposed to the cult of honor but felt that these cultural leaders had failed to live up to expectations. Thus he asks (*Autolykos*, fragment 282, in Miller, 1979, p.96), "What man has ever defended the city of his fathers by winning a crown for wrestling well or running fast or throwing a discus far or planting an uppercut on the jaw of an opponent? … We ought rather to crown the good men and the wise men, and the reasonable man who leads the city-state well and the man who is just, and the man who leads us by his words to avoid evil deeds and battles and civil strife."

Euripides is replacing the role of the gods with moral reporters who establish the cult of honor in the context of a democratically oriented moiety. Had sport still carried the imprimatur of respected mythology (delivered by gods and heroes) Euripides would have complained far less. He seems to suggest that the aristocracy had come to rely more on the pragmatic than the honorable. Aristotle was able to comment in similar terms (Politics, 1338 a): "It is clear therefore that there is a form of education in which boys should be trained not because it is useful or necessary but as being liberal and noble…."

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All of this seems to apply more to 'sportsmanship' than to 'gamesmanship' (typically a pejorative), which highlights the need to critically distinguish between 'sport' and 'game'. This is more of a chore than it may seem at first glance for there are other words and many concepts interlarded with the idea of 'sport'. Consider how we view the 'Olympic Games', versus their listing of over a hundred participating 'sports'. Does the Olympic Committee's use offer assistance in differentiating their meanings?

Section 1.1 of the Olympic Charter specifies the following: "The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practiced in accordance with *Olympism and its values*" (my emphasis). The IOC (International Olympic Committee) is our new bard, the modern Homer, whence the cult of honor which is the Olympic Games *and* the intervening efforts on behalf of sports and sportsmanship.

ii. *Medieval – Chivalry*

We list this entry under 'sport' to draw out relationships consonant with those even more apparent (below, §2.5.3). "Geoffroi de Charny (c. 1306-1356) was the chivalric embodiment of his colorful and violent age. … [and] lived the vocation about which he wrote" (Kaeuper, 2005, p.1). What we ask for at this point is to see in his writing a sincere approach to the ideals of honor (or what passes for the respect and esteem emblematic of honor). We are in effect asking the author to be chivalrous about chivalry, the identification of ideals in full appreciation of their honor cult. Here is a fellow who 'talked the talk and walked the walk'.

His aphoristic presentation is easily categorized into thematic stretches: the ethics of prowess and deeds; the ethics and qualities of a man of worth; the relevance of religious devotion, and the honoring of women. Clearly these are reflections of actual ideals. Clearly he is proud of participating in them. Just as clearly, therefore, he is participating in a cult of honor. He is also, besides a man of his age, a man clear in the simplicity of his ethics: "And again I say: he who does best is most worthy." A citation will not be necessary: he ends every aphorism with the same refrain. He sees the best in those who act while acknowledging that errors in ethics or character will not necessarily be 'the best'.

iii. *Modern – Scouting and Bushido*

'Scoutcraft', a word used in the first Boy Scout Handbook, refers to the education in the practical arts of survival. But beyond the education comes the opportunity for a cult of honor. If we look to the individual scout we will see the ad hoc office in full relief (Alexander, 1911, p.4): "Wherever there have been heroes, there have been scouts, and to be a scout means to be prepared to do the right thing at the right moment, no matter what the consequences may be." If we take scouting to be the aggregate of scouts and the bureaucracy holding the organization together, we prefer to see it as a mature office in which awareness of a subsidiary ad hoc office is always with the scout as well as his organization (Alexander ibid, p.241): "The boy scout movement is a call to American boys today to become in spirit members of the order of chivalry, and a challenge to them to make their lives count in the communities where they live – for clean lives, clean speech, clean sport, clean habits, and clean relationships with others."

Scout craft also entails all of the finest traits we can associate with an honor-based culture (Herrman, 2016b). Their handbook lists them; a scout is: trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean and reverent. Alexander (ibid, p.9) informs us that "the most important scout virtue is that of honor. Indeed, this is the basis of all scout virtues and is closely allied to that of self-respect." In short, the scout applies himself to an imitation of honor, for which reason we list him as a professional, for that is what his office dictates by the considerations we have adhered to (see also the discussion section).

The Handbook has a full chapter each on chivalry, games and athletic standards, and patriotism and citizenship. An afterward to the last of these chapters was included, written by one Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Honorary Vice-president, Boy Scouts of America. A relevant portion is here excerpted (ibid., p.355): "The same qualities that mean success or failure to the nation as a whole, mean success or failure in men and boys individually. The boy scouts must war against the same foes and vices that most hurt the nation; and they must try to develop the same virtues that the nation most needs." Here is more of the tie linking the application of the scout office to the larger community and its similar principles of value and honor.

"By the time *Hagakure* was written in the middle of the Tokugawa period, it was the lower and middle tiers of samurai, now fully transformed into non-combatant salaried bureaucrats, who sought new meaning to their existence. … The quest for perfection in daily life and dedication to duty provided samurai with a substitute paradigm for accruing honor other than fighting bravely in battle" (ibid, p.19). *Hagakure* was written for these, "and provides a frank commentary on the multifarious issues that samurai had to contend with as they navigated their way through Pax Tokugawa" (ibid, p.21). This text, along with *The Book of Five Rings* and *Budō Shoshinshū* are the books of *Bushidō*.

As with the texts surrounding chivalry, *Hagakure* roused mixed emotions. "Depending on one's point of view, *Hagakure* represents a mystical beauty intrinsic to the Japanese aesthetic experience, and a stoic but profound appreciation of the meaning of life and death.

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Conversely, it may be regarded as a text that epitomizes all that is abhorrent in terms of mindless sacrifice, as well as loathsome depreciation of the value of life and blind obedience to authority" (ibid, p.15).

"The spirit of Hagakure (Tsunetomo, 2014, pp.24-5) can best be summed up by the four simple oaths….

> Never lag behind others in the pursuit of the Way of the Warrior
> Be ready to be useful to one's lord
> Honor one's parents
> Serve for the benefit of others with a heart of great compassion

Were we speaking just slightly differently – were we never lagging behind in the 'Way of sportsmanship', and ready to serve our God, we would discover an exact equivalence with Scouting. Here again we are stressing the relevance of sportsmanship throughout these varied examples.

III. Early Civic Offices

a) Occasional events

i. *Mayordomo*

In some communities status contests result in a mayordomo "who supervises and finances an elaborate fiesta. It is noteworthy that he…alone receives credit for the effort." (Foster,1961, p.1192). To us this is less noteworthy than is made out, for it seems evident that credit is given because the feast is in part to demonstrate pure motives upon taking the office of mayordomo. As such it is similar to many other accessions to numerous offices in honor-based and traditional societies. He does not just enter an institutional office , he takes on an oath characteristic of the ad hoc office entered into by persons acceding to any variant of high status and power. We take this as a 'type' in which the duties of the new officer are expected to reflect community values and expectations. His implicit oath, evident in holding the feast, makes the latter at the least a brief cult of honor. If he is held to high levels of scrutiny in office, the office also becomes a cult of honor; for the office is by definition more than a function, it is in many regards a 'calling', a function the quality of which is elevated from a simple task or job. In more mundane environments it amounts to Veblen's (1964) 'workmanship'.

ii. *Mediation*

The concept of the mediator," explains Silverman (1965, p.172), "is relevant to many studies of 'part-societies' which exist within a larger encompassing whole. It describes the pivotal chiefs within colonial nations, whose positions derive from earlier periods of tribal autonomy, as well as the elites looked up to by peasants, deriving from a historical balance between two stable classes; the formal agents of national institutions, who penetrate into communities from distant capitals, as well as the upwardly mobile villagers who move into positions in national institutions."

Firth (1965, p.388) prefers that the term 'mediator' not be used for what Wolf (1956, p.1075) termed 'brokers' and Redfield (1956) called a 'hinge' group. We could just as well choose the composite 'brokered mediation' as a solution to the impasse. Silverman (ibid, p.173) requires that two criteria be met for his 'mediator': the functions mediated must be "of direct importance to the basic structures of either or both systems", and that mediators "'guard' these functions, i.e., they have near exclusivity in performing them…." As with many other similar positions, the mediators are either of elevated rank or will gain higher rank from the performance. 15

Wolf (op. cit, p.1073) describes what is essentially at stake: "An individual who seeks power and recognition outside his local community…must learn to operate in an arena of continuously changing friendships and alliances… However, this manipulative behavior is always patterned culturally… He must therefore learn also the cultural forms in which this manipulative behavior is couched." Depending on the origin of the broker, he finds or creates a cult of honor by which to enable and improve his working with cultural forms while mediating between two cultural entities.

Wherever found, anthropologists define patronage as an informal contract between persons of widely different rank, status and/or power and functions such that (Silverman, op. cit, p.176) "what is owed is protection and favor on the one side and loyalty on the other. The relationship is on a personal, face-to-face basis, and it is a continuing one." From the vantage of a cult of honor, patronage is a replacement serving functions originally prosecuted by kin groups. As such, patronage can become a 'family affair' (ibid, p.179), "the patron becoming 'like a father' in obligations to and respect due from the client…. Personalized terms of address are used, there generally are affective overtone to the relationship, and frequently there is a denial of utilitarian motives and an insistence instead upon the non-priced demands of 'loyalty', 'friendship', or being 'almost like one of the family'." By the same token, it is more usual, especially in rural areas, to avoid relatives as *compadres* if only because (Lewis, 1965, p.432) "it conflicts with the basic notion of respect and social distance that should exist between *compadres*." Success as a *compadre* relies on obeying cultural forms.

What is more, such a patron can become the broker in mediating cross-system contacts. "Their functions are critical ones, for they have an essential part in the basic economic and political structures of the society. Moreover, persons become patrons precisely because their capacity to perform these functions is virtually exclusive. … The patron usually has a distinctly

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defined status in both systems and operates effectively in both. Furthermore, the relationship between patron and client is stable and durable" (Silverman, op. cit, p.178-9).

The matter of patrons and compadres would be incomplete were we to skip over relationships that primarily gave rise to these two modalities. 'Donship' is a root spawning these others; Romano (1960) distinguished between 'respectables' who earned donship by who they were ('traditional'), and others who obtained it the old fashioned way, by earning it ('achieved'). The latter designation was through esteem, which could be withheld on cause, whereby the title was revoked. The 'achieved' status in particular required a full and total command of all things social and political reflecting respectability, making it a full-fledged cult of honor, meeting the criteria with which we opened the paper, criteria obtained from Romano's study of donship.

iii. *Joking and Flirting*

The manner of joking is as or more important than the fact of it under the circumstances in which it occurs. This is not a matter of 'telling a joke; it is far more a matter of joking *scandalously* in order to prevent actual scandals. The joking ritual presupposes relationships that are necessary but of questionable kinship identification, whence less respect is owing to the other group, while a show of respect must be present to avoid rank insult. Such respect is akin to bringing an audience in on the joke, to share with, identify with, the jokester. The correct amount and degree of joking says, We need you, but we don't owe you anything beyond circumstances in which we owe each other respect and mutual aid or assistance (Mitchell, 1992).

From the vantage of a cult of honor, an important reason for joking is the competitive nature of it. For honor is itself always competitive, individuals quarrying for more and more respect and esteem. Your joking may be bettered by another person's, and so forth. Most issues in culture involving necessary but dubious relationships are dealt with by taboos, which feature no competitiveness whatsoever. One obeys or one does not obey. Even this choice must be averted in the circumstances making a joking relation functional in society. Children are brought up to understand that when joking is called for it is done, no questions asked. Even if immature and sloppy, it is at least still functional. But then, children will get plenty of practice honing their skills.

Osella and Osella (1998, p.190) introduce the topic of flirtation: "In an environment of relative segregation and widespread pre-marital virginity…the penetrating, potent male is a fantasy, a young man's swagger. At the same time, aggressive harassment of girls is only half of the story: idealized romance is equally important. (192)" Chance meetings will typically find the boy with his mates and the girl with her friends. Entering the mutual ad hoc office, they each have a peanut gallery less associated with games than sports. The two compete and are judged, as in the Greek dance of §2.2.1. "The overall effect," say the Osellas (ibid, p.95), "is that of a battle of wits or verbal duel; in fact, one of the preferred forms of flirting is that in which a pair try to outwit each other by posing riddles, or by contradicting or mock-insulting each other."

Interestingly, they next bring up the very rationale I had myself used to place flirting with joking. Citing another anthropologist who remarked (correctly) that joking can be common among cross-cousins who are nonetheless potential marriage partners, they (ibid.) "believe that flirtation can most usefully be seen as a particular type of joking…. We prefer, then, to analyse it as a sub-set of 'joking', an activity which is notable for rupturing hierarchy and turning distance to empathy."

Should it happen that the girl permits a continued conversation (ibid, p.199) "a suitor will drop his aggressive and hostile teasing manner in an abrupt about-face, which sees him composing poetry and memorizing love songs." Where the girl illustrates a demur side even after levelling sexual criticism at an arrogant young man, now it is the suitor's turn to reverse initial insults into their diametrical opposite. Everything here smacks of ritual, and ritual elevates game to sport just as it is essential in identifying with the cult of honor. "So, far from being 'only' a game or an aesthetic, flirting acts out a wider existential condition" (ibid, p.196).

The use of the term 'aesthetic' is notable for it, too, speaks more to sport than to game. It is clearly ritualized flirting as opposed to 'flirting' at work, for example. The ritual is a back-and-forth series of ripostes that are in essence 'aesthetic' and sensitive to consequences. If the occasion goes to completion, we have less a gamesmanship on the part of boys than a sport equally participated in by both – but in different ways, each mindful of the other in a way games rarely demand but a sport must always.

b) Recurrent events

i. *Initiations*

Moogk (1980) offered an interpretive view of texts and masks in the Nootka Wolf ritual, important in itself but also because aspects of it were taken up by a number of other tribes in the Pacific Northwest. The following excerpts from her thesis demonstrate the extent to which the ritual encompasses the most important relation in the Nootka society, the development of the chief. This also serves as an example how myth translates, through ritual, the conditions and consequences of power, rank and honor in a society, expressing them as idealized forms not unlike the relation of archaic Greek sport to the gods and heroes.

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An analysis of the Wolf ritual itself showed that it is an initiation ritual (ii) … An analysis of the succession of messages conveyed by the three wolf masks as they appear should reveal the Nootkan process for receiving supernatural gifts, i.e., transformation; and the nature of the gifts, i.e. privileges. Both the nature of transformation, and that of the privileges should be the primary and clearest concepts that the wolf mask express if I am correct in assuming that the acquisition of a privilege is the primary Nootkan purpose for holding a wolf ritual (89). … The end product is the Thunderbird, the Standing Wolf mask or the complete man…a human chief. (92)

[The Inbetween] is a realm of process and becoming rather than of being and stability. Obtaining power from the Inbetween is a necessity for the Nootka because it is an essential attribute of moral health; it is also called a life principle or soul. … Since wealth and long life are acquired through ritual, the physical and social status of a man is dependent on his spiritual activity (93). … Only the chief's children inherit the ritual privileges needed to make it possible for novices to cross the Inbetween to acquire the supernatural gifts associated with the ritual and economic privileges that enhance the social status and power of a chief. (96)

A powerful structuralist approach (Rosman and Rubel, 1971, 1972) has put an end to the oft repeated interpretation of the potlatch as "aimed at the shaming and ultimate total destruction of one's rival" (ibid, 1972, p.668). These famous ceremonies are endemic to the North Pacific Coast of the United States and Canada but are also known to the Trobriand Islanders, the Maori of New Zealand and the Fang of Cameroon (and doubtless many others). The structuralist approach has revealed that (ibid., p.669) –

> Potlatches occur on occasions which mark the rearrangement of the social structure, when, in the absence of fixed rules…the outcome of such changes is dependent upon the manipulations of individual actors. At such point, the potlatch serves as a ritual involving host and guests where the latter serve as witnesses to the statement of the new arrangement…. … Potlatches…are in effect *rites de passage* for the society.

Though the potlatch is formally introduced by an occasional event (say, e.g., the death of a chief) and might thus be viewed as an example of the ad hoc office, the reality is that the triggering events are recurrent and that a consistent regularized process has been instituted to handle all such instances. This is the potlatch.

"The potlatch [is] a competitive display…culminating even in the destruction of highly valued property in order to achieve the maximum social effect" (*Notes*: 172). The words 'maximum social effect' mean what they superficially suggest: an acute awareness of the cultural milieu that is maximally expressed, as if to say this is a ritual expressing such cultural material. It is an extraordinary mirror to the structure of society, one which involves very specific relations of giving and receiving in accord with endemic social arrangements (including especially relations of rank and its honor).

It also reflects a cultural subtext infrequently mentioned in the same breath as 'potlatch', namely, the evidence in wealth destruction that these future leaders, for whom potlatches are formally held, will not use wealth to aggrandize upon the community. Thus this ritual is without question drawing attention to and expressing the rules derived from, the social cult of honor. The fact of ritual and public participation elevates an otherwise peculiar contest into a reflection of social ideals.

ii. *Compadrazgo*

This relation involves parents obtaining god-parents for a child. As they share the parenting role they are equally considered *compadres*. Three circumstances dictate how this will be accomplished: "A wealthy townsman has many *compadres*, but he is often on the giving, not the receiving, end of the relationship. The town middle-class people have few *compadres*, and the relations tend to be reciprocal. The town poor and the peasants have few *compadres* and seek to acquire some of them from among the wealthy in order to be recipients of aid" (Service and Service, 1965, p.p. 76-7).

We are interested only in the case where the god-parent is wealthier and able to materially assist in a child's development. The reason is that this properly reflects a stewardship relation between the well-to-do in their felt obligation to the less fortunate. There are relations of honor and etiquette to be mastered, so that the whole involves a veritable cult of honor. With this in mind, the process begins as follows:

"The relationship is initiated," says Foster (1961. P.1183), "on the basis of an explicit, formal contract in which two people agree to be compadres. Yet the system contributes to social stability only when the implicit contract follows – when compadres do in fact cooperate with each other through a system of continuing exchanges." The basis for an exchange are 'services in a ritual context' – "associated with life crises such as baptism, confirmation, marriage and death" (ibid., p.1185).

The compadre will offer financial assistance to the less fortunate that he has formally agreed to help. Where the relationship is steady, assistance is recurrent through these various stages or crises. The recipient is careful not to over-express thankfulness since that would suggest an equivalence of exchange; the message of honor requires an asymmetrical relationship in order to express the elements of honor at an idealized level as befits the cult. "Compadre relationships hold

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this strategic position by their long-enduring, mutual, socioeconomic commitments which are accompanied by special terminology, imbued with respect and trust, and sustained by compelling sacred sanctions" (Deshon, 1963, p.574). All of these, but especially 'trust' and 'respect', are mainstays in the honor-system celebrated in the cult of honor.

The two compadres in the relation are each creating a cult of honor that reflects and respects cultural values but from the altered conditions of the *compadrazgo* relations and the needs it serves. It offers one, the biological parent, security and stability and the child receives what otherwise would be difficult for the parents to provide; the other compadre fulfills stewardship ideals felt consistent with cultural expectations. Furthermore, the ritual operates cross-culturally, serving distinct prestige systems in accord with their respective cultural patterns but always in agreement with a general archetypal structure examined by Bloch and Guggenheim (1981, pp.383-4). Wherever found,

> "We find the same four symbolic elements noted for the Christian case [i.e. baptism]. In all of them biological reproduction is equated with motherhood…in all cases it is defined as dirty and the child must first be cleansed…. In all cases, substitute parents are given the task of 'producing' the child by a substitute birth and making him a part of this supernaturally created society, a community dominated by men."

All of which tells us that in each instance we have a ritualized interpretation reflecting a social prestige system and its affiliated rules surrounding what is honorable and respectable.

iii. *Societies*

Secret societies generally exist to educate members in cultural lore and values. These are ideals in a very real sense by virtue of being 'secret'. Only the initiates can express the idealized relations of honor that elevate matters to a cult. Little (1949, pp.199-200) offers an excellent overview:

In terms of their institutional personnel and apparatus of hereditary officials, masked spirits: rituals, etc., the secret societies are an embodiment of and a means of canalizing supernatural power. … On the other hand, both their control over supernatural power and their regulation of lay conduct and behavior is, to some extent, departmental, and even a matter of specialization. That is to say, particular fields of the cultural life and their regulation tend to fall within the exclusive province of specific societies. The combined effect, however, is to produce a general pattern of life influenced very largely by secret society activity and function. The extent to which this cultural arbitration and specialization obtains can be studied best by reviewing the various roles which secret societies perform in the secular life.

The Twana secret society (Elmendorf, 1948, p.631), for example, was "superadded to the religious and social complexes expressed in guardian spirit questing and potlatch sponsorship, as an auxiliary device for insuring the fullest participation by an upper class person in his culture." In other words, to ensure the inculcation of the ideals that constitute the cult of honor.

Secret societies and age-sets share in common the use and significance of initiation. A general statement connecting Maasai (of East Africa) initiation as related to the larger social structure is had in their distinction between a killing and a sacrifice of a ritual animal: the sacrifice is elevated and extends the killing to a higher function. As Durkeim would say (in Galaty op. cit, p.366), rites "really strengthen the bonds attaching the individual to the society of which he is a member." In this instance the sacrifice turns an ox into "a virtual icon of Maasai society" (ibid, p.368). By such icons "Maasai society is not only 'represented' or 'expressed' but 'acted upon' in ritual performatives" (ibid.).

One ritual in particular sees the appointment of two men to formal offices which they will retain for life. In keeping with the later public influence they exercise in virtue of these offices, the two must (ibid, p.369) "be morally and physically whole and symmetrical, without blemish or blame, in short, 'holy'." They now exist, at one and the same time, as 'fathers' of the age-set and as adoptive elders, assuming their norms. These exemplifications are iconic as well, "for in their holiness and symmetry they embody not only a perfect ideal…but also the projection of the ideal into the future…." We see better how this expresses a desire to identify with a cult of honor – its ideals, the experience of which is a rite.

In the Karimojong (of northeaster Uganda) "the institutional means…for coordinating groups for political action rest with the age system." This is how Dyson-Hudson (1963, p.358) introduces the age-set relation to the larger society. "The structural principles by which age-based groups are created and interconnected thus establish a generalized status relationship [authority and obedience to it] in Karimojong society and secure the continuity of that relationship through time" (ibid, p.363). As with the Maasai, here also the initiations result in a father-son relation within the age-set "and, as the authority of the fathers individually is final in domestic matters, so is their collective authority, as the senior generation-set, final in public affairs" (ibid, p.367).

Honigmann summarizes an important consideration (1963, p.128): "Generally whenever [age-set] segregation occurs it can be counted on to reinforce bonds of solidarity between those persons who confine a significant portion of their interaction to one another." We will return to the implications of this in the discussion section.

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IV. Mature Civic

a) Professional

i. *Golf and Green Bay*

Golf, which many consider to be a silly *game* (chasing a little ball to a hole in the ground), made its triumphal return to the Olympics this last year as one of the esteemed *sports* to compete on the world stage. It seems the place to note broad agreement on two points: the sense in which the Committee (IOC) uses 'game' appeals to the meaning that identifies a game as a civil divertissement of contest or competition. We can also agree that there must be another definition of game which distinguishes it from sport. Referring to sport, the IOC seems to be aiming at what is not a 'game' in this other sense of the word, namely, a game as opposed to a sport. But that takes us immediately to the crux of the problem, for which the Committee is of little or no use.

In the belief that long held customary use leads to reasonable definitions, we adopt the position that intelligent educated people may not be able to define these words but can use them in very similar ways, indicating a culture-wide agreement on the basic formative notions that go into each of our two lead ideas. If I ask ten people whether ping pong is a sport or game relative to the more expansive 'tennis', nine of those will choose 'game' for ping pong. Our objective is to uncover some formulations that agree with a basic logic as well as with commonly received opinion.

Table (2) explains our considered ideas on thinking through the related issues. Half of the six pairs of criteria are ruled by contiguous v. discontiguous play, making this the chief criterion. The second most relevant criterion is the rules of play. The next most dispositive is a clear choice between objective (i.e. to win). The least relevant factor is the remunerative element, but it cannot be simply discounted as we will see in looking at honor-based cultures.

Structural field: pattern in which play is permitted (e.g. whole field – such as a board or a table – or a checkerboard design) with respect to rules governing the mode of use. Reflects contiguous mode of play (below), whence **Game.**

Functional field: has markers to facilitate play (e.g. scrimmage lines) and/or safe/risk zones (in golf, e.g., sand traps). Reflects discontiguous mode (below), whence **Sport.**

Structural border : epiphenomenal limit of play, ergo no penalty because no way to violate the playing area. Reflects contiguous mode of play (board or 'card table' play) – **Game.**

Functional border: e.g. out-of-bounds or home run fence comes into play and is associated with absolute (OB penalty in golf) or relative (turnover in basketball) observances in scoring or penalty. Reflects discontiguous mode of play – **Sport**

Play by using rules: Judging play by what rules permit or reject ('rule strategy') and/or use a rule for non-intended use but which confers advantage (e.g. fouls in basketball) – **Game**

Play within rules ('by the rules'): Rules dictate conduct ('active penalties') as well as play ('procedural penalties') – **Sport**

Play to win: Strategy stresses victory and defeat more than placement or attainment **Game**

Play to achieve : Achieving first place need not imply focus on defeating opponent **Sport**

Play dependent on contiguous manipulation : scoring or playing object is held until placed; e.g. moving a chess piece, or carrying football until tackle or score, etc. – **Game**

Play dependent on discontiguous manipulation : Scoring/playing object thrown or kicked instead of being carried. Dribbling in basketball is an example of this activity – **Sport**

Participation non-remunerative : That is, the public sees insufficient strategy or excitement to commit to paying to see the action – **Game**

Participation remunerative : Public sees reason in mode of play and scoring to accept a cost to watch – **Sport**

Notes to Table (2)

1) The same play may entail both structural and functional fields (in tennis, the court is functional with OB lines, service court lines, etc. The service court itself is structural).
2) The choice between using and playing by rules is dictated by a 'best choice' method. Which offers what is most necessary to strategy and scoring?
3) Play can be equally to win as to achieve in some instances. This is admittedly a judgment call.
4) Play can feature both contiguous and discontiguous play and both will therefore be tabulated.

Table 2: Differentiae between game and sport

G-ame/S-port:		G	S	G	S	G	S	G	S	G	S	G	S
		SF	FF	SB	FB	PUR	PWR	PTW	PTA	PCM	PDM	NR	R
TF	S 4/2		X	X			X		X		X	X	
G	S 6/0		X		X		X		X		X		X
T	S 6/1	X	X		X		X		X		X		X
TT	G 3/3	X			X		X	X			X	X	

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BB	S 4/3	X	X		X	X		X			X		X
FB	S 4/2		X	X			X	X			X		X
VB	G 3/3	X			X		X	X			X	X	
CH	G 4/4	X	X	X	X		X		X	X		X	
GO	G 5/1		X	X		X		X		X		X	
MON	G 5/2	X	X	X			X	X		X		X	
B	G 5/3	X		X		X	X	X	X	X			X
POK	G 5/3	X		X		X	X	X	X	X			X
BSB	S 4/3	X			X	X	X	X	X		X		X

Sports: TF + Track and Field; G = Golf; T = Tennis; TT = Table tennis; BB = Basketball; FB = Football VB = Volleyball; CH = Chess; GO = Go; MON = Monopoly; B = Bridge; POK = Poker; BSB = Baseball
Criteria: G = Game; S =Sport. SF = Structural field; FF = Functional field; SB = Structural border; FB = Functional border; PUR = Play using rules; PWR = Play within rules; PTW = Play to win; PTA = Play toachieve; PCM = Play is contiguous manipulation; PDM = Play is discontiguous manipulation; NR = Non-remunerative; R = Remunerative

With the results of Table (2) we can take any variety of play and obtain a set of criteria that can be mathematically denoted for purposes of reference. This is effected in Table (3) below. Note that a tie of game and sport rating goes to the game. We want special certainty that we arrive at a sport as something more refined in some sense than the game. Note that in two cases (BB, BSB), removing the remunerative factor turns these into ties and changes them from sport to game. In three cases of tie (TT, VB, CH) adding pubic participation translates from game to sport. This is not whimsy, it is significant. Having an active audience reveals a marked disposition toward sport. The more 'compelling' the more likely it will be a sport.

To use Table (3) count the number of 'X's indicating G='game' and likewise for S='sport'. Whichever is the larger takes the label of the winning tally (game or sport). Then express them as a ratio. Except for golf, entries are listed as in the author's judgment they are typically conceived; poker, e.g. is not listed as if 'professional'. Absent the public influence baseball and basketball would be games, not sports. The same happens, as we have seen, in traditional societies where the public is an interested stakeholder. When what is otherwise a game represents (somewhat like a leader) the idealist aspects of an honor-based society, it is hardly unfair to suggest that what is being spoken of is, regardless the objective of the game, a cult of honor. As a cult of honor the game has become a sport. Sport seems to go beyond a game by including cultural content. Our contention is in fact that we can define the distinction between game and sport predominantly by this criterion. Again, it is the leading finding from the table.

The reader may notice that Searle's (1969, pp.39-42) 'constitutive' and 'regulative' rules are not utilized. This is so because for the most part they apply to games equally to sport and thus cannot function as differentiae. In short, the criteria indicative of a sport speak to cultural aspects such as quality, trustworthiness and value to society of the activity – or what the activity represents. These are ingredients of an honor-based society that myth likewise teaches. From Table (3) we propose that when a modern 'dignity-based' society puts out its values in like fashion, we get the same result, a cult of honor.

Golf in the United States is a $70 billion annual industry with 24.1 million players. Golf is 'big', suggesting the relevance of identifying it in terms of game and sport. We see from the material presented that it agrees totally with the Olympic committee's usage 'Olympic Games' but over a hundred 'sports'. This is how we now can look at golf. But does golf have anything to teach us about the nature and character of the sport wherever found? We think the answer is Yes.

Opponents say that golf better meets the definition of 'game' than 'sport', does not require rigorous physical activity, and can be played professionally by people who are overweight, injured, or non-athletic. They argue that golf is a game or leisure activity, and they cite golf's 112-year absence from the Olympics as proof that it is not a sport. Here we assume that talent and strategy and often a goodly share of movement can be said of many games and essentially all sports. The objective was therefore to get behind these seemingly obvious but less than relevant criteria.

Given the role of the public stakeholder it is noteworthy to examine just what indicators of stake the public attends to. A good test of a sport with respect to the cult of honor involves charity. Thirteen baseball teams give an average of 1 million or more per year through their team foundations; 20 teams give at least 500 thousand per year (Littlefield, 2016). Denver Broncos Charity Fund (football) gave an average of some 2 million per year from 1994 to 2003 (Saunders, 2003).

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According to http://together.pgatour.com/, golf, which scored 6 for 6 in Table (3), regularly (some 45-50 tournaments per year) gives an average of a million dollars per tournament to charity. Look up any given tournament for charity proceeds on the site listed above. The average proceeds per tournament appears to be about one million dollars, making the season total some fifty million. And that doesn't count the Web.com or Champions tours.

But it is still more golf's relation to culture that makes it unique among today's sports. It is one of very few that can truly be considered a cult of honor – not just because it so drastically outdoes all other sports in charity, but because the rules of golf and the efforts of individual players demonstrate a pervasive culture throughout the sport. It started hundreds of years ago asa gentleman's sport and has not only not changed in that regard, but goes out of its way to sponsor such conduct among youth golfing enthusiasts. To this day it is in the United States associated with Republicans and their culture. Here is another example in which a cult of honor need not reflect the broad culture but must well reflect a subset of it.

We have seen a tendency for the public to be more involved in sports than games (as we have articulated their differentiae). The public cannot get closer to football than to own their own franchise as does Green Bay with their Packers. Having by comparison erected something approaching a fetish helps us to determine their efforts not just as enthusiasm but as a cult of honor.

i. *The Republican*

Conventionally, the Republican is a member of a political party in the United States. From a cult of honor standpoint, however, the Republican is a member of a *subculture*. That culture is of honor and has been for a very long time. Jefferson (1955, p.160) characterized the South as follows (brackets offer this author's interpretive remarks):

SOUTH: Fiery [thin-skinned and impulsive], Voluptuary, Indolent [except to insults to their culture], Unsteady [uneven temper], Independent [fear of dependence], Zealous for their own liberties, Generous [magnanimous, as was Jefferson himself], Candid [unaffected, plainspoken], Without attachment or pretentions to any religion but that of the heart.

Gorer (1948: 15), writing of the 1940's, observes the same distinctions: "The history, the traditions, and even to a large extent the population of the southern states…contrast so strongly with those of the remaining portion of the country that proper consideration would demand for each of these subcultures treatment nearly as extensive as this book."

The upshot is that a Republican, for living his or her culture is by our definition of the mature civic office, no less a professional than the doctor or lawyer. Their technical expertise is in their political platform and religious tenets. What makes the living of a modern culture a cult of honor, however, is a different matter. The issue is one of turning a standard (broadly interpreted) honor-based society into a ritualized equivalent.

The Republicans have managed this by 1) in the past, threatening secession if the north elected Lincoln President (and making good on the promise); 2) throwing overboard the doctrine that disfavors turning a set of religious precepts into a political football, as an attempt to force particularistic rule over the entire culture; 3) voluntarily isolating themselves from a number of publicly available services (e.g. public education), and 4) accusing the larger culture of subverting their own when in fact that larger culture (of liberal persuasion, and dignity-based) is in fact the only true preserver of those very liberties inherent to the religious precepts – and other liberties which the Republican leaders have universally and uniquely failed to protect (equal opportunity, etc.), which finally came to haunt the Party through the selection of Donald Trump.

b) Personal

i. *The Liberal*

The liberal person is not living a culture but is participating in a cult of honor which must be carefully defined. The liberal's philosophy, culturally and legally speaking, is *dignity*, the inherent fount of inherent worth and of rights that evidence worth in actual life. As we have allowed honor to be tantamount to customs meriting respect and esteem from a wide swath of the public, so here. In this case dignity is the honorable way of life and living. It is the foundation of the liberal prestige system. It is not, however, a culture, but rather a philosophy of humanism and a political party defending and advocating rights predicated upon dignity.

The liberal has no qualms over the Republican culture but for one detail: the Republicans, as a political party, have decided that their culture is the rationale for the laws that they believe should govern all alike. In short, if everyone lives under Republican laws, the latter may awaken peacefully from sleep assured that their precious children will not suffer themselves to see wicked liberals doing wicked things that distress good Republican values to the quick. There should be a law… and under Republicanism, there *IS* such law (if they could just get it passed in Congress). They have achieved some of this nonsense at the state level, sometimes giving in to financial pressure as businesses move away from Medievalism's lesser valuables.

The liberal sees the courts as a part of the honor cult to the extent that they have stood up pretty decently for dignitarian values. Indeed, Dupré (2011), writing in the *Guardian*, claimed that "Human dignity has

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therefore emerged as an entirely judge-made concept with an uncertain normative basis and definition, generally located somewhere between the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment … and the right to privacy …."

The liberal projects a normative legal system upon the existing reality (that system exists but is underused, as for example equitable remedies for those abusing offices). Since that legal system's values are predicated upon dignity in the Constitutional documents (notably the Declaration and Preamble), the liberal is imagining it as a fully living document. Activist liberals will actively work to that end. It is the almost fetishistic emphasis on declaring these points and actively proselytizing them widely, together with its sensitivity to the Republicans, that make the liberal stand out as a caricature of an ordinary political philosophy.

ii. *Stewardship*

In 1911 Waldo H. Sherman (1911, p.349) wrote, "Any business that does not benefit society, but on the other hand degrades it, whether run by an individual or individuals in a firm, company or corporation, is a business that ought by the law to be put out of existence." He was writing in the initial Boy Scout Handbook of 1911. His remarks were followed by the man who 'busted the trusts', Theodore Roosevelt.

What is popular is not always right, not always the most honorable despite the esteem. When the cultural reality raises this issue the cult of honor must be approached from the vantage of truth and rightness. Honor in the sense of esteem may not represent the reality of a proper cult of honor, that which is deserving of praise and esteem. In America, stewardship is not at a cultlevel, whence a company endeavoring to be a good steward, a good citizen, can live in the cult by living in what is true and right. With the lure of 'business as usual', stewardship is an uphill battle. Nevertheless some few have adopted viewpoints and taken actions that permit us to conceive of the cult of honor within a business context.

Henry Ford could have with reason claimed he was practicing a cult of honor. Today, it is possible to include the name of John Mackey despite some missteps. His 'conscious capitalism' opens up the ethics of awareness to social realities that a corporation might successfully address. That is Mackey's (2006) message in a nutshell. One is entitled to presume he would not find overmuch fault with this writer's (2016a, p.19) summary of the principles involved –

> I shall endeavor to apply a small token of my resources in order to determine and apply the best stewardship for my firm's time, talent and money. I shall become a "conscious" capitalist. I shall work with the advice and assistance of charities, and determine what is the best philanthropic bang for the buck, even perhaps in turn assisting *them* to be more efficient in the ways and means of business efficiency, bookkeeping, etc.
> Perhaps we will donate products where they do the best social good; perhaps labor, perhaps investments of money. I am good enough to offer a service or product; surely I have the moxie to establish a "best practices" program, consistent with my business and personal goals, for the community whose trust I am expected to earn and maintain, as well as toward the betterment of conditions for employees and, finally, for the sustainability of the environment. It doesn't require that I go to night school. It requires only an attitude, an awareness—a *consciousness*. I *can* do this. *We* can do this. We *will* do this.

V. Discussion

As Fallers (1955, p.293) has asserted, "The integrated system is one in which the motivations of its component individuals are to a high degree complementary with the shared systems of value and belief" (see also Herrman, 2016b). It seems needles to add that a cult of honor must obey the same stricture. The question, however, is Why? What makes the cult 'complimentary'? In a word,*ritual*. It is the ritual that, supposing *it* to be complimentary, provides the same to the cult of honor. But ritual is commonly defined relative to those very social values and beliefs. Still, there are issues remaining.

What makes ritual effective as a defining component of the cult of honor? We have mentioned various, but the critical feature is a rarefication from the standard model of prestige mechanics, achieved by caricature of the standard features; a heightened 'outline' with few other than purely stylistic elements to dilute the emphasis upon the icon. What Miller (1955, p.278) employed in the study of the Fox system of authority applies here: "The…system represents the 'purest' manifestation of this kind…and so presents its essential features most clearly for purposes of analysis."

It is one thing to identify with an ideal; another to participate in a cult of honor. Why, then, do we include secret societies and age-sets when the usual interpretation of an initiation is the educative aspect of it all? In that section Honigmann hit on something, namely, the solidarity, which can be expanded to include the shared participation in *ritual*. It is through ritual that they actually participate in the cult, not solely by virtue of their education. And their participation is, in virtue of their seclusion and their awareness of its importance, the unique experience of the ideal itself, not (for the time being) the actual society. They are in the cult; after initiation, when they enter society, they are ordinarily no longer in the cult but in the society that serves as its pattern. Here, however, the secret society retains uniqueness even in the broader society, thus still qualifying as a cult of honor.

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Something similar takes place in creating private virtual sport teams. These cannot be cults of honor, however, because they do not represent the actual sports as a ritual; here, there can be no proper representation of reality that will qualify as a ritual. Those involved are secret groups of coaches making decisions strictly to win a game, not to ritualize participation *in the honor* of real sport. Creating a dream team and betting on it does not mean there is a ritualized representation any more than betting on horses does. Unlike the imaginary 'sport' the real group responsible for creating, nourishing and betting on real race horses might well be a cult of honor.

Of course, all of this means there is undoubtedly a cult, for all the earmarks are present. But an *honor* cult they are assuredly not – until, that is, there is a way to ritualize infractions beyond 'using them' to construct a team, as well as a way to create and conduct the play independent of a mechanical/computer point system. For the same reason, a board game can accomplish much the same thing if with less excitement and detailed involvement.

In Japanese business we see many reflections of Japanese social principles, in particular the widespread paternalism. Are workers receiving these emblematic elements as members of a cult of that culture – or perhaps just of the corporate culture? In neither case are they in a properly constituted cult of honor, for *they are not participating in ritual enabling the experience of ideals*. Borrowing cultural traits between or within cultural sections does not make for participation in a cult of honor, for it does not constitute a cult of honor in the first place.

Talking enthusiastically about ideals can sound a lot like the connoisseurship characterizing one who experiences a cult of honor. Talk is insufficient. Companies occasionally talk up corporate stewardship only to elevate brand awareness and stature. There is a truthfulness in the reality of honor that disqualifies 'talk' from exemplifying the experience we are getting at. 'Walking the walk' is far more to the point for stewardship than any armchair identification with honor (see Herrman, 2009, 2016a).

An Eagle Scout (Townley, 2009, pp.149-150) raised the same question and got the same answer we have just offered: "I'd heard similar musings from Eagle Scouts of all generations…. I explained two of my main questions: How is our generation different and how are we creating a legacy of our own?" The answer, in part: "There should be no reason why we're not going places. There should be no reason why Scouts' faces are not seen on the positive things in society." That counts for a cult of honor.

We tend to think we can study our way through a cult of honor. The literature within the chivalric age and since has been as critical as laudatory (Kaeuper, 1999, p.209). Reading about it all is fascinating, but not the stuff of participation in the cult – *unless, that is, what one studies is/was itself a genuine cult of honor. It also requires making something of a fetish of such study, something the onlooker notices and remarks upon*.

"The pragmatics of ritual," explains Galaty (1983, p.364), "must be contrasted with the structure of ritual 'texts', as such – not being written – exist as the codification of the aims, rules, attitudes and events of a given rite." We opened the paper claiming that the modalities of the ad hoc offices were ritualistic, where by that term we mean as the excerpt above suggests, and which begs the question as to the distinction between a ritual and a rite as it relates to the cult of honor. In fact, the participation in *any* cult of honor office is ritual in the context of a rite; what is relevant is how the modality is influenced in the progression from ad hoc to early civic and then to mature civic offices.

Table (4) summarizes the thirty cults discussed in the paper with respect to the place and purpose of the rituals involved. Rituals may reflect past or present, or they may represent the living past or present. In the table the italicized entries are all from the early civic office category. The symmetry is to be noted.

We will say that the content of the cult consists precisely of the 'codification of the aims, rules, attitudes and events' and that the experiencing – the 'coming to experience' – of these items *is* the 'rite'; and the manner by which the experience is effectuated is by modalities we prefer to label 'rituals'.

The single essential and defining objective of one's relation to a cult of honor is specifically to 'identify' with both the rite and the items experienced, namely, the aims, rules, attitudes and events. The rituals achieve this in the ad hoc office by *figurative* means; in the early civic offices by *emblematic* means, and in the mature civic office by *imitation*. That is, the ad hoc modalities of art, ethics, sport, etc. are *symbols* the use of which enable us to identify with the content of the cult. In the early civic offices we find formally simplistic *representations* of the actual cult activities and meanings where there are real parallels to be found between representation and reality. In the mature office we practice actual *applications* of what we identify with in our imitation.

We can then suppose that with the mature office the officeholder 'owns' the experience. By the same token the ad hoc rituals 'celebrate' the cult, whereas the early civic offices manifest 'appreciation' of it. In short, as we begin with the most primitive or basic office, we progressively come closer to a full and faithful identification, achieving full identity with the mature office. Curiously, however, the aesthetic pleasures involved in these identificative ritual experiences appear to follow the reverse order, being the most acute in the ad hoc offices and least intense where the actual application carries such responsibilities as to rob us of a part of the ideal experience.

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Table 3: Differentiae in various play types

Example	Reflecting Past	Reflecting Present	Living Past	Living Present	Provenance Internal	Provenance External	Potential Cultural Influence
Leadership		X				X	X
Poetics				X		X	X
Bards	X				X		X
Dance (1)				X	X	X	
Dance (2)			X			X	X
Tea Party	X				X		
Karate-do	X					X	
Merit				X		X	X
Bargaining				X	X		
Samaritan				X	X	X	X
Chariots		X				X	X
Chivalry			X			X	X
Scouting				X		X	X
Bushidō			X			X	
Mayordomo				*X*		*X*	*X*
Mediation				*X*		*X*	*X*
Patronage				*X*		*X*	*X*
Joking				*X*		*X*	*X*
Flirting				*X*		*X*	*X*
Initiation				*X*		*X*	*X*
Potlatch				*X*		*X*	*X*
Compadres				*X*		*X*	*X*
Society		*X*			*X*		*X*
Age-set		*X*			*X*		*X*
Golf		X		X	X		X
Republican				X		X	X
Liberal				X	X	X	X
Steward				X	X		X
Volunteer				X	X	X	X

Finally, the relation between ritual and prayer could use some clarification. By 'prayer' we imply a desire for communion of some sort, be it pity, acceptance or regard. All of these are forms of identification, the objective of those interested in partaking of the honor cult experience. Prayer utilizes and effectuates what ritual provides; it connects ritual with rite.

VI. Conclusion

What all of this leads to is the proposition that sportsmanship is everywhere a component of a cult of honor and typically one of its identifiable (one had almost said 'defining') characteristics. It implies that systems of prestige are perfectly capable of adhering to values associated with sportsmanship despite the widely recognized 'gamesmanship' of their politics. There is an elevation, a reemphasis, of cultural ideals through the auspices of ritual, not excluding a degree of competition intended to preserve the expectations owed of such cults.

Western Europe and especially the common law nations are what can be termed 'dignity-based' cultures for establishing concepts of worth upon a doctrine of inherent dignity. Though less than ten percent of the world population they ever increasingly relevant. Yet the results of this study suggest that the individualist character of these societies has influenced the incidence and character of honor cultures so as to diminish them in the public perception.

One easily imagines that in Iran and Russia chess at the professional level is effectively a sport. The

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dignity contingent will see it as a board game and stop there. In Russia, ballet is, if not a sport, a national topic and a cult of honor. Not so elsewhere. In most areas of the world dance is readily ritualized; not so in the most developed nations. These findings are in line with the results of material tabulated in Tables (2) and (3) despite reasonable disagreements over my choices.

At issue may well be the question of honor cults in one's comprehension of 'culture'. This paper can without injustice be characterized as attributing less culture to the dignity-based and more to 'the rest'. The most important speeches in today's dignity-based societies are secured through paid writers. Gone are the days of Lincoln, each of whose written presentations is exemplary of what can only be a cult of honor relative to current practice.

I would like only to add something of a *mea culpa* that I nonetheless mustn't apologize for. From an academic's point of view the paper may appear to read as a senior thesis written 'around' excerpted material. In fact, the paper is largely a series of short analyses with to-the-point excerpts explicating what I could paraphrase only by plagiarizing. They are excellent for the purpose they serve in this paper and their authors are, after all, the anthropological experts. I am a metaphysician, developing the structuralist methodology aback the presentation. I accordingly ask to be excused from otherwise valid criticism.

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