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A Miscarriage of History: The Case of Adria K. Lawrence'sImperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism: Anti-Colonial Protest in the French Empire

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Introduction- The writing of history, as always, has been subject to biases, most of the time from those who call the shots, but sometimes from factors so insidious that it is very difficult to isolate them. Books of history written by approved authorities as well as by independent ones, are replete with such examples I do not have space for in this work. I need, however, to draw a line between deliberately sidestepped factors and those that, for one reason or another, have been omitted. My concern in this paper is to highlight the factors that, willingly or not, are overlooked by the author of the book under focus for what I think are ideologically motivated reasons. Pragmatists (Donald Davidson 2001b; 2004; Richard Rorty 1979;1982; Willard Van Quine 1969;1990) and language philosophers (Gontard 1981), indeed, speak of a cultural phenomenon, a driving force among intellectuals, constituted by popular ideas (opinions and thoughts or ethical norms) which, quite often act as doxatic1 factors that either favor alignment behind them or condemn dissident voices. It is, therefore, a major concern of this paper to show that Lawrence, the author has fallen victim of such a phenomenon by truncating chunks of vital historical information of the colonies she has studied, and more particularly the Moroccan one.

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I. Introduction

The writing of history, as always, has been subject to biases, most of the time from those who call the shots, but sometimes from factors so insidious that it is very difficult to isolate them. Books of history written by approved authorities as well as by independent ones, are replete with such examples I do not have space for in this work. I need, however, to draw a line between deliberately sidestepped factors and those that, for one reason or another, have been omitted. My concern in this paper is to highlight the factors that, willingly or not, are overlooked by the author of the book under focus for what I think are ideologically motivated reasons. Pragmatists (Donald Davidson 2001b; 2004; Richard Rorty 1979;1982; Willard Van Quine 1969;1990) and language philosophers (Gontard 1981), indeed, speak of a cultural phenomenon, a driving force among intellectuals, constituted by popular ideas (opinions and thoughts or ethical norms) which, quite often act as doxatic[1] factors that either favor alignment behind them or condemn dissident voices. It is, therefore, a major concern of this paper to show that Lawrence, the author has fallen victim of such a phenomenon by truncating chunks of vital historical information of the colonies she has studied, and more particularly the Moroccan one. Generally speaking, these acts are done outside any apparent and compelling material forces. Derridians call this a hegemony of the dominant episteme (Foucault 1969) that compels intellectuals and the rank-and-file to abide by a certain popular view for fear of castigation and outright condemnation. Historians, anthropologists and political sociologists, to name but these, are commonly trapped by such dialogic situation even when they try their best to avoid falling victim of it. S lisli's "Islam: The Elephant in Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*" (2008) is perhaps an illustration one may bring to corroborate the view of how dominant zeitgeists can determine discourses to be held by people despite their claim to a certain seamlessness. Slisli shows Fanon's falling victim, willingly or not, of the dominant Approaches to writing history under an evolving Marxist doxa. It is my belief that Lawrence too has fallen victim of the same bias by muting the role certain actors may have played in the making of French colonies and more particularly of Morocco's Political and Nationalist protests preceding independence.

Her book (2013), indeed, has a rare disturbing quality – not because of the truths she says but rather because of those she ignores – in that it posits itself as a challenging alternative reading to conventional narratives of anti-colonial protests in the French Empire. She advances the view that nationals and foreign researches have come up with narratives of colonial history and mostly of mobilizations for political and nationalist agendas that are plagued with oversights and over-generalizations. To redress this wrong, she proposes a new approach that focuses on each individual state allowing her to tend to the intrinsic factors that may have affected mobilizations against the French colonial presence each state has undertaken. Because of the hegemony of the conventional nationalist narratives, basically romanticizing and/or overrating certain factors, she proposes to undo these readings by trying to focus on credible data that can help her override these and come up with endogenous material likely to substantiate her hypothesis that had the French responded to the political grievances of their colonials subjects, like they had done in some colonies in the Pacific, the history of the French Empire would have been written differently.

Although one would agree with the quality of the material brought forth and mostly with the challenge the approach poses to, basically, most nationalist readings, one would also deplore the muting of the roles played in either acts of 'mobilization and/or demobilization' by

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[1] Doxatic is an adjective derived from the word Doxa (from ancient Greek **δόξα**, "glory", "praise" from **δοκεῖν** dokein, "to appear", "to seem", "to think" and "to accept") is a Greek word meaning common belief or popular opinion. https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=doxa+definition. Accessed on 6th October, 2015.

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large groups of the autochthonous populations, following in this a tradition set up by Marxist readings of the histories of colonized countries as the case has been with Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* on Algeria (Slisli 2008). Three of these players (the Tribal Chieftains, the Zaouya Sheikhs and the so-called Protégés) seem to have played primordial roles be it in mobilizing and/or demobilizing crowds of people with regard to a certain national programme. These actors have, indeed, contributed a great deal; first by cultivating a pseudo-jihadist discourse (sometimes to cover their political drives), and second by immersing in extra-zealous jihadist culture when their plans for spoils have failed. One has only to ponder over the jihadist discursive practices common among the chieftains and protégés like El Rogui (described as the most roguish of these chieftains), Mohamed Ameziane, Raissuli and the Khattabis, to name but these, to get a glimpse at the use of the jihadist discourse produced by these leaders (Balfour 2002). The Zaouyas, however, are unquestionably the home ground for the cultivation of 'Jihadist culture' as we shall see later. In the folds of this paper, I propose to lay bare these 'elephants,'(Slisli 2008) muted in Lawrence's approach, in addition to other argumentation incongruences and methodological shortcomings to the fluency of the arguments held in her book.

II. On the Argumentation and Methodology

Lawrence's reliance on a political culture, common among the Western democracies, to explain mobilization is tarred with flaws. For instance, the political choice in a democracy is necessarily driven by reasoned, unfettered decision-making while in the colonized countries this political culture has not been instated as a practice even through 1980s and 90s, that is 40 or so years into their independences. In the colonized countries – particularly in Morocco and Algeria – politics has always been based on ethnicity and generally on religious affiliations. Democratic culture is still, as we speak, in the stage of construction.

As stated previously, Lawrence proposes to debunk the so much taken for granted explanations of the rise of the nationalist mobilizations in the French Colonial Empire. One of the approaches adopted to debunk the hegemonizing opinion that nationalist mobilization has always been at the heart of any move to organize the crowds, is to rely upon authentic data collected from the French Intelligence services or from official declarations of leaders in the colonial empire as well as those from other groups. The riding principle of this drive has been to show that such protests have only occurred with colonies in which calls for either political mobilization and/or nationalistic agendas have not been answered (Lawrence 2013). Such a rider is meant to highlight the political failures of the French colonial administration; but it also addresses all the root causes of the shift in the motives of the mobilizations. To give her approach more space, two of the five chapters are devoted exclusively to Morocco with one divided between Morocco and Algeria – although she agrees that these two cases are very hard to compare; Morocco because it is hardly a case where the colonial authority was actually deeply entrenched because it was a mandated Protectorate not a direct colonial authority; and also because it was a somewhat modern administrative authority under the tutelage of the Sultan, contrary to the other countries in the empire. Algeria, on the other hand, was a major colony.

Her approach, one assumes, is very controversial on a number of counts, although rightly so at times as for instance when it challenges the nationalists' claims to be the predicators and main engineers of the independence movements; these would also see themselves as custodians of the collective memory of their respective people. The major controversy, however, is that it occults a very large period in the history of the encounter between the French early invaders and the autochthonous populations, at least in North African (Algeria and Morocco for instance). In addition, and although it does acknowledge the import of the international ideological context, it minimizes and, at times, overlooks its impact, while it gives precedence to the quantitative analysis of the data collected which is flawed as has been highlighted above.

The contentions, I voice here, stem from the fact that no factor could be said to be determinant as to how the leaders have swayed their opinions one way or another given the fact that several factors may have always been present during the periods the author has focused on. The period pondered over starts from the early 1900s and goes up to the time immediately following the end of the second world war and the beginning of the wars for independence. My reading, however, should not be seen as a way to reject the entirety of her approach nor the results achieved; I do acknowledge the scientific aspect of the analysis and appreciate the challenge these results pose to commonly held narratives as they allow, even nationals like myself to see their history in a rather different light. What I contest in these results, once more, is that their seamlessness gives them a certain authoritarianism that needs to be debunked.

One of the main methods employed by the author to legitimize her choice of agency starts with what I would describe as a heavy handed enforcement of definitions of key terms such as what she considers as 'mobilization' and what not; what she considers as nationalist and what not. In other words, I start with her definition of 'mobilization' in which she considers.

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> … mobilization to include the kinds of contentious activities described in the social movement literature – such as boycotts, demonstrations, strikes and other protest activity – but I also include non-contentious collective actions such as voting for or joining nationalist parties (Lawrence 15).

There are few problems with such a statement: first there is no literature that describes or defines what mobilization is, particularly with reference to the authors she mentions. The literature she refers to is one that deals with opportunities for a mobilization and all the rhetoric (for a *change* and for *reaction*) that ensues from that (McAdam 1996 and 1999). The second problem with that statement is that there is no reason for legitimizing the type of mobilization she advances as compared to say a mobilization conducted by the Tribal chieftains and the Zaouya Sheikhs where they do not have to 'boycott, vote or demonstrate'. These cultures have their own ways of mobilizing large crowds of devout partisans to support even a war should that be needed. This again is a domain not well researched by anthropologists or political sociologists. On the contrary, one needs to understand its mechanisms and strategies before one writes it off. Lawrence's definition of 'mobilization' presupposes a world with technological capabilities that would allow faster communication to mobilize, easier to persuade and, potentially, reach and touch larger crowds. This is possible, with the current technology, but not at the time of the colonial period targeted by the author. Radio communication was a privilege of some even in the urban centers where this type of mobilization would have been conducted.

This type of 'mobilization' also implies a 'political culture' – including 'democratic choice' guaranteed by a constitution, party organizations and unions – none of which actually existed at the time except among a tiny minority of the elites. The culture predominant at the time was 'armed resistance' (or what some authors would call 'jihad culture') (Slisli 2008) crossing ethnic boundaries and social class ones. Mobilization along these principles would have been easier, particularly among the lower classes, but more importantly among the peasant and nomad communities. Because none of these elements has been highlighted in her book, one may easily assume that Lawrence talks about a specific type of mobilization exclusively targeting 'middle class elites'; which in my view is a biased approach to studying resistance and independence movements within colonized countries such as Algeria and Morocco more specifically. The literature available on the period speaks of a tiny minority who could actually read and write. Ezzaki (1988) speaks of a class of intellectuals who were lettered in Arabic and religious theology and even modern languages; a class that would eclipse the tiny minority of 'Westernized intellectuals'. The latter may have been a significant variant indeed, but not as effective as the religious elites, who also tried to upgrade their methods of contestation particularly in the 1940s and after. Yet, put together, both elites would constitute a very small percentage (although no exact statistics are provided) of the overall population to convince.

A few paragraphs later, Lawrence gets more specific by stating that 'mobilization is nationalist if the actors frame their actions in the discourse of nationalism' (Lawence 16) making thus the segmentation between the discourses she is trying to hammer more problematic and more controversial essentially because one needs to understand, first and foremost what is nationalist and what is patriotic for instance. Such a distinction is based on an *apriori*, not on any tangible study. One has in mind the difficulty social researchers have had to define what nationalism is as compared to what is patriotism and what is not. George Orwell, who may pass for a social scientist, albeit not a specialized one, has been struggling with such a terminology only to conclude that it is a slippery term. He ends up by a tentative approach defining nationalism as "inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality" (1945); this being another distinction very hard to make.

The above definitions, have provided a ground floor for further applications allowing a focus on the type of mobilization that the author has in mind; basically the ones held for: (a) political demands and (b) for nationalist agendas. My objection to this use comes from a conviction that Lawrence has tied population contestation to a Structural Approach that would deny any role to the Cultural variables; a reading that is much nostalgic of the 1960s and early 70s. In doing so, the author is also muting actors that may have played a significant role in any of the uprisings targeted by the study, on the grounds that they do not belong to the political structures she has in mind (see Dochartaigh 2010; McAdam et al 1996; McAdam and Larks 1999).

III. On the Incongruence

Reading Lawrence as has been suggested above, is most unsettling due to, among other things, the frequent in congruences one has to face up to in the fabric of the text. One is indeed baffled by the underlying paradoxes that the text is studied with. For instance, there are statements that acknowledge the salience of the context in which events have evolved. She, as a matter of fact, asserts that 'opponents of French colonialism were both empowered and limited by what appeared possible, by the menu of options they saw before them' (Lawrence 22), underlying thus the

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influence offered by the context. This is reiterated in "they were bounded by the particular circumstances of living in the twentieth century of French empire" (Lawrence 23); or much clearer in "actors' opinions were shaped by a wider global context in which particular political frames were gaining currency while others were in decline" (Lawrence 23). Yet this recognition is undermined by other statements whereby she decides to sidestep the overall context by focusing only on the intrinsic factors which, one has to acknowledge, are "proximate causes of action". But her determination to ignore "the background conditions that serve to facilitate it" undermines any importance the overall context may have had. This amounts to conducting an in-vitro experimentation, so reminiscent of the structuralist approach which cuts off all other possible influential ingredients and consequently resulting in a biased view of the problems addressed.

One understands the reasons why Lawrence has had to opt for this approach which cuts across the approaches so common among the Nationalists. The hegemony of such totalizing narratives has had negative renderings that previous historical readings have fallen victim of. Yet one cannot avoid to find out traces of hegemonizing and over-generalizations in the folds of the book, something that Lawrence has striven to avoid. Several instances can be dug out of the text to corroborate this:

a) The lumping together of a number of French colonies to make them amenable to the hypothesis she is trying to advance. The method she has elected to use: the Middle-N study as opposed to the Large-N one, on the assumption that the latter is over generalizing and, therefore, leading to incongruence's is as questionable as the one she has tried to avoid. When one looks closely at the method, one cannot fail to find out the same pitfalls she has been trying to avoid. None of the French colonized countries she has studied has a similar approache to things given the class structure, the history, the culture, but mostly the political structures of each. One finds greater disparities between Morocco and Algeria for instance although they share some features, let alone comparing them with Sub-Saharan and Pacific French colonies. Lumping these together produces the same over generalizing view as with the Large-N study approach she has striven hard to avoid.
b) By failing to: (i) conduct a discourse analysis of the leaders' speeches, be they of the Zaouyas, or the Tribal Chiefs or those of the political or union organizations, a considerable testimonial material has been overlooked. (ii) Similarly, unconventional historical material represented by anthropological, sociological and other cultural literatures could have added to the flair that Lawrence has been striving hard to bring home.

Having pondered over what I describe as methodological and argumentative shortcomings that impair the findings of the book, I finally want to disagree with the fact that no mention has been made of the political structures that could have made a serious difference when it comes to mobilizing and/or demobilizing public opinion in the country (Morocco) against/or in favor of a specific agenda. The main structures responsible for shaping any political culture at the time were, as suggested above the Zaouyas, the Tribal chieftains and the Protégés. I should not, on the other hand, diminish the role played by the global context – albeit an exogenous factor – as an ideological structure in shaping public opinion worldwide, including in the colonies. For the sake of convenience, the role played by each of these actors will be dealt with under the following order: first the Tribal chieftains and the Protégés as the two seem to have enjoyed sponsorship from their protectors, and second the Zaouyas and the role they played; although one may also think that some of these actors may have benefited from the Protégé programme at times. At a later stage, a survey of the forces shaping the global ideological context may be elicited.

IV. Tribal Chieftains and the Protégés

There is need to underline that these two categories of players can be merged into one given the fact that, practically speaking, Tribal Chieftains have all benefitted from the 'Protection System' set up by European powers – France, Spain, Great Britain and even countries like Portugal and Italy – to safeguard the political and economic interests of the sponsoring state and offer them an eye on the internal affairs of the country. Whether I go back to the 16th century or content myself with the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, the Protection System has always included Tribal chieftains. In this connection, I may invoke El Rogui also known as Bou Hamara (Taza); Mohamed Ameziane (in the Eastern Rif area); Raissouli and the Khattabi family (in the larger Rif regions). One may also speak of Laglaoui (Marrakech) or Addi U Bihi (in the Tafillalet). Most of these have enjoyed the privilege conferred on them by the European powers they have served. But the system also covers a large number of individuals who have no authority over the population apart from the privilege of the Protection. Kenbib (1996) has widely researched the phenomenon and brought forth lists with names of individuals from all walks of life (notables and gardeners, etc.) who benefitted from such a programme. The role he gives these structures is clearly stated in the following:

> The role of the holders of protection patents in the nationalist mobilization has, starting from the 1930s, been clearer than ever since they were the principal organizers of the protest campaigns against, mainly,

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the '*Berber Dahir*' and the dissolution of the *Comité d'Action Marocaine*. This phase, in the history of the protection programme, was crucial. It allowed the rise of the traditional mercantile bourgeoisie which, after feeling threatened to be marginalized by the progress and the direct control of the French businesses and the 'colons' on the resources of the country and the distribution networks, decided to mobilize for the 'national cause' and request a share in the management of the affairs of the country. (Kenbib: 22) (Translation is mine)

Earlier, Kenbib speaks of the Protection System as being responsible for the multiplication of pockets of violence (Kenbib:18) as has been the case in the Rif area and elsewhere, that is in areas where contracts have either been withdrawn from one mining company in favor of another be it by the Tribal Chiefs themselves or by the occupying force. El Rogui, Raissuli and the Khattabis have all started their campaigns as a result of such advantages being taken away from them or because of their greed (Balfour 2002). These pockets of violence, in Kenbib's view, have contributed largely to the deterioration of the control of the *Makhzen* and the eventual imposition of the French Mandate in the Fez Treaty to protect the Sultan and pacify the country (Kenbib:18). In addition, Kenbib evokes a large number of cases where protected families had to dictate judicial procedures to the ruling Sultan with regard to certain national issues. This intrusive behavior, which has dented the sovereignty of the country, may have started since the 16th century, but it has duly been recorded through official correspondence only since the 19th century (Kenbib: 48 – 66). This survey of the protégés' influence shows that they have always been a force to contend with as they threatened the authority of the sovereign in several ways: (a) the sultans had no authority over them and could not bind them to any law; (b) they allowed external power to directly interfere in the running of the country; (c) they had extended power to manipulate public opinion either by calling for alignment with the central authority's policies or by disobeying them.

It is true that the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, the Protégé System has frequently come under fire as the examples show with Ba Ahmed (in the Draa) who had to conduct a campaign against Tahar Ben Slimane (a protégé); or by the fatwas issued by imams against the protégé system as a whole (Kenbib:261-280). But common sense allows us to think that the non-existence of structures likely to reduce the influence of such protégés has favored their proliferation into a discursive power structure of its own likely to favor mobilization and/or demobilization through the periods preceding independence, and in cases even after that (the case of Ait Hadidou's uprising in 1957).

With this being said about the Protégés and the Tribal Chieftains, one should not ignore that what has been said about these can also be said about some Sheikhs of the Zaouyas who had also been on the pay role of these European powers. Yet, these had power on their own, which I am going to embark on in the folds of what follows.

V. The Zaouyas

The Zaouyas, to begin with, remained the unescapable route for any talk on mobilization as they had the means to galvanize crowds for any sort of protest imaginable that could cause problems to the Sultan and mostly to the French. Historians are all agreed that the role these played in mobilizing populations either against the central authority or in favor of it was very great (Harris 192; Landau 1955). Sociologically speaking, most of these sources speak of the greater influence that these Zaouyas had; this being one of the reasons that led French military analysts and political sociologists to study these structures and underline the role these Sheikhs could play in either allowing France to settle down or cause her problems she would need years to grapple with. In this connection, I may quote Edward Cat's (1898) exhortation of the French colonial administration to pay close attention to the role of these Zaouyas:

> Our administrators and our diplomates have a strategic interest in getting to know these congregations, their role and their tendencies, the influence they can have, and it would not be too much to safeguard our interest in North Africa to set up a very tight and constant surveillance on them (Cat 18)(My translation).[2]

It is also in this line of thought that the military report by both Octave Depont and Xavier Cappolani (1897) on "Les confréries religieuses musulmanes" has been drafted and well documented. In this report, the two colonial administrators, drew a very impressive picture of the power these marabouts had on the population and on the central governments in both Algeria and Morocco. "In Africa, and since the Berlin Conference (1884-5) France and England, which have been trying to penetrate each in its respective hinterland, are particularly interested in following the movement of Islamic propaganda conducted by these religious congregations" (Depont xiii).[3] The report also outlines the power of mobilization that these congregations have always had over the years even beyond the bounds of the Maghreb. "However, between the Islamic faith, very simple and perfectly in harmony

[2] See original text : « Nos administrateurs et nos diplomates ont donc un intérêt supérieur à connaitre les confréries religieuses, leur rôle et leurs tendances, les influences qu'elles peuvent subir, et ce ne sera pas trop pour sauvegarder notre avenir dans l'Afrique du Nord d'une surveillance très perspicace et de tous les instants ».

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with the existence of the black Africans as compared to our complex civilization, our success against these is very doubtful" (Depont xiii).[4]

One thing that needs to be said though, is that contrary to the methodology adopted by political and/or nationalist elites in the 40s, the Zaouyas had rather more insidious approaches. The hierarchical structure of the congregations with its culture of blind obedience to the Sheikh was predominant; one word would suffice to mobilize swathes of followers and bring fatal blows to the social and economic beings of the state (known mostly as the *Makhzen*) and the colonizers at the same time. For instance, the threat that the Shereef of Ouzzan Mouley E. Tayeb constituted against one of the most aggressive sultans Moulay Ismail, was not a hot air, but a tangible threat that all leaders, even the French, had to take seriously.5 Given this power in the hands of these Sheikhs, one would only conclude that this is a domain that has remained even today under-researched despite the French efforts. But it has to be agreed that it has remained a political taboo even among nationalists who have been very much under the sway of leftwing ideology particularly in those years of a growing Marxist zeitgeist.

In Lawrence's book, the political technology she has used does not account for such a phenomenon. When one wonders about the role these congregations could have played in either mobilizations or demobilizations strategies, one is stunned at the carefully orchestrated silence that she has opted for. This is obvious partly from the exclusive reliance on official documents which is no doubt more reliable since it is collected by French Intelligence services for political decision making by the Metropolis; but the fact that it does not account for the non-official aspects of this historicity makes it incomplete. On the other hand, the language in which it is couched, quite often polished to achieve *perlocutionary* objectives commensurate with the political stance that the occasion requires, tempers with the realities that it is supposed to be reporting. A more comprehensive analysis, in my view, would require that other "unconventional data" be collected and measured against the official documents to complete the picture. What is meant by 'unconventional data' is, for the sake of illustration, the 'jihadist culture' embedded in the competing speeches of the leaders and the Tribal chieftains, as well as other literary voices during and after the period under focus. Where else can a better and more varied data be collected except in mosques and Zaouyas, thought to be the holy shrines of the collective consciousness of the time? Unfortunately, these are the exact locations Lawrence has overlooked; enacting thus a myopia *à la Paul de Man* (de Man 1971). Any public space offering venues for the contestant and dissident voices would have been helpful; that is exactly what the voice of the Chiefs and the Sheikhs of the Zaouyas meant for the communities they represented. These elephants are the muted agencies that this paper speaks of. Not that these should have any precedence over the other documents that Lawrence has used, but their value resides in the fact that they offer a leverage likely to help gage the public mood in a more comprehensive way. On the other hand, the literature produced by elites, if any, popular arts like graffiti (if any), music, etc., could have offered other possibilities of gaging the mood.[6] Reliance on party and union leaders' speeches is politically and epistemologically sound, because in the end of the day, it is their decision that counts; but the Zaouya Sheikhs and the Tribal Chieftains would undermine that decision have they been given a say. Similarly, it would undermine the findings of Lawrence, as they could have shown other factors at play and possibly blur the picture she is trying to draw.

The main hypothesis at the heart of the book is that had the French responded positively to the population's grievances and demands to be treated as equals with the Colons, the French empire would have been differently drawn. In her view, the leaders of the parties (or contesting groups) leading the protests would have talked their followers into acquiescence.

[3] See : original text : « En Afrique, la France et l'Angleterre, qui, depuis la convention de Berlin, ont à pénétrer chacune dans son hinterland respectif, sont tout particulièrement intéressées à suivre le mouvement de propagande islamique dirigée par les confréries religieuses. » p.xiii

[4] See original text : « or, entre la foi musulmane, si simple, si parfaitement on rapport avec l'existence des noirs, et notre civilisation compliquée, le succès de la partie à engager n'est rien moins que douteux pour nous. »p.xiii

[5] See (Cat 1898). Edward Cat says that: "Most important of all is that those *Khouan* are numerous, and that the zawiya that is scattered over large area starting from Tangier to the desert is that of Taybiyas. It originally connects to Moulei-Edris, the founder of Fez; and also to another disciple brotherhood of the University of this city around the tenth century AD. In reality we cannot say if it existed before Moulei Abdallah, Sharif scientist who came to settle in Ouazzan in 1678 and founded the Great Mosque. Following some hagiographers, he received the instructions of the Prophet for the organization of the order; others attribute this honor to his son and successor, Moulei-Tayeb, who gave his name to the Brotherhood. Anyway, one and the other were on good terms with Moulei Ismael, who came in 1672 to establish the dynasty that ruled until now; he powerfully helped to seize power; and Mouylei-Tayeb passes for somebody who cooperated in the creation of the famous black Boukharis guard. The sultans registered as members of the order of the *Khouan*s, sent gifts to the chiefs, often took their advice from them, and consequently the congregation of Tayibiya became a national sect against the Quadriya, which received its orders from Baghdad. We generally attributed to Moulei-Tayeb the following words: "None of us will have the empire, but none will have it without us." In any case, it is a tradition that at the death of the Sultan, the pretender to the empire should be recognized by the Sharif of Ouzzan as the legitimate Sultan. At the death of the last sultan in 1894, this was the case." (p.10) (My Translation)

[6] Reference can be made to the novel by Paul Bowles, *The Spider House* where a youth contests the authority of Allal Al Fassi, the leading Nationalist figure during the campaign for Independence. (Bowles 1955)

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While this is only hypothetical as the writer acknowledges, it is important to underline the fact that political courses of nations –including the French Empire – are never drawn by single circumstantial factors, although this is not impossible. In the case of the colonies, and in particular Morocco, the actors contesting the political space were numerous – although not organized in the form of political parties, at least in the beginnings of occupation (1907) and even periods before up to the Protectorate (1912). Zaouya Sheikhs, along with other existing structures, had a say in the political course of their countries as they could do and undo central authorities, something we already mentioned above. These, contrary to the urban (middle class) elites would have certainly influenced the making of the political deals with the French as has been duly demonstrated above with Landau (1955) and Cat (1898).

The view I posit here is that the Zaouyas (like the Tribal Chiefs) are political structures – and powerful institutions for that matter – with a specific political culture that had a significant impact to either mobilize or demobilize their followers be it for political motives or nationalist ones or any other motives. If they did, the question would be to know how and why they had done it. The likelihood is that answers to these questions may undermine Lawrence's theory which privileges the urban agency. In fact, looking at the issue of mobilization from the point of view privileged by Lawrence amounts to treating the issue as a highly urbanized phenomenon while the realities on the ground contest that. One only needs to look at the urban/rural demographics during the protectorate to understand that more mobilization may have been possible in the rural areas than in the urban ones (see Kenbib 1996). It has to be agreed, however, that the mobilizing agency was mostly based in the urban centers. Yet without the rural factor, results would have been very minimal.

To substantiate such a fact, one needs to ponder over these Zaouya structures and the way they worked, to understand their capacity to respond to any political and/or military situation they were confronted with. Needless to go back into the periods of 1920s to find out stern and vigorous resistance to powerful armies such as the Spanish and the French (Balfour 2002; see also Dunn 1977). To mobilize warring communities behind one objective (to fight against regular armies), one needs ethnic credentials, and much oratorial skills. Selling such ideas as Abdelkrim did by rallying even hostile tribes to his father requires more political skills, diplomatic and certainly military ones. More research into the strategies he used would be helpful to historians and political sociologists in enhancing their understanding of social movements and mobilizing techniques at the time. This area, like so many others has remained a taboo, therefore under-researched even by national academics.

It is my assumption, as has been already advanced, that the "jihad culture" and the accumulation of scars from previous wars fought and lost may have been very determinant factors in the mobilization drives of Abdelkrim (Balfour 2002). What is not clear so far is why would Lawrence opt for a biased and restrictive definition of 'mobilization'? When it comes to the Zaouyas. These institutions, which could cultivate specific cultures with their mosques and *medersas*, have been underestimated and in my understanding, the most muted agents in the book. Anthropological literature available shows that these institutions can and have always cultivated even a 'counter-state nationalism' (see Cat 1898; Landau 1955; Dochertaigh 2010), that has been and would be very hard to defeat. Edward Cat's advice to buy their services comes out of his understanding, better than any official at the time, that these institutions had a culture that they (the colonial authorities) had better accommodate by buying their services against competing voices for national liberation. If they have been bought and silenced by France, it is not obvious where their followers' allegiance have gone.

In fact; some of these national competing moods of the era haven ot been duly probed except where they substantiated Lawrence's hypothesis. One does not understand why opposition leading to war against France in the South led by Ma Al Aynain in 1912 has simply been brushed aside. Historians say that he drove France out and has ruled Marrakech for up to 2 months. Similar "traditional oppositions" like this one were many in the early periods leading to confrontation with the colonizers be it in Morocco or in Algeria. That the writer does not ponder over these – except slightly – because they do not support her thesis is a disturbing fact that this paper interpellates. For one question remains hanging in the air; where would the sentiment of early revolt felt by these combatants go after their revolts have been crashed? Has it died out because they have all been exterminated? Or because the factors that brought it have disappeared? Could it not simply lie dormant waiting for the right moment to erupt again? In the case of the fight against France –speaking of the traditional resistance – historians underline the fact that the rural populations, mostly those devoutly muslim, saw the French as a continuation of the Christian crusades against the Muslims. Although this remains to be confirmed, the pockets of Muslim returnees from Andalusia in the North and other parts of the country had memories of their expulsion from Spain still fresh (Balfour 2002), a very good grist for the Zaouyas' enticing discursive campaign.

Morocco, and Lawrence is right to underline this, has been an Empire with a modern administration (not the Webberian style though) and for that matter, much aware of the notion of sovereignty: a basic pillar of any modern state by then. The Sultans have always

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shown stern resistance to invaders on the same ground. One remembers the battle of Alcazar (1578) and that of Isly (1844), but also resistance shown against the Turkish armies kept at bay in the eastern confines of the town of Oujda. One argument to waver against such a proposition would be to consider the Protectorate as a contract signed by a weakened king who looked for protection when he was unable to control his subjects anymore; in which case the issue of sovereignty would be null. That again would be an untenable argument – at least needing verification – because the issue of sovereignty is one that the local populations have enshrined to a stage that if has become part of their 'demos'; that is their collective consciousness. Several events in the history of the country have shown that the tribes have risen to defend their sovereignty where the king's authority has been defeated or inexistent. The two cases brought above are meant to substantiate that point.

a) Why Would the Global Context Matter?

Although Lawrence acknowledges the importance of the ideological context – another important agent in the development of mobilization movements towards independence – she decides to ignore it by focusing only on what she perceives as internal factors. Exogenous agents like the competing ideologies in France's internal politics have been overlooked; and so has the ideology that brought forth the French Mandate on Morocco a few years before the Mandate Policies have been put on the table for negotiation by the first ever international institution: The League of Nation (1919). President Wilson of the USA – described as an idealist by the majority of historians has been competing with a conservative political opinion of the Political elites and Congress – put his weight behind the project years before the end of the 1st World War and the eventual Versailles Treaty (Anghie 2004: 139). One would only assume that if such a system has been on the table during all these years and as it has been consecrated by the Versailles Treaty, it would be myopic to ignore the possible repercussions it may have on progressive thinkers even within the French government itself. The Westernized as well as Arab/Islamic intellectuals may have also saddled such views. How much influence each one of these actors may have had would be a very difficult line to draw. After Wilson's drive, one would only guess that it would be difficult – until otherwise proven – to think that it may not have gathered momentum among progressive thinkers; all nationalities and ethnicities confounded. Antony Anghie (2004:138 - 146) speaks of groups of lawyers putting all their efforts behind the project; a testimony backed up by the following:

The liberal humanist sentiment that animated Wilson's condemnation of colonialism was shared by a number of important international lawyers (Lauterpacht 39). Further jurists of the League period, including Wright and Lindley (Wright 6), pointed out that many of their distinguished nineteenth and early twentieth-century predecessors, such as Lawrence, Westlake and Oppenheim, had endorsed, if not authored, a system of international law that sanctioned conquest and exploitation (Wright 7). The interwar lawyers, then sought not only to challenge the formalist law of their predecessors, but also to reform the international law that had legitimized the dispossession of non-European peoples (Anghie:144).

Anghie extends the origins of the humanist drive – although with reservations – as far back as the 16th century by referring to the work of Francisco de Vitoria, who may have had earlier conceptions leading, in the years to come; to the development of political stands such as self-determination (Anghie :144 -146). With the drafting of the Charter of the League of Nations (basically article 22)[7], the notion of self-determination must have been in the minds of any colonial administration; the modalities and timing may have been different but the idea may have already germinated. Only speculation could determine the impact it may have had on the colonizers as well as on the colonized. To deny these any impact would amount to another violence enacted upon the colonized countries' history, Morocco for one.

[7]Article 22 of the Charter of the League of Nations says that: To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of

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VI. Concluding Remarks

What Lawerence should have said is that despite the importance of early resistance movements, which may have left scars in the native population; and despite the contamination that may have occurred from factors exogenous to the national cause(s), her focus would be only on the reasons why 'mobilizations' for political rights shifted to ones for Nationalist agendas. This would have given her enough leeway to deal with the specific period with no risk of digressing or falling short of accounting for all the agencies involved. The way she posits the hypothesis presupposes that she is familiar with the vulenrabilities of the nationalists' mobilization compaigns; a fact that is not supported by the details she has provided. Besides, what she is saying is that because institutional change does not happen, the other structures (institutions) would respond accordingly. This is a statement that priviledges structures over culture as it denies the political cultural context, in general, and of the countries targeted any impact whatsoever. The ethnic communities, the social structures and the dynamics inherent to each of them are denied the role as they undergo the tyranny of the structure they are being embedded in.

What could have been more supportive and convincing would have been a probe of the social, cultural and political dynamics of the countries targeted during the period under scrutiny. Short of that, we are confronted with a disturbing mutism; one that leads to questionning the legitimacy of the hypothesis posited by the author.

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civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

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