

1 State Elites' Policies towards-Balochistan (1947-70). Its 2 Dynamics and Impacts

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7 **Abstract**

8 The British administration made an announcement of the partition plan for India and
9 Pakistan on June 3, 1947. Shahi Jirga was formed as an electoral college to decide about the
10 future of British Baluchistan. It finally announced its decision in favour of Pakistan.
11 Afterwards, the state elites seemed bound and determined to include the Kalat state as its
12 part because it geo-strategic and geo-economic significance. They changed their mindset and
13 expressed the intention of unconditional accession of the Kalat state to Pakistan. The Khan
14 finally signed an instrument of accession realising the precarious conditions in and around the
15 Khanate. The Baloch nationalists challenged the validity of instrument of accession and
16 verdict of Shahi Jirga. There were further developments subsequent to it, the Advisory
17 Council was made in June 1949 to ensure people's participation in the governance of British
18 Baluchistan. Another initiative taken in this direction was the appointment of the Reform
19 Committee in October 1958. The state elites decided to combine four states of Kalat, Mekran,
20 Kharan and Las Bela into Balochistan States Union. Prince Abdul Kareem Khan did not
21 resign himself to the changed status of the Khanate but his rebellion was suppressed by the
22 Pakistani armed forces. The second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Subsequently adopted
23 the most contentious plan of one-unit by totally ignoring the sensitivities of the smaller
24 provinces. It was the brainchild of the central state players who wanted to defeat the political
25 alliance between East Pakistan and provincial regional players of West Pakistan. It turned out
26 to be counter-productive. The ethnic and regional actors of Balochistan became sceptical and
27 apprehensive about the policies of central state actors. One Unit Plan was made a part of
28 1956 Constitution. It was a fateful attack on the federal parliamentary set-up. The central
29 elites believed in unity through conformity, not through diversity. The unification plan

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31 **Index terms**— ustama gall, advisory council, wore pashtun, reform committee, baluchistan states union, y,
32 one unit plan, brahavi and baloch, pakistan national part
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50 ethnic and regional actors of Balochistan became sceptical and apprehensive about the policies of central state
51 actors. One Unit Plan was made a part of 1956 Constitution. It was a fateful attack on the federal parliamentary
52 set-up. The central elites believed in unity through conformity, not through diversity. The unification plan
53 further compounded the feelings of neglect and deprivation in Balochistan. The NAP and the Khan vehemently
54 opposed it and demanded its dismantling. The highly centralized structure gave rise to the centrifugal tendencies
55 in Balochistan. There was a popular perception that Baloch people had been denied an adequate share in the
56 state affairs. The state of Pakistan was challenged by Sardar Nauroz Khan. He gave up armed insurrection as
57 a result of a general amnesty announced by the state authorities. The pledge was not honoured and Nauroz
58 Khan was arrested and his sons were given capital punishment. The new phase of the Baloch insurgency sparked
59 off after the Nauroz Khan's life imprisonment and execution of his sons and companions. The guerrilla's war
60 fare continued in Jhalawan and Marri-Bugti area during Ayub's regime. Iron-fisted tactics of the regime further
61 inflamed the centrifugal forces in Balochistan.

62 2 Introduction

63 he rise of ethno-national movements as a global phenomena has been capturing significant attention from social
64 thinkers. Post-1947 Pakistan represents an excellent case study to examine state elites policies, their dynamics
65 and impacts about these movements. This study focuses on what are the causes and its consequences of the
66 centralist state actors' political policies towards Baluchistan imbroglio. . The state elites, since the birth of the
67 country in 1947, have been grappling with the Balochethnic movement. Their "state building policies" turned
68 out to be counter-productive as the Baloch-ethnic movement has led to upsurge and separatist course. The four
69 mini wars were broke out between the insurgents and the state of Pakistan. The impacts of their policies have
70 been contributively to the rise of Baloch-ethnic movement and disruptive of national unity.

71 3 II.

72 4 First Baloch Insurgency a) The Acccession Arrangement with 73 State elites

74 Pakistan took control of the Khanate on 15 April, 1948 in accordance with 3 rd June plan after the Khan had
75 inked an agreement of accession with Pakistani authorities ??Rana, 2008). Tahir Amin, a well known political
76 analyst and writer is of the opinion that Khan of Kalat entered in the accession arrangement with state elites
77 unwillingly. He was left disappointed to get help from India and Russia. Secondly, he was threatened with the
78 of use of force against his state by the government of Pakistan (Amin, 1998).

79 5 b) Prince Abdul Karim Never Reconciled to the Changed 80 Position of the Khante

81 Prince Abdul Karim, younger brother of the Khan, never reconciled to the changed position of the Khanate
82 after its accession to Pakistan. (Dashti, 2012). He, along with his companions, decided to take up arms against
83 the state of Pakistan ??Ahmad, 1988). He entered Afghanistan with a hope of getting assistance for liberation
84 movement. The Baloch freedom fighters tried to get help and sympathies of the Baloch Sardars for their cause.
85 The Russian and Afghanistan governments were also approached in this regard (Baloch, 1987). They also spared
86 no efforts in creating chaos and unrest like situation in Balochistan ??Awan, 1985). Muhammad Hussain. Anka,
87 Malik Saeed Dehwar, Abdul Wahid Kurd, Qadir Bakhsh (Baloch Nationalists) backed the armed resistance
88 movement. ??Titus, ??996), However, it was not favoured by Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Gul Khan and Abdul Aziz
89 Kurd because they were not certain about internal and external support ??Dehewar,1994). Afghanistan could not
90 be supportive of the cause of Baloch movement because it was in conflict with its own demand of "Pashtunistan"
91 spreading from Chitral to Balochistan in the Arabian sea. (Baloch, 1987). Afghanistan supported movement
92 for the Pushtunistan both militarily and financially across the Durand Line (Titus, Paul, Swidler, Nina. Feb.,
93 2000)). Thus, due to lack of internal unity and external support it failed (Baloch, 1987). Realising the failure to
94 materialize the liberation struggle, Abdul Karim returned back on 8 th July and was arrested. His trial began
95 on 27 November, 1948 by special Jirga in Mach Jail. He was awarded ten years rigorous imprisonment and was
96 fined Rs 5000. His other companions were also sentenced and fined (Nasir, 1982).

97 6 c) Ustamam Gall or the Peoples Party

98 Upon his release, Abdul Karim Khan formed a new political party (Ustamam Gall) or the people's party. It
99 focused on the formation of Baloch province. The Wrore Pashtun led by Achakzai was also working on the same
100 lines in Pushtun dominated areas of Balochistan ??Awan, 1985). The Khan's dream of making it all embracing
101 Baloch Political Party never materialized because it received cold response from Makran, Kharan and Lasbela
102 ??Awan, 1985).

103 7 III.

104 8 Initial Insiatiives by the Sate Elites toards Baluchistan a) 105 Formation of Advisory Council

106 Jinnah had a desire to change the statuquo in Balochistan. To fulfil his pledge he established Governor General's
107 Advisory Council in Balochistan ??Khan, 2009). It was made to sure public's participation in the governance of
108 their province (Axmann, 2008) It was nominated body of the areas of British Balochistan. The announcement
109 was a big step forward for the province. According to Axmann, it was established on 11 June, 1949 (Axmann,
110 2008). However, it did not come up to the expectations of the people because it was only a recommending
111 body. It consisted of two members with nominal powers. It was devoid of composite representative enlarged
112 body of all areas forming British Balochistan. All hopes were dashed to pieces regarding people's representatives'
113 participation in the governance of the province. The real powers were with the AGG to whom the Advisory
114 Council merely referred any matter in the form of proposal for consideration. Eventually, it met its death on 1 st
115 September, 1951. The council was formed as a body so that it may have check on the decision and administrative
116 planning of the AGG but its original position and capacity was not as it envisioned. (Ahmad, 1992).

117 9 b) Report of the Reform Committee

118 Another step taken by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to bring constitutional and administrative change in
119 Balochistan was the appointment of a Reform Committee on 4 October, 1950. It was composed of five members.
120 It visited each and every corner of the British Balochistan. Its report was a remarkable step in the constitutional
121 and political history of British Balochistan. The report of the committee proposed provincial autonomy and
122 raising it to the status of Governor's province. It also stressed upon the introduction of adult franchise and
123 enlarged powers to the provinces. The creation of local bodies institutions were also regarded as inevitable
124 (Axmann, 2008). The topmost central administration opposed the report of the committee and was not given
125 practical shape in the post-colonial Balochistan. The arguments given in this regard were far from convincing
126 like weak financial position and under population of the post-colonial Balochistan. Jinnah had earlier set aside
127 the arguments by saying that centre would share the financial difficulties of the province for the sake of progress
128 and welfare of people (Axmann, 2008).

129 10 c) Balochistan States Union (BSU)

130 The state authorities decided to integrate four states of Kalat, Mekran, Kharan and Lasbela into 'Balochistan
131 States Union' (BSU). All four states agreed to the idea in March 1952. ??Awan, 1985). It had common executive,
132 legislature and its administration was to be headed by the Prime Minister. The permission of the government
133 of Pakistan was needed in the removal or nomination of the Prime Minister. However, Council of Rulers had
134 the powers to appoint or remove him. The Council of Rulers, comprising four rulers of the states, headed by a
135 President was to be selected among the rulers in rotation. Accordingly, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan,
136 was chosen as the President of the council. BSU had its own cabinet to be chosen from the Assemblies. They
137 could not be appointed or dismissed without the prior approval of the government. The agreement provided for
138 a legislative council of 28 elected and 12 nominated members. Aga Abdul Hamid, a civil servant, was appointed
139 as the Prime Minister of the Union ??Awan, 1985). Awan also maintained that Ahmad Yar Khan took it as a
140 chance to emerge as the future leader of the post-colonial Balochistan. He also urged the Marri and Bugti tribes
141 to demand for their joining in BSU. He further writes that BSU was a 'a trap' to Iure Khan before demolishing
142 him ??Awan, 1985). Where as, Dehwar views that topmost central authorities did not like the institution of BSU
143 and they had some other foolish and dubious designs like one unit at the back of their mind ??Dehwar, 1994).
144 The later events also witnessed that the idea of BSU was originated with the aim of merging it with the province
145 of Balochistan. The government finally gave this region a special status (Ahmad, 1992). Special areas were to
146 be part of the province. These areas would not have any representation in the provincial legislature. Provincial
147 Executive, Chief Commissioner or Governor, would control these areas.

148 11 d) Dissolution of First Constituent Assembly

149 In the meantime, the dispute between the Constituent Assembly and the then Governor General, Ghulam
150 Muhammad was moving towards its climax. The Constituent Assembly's two hasty enactments led to its
151 dissolution by Governor General on 24 October, 1954. Governor General was annoyed with the Constituent
152 Assembly when it asserted its powers. Firstly, it repealed 'PRODA' (Public and Representative Offices

15 D) IDEA OF BALOCH HOMOGENIETY

153 Disqualification Act, 1949). (Rizvi, 1886). It was made during Liaquat's period to check the mal-administration, 154 mismanagement, and corruption in the society. The prestige of the Constituent Assembly was greatly lowered 155 due to this step (Khan, 2006). Secondly; it amended the Government of India Act, 1947 by divesting the powers 156 of Governor General to remove the ministries. It was, indeed, a step forward in the growth of parliamentary 157 democracy in Pakistan ??Sayeed, 1965). The Constituent Assembly kept the Governor General uniformed on this 158 account. He reacted sharply and dissolved the Constituent Assembly ??Ziring, 2006). The Governor General's 159 action could not be justified because it was about to complete its work in regard to the framing of the constitution. 160 If the Governor General had dissolved it when it lost its credibility after the election of 1954 in East Pakistan, his 161 action would have been defended. He did it only to protect his vested interests rather than to protect democratic 162 principle (Khan, 2006).

163 After dissolving the first Constituent Assembly, civil and military bureaucracy fully asserted and made solo 164 flight in deciding the future of the constitution making history of Pakistan. The formal agreement regarding the 165 integration of the BSU in to Balochistan was signed between the Khan and the Government of Pakistan on 1st 166 January, 1955. Ahmad Yar and other rulers consented to dissolve the BSU and thereby sanctioned the abolition 167 of the states. By raising their annual allowances the government of Pakistan easily succeeded in doing away with 168 Kalat, Karan, Lasbela and Mekran as independent princely states (Axmann, 2008).

169 IV.

170 12 Politics of One Unit in West Pakistan a) The Formation of 171 One Unit Plan

172 The most controversial step taken by the second Constituent Assembly was the formation of One Unit Plan 173 (1955) ??Rizvi, 1896) It was basically the brain child of central state actors, who regarded welding all areas and 174 provinces in to one unit as pre-condition to bring 'the linguistic and cultural homogeneity'. They viewed it that 175 it would eliminate the feelings of provincialism and prejudice. It would also be necessary for viable political and 176 economic system. Defence requirements could also be met. Ayub Khan backed one unit scheme in these words.

177 Strategically and economically, West Pakistan was destined to stand or fall as a whole lying as it does in the 178 basin of the Indus River and its tributaries, its future economic development must be considered as a whole to 179 achieve the maximum result. West Pakistan, in order to develop properly and prove a bulwark of defence from 180 north and south must be welded in to one unit and all provincial artificial boundaries removed regardless of any 181 prejudices to the contrary, which are more the creation of politicians than real. (Khan, 1967).

182 Balochistan, instead of achieving a full fledged provincial status, was included in West Pakistan it was actually 183 planned by the central state elites to counter the numerical majority of East Pakistan ?? Samad, 1995) and to 184 foil the political alliances and cooperation between Bengal and smaller provinces (Axmann, 2008). The politics 185 of one unit in west wing further made the smaller provinces and nationalists forces more organized and sensitive 186 about the cultural peculiarities and idenlities ??Harison, 1981).

187 13 b) Political Manoeuvring to get One Unit Plan Imlemented

188 No doubt, the central state actors used all kinds of political manoeuvrings to get One Unit Plan implemented. 189 They succeeded in obtaining Provincial Assemblies' approval for their one unit scheme. Sindh Assembly did not 190 toe the line of civil-military elites and had to pay the price. Pirzada's ministry was dislodged because of its 191 disapproval of one unit. "The major political parties of West Pakistan, Muslim League and the Republican Party 192 were ambiguous, non-committal and opportunistic in their attitude towards one unit." ??Afzal, 1976). One unit 193 scheme which was incorporated in the Constitution of 1956 led to the death of federal principle in west Pakistan 194 (Yusuf, 1998), Provincialism could only be lowered by a big change in outlook and policies of the civil-military 195 establishment.

196 14 c) Opposition by Regioalists

197 The regionalists in Balochistan were against the One Unit Plan as envisaged by the centralist state actors. They 198 wanted independent status or at least complete political and economic autonomy for their province. The ethnic 199 actors were sceptical and developed a lot of apprehensions against central state actors' policies. They considered 200 their policies as an invasion on their regional cultures.

201 15 d) Idea of Baloch Homogeniety

202 Baloch nationalists even laid stress on homogeneity within Baluchistan rather than language differences between 203 Baloch and Brahavi. They believed Baloch and Brahavi belong to the same origin (Baloch, 1975). They are the 204 branches of the earlier Baloch. (Marri, 1985). A reputed researcher, Tariq Rehman opines that the Khans of 205 Kalat, who were Brahavi rulers, promoted the idea of common origin between Brahavi and Baloch to get help 206 to consolidate their rule (Rehman, 1997).

207 The Khanate parliament declared on 14 December, 1947 that Baloch would be its national and official language. 208 In practice, however most of the work of Kalat was carried out in Urdu, while correspondence with outsiders was

209 in English. Not withstanding administrative necessities, it was significant that Balochi nationalism was expressed
210 through Balochi during 227 days of the independence of the Kalat State. (Rehman, 1997).

211 **16 e) Concept of Unity through Conformity by the State Elites**

212 Whereas the Pakistan State elites believed in one nation, one language and one culture (Amin, 1998). They
213 wanted to make Urdu the only national language country. They emphasized a strong centre and used Islam to
214 gain legitimacy. Ethnic identities and cultural diversities were considered as dangerous ideas to the concept of
215 one nation. Ethnic elites were dubbed as "anti-state and anti-Islam". The state elites showed zero tolerance
216 towards regional languages. They believed in unity through conformity (Amin, 1998).

217 **17 f) Pakistan-Natioanl Patry (PNP)**

218 A significant development occurred on 30 November, 1956 when like minded political parties in West-Pakistan
219 formed the political organization by the name of Pakistan-National Party (PNP). The like-minded political
220 groups were Azad Pakistan Party headed by Mian Iftikharuddin, G.M Syed's Awami Party, Wror Pashtun of
221 Abdus Samad Achakzai, Khodai Khidmatgar of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Ustamam Gall (Peoples Party) from
222 Balochistan and Sindh Hari Committee of Hyder Bakhsh Khan Jatoi. All these political forces looked upon the
223 unification plan as usurpation of regional, constitutional, economic and political rights of the small provinces.

224 **18 g) Policies of the Ethnic Elites**

225 The regionalists and separatists forces vehemently opposed the welding of the West-Pakistan in to one unit and
226 demanded its demolition with greater provincial autonomy to the smaller provinces. Maulana Abdul Hameed
227 Khan Bhashani joined it in 1957. It was renamed National Awami Party (NAP). Abdul Ghaffar Khan was
228 elected its first President. ??Awan, 1985). The party manifesto included the following main points. It vowed to
229 defend the territorial integrity of the state. It laid stress upon the independent and non-aligned foreign policy.
230 It demanded the creation of provinces on linguistic lines. Adult franchise should be introduced. It demanded
231 the ending of usurpation and exploitation of the people belonging to different regions. The NAP started to act
232 as opposition front. It also provided a platform to the leftist groups to express their viewpoint on the country
233 politics ??Baloch, 2004).

234 **19 h) Khan Joined Hands with Nap**

235 After return from abroad, The Khan found his state of Kalat being a part of one unit, West-Pakistan. He took
236 anti one unit stand and joined hands with NAP in its opposition and abolishing one unit. He again tried to
237 restore his state and creation of an independent homeland for the Baloch. He sought the help of the former
238 Sardars in this regard. He vigorously demonstrated against unification plan. ??Awan, 1985).

239 **20 i) The Historic Meeting of Baloch Sardars**

240 The Khan chaired the historic meeting of Baloch Sardars held at the Palace Hotel in Karachi in 1957. It was
241 attended by Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, Nawab Ghous Bakhsh Raisani, Mir Jamal Khan Jamali and Nawab
242 Akbar Bugti. The historic demand of the meeting was the dismantling of one-unit and creation of Balochistan
243 province on the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and historical basis (Mazari.1999). When Khan's real determination
244 of the creation of the Khanate of Kalat was exposed to the participants of the meeting most of them opposed
245 it and walked out in protest. (Mazari.1999), Having lost trust of the Sardars, Khan's political future was in
246 jeopardy.

247 V.

248 **21 Severe Political Crisis in Pakistan**

249 Meanwhile, Pakistan was confronting severe political crises. It was mostly created due to weak federal
250 parliamentary system. The political parties were not well-organized and well-established. (Choudhury, 2011).
251 They lacked political tradition and norms. The political culture of West-Pakistan was dominated by powerful
252 land and tribal elites. The Muslim League had very short history of organized political struggle. The early
253 death of Jinnah created vacuum. Moreover, the political and constitutional problems were further compounded
254 by federal character of Pakistani society. The West-Wing had dominance in military and bureaucracy. It was
255 also politically dominant. It created a sense of deprivation and alienation among the people of East-Pakistan.
256 (Choudhury, 2011). In the western wing, small provinces were raising head against Punjabi dominance in the
257 polity. The one unit scheme further promoted apprehensions and reservation of the small provinces, Inter-wings
258 and intra-west-wing conflicts caused a great delay in the constitution making process.

259 The ambitious civil-military bureaucracy manipulated the circumstances taking advantage of the institution
260 imbalance. It took its benefits and asserted its role in polity. After the dismissal of Nazimuddin' ministry in
261 1953 and dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954, the civil-military bureaucracy increased its role
262 in politics and emerged as a key factor in determining the state's policies. President Sikandar Mirza proclaimed
263 Martial Law in the early hours of October 8, 1958. The constitution was abrogated and central and provincial

264 assemblies were dismissed. Political parties were banned and general elections were postponed for an indefinite
265 period. Ayub Khan was appointed as a Supreme-Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.

266 As earlier discussed, the feeling of neglect and deprivation were compounded in Balochistan over the issue
267 of one unit. The NAP and the Khan opposed and demanded its dismantling. The ruling elites were anxiously
268 waiting to take the Khan's designs as a pretext to arrest him on the charges of high treason. He was allegedly
269 blamed for conspiracy to merge Kalat with Iran (Axmann, 2008). He was also accused of reeling Afghanistan's.
270 support for proposed Balochistan rebellion. (Harison, 1981). The Khan, while addressing the workers of the
271 Baloch Academy at Quetta on 26th August, asked for the breaking up of one unit and creation of new province
272 on linguistic basis. ??Awan, 1985).

273 **22 VI.**

274 **23 Baloch Armed Insurrection of 1958 a) The Arrest of the
275 Khan**

276 On the Khan's refusal to meet the President and the Prime Minister to explain his alleged involvement in anti-
277 state activities, the government of Pakistan finally decided to arrest him at the end of September, 1958. ??Awan,
278 1985). Martin Axmann opined that the allegations against the Khan were levelled to pave the way for imposing
279 Martial Law in the country. Awan and Iqbal Ahmed differ with the Axmann's views. They did not see any link
280 between the two-events. The Khan was detained in Kalat allegedly on the blame for starting fullscale Baloch
281 insurgency with the help of 80,000 tribesmen. Pakistani armed forces entered on October, 6 in Kalat finding no
282 such reported numbers of insurgents. As a result of the clashes, a number of tribesmen were killed (Axmann,
283 2008). The khan was deprived of all distinctions and privileges by the order of President, Sikandar Mirza. Agha
284 Daud Jan was appointed as his successor. (Axmann, 2008).

285 **24 b) Sardar Nauroz Khan Challenged the Authority of the
286 State** Sardar Nauroz Khan Zarakazai, an old man of ninety, decided to challenge the authority of the state of
287 Pakistan. He led the major Baloch armed insurrection in support of the Khan. Nauroz Khan was perceived as a
288 notorious fire brand during British times. (Harison, 1981). The chief demand of Nauroz Khan was release of the
289 Khan and breaking up of one unit. He also urged upon the protection of Baloch customs and traditions ??Awan,
290 1985). He, along with his gathered guerrilla force of 1000 men, went to the Mulla Pass. The army launched
291 bombing on the guerrilla hideouts in mountains.

292 **25 c) An Agreement Reached between State Elites and Nauroz
293 Khan**

294 Baloch nationalists opine that an agreement was reached as result of discussion between Pakistani authorities
295 and Nauroz Khan. According to it, tribesman gave up their armed resistance movement in response to general
296 amnesty and safe conduct. Abolishment of one unit was also promised. Sardar Doda Khan Zehri took an oath on
297 the Koran, the Muslims' holy book, assuring the insurgents that authorities had met all their demands. (Axmann,
298 2008).

299 According to nationalists' accounts, the authorities dishonoured the pledge by arresting Nauroz Khan and his
300 sons. However, the military government officials declined to accept the authenticity of such agreement. (Axmann,
301 2008). Nauroz Khan and seven of his followers, including Batay Khan and his sons, were given capital punishment
302 by a special military court held at Mach Jail. Nauroz Khan's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment
303 due to this old age and his six supporters were executed, (Titus, Paul, Swidler, Nina. Feb., 2000)).

304 The early two military actions were taken in post-colonial Balochistan against the Khan. First, to compel him
305 to accede to Pakistan in 1948 and second, on the pretext of his 'anti-state activities' in 1958. That ended and
306 rebels were forced to give in (Cohen, 2009). The next conflict erupted in 1962 after the military operation and
307 the military court' punishment to the leader of second armed rebellion, Nauroz Khan and his followers. Besides
308 repeated military actions in postcolonial Balochistan and persisted incarceration of Baloch leaders. (Chandio,
309 2013). The other factors which caused alienation and disillusionment among the Most Baloch considered army's
310 attack on Khanate in 1958 as unprovoked and aggressive. There was also strong resentment among tribesmen
311 against authorities' demand of turning in their weapons at local police station. (Axmann, 2008). The arrest of
312 the Khan also caused a wave of anger to sweep throughout Balochistan. people of Balochistan were the formation
313 of one unit in 1955 and Ayub Khan's Martial Law in 1958.

314 **26 VII.**

315 **27 Discussion**

316 The adopted policies of Ayub's regime, in political, cultural and economic spheres were totally unitary in
317 characteristics. He sustained One Unit Plan and introduced. "Controlled democracy" based on "Basic
318 democracy" (Rizvi, 2003). The civil military elites during Ayub's period believed in using force to suppress the

319 opposition. The government intensified the military operation in Balochistan to crush the insurgency sparked off
320 after the life imprisonment of Nauroz Khan and his companions' execution. In July, 1960 Army's action caused a
321 wave of indignation among the political activists. Ayub Khan paid visit to Quetta in August 1962. Baloch leaders
322 organized a political meeting on his arrival. They condemned military operation as solution of the Balochistan
323 problem. (Harison, 1981).

324 The dictator was angry with their warning and threatened them with "extinction" if they persisted with their
325 resistance (Amin, 1998). The regionalists in Balochistan strongly opposed the state elites' policies. The Bugtis,
326 the Marris and the Mengal tribes continued their resistance under the leadership of respective tribal chievs like
327 Khair Bakhsh Marri, Akbar Bugti and Atta Ullah Mengal (Forign policy Centre, 2006).

328 It must be noted that the Baloch were greatly under represented in state power structure during Ayub' period.
329 The next wave of uprising was launched by the Mengals and it spread to the Marri-Bugti areas. It carried on
330 till the declaration of amnesty in 1967. The Mengals were annoyed with government's demand of surrendering
331 of weapons. Tribesmen were greatly perturbed over the government's decision to replace the traditional Sardar's
332 with that of the government's nominees.

333 The guerrilla warfare continued in Jhalawan and Marri areas during Ayub's regime. Skirmishes between the
334 hostiles and the government forces took place during 1956-66. The government in order to control the rebellious
335 activities decided to replace hostile Sardars like Attaullah Mengal, Nawab Akbar Bugti and Sardar Khair Bakhsh
336 Marri with that of government supporters. The government's initiative in this regard was totally failed. All of
337 the government's nominees were killed by their tribesmen.

338 Ali Muhammad Mengal started armed resistance after the arrest of Atta Ullah Mengal and made the following
339 demands: First, to release Atta Ullah Mengal, second, to stop the campaign to collect weapons, third, closure
340 of police stations. The clashes broke out between tribesmen and security forces that lasted till the end of 1966.
341 (Forign policy Centre, 2006) The government arrested Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo,
342 Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Mari on charges of supporting armed uprising. They were time
343 and again detained and set free on different charges. 65 They were blamed for backing and extending assistance
344 to the Baloch resistance against the government of Pakistan. Sher Muhammad Marri stood distinguished in
345 raising the flag of guerrilla rebellion. 67 He was also famous as General Sherof. He had joined politics in 1945
346 and established "Mazlum Party" in the tribal areas of the Sulaiman Mountains. He also founded the Parari
347 movement. (Suddiqi, 2012) Both commands were under his control. He himself led the northern command of the
348 Marri-Bugti area.69 The southern command of Jhalawan district was under the supervision of Ali Muhammad
349 Mengal. It was believed that Sher Muhammad had organized 22 base campus in Marri-Bugti and Mengal areas
350 by July 1963. The army headed by Major General Tikka Khan took on the "Pararis". They put up stiff resistance
351 (Suddiqi, 2012). The government authority was greatly undermined by the killing of all the new Sardars replacing
352 the traditional ones. The Baloch became more united and die-hard due to the military operation. Amazingly,
353 even the British avoided to replace the Sardars in such a manner as Pakistan government did under Ayub. Sher
354 Muhammad expressed the objectives of this rebellious struggle with the News International. According to him,
355 the key goal of the armed struggle was to break up the one unit. The rebels had close political affiliation with
356 the NAP, which was struggling for provincial autonomy. The government failed to control the situation and it
357 deteriorated with the passage of time. The government felt the failure and futility of its strategies towards the
358 Balochistan crisis. There was a shift in government's attitude towards the problem after the appointment of
359 General Muhammad Musa Khan as a Governor. Amnesty was announced and the Baloch leaders were released
360 as a gesture of goodwill. The authorities also reinstated the deposed tribal chiefs. They were further assured that
361 their political demands would also be met. The area returned to normalcy after calling the rebellion off in 1967.
362 76 After brief interval, the situation again became tense due to lack of trust between the central state actors and
363 ethnic lords. Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugti, Gul Khan Naseer, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Abdus Samad Khan
364 Achakzai were re-arrested. Trouble again sparked off in Easter Balochistan and Pat-Feeder area. Meanwhile,
365 the political condition of the country worsened. There was wide spread agitation against the government. Ayub
366 Khan's experiment of "Controlled Democracy" based on Basic Democracy ended on a note of disillusionment
367 and failure ??Ziring, 2006). Basic democratic institutions increased the influence of bureaucratic elites and
368 marginalised the politically informed section of the society (Jalal, 1991) Highly authoritarian and centralized
369 political system promised little to the Baloch grievances. They were excluded from Ayub Khan's rule stopped
370 the growth of democracy in Pakistan. There was no space for the growth of genuine political system. The
371 whole system was circling around Ayub Khan's authoritative personality and his created political party (Rizvi,
372 2003) It crumbled to dust after his departure from Presidency. Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, passionate supporter
373 of provincial autonomy, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, advocate of populist program, moved in to the political vaccum.
374 79 Baloch nationalists stopped their hostilities against the regime because their major demands were fulfilled.
375 However, they sustained their "Command Headquarter" and guerrilla formation.

376 The Constitution of 1962 was more centralized and the central grip over the units increased manifold.
377 ??Ali,1966). Ayub Khan considered a strong centre inevitable for achieving unity and economic progress of
378 the country. ??Rizvi, ??003). He ruled like an autocrat and concentrated all powers in his own office. The
379 institutions of Basic democrats were established to enhance the influence of the bureaucratic elites The regionalists
380 were totally opposed to his views. Regionalism reached it peak during Ayub Khan's rule because of the extensive
381 powers of the President, centralized so called federal structure and the subdued position of the indirectly elected

382 National Assembly. (Talbot, 1990). The centralist elites regarded the ethnic actors as Indian agent working
383 against the integrity of Pakistan. (Haqqani, 2005).

384 The situation had gone beyond his control and he realized his grip losing over the country's affairs. Ayub Khan
385 resigned his office on 25 th March, 1969 and handed over the reigns of the government to General Yahya Khan,
386 Commander in chief of the army. Yahya Khan imposed Martial Law and abrogated the Constitution of 1962.
387 The political parties were banned. Yahya Khan introduced two-major changes in the future political structure.
388 One unit was dissolved and the former provinces were restored.

389 Second, Balochistan was made a full-fledged Governor's province. Yahya's regime also released Baloch
390 nationalists. It was the undemocratic rule of the Ayub's regime which deprived Balochistan of an effective
391 voice in the nation and state-building task.

392 The movement of maximum provincial autonomy gained currency in the Eastern-wing. The situation also
393 worsened in Western-wing. The ethnic elites in Balochistan resented the one unit. Instead of following the
394 strategies of pacification, the ruling elites tried to suppress the Baloch regionalists. Troops were deployed in
395 the province to put down the insurrections. A number of Baloch regional leaders were arrested. The strategy of
396 suppression further inflamed the centrifugal forces in the provinces. The Ayub government underestimated the
397 forces working for restoration of democracy and provincial autonomy. Eventually, the regionalists and supporters
398 of democracy started movement against the authoritarian regime, which brought about the downfall of his rule
399 in March 1969. 1i VIII.

400 **28 Conclusion**

401 The early two military actions were taken in post-colonial Baluchistan by the state authorities against the Khan.
402 First, to compel him to accede to Pakistan and second, on the pretext of his 'anti-state activities' The next conflict
403 erupted after the military operation and the military court' punishment to the leader of second armed rebellion,
404 Nauroz Khan and his followers. Besides repeated military actions in post-colonial Balochistan and persisted
405 incarceration of Baloch leaders. The other factors which caused alienation and disillusionment among the people
406 of Balochistan were the formation of one unit in 1955 and Ayub Khan's Martial Law in 1958. The centralizers'
407 attitude had always been that they knew the best what is good for an area and its people and what they do,
408 had to be accepted without any questioning. The Baloch were not prepared to accept their perception, with the
409 result that military operation were launched and their top leadership remained imprisoned for long periods. Top
410 most military-civilian elites' policies towards Balochistan created feelings of mistrust and deprivation among the
411 people of Balochistan. Since Khan's arrest, the wave of violence and counter violence erupted and continued
412 even to the present time. Decentralization along with democratization should have been the response to the
fissiparous tendencies instead of a greatly centralized governmental set-up.¹



Figure 1:

413 [Dynamics in Post-Colonial Balochistan International Journal of Middle East Studies] , *Dynamics in Post-*
414 *Colonial Balochistan International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32 (1) .

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