

# 1 Globalization and Non -Governmental Organizations in Africa 2 (NGOs). Problems and Prospects

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## 7 **Abstract**

8 Globalization has compressed the world to what is now called a global village. The  
9 phenomenal increase in the production of goods and services, and the rapid movement of  
10 persons across national boundaries have reduced the exclusivity of national frontiers. Thus the  
11 growing interconnectivity has spawned what may be described as a global consciousness and  
12 culture. Therefore, the rise of NGOs is a precipitate of this global transformation. NGOs  
13 which were hitherto, an exclusive preserve of some regions, have come to assume a global  
14 character. It is now located in almost all the corners of the world. This paper seeks to  
15 examine the problems and prospects associated with this development in the Third World,  
16 particularly Africa. In looking at the problems, our data collection method was based on two  
17 sources. Primary and Secondary sources. The primary sources include personal interviews and  
18 discussions, while the secondary sources include literature review, examination of official  
19 bulletins, gazettes, newspapers and magazines. It was discovered that NGOs in Africa perform  
20 some vital functions in the continent because of its underdeveloped character. These functions  
21 were obviously neglected by the state and the local authorities. We, therefore, suggest that  
22 the state need not suffocate NGOs or be wary about of their emergence. Rather, they should  
23 have a synergistic relationship through networking and partnership based on best practices  
24 and standard of accountability.

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26 **Index terms**— accountability, non-governmental organizations, globalization, global village and partnership.

## 27 **1 Introduction**

28 he end of the second world war (WWII) witnessed an era which was characterized by fascinating changes in  
29 international relations and social movements. These mutations overtime facilitated the rise of industrialization,  
30 enhanced the quality of life and increased human population. Correspondingly, there was an unprecedented rise  
31 of crises, diseases and human insecurity which created unforeseen challenges for the state and the international  
32 community. Interestingly, in-spite of the global improvement, some countries of the world still wallowed in  
33 underdevelopment and exist at the fringe of the global political economy while, some are living in munificence  
34 with the basic essentials of life. Africa is not immune from these global dialectical processes. It has appropriated  
35 the advantages of the global trend, yet it is made up of states with weak democratic institutions, presided over  
36 by a band treasury looters, and constrained by a phalanx of neo-colonial forces. The aftermath is that almost  
37 in all cases, African states do not posses the state building capacity legitimacy to command the loyalty of the  
38 populace, and often said to be at the limbo of the international system, existing at the outer limits of the planet?  
39 ??Bayart, 2010:x). Despite the natural riches of the continent, it has not been able to rise beyond predatory  
40 rule, neo-patrimonialism and politics of the belly (Bayart, 2010). This is largely so because political power is a  
41 function of patrimonial power and not a representation of the sovereign will of the people ??Taylor, 2009:9). It is

### 3 IT UNIFORMALIZES AND DIVERSIFIES, CONCENTRATES AND DECENTRES, IT UNIVERSALIZES BUT ALSO ENGENDERS PARTICULARITIES IT COMPLEXIFIES AND SIMPLIFIES. ALWAYS IT IS MEDIATED BY HISTORICAL SPECIFICITIES. A) NGOs

42 Against this background that we shall examine the process of globalization and NGOs in Africa. What problems  
43 and prospects do they portend? II.

## 44 2 Conceptual Framework

45 Globalization has become a big idea and the cliché of our epoch. This is because of its complexity, versatility and  
46 multifaceted nature. In-fact, its clout can be experienced in an known disciplines. This has made it an irresistible  
47 and inescapable global phenomenon. As a process, it can be located in the womb of antiquity when interactions,  
48 exchange of goods and services commenced. By the twentieth century, there was a tremendous improvement in the  
49 means of communication. This was made possible because of the scientific revolution, especially in the discipline of  
50 communication technology. Instruments such as computer, fibre -optic cable, satellite television, Global System  
51 for Mobil communication (GSM) and internet have made communication among people of the world easier  
52 and less stressful. Globalization, therefore, is technology-driven. It can be defined as the transformation and  
53 intensification of global interconnectedness because of improvement in the means of communication. ??wonusi  
54 (2004:86), noted that globalization refers to the universalization of concepts, movements, technology markets  
55 etc? in the context of a compressed world. Globalization enhances the intensity of human interaction, opens  
56 the barriers of states and creates a united humanity. As Stiglitz to knowledge well beyond the reach of even  
57 the wealthiest in any country a century ago. It was this untrammelled access to information and unification of  
58 humanity that prompted Marshal McLuhan in the 1980s to aver that the world is a global village.

59 Regrettably, the benefits derivable from globalization are not evenly spread. Only those who can command  
60 the latest information technology have such opportunity. Unfortunately, Africa does not have the wherewithal  
61 to subject globalization to its needs and desires. This is why the continent is at the mercy of the apostles of the  
62 process. ??iakolo, et al (2011:26) noted that in 2009, the internet use throughout Africa stands only at 6.7% of  
63 the population leaving 93.3% on the wrong side of the divide. The internet is often trumpeted as the newest and  
64 best for increased democratic involvement and participation. ??Biakolo, et al 2011:110), and through it, and the  
65 satellite there is a glut of news, and the unprecedented internationalization of information across the world. The  
66 implication is that the nature and content of information is conditioned by the command of those who control  
67 the technology. This is a situation of he who pays the piper must pick the tune. The uneven spread of the gains  
68 of globalization has created a world of inequality and the preponderance of a global culture and consciousness,  
69 sometimes antithetical to the aspiration and historical specificity of third world countries, as in Africa. This  
70 is the basis for the vilification of the global order. While it may be seen as just a media imperialism, others  
71 just condemn it as an ideological tool for creating epistemic disjuncture in the consciousness of citizens in the  
72 peripheral states ??Biakolo, et al, 2011:25). Apart from creating a false world and consciousness in the minds  
73 of African youth, the mantra of globalization is nothing but an old and continuing process that is exhibiting  
74 its latest manifestations in areas of market forces, trade liberalization and democratic institutions... ??Oni,  
75 et al 2004:21). As the developed countries siphon the resources of the world and force their principles on the  
76 weak countries, there is a growing world of povertystricken people in the third world. The United Nations (UN)  
77 revealed that despite the progress of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 863million people still live in  
78 extreme poverty of \$1.25 per day (Business Day, July 8, 2015), just as Africa continue to lag behind development  
79 benchmarks. According to Kofi Annan former Secretary General of the UN, globalization is presented as a foreign  
80 invasion that will destroy local cultures, regional tastes, and national traditions ??Annan, 2000:127). The rapid  
81 spread of Western mannerism and the logic of market fundamentalism has equated globalization to westernization  
82 and associated with accepting triumphant capitalism ??Stiglitz, 2002:5). ??ke (1995:22) summarized the politics  
83 and contradiction of globalization when he observed that:

## 84 3 It uniformalizes and diversifies, concentrates and decentres, it 85 universalizes but also engenders particularities it complexifies 86 and simplifies. Always it is mediated by historical specifici- 87 ties. a) NGOs

88 The exponential rise of NGOs can be described as a global associational revolution such that in the 21 st century,  
89 they have become a household name with a portent force in the international political economy. Gradually, they  
90 have emerged from the backstage of events to global politics, development and inter-state relations. Through  
91 their activities, they have become an indispensable non-state actor in the formulation of global policy. Therefore,  
92 as an analytical category it is not easy to subject them to a simple definition because of their variation, structure,  
93 global reach and complexity. Nevertheless, the World Bank (WB) defines NGOs as:

94 private organizations that pursue activities to relieve the suffering, promote the interest of the poor, protect  
95 the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development.

96 They are non-profit making organizations that have chosen a specific issue that need urgent attention, but  
97 have been neglected and abandoned by the government. Pearce (2003:xi) defines it as a name given to those non-  
98 profit associations focused on social change in a political influence or to those providing social and humanitarian  
99 services in highly politicized crisis -national contexts. NGOs are issue based and action -oriented. They pick a  
100 specific matter and bring it to the attention of the government and society through consistent enlightenment and

101 advocacy. Their activities are based on charity and voluntarism. Seldom do they receive government patronage.  
102 As ??ewis (2009:3) put it, NGOs are self-governing, private, not for profit organizations that are geared to  
103 improving the quality of life for disadvantaged people. A look at the definitions would see some of their essentials  
104 which include an institutionalized structure, institutionally separated from government, non-profit making and  
105 some degree of voluntary participation in the conduct or management of the organization ??Lewis, 2009:3). It is  
106 important to state that private organizations are the oldest organizations humanity has experienced. But they  
107 grew and became complex and sophisticated with the growing inability of the state to fulfil its social contract  
108 with the people. Today, NGOs have constituted a third force in the society and serving as the moral pulse and  
109 conscience of the exploited. ?? 2006). This scenario is not an eerie one because globalization during the 20  
110 th century gave rise to the importance of NGOs. (Wikipedia, 2006). Since NGOs operate within a contextual  
111 matrix derived from a historical specificity, they are not alien to Africa. Whether in the pre-colonial or colonial  
112 epoch, civil society organizations have made noticeable contributions to their constituency. They were prominent  
113 through participation in nationalist struggles and protest against colonial thralldom. The growing incidence of  
114 NGOs in the continent reflect its desire for development and the particular despair against the state. In Nigeria,  
115 there are about 221 registered NGOs, 500 in Kenya, 1,000 in Uganda, Zambia 128, Tanzania 130, Zimbabwe  
116 300 and Namibia over 55 (Makoba, 2002). These groups are carrying out many policy oriented programmes,  
117 enlightenment, and awareness raising in their locations.

## 118 4 b) Functions

119 NGOs are not limited liability companies, but non-profit making institutions in the society. They are closer to  
120 the grassroots, most often seen as the preferred channel, and most efficient agent of guaranteeing the success  
121 of sustainable development. It is, therefore, not surprising that many NGOs are involved in care and welfare  
122 activities. In-fact, as triggers of change they assist the people to be part of social change, and foster a feeling  
123 of belongingness and sense of responsibility among the marginalized segments of the society. As catalyst  
124 for social transformation, and vehicles for empowerment, their demand for a people-centred development and  
125 democratization through protests and awareness programmes have the efficacy to propel government to be  
126 amenable to democratic etiquette. Recognizing the vital role of NGOs in development and democratization,  
127 the secretary general of the UN in 1985 averred that:

128 Non-governmental organizations are a basic element in the representation of the modern world. And their  
129 participation in international organizations is in a way a guarantee of the latter's political legitimacy. On all  
130 continents non-governmental organizations are today continually increasing in number. And this development is  
131 inseparable from the aspiration to freedom and democracy which today animates international society. From the  
132 standpoint of global democratization, we need the participation of international public opinion and the mobilizing  
133 powers of non-governmental organizations (Uwhejewwe-Togbolo, 2005).

134 That NGOs have become a basic element of development initiative in the modern world is mostly because of  
135 their efficient service delivery, costeffectiveness, innovations and beyond the bureaucratic constrains of the state.  
136 Lewis (2009) argued that NGOs embodied a philosophy that recognises the centrality of people in development  
137 policies, and that this along with some other factors gave them a comparative advantage over government. This  
138 is because of their proximity to their members or clients, their flexibility and high degree of peoples strong  
139 commitment, appropriateness of solutions leads to acceptance of decisions implemented (Africa Recovery, 1999).  
140 In 1987, the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNDO) noted that NGOs have a comparative advantage in  
141 six areas viz, local accountability, independent assessment of issues and problems, expertise and advice, reaching  
142 important constituencies, provision and dissemination of information and awareness raising. Article 71 of the  
143 UN charter recognised NGOs is an integral part of global governance. It stated that:

144 the economic and social council may make suitable arrangement for consultation with non-governmental  
145 organizations which are conversant with matters within its competence. Such arrangements maybe made with  
146 internal organizations and, where appropriate with national organizations after consultation with the member of  
147 the United Nations concerned.

148 With the collapse of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) in the 1990s, the political relevance of  
149 supporting dictatorial regimes and war lords like Jonas Savimbi of the Union for the Total Liberation (UNITA) of  
150 Angola, Joseph Mobutu of Zaire and President Samuel Doe of Liberia as buffer against communist aggression was  
151 under scrutiny. The new era eclipsed the decade's long cold war, and ushered in the dawn of political liberalism.  
152 Makoba (2002) pointed out that for most western industrialized countries including the United States, the end  
153 of cold war has meant an end to using foreign aid to 'buy' allies in the third world to support it against former  
154 Soviet Union.

155 Hence, the strategic importance of development aid has diminished. Pursuant to Article 71 of the UN charter,  
156 the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) granted consultative status to many NGOs. As allies of the UN,  
157 they became privy to most of the programmes, policies and even assist in the planning of some UN conferences  
158 such as the Stockholm Environment Conference in 1972 and the Rio Environment and Development Conference  
159 in 1992, Brazil. But when the pains of globalization became unbearable in the Third World, it was the NGOs  
160 that epitomised the feelings of the people by disrupting the 1999 Seattle Washington meeting of the WB and  
161 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Xenophobia Conference in 2003 South Africa. The end of the cold  
162 war and the ascending of liberal democracy, made western donors insist that NGOs must conform to the new

5 NGOS IN SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES NOW PROVIDE OR  
IMPLEMENT MORE THAN A FIFTH OF TOTAL AID FLOWS COMPARED  
WITH LESS THAN ONE PER CENT FIFTEEN YEARS AGO.

INCREASINGLY, A LARGE NUMBER OF NGOS IN THE THIRD WORLD  
ARE FUNDED BY SMALL NUMBER DONORS SUCH AS WORLD BANK,  
THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

163 (USAID), AND THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP).  
164 These glaring limitations have made African states the inhibitors of social, economic and political development  
165 beginning the New Public Order (NPO) in 1989. The NGOs are seen as vehicles for market based  
166 solutions to sustainable development and private sector development.  
167 they are seen as vehicles for democratization as well as for providing goods and services in the third world  
168 countries where markets are inaccessible to the poor or where government lack the capacity or resources to reach  
169 NGOs were involved in about 15 cost-effective in reaching the poor and are considered  
the preferred channel for service provision in deliberate substitution for the state ??Makoba, 2002:2).

170 In this regard, the State is confined to a minimalist role, only creating the enabling environment for the third  
171 sector to triumph. Bagei (2007) noted that the functions and services of NGOs could be expressing the complex  
172 needs of the society, motivating the individuals to act as citizens, promoting pluralism and diversity and creating  
173 an alternative to the centralized State. It is important to note that, despite the end of the cold, war, the focus  
174 on NGOs by international donors was precipitated by the apparent failure of African States in their development  
175 agenda. The manifest graft, exclusivist governance, warped electoral system and a leadership in limbo have  
176 combined to weaken states in Africa, thereby making it a visible log on the path of development.

177 These glaring limitations have made African states the inhibitors of social, economic and political development  
178 ??Makoba, 2002:3), and bugged down by a confusion of agendas (Ake, 1996). Today, NGOs have become  
179 a counter-weight to state power especially in the promotion and protection of human rights and community  
180 development. The efficacy and efficiency with which they carry out their duties have convinced many people to  
181 believe that they have the magic bullet to strategically tackle the problem overlooked by an incompetent and  
182 weak state. Therefore, the rise of NGOs is not an accident, but a response to economic and political thinking in  
183 developed capitalist world. It is not strange, therefore, that NGOs received fabulous amount of aid in the late  
184 1980s and the late twentieth century than the state. Between 1980 and 1993, total spending of NGOs rose from  
185 \$2.8 billion to \$5.7 billion:

186 In 1980 funding from international donor community allocated for less than 10% of NGO budgets (but) by  
187 the 1990s their share had risen to 35 per cent.

188 5 NGOs in some African countries now provide or implement  
189 more than a fifth of total aid flows compared with less than  
190 one per cent fifteen years ago. Increasingly, a large number  
191 of NGOs in the third world are funded by small number  
192 donors such as World Bank, the United States Agency for  
193 International Development (USAID), and the United Nations  
194 Development Programme (UNDP). The World Bank not  
195 only encourages member governments to work with NGOs  
196 on development projects, but also directly funds the NGO  
197 projects? From 1973 to 1988 NGOs were involved in about  
198 15

199 World Bank projects a year. By 1990 that number had jumped to 89 or 40 per cent of all new projects approved.  
200 In 1997 approved World Bank projects in the third world countries involving NGOs were 84 per cent in South  
201 Asia, 61 per cent in Africa, and 60 per cent in Latin America and Caribbean. USAID is said to funnel 20 per  
202 cent of its funds through NGOs ??Makoba, 2002:2).

203 According to the WB, 12 per cent of foreign aid to developing countries was channelled through NGOs in  
204 1994, and in 1996 the total amount was \$7 billion worldwide. External aid to African NGOs rose from \$1 billion  
205 in 1990 to \$3.5 billion in 1999. This is in contrast to developing aid to states. Between 1993 and 1997, total  
206 aid to Africa declined by nearly 13 per cent from building a vibrant civil society with the capacity for private  
207 initiative. This is why Prudence Bushwell, former United States Ambassador to Kenya in his Declaration noted  
208 that the US government would channel most of her development aid to Africa estimated at \$711.3 million in 1999  
209 through NGOs, becomes instructive (Africa Recovery, 1999). With huge amount of money at their disposal, and  
210 their array of professional personnel, NGOs as international whistle blowers are demonstrating their vitality at  
211 every historical epoch.

212 the effectiveness of their efforts stunned the major multilateral institutions and governments worldwide and  
213 forced them to develop ways to engage and involve NGOs in their deliberation and decision making. Wikipedia,  
214 2006 III.

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## 215 **6 Problems and Prospects**

216 It is indubitable that NGOs in Africa are in the mainstream of social services and development in the continent.  
217 Nevertheless, they are saddled with myriad problems that have the capacity to eclipse their development-oriented  
218 efforts. One of their greatest vulnerability is the inability to match their vision with actions, and rise beyond the  
219 social impropriety of the society. There is an endemic crises of transparency and accountability. In most cases,  
220 these can be equated to what obtains in the State. Since they are not accountable to any authority, except their  
221 distant donors, it becomes easy to manipulate financial records. Sometime fake invoices and receipts are printed  
222 to satisfy the donors who do not have the time to scrutinize the records and claims of NGOs. It is not strange  
223 that Executive Directors of most NGOs use the money siphoned from the organization to establish chains of  
224 capitalist ventures, engage in real estate business and display mindboggling munificence. During the military era  
225 in Nigeria, NGOs were proliferated; most of them visionless and consequently some were embroiled in internal  
226 crisis traceable to distribution of revenue from funders and outright embezzlement of money meant for projects.  
227 Furthermore, with an untrammelled access to funds and global reach, it is possible that they can scorn and  
228 undermine state sovereignty. This is why some African states like Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa decided to  
229 apply some measures to checkmate their excesses. It is interesting to note that some of the NGOs do not have  
230 formal and recognisable locations. Hence, they are pejoratively addressed as Briefcase, Illegitimate and Pocket  
231 NGOs.

232 The ??Africa Recovery, 1999).

233 In Nigeria, it has become mandatory for NGOs to register with the Corporate Affairs office (CA). This is to  
234 monitor their voluntary social activities. A worrisome problem plaguing NGOs in the 21 st century is that they  
235 are vulnerable to infiltration by insurgents whose activities are inimical to national interest. The free flow of goods  
236 and services have made it possible for the movement of Small and Light Weapons (SALWs), and the emergence  
237 of terrorist groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al shabaab in Somali and Mali. Arms supply to Africa by  
238 Western countries especially Sub-Saharan Africa stand the risk of being used for insurgent activities. In 2006,  
239 22 of 48 countries in Africa were involved in conflicts whose impact was dehumanizing, to millions of Africans.  
240 These conflicts were sustained by insurgent groups buoyed up by their command of SALWs. According to the  
241 2005 Human Security Report, 'by the turn of the 21 st century Sub-Saharan Africa had become the world's most  
242 violent region, experiencing more battle -death than all other regions combined'. In West Africa, small arms are  
243 estimated at 7 -8million with a minimum of 77,000 in the hands of insurgent groups. Guinea Bissau is estimated  
244 to have 25,000 weapons in circulation. In Nigeria, one could acquire a pistol for between \$25-\$28 depending on  
245 the type, and the Centre for Defence Information stated that 120,000 African children under the age of 18 were  
246 used as child soldiers in conflict perpetrated by the availability and use of small arms. Since NGOs are not under  
247 the ambit of states, it becomes a herculean task to monitor and supervise their activities. It is within this out  
248 of state reach that they can be used to import large cache of arms for sinister motives. The point is that there  
249 is the possibility that NGOs can be used for illegal trafficking in weapons and transnationalization of organized  
250 crime. Aware that NGOs can serve as conduits for the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),  
251 the Security Council(SC) of the UN in 2014 passed the resolution 1540. The Resolution Committee headed by  
252 Peter Brown of the Slovak Republic, has the onerous responsibility to advance awareness and compliance of the  
253 Resolution. According to Turpen:

## 254 **7 the Resolution includes for states to adopt and enforce 255 'appropriate affective' laws which prohibit any non-state actor 256 to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer 257 or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons their means of 258 delivery, develop and maintain effective physical protection 259 measures, border controls and law**

260 The Cooperative Non-Proliferation of programmme at the Stimson Centre in 2006 launched the 100 project, also  
261 to sustain implementation of the UNSCR 1540. The United Kingdom based One World Trust has launched the  
262 Global Accountability Project geared towards checking the NGOs to conform to the tenets of accountability. The  
263 Centre for Global Counter Terrorism has joined to give strength to Resolutions 1540 and 1373 against global  
264 terrorism.

265 Apart from the above, the fact that most NGOs suffer from a strictly defined goals and objectives, creates a  
266 lacuna which makes it possible for them to dabble into areas where funds are readily available. To survive and

## 8 A) PROSPECTS

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273 was given them. If they protest or reject, next programme invitation may not be extended to them. This is  
274 in-spite of the 10% institutional development always built in the proposal. In this scenario, one begins to query  
275 the non-profit motif of NGOs, since in most cases they are used as fronts to attract foreign currency. From our  
276 survey of NGO activities in Nigeria from the 1980s to the late 1990s, it was discovered that the political ferment  
277 and the currency of Niger Delta theme which centred on environmental degradation led to NGO explosion.  
278 Billions of dollars were pumped into the region to address specific environmental problems, and raise awareness  
279 about the human insecurity bothering on military administration. Regrettably, only few were able to meet their  
280 target, while others haphazardly produced a report just to cover their records or claim that they were disrupted  
281 or arrested by the military junta. With the return of civilian rule in May 29, 1999, the so called vibrancy and  
282 vitality of NGOs came to the nadir. It was against this backdrop that late Gani Fawehemi demurred total  
283 dependence of NGOs on foreign funds. He consistently pointed out the negative implications of this economic  
284 dependence both on the image of the country and the vision and mission of the organizations. Malena (1995)  
285 It is a common occurrence that NGO fraternity in African countries are echoing and mimicking the state of  
286 corruption happening within the leadership circles of their countries. In many NGOs, reports have indicated  
287 that those entrusted with funds for the institutions have misused them for personal benefit and in some instances  
288 corruptly access funding (Kang'e the and Manomano, 2014). Most NGOs suffer from chronic donor-dependence.  
289 This is a situation where NGOs always depend on foreign donors to finance their projects. We discovered that  
290 members of NGOs hardly contribute to the administration of their organizations. This reluctance is hinged on  
291 reliance from funding. In some cases, basic administrative materials cannot be provided when there is a dearth  
292 of external funds. The implication is that NGOs become susceptible to the vicissitudes and ideological bent  
293 of funders. After all, he who pays the piper must pick the tune. Lewis (2009) declared that NGOs maybe  
294 seen as progressive vehicles for change, but regarded as part of marketbased solutions to policy problems. In  
295 Nigeria, it was discovered that NGOs who questioned the relevance of free market orthodoxy were blacklisted  
296 and starved of funds. Sometime in the 1990s, the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR) had a  
297 change of leadership in Benin City, Edo State, but those who lost the election told the external funders that the  
298 organization had been taken over by communists. This unverified statement starved the organization of needed  
299 funds to execute its projects for a long time. CDHR was one of the most vocal NGOs in Nigeria that fought  
300 against prolonged military dictatorship in Nigeria between 1985 and 1999. Only what is allowed is dished out to  
301 members of the public. The implication is that members and other volunteer staff pretend to work since their  
302 boss pretend to pay them. Gradually, an organization that was built on populist pedestal and propoor vision  
303 degenerated to a one-man business. Unfortunately, this hypocrisy has not come within the scrutiny of anti-graft  
304 agencies in Africa. Most NGOs are urban based and not regularly in touch with the peculiarities of the rural  
305 areas. They only visit during advocacy campaigns and take beautiful pictures, adverts and publicity to justify  
306 their expenditure. This disconnect has kept them aloof from the development trend and needs of the society.  
307 NGOs had to do a better job of linking their humanitarian services to US foreign policy and making it clear that  
308 they are an arm of the US government. If they didn't Natsios threatened to personally tear up their contracts  
309 and find new partners". (The Globe and Mail, June 20, 2003).

### 310 8 a) Prospects

311 Although NGOs have come under intense criticism because of their problems. As Rief puts it, Without a treasury,  
312 a legislature or an army at its disposal, civil society is less equipped to confront the challenges of globalization than  
313 nations are, and more likely to be wrecked by divisions based on region and self -interest of the single issue groups  
314 that form the nucleus of the civil society. (The Nation, February 22, 1999) Nevertheless, NGOs in African cannot  
315 be wished away in-spite of their challenges. Apart from being part of the responses of the dialectical trend in the  
316 world, there is no gainsaying the fact that they have undoubtedly contributed to the continent's human security,  
317 served as the voice of the poverty -stricken and unreservedly condemned obnoxious practices in the continent of  
318 much significance is the vigorous and fearless campaign against the military rule in Nigeria in the 1990s. And the  
319 aggressive anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa. It was their dogged and consistent campaigns that attracted  
320 international condemnation and sanctions from the international community. The Civil Liberties Organization  
321 (CLO) CDHR, Campaign for Democracy (CD), Women in Nigeria (WIN), National Association of Nigerian  
322 Students(NANS) and the Labour became prominent in installing a civil regime on May 29, 1999, and ensuring  
323 that Ken Saro-Wiwa's death on May 10, 1995 received global condemnation and sympathy. The well-coordinated  
324 campaigns of Bring Back Our Chibok Girls has created the awareness about the inhumanity perpetuated by Boko  
325 Haram. The Nigerian Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 2011 is the handiwork of the Coalition of Freedom  
326 of Information ,including the Media Rights Agenda (MDA). In Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Environment Research  
327 Organization (ZERO) and the Empowerment for African Sustainable Development (EASD) have embarked on

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## 334 9 Conclusion and Recommendations

335 NGOs have come to stay because they have become the conscience of the globe. Their geometrical rise since  
336 WWII demonstrates their indispensability in the global village. As the third sector in the society, they are an  
337 important ally of the exploited and the channel through which the poor gets the attention of the international  
338 community. Indeed, state-centred monopoly in development policy and economic growth is now brought under  
339 a sharp focus. In Africa, NGOs have constituted themselves into an alternative channel drawing the attention  
340 of the state to the grassroots, especially on gender -related issues and human rights. All these were facilitated  
341 because of globalization. The revolutions in communication technology unprecedently offered humanity a  
342 new era of swiftness in social relations, communication, relations political governance, geographical reach and  
343 economic vision. Sadly, the benefit from this development is not evenly distributed. In fact, globalization has  
344 become a foundation on which NGOs are propelled to greater height. However, despite the essential duties to  
345 humanity, they have come under caustic criticisms. These range from the opaque nature of their operations,  
346 to lack of accountability, transparency and susceptible to be overwhelmed by the totalizing logic of neo-liberal  
347 orthodoxy. It is against this backdrop that the New York Times averred that "we should not be afraid to ask  
348 who holds groups working in the public interest accountable or asking 'Do-gooders' to prove they Do good" (New  
349 York Times, ??anuary 3, 2004). In other words, NGOs must practice what they preach because they appear to  
350 epitomize the best and highest ideals. Nevertheless, considering their historical role which portends a glowing  
351 prospect, to eclipse their existence is to deny African a rare opportunity to be in the mainstream of global trend.  
352 NGOs must be embraced as partners in the business of governance, protection and promotion of basic freedoms of  
353 African peoples. As in integral part of democratic development, they must be given a pride place because: from  
354 the abolition of slavery, the drafting of the UN Charter and its subsequent formation through to the campaign for  
355 the international criminal court and the ban on anti-personal mines, NGOs have made critical difference to our  
356 world. <http://www.globalissues.org/print/article/25> Accessed on ??une 22, 2015 In conclusion, African NGOs  
have come a long way. Sometimes, they have become the only visible <sup>1</sup>



Figure 1: Finally,

## 9 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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goods and services. In 1863, the International Red Cross was formed by Henry Dunant to deal with humanitarian issues arising from the Crimea war of 1859,

Year 2016

( F )

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They are known by different names

such as Community Based Organizations (CBO),

Voluntary organizations depending on convenience. The post WWII and the epoch of globalization saw the rise of NGOs mainly because of the urgent need to address some of the attendant problems associated with the war and the progress in communication and exchange of

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*[Note: <http://www.globalissues.org/print/article/25>. Accessed on 14/06/15 Economists estimates that the number of international non-governmental organizations rose from 6,000 in 1990 to 26,000 in 1996. The 2002 UNDP Human Development Report noted that nearly one-fifth of the World's thirty seven thousand NGOs were formed in the 1990s. The independent sector, a non-profit organization that serves and track developments in the third sector of the society estimates that there are currently 1.5 million nonprofit organizations in the United State (Meciam and Johnstone)]*

Figure 2:

<http://www.wds.world bank.org/-servlet> Accessed on June 20/06, /15  
the broader social or economic context.

Figure 3:

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