

1 On Chang Chien's Change from a Constitutional Monarchist to a  
2 Republican-Political Thought with Flexibility as the Underlying  
3 Reason

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7 **Abstract**

8 Chang Chien was born on July 1st in 1853 in Haimen Kiangsu and died on August 24th in  
9 1926 in Nant'ung Kiangsu. In spite of his extraordinary enthusiasm in the promotion of a  
10 constitutional monarchy, Chang Chien changed from a constitutional monarchist to a  
11 republican within less than one month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change? This is  
12 a significant topic for discussion. So far lots of scholars have done research on this topic;  
13 however, the answers to this question have not been completely discovered yet. My finding in  
14 this paper contends that though reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated,  
15 the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that  
16 industry, education and self-government were able to be achieved under whether a  
17 constitutional monarchy or a republic to save China. It would be unfair to attribute Chang  
18 Chien's change only to his personal ambition to maintain his property, his prestige, or to  
19 attain political power. Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and his political  
20 thought with flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government  
21 for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, a republic.

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24 **Index terms**— political thought, political flexibility, constitutional monarchy, republic, north-south negoti-  
25 ation.

26 **1 Introduction**

27 Although for a couple of years Chang Chien had been extraordinarily enthusiastic in the promotion of a  
28 constitutional monarchy, he changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican within less than one  
29 month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change? This is a significant topic for discussion.

30 So far lots of scholars have done research on this topic; however, the answers to this question have not been  
31 completely discovered yet. Chang Hsiao-jo's Biography of Mr. Chang Chien of Nant'ung is a pioneer work  
32 which contains a great many source materials on this topic, however, this book suffers from loose organization  
33 and superficial treatment of Chang Chien's political thought (Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930). Sung Hsi-Shang 's The  
34 Career of Chang Chien is less a biography than an annotated collection of source materials, drawn largely from  
35 Chang Chien's works, supplemented by personal remembrances, but touches little on Chang Chien's change to  
36 a republic ??Sung Hsi-Shang, 1963). Liu Hou-sheng 's Biography of Chang Chien concentrates on the political  
37 events of Chang Chien's time including his change to a republican (Liu Hou-sheng, 1958). Samuel C. Chu's  
38 Reformer in Modern China: ??hang Chien, 1853 ??1926 emphasizes Chang Chien's role in industry, education,  
39 land reclamation, water conservancy and his involvement in national affairs including reasons leading to his  
40 change to a republican ??Samuel C. Chu, 1965). However, Chu concludes that Chang Chien "was of surprisingly  
41 little influence on the key events of his time. Compare to such men as Yuan, Shih-k'ai and Sun, Yat-sen, or

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42 even to such as Liang, Ch'i-ch'ao and Li, Yuan-hung, he had far less to do with the outcome of what was one  
43 of the crucial periods in the history of modern China. His role was a subsidiary one at best" ??Samuel C. Chu,  
44 1965:86) and "his career was generally outside the mainstream of contemporary history...In spite of his concern  
45 with national affairs, he was always isolated from the larger movements of his time" ??Samuel C. Chu, 1965:177).  
46 I find this view unreasonable since ??hang Revolution was not a breaking point in terms of local self-government.  
47 To be sure, the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty demanded the reorientation of local selfgovernment from being  
48 a base for a constitutional monarchy to being one for a Republican government" ??Shao Qin, 2004:11) and  
49 Peter Zarrow points out that the Ch'ing's New Policy reforms encouraged "local selfgovernment", and Chang  
50 Chien and his brother were able to build a new power structure in Nantung as they pursued modernization  
51 project. They rode out the 1911 Revolution much, perhaps, like other local elites, and seemed happy enough  
52 to convert from monarchism to republicanism. What mattered most to them at this particular juncture was  
53 Nantung(Peter ??arrow, 2006:189).Other works by Wong King-kong ??Wong Kingkong, 1957), Jerome Ch'en  
54 (Jerome Ch'en,1983), Chang P'eng-yuan ??Chang P'eng-yuan,1968(Chang P'eng-yuan, ,1969)), Lu Yao-tung  
55 ??Lu Yao-tung,1980) , Li Shih-yueh ??Li Shihyueh,1962), Hsu Lun ??Hsu Lun,1962), T'a Fu-hui , ( T'a fu-  
56 hui,1970), Sun Shun-chih, ??Sun Shun-chih,1991:326-332; ??995:41-44; ??997:135-137; 2001:106-110; 2009:71-72)  
57 also give explanations to Chang Chien's change from a constitutional monarchist to a republican.

58 The fourth international symposium on Chang Chien held in Nantung on the 25th -28th of November 2006, 88  
59 articles in relation to ??hang Chien and modern Chinese society had been submitted to this symposium ??Chang  
60 Chien International Symposium Committee, 2007), and the fifth international symposium on Chang Chien held  
61 in Haimen on the 17th-19th of April 2009, 120 articles in relation to ??hang Chien and Haimen : The Thoughts  
62 and Practice in the Early Period of Modernization had been submitted to this symposium (Ts'ui, Chih-ch'ing,  
63 2010),however, the reasons leading to Chang Chien's change from a Constitutional Monarchist to a Republican  
64 still have not been completely found out yet.

65 My finding in this paper contends that though reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated, the  
66 underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and local  
67 self-government could be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic. It was also due to his  
68 pragmatic attitude and political flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government  
69 for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, the same, a republic.

70 I have adopted the content analysis method in this research and I have collected, arranged, compared, and  
71 analysed the related data to help reach a conclusion. This paper depends more on basic source materials rather  
72 than second-hand data. Among various source materials, Chang Chien's Diary (Chang Chien, 1986. Hereafter  
73 cited as Jih-chi) is the most basic one, which covers almost 53 years from 24 October, 1873, when he was  
74 twenty years three months and twenty three days, to 2 August, 1926, twenty two days before his death. This  
75 diary contains approximately 875,000 words by which we are able to understand the life of a typical Chinese  
76 intellectual, to check the exact dates of some writings of his, and to correct errors against related sources. The  
77 first part of Chang Chien's diary which covers approximately the period from 1873 to 1892 was published in  
78 Taipei in 1967; and the second part of Chang Chien's diary which covers approximately the period from 1892 to  
79 1926 was later published in Taipei in 1969. These two parts of Chang Chien's diary were reprinted together in  
80 1986 in Taipei covering the period from 1873 to 1926.

81 The Nine Records of Chang Chien (Chang Hsiao-jo, 1983. Hereafter cited as Chiu-lu.) is an indispensable  
82 source material to Chang Chien's political thought. This collection of his writings is divided topically into:  
83 Cheng Wen Lu (On Politics), Shih Yeh Lu (On Industry), Chiao Yu Lu (On Education), Tzu Chih Lu (On  
84 Self-government), Tz'u Shang Lu (On Philanthropy), Wen Lu (Essays), Shih Lu (Poems), Chuan Lu (Special  
85 Section), and Wai Lu (On the Civil Service Examination). Within each topical section the sources are arranged  
86 in Chronological order.

87 Extant Writings of Chang Chien (Yang Lich'iang, 1987 ), is an invaluable source material which includes  
88 Chang's unpublished letters and telegraphs to Chao, Feng-ch'ang and Yuan, Shi-k'ai, his personal letters to  
89 Chang, Hsiao-jo, Wen, T'ung-ho's letter to Chang Chien, and Ts'ao, Wen-lin's Collation on Nine Records of  
90 Chang Chien.

91 The Complete Work of Chang Chien (Chang Chien Research Center, 1994) includes some new data not found  
92 in The Nine Records of Chang Chien, is an invaluable source material to Chang Chien's political thought.

93 This paper starts with a brief introduction to Chang Chien's careers and political thought in order to trace  
94 the clues of Chang's change to a republican. This is followed by describing the fact of Chang's shift so as to help  
95 understand why Chang Chien changes. And finally this paper analyses critically and points out the underlining  
96 reasons leading to Chang's change from a constitutionalist to a republican based on various source materials and  
97 different points of view from scholars.

98 This paper is also to explore Chang Chien's decisive role in the North-South negotiation from December 1911  
99 to February 1912 leading to the abdication of the Ch'ing government under some concession, in exchange for the  
100 support of Yuan, Shihk'ai as the president of the republic.

101 The conclusion unveils the most important finding of this paper that the underlying reason leading to Chang  
102 Chien's change could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-  
103 government could be accomplished to save China under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic.  
104 Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and political flexibility which allowed him to work out

105 industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, the same, a  
106 republic. Of course, his change was apparently due to the trend that he could not reverse, however, his political  
107 thought with flexibility should be taken into account as well. In 1864, his father employed Sung, Hsiao-ch'i as  
108 family teacher to help Chang Chien and his brothers in the preparation for local examinations. The teacher asked  
109 Chang Chien to study again The Great Learning, The Doctrine of Golden Means, The Analects of Confucius,  
110 and Mencius, but from better editions. Then he proceeded to teach the boy The Book of History, The Book  
111 of Change, The Book of Rites, and T'so's Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals. Under his teacher's  
112 effective guidance, Chang Chien learned to write examination poems and examination essays which were required  
113 in the examinations. Unfortunately, this enthusiastic teacher died in the Summer of 1866, and Chang Chien was  
114 sent to follow Sung Lin, the dead teacher's nephew, in a neighbouring village, Hsi T'ing. Under the new teacher,  
115 Chang Chien advanced to study two more Confucian Classics, The Rite of Chou and The Book of Ritual (Chiu-lu,  
116 Chuan Lu, chuan 6, 2a-4b).

117 Chang Chien's examination life was a long and toilsome history. In the first stage, Chang Chien was lucky  
118 enough. He spent only five years, 1864-1868, in preparation, successfully passed through the district, prefectoral,  
119 and Yuan (one conducted by provincial literary examiners) examinations, placing twenty-sixth in the latter, and  
120 was classified a Fu-sheng (Licentiate) in 1868, at the age of sixteen ??Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930: 25-26).

121 The second stage was very hard for Chang Chien. He spent seventeen more years, 1869-1885, failed five times  
122 in the provincial examinations. In 1870 he tried for Chu-jen degree for the first time, and succeeded in placing  
123 sixteenth in the k'o examination but failed to pass the provincial examination. He was to repeat this pattern of  
124 succeeding in the k'o examinations and failing in the provincial examinations four times in 1873, 1875, 1876, and  
125 1879. The degree of Chiu-jen continued to elude him until 1885, when he competed in the provincial examination  
126 and succeeded in placing second highest among who passed.

127 Chang Chien spent nine more years, 1886-1894, in preparation, failed repeatedly four times in the examinations  
128 for Chih-shih degree in Peking in 1886, 1889, 1890, and 1892. In 1894, at the age of 42, Chang Chien, at the  
129 insistence of his elder brother, Chang Ch'a, and the encouragement of his aged father, once more took the  
130 metropolitan examination. This time, his name was found in the sixtieth position. He improved on this in the  
131 re-examination by placing tenth, and when the palace examination was over, he was chosen to be Chuan-yuan,  
132 the highest of all. He was duly appointed a Compiler of the First Class in the Hanlin Academy. Unfortunately,  
133 only six months after he had won the highest title of Chuan-yuan, he lost his father, who had played the most  
134 important role in his examination life. Four years later, in 1898, when he had decided to take no office in the  
135 government and when he was busy promoting local development in his home area, Chang Chien did not forget to  
136 come back to Peking for his last examination in Hanlin Academy. According to himself, this unnecessary effort  
137 was again to fulfil the dream of his deceased father.

138 Through the traditional training, Chang Chien had accepted the pragmatic and the reciprocal aspects of  
139 Confucianism which later functioned as his guiding spirit in promoting industry, education and self-government  
140 as the foundation of a constitutional monarchy, and then a republic. Chang Chien believed that the best  
141 way is somewhere between the two extremes. As he understood it, there were no basic conflicts between the  
142 Chinese tradition and Western civilization. It was possible to find some form of compromise by adhering to the  
143 broad principles of Confucianism and adopting Western technology, organization, and even political system of  
144 constitutional monarchism and republicanism. Chang Chien thought that "practical use" might be changed but  
145 "basic principle" should be permanent and could not be changed. ??hang ??Sun Shun-chih, 1995:98).

146 The main lines of Chang Chien's political thought may be briefly summarized as follows: industry is the basis  
147 of education; education and industry are the foundation of self-government; and self-government is the basis of  
148 constitutional monarchy (or later, a republic). The ultimate purpose of his political thought was to make China  
149 wealthy and powerful.

150 Industry is the basis of education since educational expenditures have to be supplied by the income of industry.  
151 Industry, according to Chang Chien, incorporated agriculture, labour and commerce and it is roughly equivalent  
152 to the term of "economic development" of today. Chang Chien saw industry as a means to supply funds for  
153 education and also saw industry as a means to save China. He personally devoted himself to the cause of the  
154 development of industry and had made great achievements. The success of his economic endeavours enable him  
155 to advance education.

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157 Volume XIII Issue V Version I Education and industry are the foundation of self-government since they are the  
158 essentials of self-government. Education, according to Chang Chien, was not merely "instruction", but was the  
159 means for the people to obtain wisdom, learning, and knowledge. In order to save China, Chang Chien thought,  
160 people should have ordinary knowledge, and ordinary knowledge must be obtained through adequate education.  
161 Chang Chien regarded education and industry as the foundation of self-government, and also avenue to a strong  
162 nation.

163 Self-government is the basis of constitutional monarchy (or later, a republic) since constitutional monarchy  
164 or a republic cannot really be achieved without self-government. Self-government, according to Chang Chien,  
165 meant that everyone should devote himself to the development of industry, education, and other local affairs  
166 under the leadership of the intellectuals-the representatives of the people, and thus local councils were essential

### 3 III.

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167 to self-government. Chang Chien saw self-government as the basis of a strong nation. Constitutional monarchy, 168 according to Chang Chien, was a separation of the three-power political system under an emperor. Chang Chien 169 thought that self-government and constitutional monarchy were related and mutually influenced, and thus he 170 was inclined to have a parliament to define the shape and size of taxation.

171 Chang Chien had played a very important role in the Constitutional Movement: in the gestation period of 172 1904-1906, he acted behind the scene to push the Ch'ing government to adopt constitutionalism; In the developing 173 stage of 1909-1911, he advocated the Petition-for-a-Parliament Movement and as a result the Ch'ing government 174 shortened the preparation period toward constitutional government by three years or more.

175 Although for a couple of years Chang Chien had been extraordinarily enthusiastic in the promotion of a 176 constitutional monarchy, he changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican within less than one 177 month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change?

178 The reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated. However, the underlying reason could be 179 attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-government which were able 180 to be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic. The second main reason should be 181 attributed to his pragmatic attitude. He had no choice but to accept the fact that revolution had broken out 182 and that most of the provinces had declared independence, and lots of the constitutionalists had changed their 183 attitude toward republican, and he could not reverse the trend. Even his home county of Nant'ung and home 184 province of Kiangsu were under the threats of troops in Nanking. He was concerned with the safety of his own 185 county and province. He thought that the only way to stabilize the society was to accept the republic in order to 186 avoid chaos so as to achieve his industry, education and local self-government program. The third main reason 187 should be attributed to his despair with the Ch'ing government. His Chuan-yuan background made it impossible 188 for him to lead an uprising, but he could accept the fact of revolution. Although he had no ambition in obtaining 189 political power, he had to get involved in politics. Therefore he found a solution by supporting Yuan Shih-k'ai 190 as president of the republic in exchange for the abdication of Ch'ing court under some concession. Behind the 191 scene during the period of North-South negotiation 1911-1912, Chang Chien had played a very important role.

### 192 3 III.

#### 193 The Process of Chang's Change from a Constitutional Monarchist to a Republican

194 In May 1911, true to its promise to the edict of November 4, 1910, the Cabinet Law was enacted and a cabinet 195 was appointed with Prince I-k'ung as Prime Minister. However, of the thirteen posts on the cabinet, eight were 196 held by Manchus, four by Chinese, one by Mongolian, revealing the basic distrust held by the Throne toward 197 the Chinese officials. Five of the Manchus were members of the imperial house, thus providing the basis for the 198 cabinet being nicknamed the "royal cabinet".

199 For Chang Chien the make-up of the cabinet came as a distinct disappointment. In May 1911 Chang Chien 200 united with his friends T'ang, Shou-ch'ien, Sheng, Tseng-chih and Chao, Feng-ch'ang in writing a letter to Tsai- 201 feng, the Prince Regent, protesting this measure and urging that learned and experienced Chinese higher officials 202 be appointed as ministers. Chang Chien, through Chao, Ch'ing-k'uan, a former follower of prince Ch'un, even 203 warned the Regent against running the risk of losing his throne. Some two months after the establishment of 204 the cabinet no actual progress had been made in political reforms. ??hang Chien submitted a petition to the 205 cabinet urging it to take three actions: 1. To formulate and announce an over-all policy in order to communicate 206 between the government and the ordinary people. 2. To establish direct coordination between the cabinet and 207 the various government departments in order to communicate among the government offices; and 3. To make 208 known the program of the cabinet through Tze-cheng Yuan (Political Consultative Council) to the people and 209 call in experts for consultation (Chiulu,Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 28b-30a). He laid particular stress on the last 210 point as an indispensable step toward securing public support for the cabinet. There appeared to be no response 211 to this petition. Of course, Chang Chien was depressed. But he still supported the Ch'ing government at this 212 moment.

213 In May of 1911 Chang Chien was selected by the chambers of Commerce of Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton, and 214 Hankou to go to Peking in order to obtain government permission for the founding of a joint Sino-American 215 bank, and a joint shipping line. This scheme came as a result of the visit of an American delegation to the South 216 Sea Industrial Exposition of 1910 in Nanking, in which delegation the American financier Robert Dollar was a 217 prominent member. Through Robert Dollar, Chang Chien had met with the group of American businessmen 218 and worked out the details for a joint Chinese-American bank with a total capital of five million Yuan (about 219 3.5 million taels ), to be established with the American half of the capital. At the same time a Chang had 220 been interested in taming Huai River since 1887 but without success nor opportunity. This is why Chang Chien 221 discussed with Yuan the control of Huai River on this occasion. More importantly, in this meeting, these two men 222 discussed future Chinese politics. Yuan, Shih-k'ai expressed his feeling that once he reappeared in the central 223 government, he liked to act according to the opinions of Chang Chien and the public. Chang Chien and Yuan, 224 Shih-k'ai reached an understanding that they would be co-operating in politics in the future. After this pleasantly 225 nostalgic meeting, Chang wrote in his diary:

226 We talked about the past and the present. I found that, after an interval of 28 years, his powers of judgment 227 and observation had become both mature and incisive. He is head and shoulders above the lot lot (Jih-chih, 228 2674).

229 It is exaggerated to say that on this occasion he had already discussed with Yuan Shih-k'ai the future abdication  
230 of the Ch'ing court. But it is significant that at that time these two men had reached an understanding on Chinese  
231 politics and intended to co-operate in the future. And this sowed the seed for Chang Chien to negotiate between  
232 the North and the South later in 1911-1912 in terms of the election of Yuan Shih-k'ai as president and the  
233 abdication of Ch'ing court in exchange for some concession from the Republican government.

234 The next day, June 8th 1911, Chang reached Peking, arriving a day earlier than the original schedule in order  
235 to avoid the elaborate welcome which various organizations had planned for him. On June 11th, he received word  
236 through Prince Ch'ing that the Regent, Prince Ch'un, the father of the infant Hsuan-t'ung Emperor, wished to  
237 see him two days later on June 13th. Chang Chien accordingly first paid a visit to Duke Tsai-tse, the Minister  
238 of Finance in order to make clear that he was not seeking an official appointment. The actual audience with the  
239 Regent took place on the evening of the thirteenth. The audience lasted more than three quarters of an hour  
240 (Jih-chi,2676-2678 ).

241 Within a few days Chang Chien had fulfilled his original mission, obtaining the necessary approval from Duke  
242 Tsai-tse for the establishment of the joint bank and joint steamship line. However, the 1911 revolution which  
243 broke out later in the year cut short the scheme, and it never materialized.

244 Chang Chien went to Wu-ch'ang to help draw up the operating regulations of the Ta Wei Cotton Mill scheme  
245 some two month after he had returned to Nant'ung from the north. He arrived there on October 4th. On the  
246 evening of the ninth two revolutionaries were arrested by the authorities. The city gates were closed immediately  
247 while authorities sought to round up other revolutionaries. At ten o'clock on the morning of the tenth the gates  
248 were finally opened. Chang Chien promptly went across the river to Hankow. That evening he boarded ship for  
249 his return trip to Nant'ung. When he boarded the ship at eight o'clock, he could see across the river burning  
250 of an engineering corps camp just outside Wu-ch'ang. The river was too wide at this point for him to hear any  
251 district sounds, but seven miles downstream he could still see the horizon bright with the reflected glow of the  
252 conflagration.

253 On the evening of the eleventh the boat arrived at Anking, the capital of Anhwei Province. Next morning  
254 Chang Chien went ashore to call on Governor Chu, Chia-pao to discuss the Huai River Conservancy Scheme. It  
255 was then that he learned that Wu-ch'ang had fallen to the revolutionaries on the previous evening. Anking was  
256 then in a most precarious position, as there was a shortage of ready funds for emergencies, and the new style troop  
257 stationed there were rife with revolutionary sentiment and could not be relied upon. Under the circumstances  
258 Chang Chien gave up any hope of pursuing the subject of controlling the Huai and left Anking that evening.  
259 The following night is boat tired up together with a later arrival, from the passengers of which Chang Chien got  
260 details of the events of the ninth and tenth in Wu-ch'ang.

261 At this moment, Chang Chien still supported the Ch'ing government and undertook the work of saving the  
262 Manchu Dynasty from revolution. He reached Nanking on October 14th and went directly to T'iehliang, who  
263 was the commanding general of the region at the time. He urged the Manchu general to send troops at once to  
264 Hupeh and to memorize the government for the immediate establishment of a constitutional government. But  
265 T'ieh-liang evaded the issue by asking Chang Chien to refer the matter to Chang Jen-chun, the governor-general  
266 of Liang-kiang. This Chang Chien did on the following day. Governor-general Chang, however, not only treated  
267 the proposal to urge the establishment of a constitutional government with great contempt, but refused even to  
268 entertain the notion of sending troops to the aid of the authorities in Hupei.

269 On 16th October he went to Soochow, where Ch'en Te-ch'uan, the governor of Kiangsu, backed his proposal  
270 and asked him to draft a memorial to be sent to the imperial Court. That evening he and two of his fellow  
271 constitutionalists, Lei-feng and Yang, T'ing-tung, worked jointly until midnight before the memorial was done.  
272 It was sent to Peking in the name of Governor-general Ch'en, The-ch'un and governor Sun Pao-ch'i of From  
273 his writings as the following you can see, Chang Chien attributes his change from a constitutional monarchist  
274 to a republican to world situation, public opinion, peace security, avoidance of chaos, and consideration over  
275 territories, nations, people's thinking, and theories of statesmen. In 1911:

276 Now the war has happened and the prefects and the counties have collapsed. Considering the world situation  
277 and the trend of public opinion, the only way to secure peace for the country and to avoid chaos is to accept  
278 republicanism ... we would rather integrate nationalism into republicanism so that people may avoid chaos of  
279 war (Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 40b-41a).

280 and again in 1911 Chang Chien pointed out the fact that he had promoted the constitutional monarchy for ten  
281 years, however, he had no choice but to accept republicanism in accordance with time and tide ?? Chang Chien  
282 Research Center, 1994:180). And again in 1911, in a telegraph to the cabinet, he recommended republicanism:

283 Since inception of the 1911 revolution, I have remarked that without fundamental political reform, chaos of  
284 war cannot be eliminated. For the previous month, I have alone considered this issue seriously, I have discussed  
285 this issue with the talented, I have consulted public opinions on this issue, I have pondered issues over territories,  
286 nations, people's thinking, theories of statesmen from home and abroad, and I have compared monarchical  
287 constitutionalism with republicanism of different counties ... Within one month, the republicanism has spread  
288 over the country and has been accepted overwhelmingly by the people ... For the benefit of the Manchurian, the  
289 Hans, the Mongolian, the Tibetan and the Muslims, I think your majesty had better follow public opinion and  
290 give up the throne for the republicanism(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 41b-42a) .

291 "Public Opinion" here is worth mentioning, according to political scientists, "Public opinion is the sum of

292 private opinions of which government officials are aware and take into account in making their decisions"(Austin  
293 Ranney, 2001:115); and "Public opinion clearly plays a major role in modern democracy"( Michael G. ??oskin  
294 et.al , 2008:134). Chang Chien here referred "public opinion" to the opinion of the talented (the elite, the  
295 intellectual, the scholar gentry) including the constitutionalists and the revolutionaries.

296 And on November 27th in 1911, in a letter to his friend Hsu, Ting-lin, a member of Kiangsu Provisional  
297 Assembly who had stayed in Peking advocating the convening of parliament, Chang Chien pointed out the fact  
298 that there would no peace unless republicanism:

299 Now the situation is urgent, people are suffering, and a peaceful solution to avoid chaos is imperative.  
300 Republicanism has become a consensus for the southern provinces to achieve peace, and I can not reverse the  
301 trend. Please come back to the south and you will understand the situation. The name of the Kiangsu Provisional  
302 Assembly has changed into Kiangsu Legislative Assembly and hence there is no need for you to stay in Peking  
303 any more ??Yang Lich'iang, 1987:25-26).

304 As to the issue concerning the quality of Chinese citizens at that time to meet a republican political system,  
305 Chang Chien was optimistic and said in 1911 in his article entitled "The Reasons Why We Should Establish a  
306 Republican Political System":

307 The quality of the citizens in a nation is produced by the political system of that nation. The "quality of  
308 citizens" is a product whilst "political system" is a productive machine. Where there is a republican political  
309 system, there are qualified republican citizens.... When Chinese citizens have not broken away from a monarchical  
310 monarchy, they have no choice but to accept constitutional monarchy. However, once Chinese citizens have  
311 broken away from a constitutional monarchy, they are able to accept a republic. This is due to the fact of  
312 national situation (Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 43a-43b).

313 However, later in 1912, he made a complaint about inferior quality of Chinese citizens:

314 Today the voices of Republicanism have spread all over the country, however, impermissible behaviours occur  
315 frequently due to inferior standard of Chinese citizens caused by inadequate education of the Ch'ing government.  
316 Now, it is the time for us to change the course of education for better (Chiu-lu, Chiao Yu Lu, chuan 3, 13a).

317 Finally in 1923, Chang Chien believed that quality of Chinese citizens had failed to meet republicanism:

318 The foreigners who discuss my country's political system often say that because Chinese education has not yet  
319 been universal and hence the ordinary people's knowledge has not matched the requirement of Republicanism.  
320 At first, I doubted about this opinion, however, later I believed half of it, then later, I believed it, and finally,  
321 now I firmly believe it(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 6, 8a).

322 At first, Chang Chien thought that once there is a republican form of nation, there will be qualified republican  
323 people; later, he doubted it; and finally he realized that without qualified republican citizens, republican political  
324 system would be impossible to be operated. He had witnessed political turmoil in the warlords period, and  
325 hence he realized that despite the establishment of a republic, Chinese democratic political culture had not been  
326 established yet. I have seriously taken into consideration and have discussed comprehensively with friends the  
327 matter on political reform for the past month after the 1911 Revolution ...Rousseau said that it was difficult for  
328 the central government to control over a vast nation, and Lao-tzu said that to govern a nation was like to cook  
329 a small fish. And these are the evidences to support the view that such a huge nation like China should adopt  
330 self-government under a republic. The constitutional monarchy was suitable only to a small country made up of  
331 a single race ...such as Japan. Republicanism is the most suitable to a country with vast territory, composed of  
332 different races and thus having different customs...such as the United States(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3,  
333 41b).

334 And again in his article entitled "Why We Should Establish A Republican Political System", Chang Chien  
335 said:

336 A nation with vast territory is most suitable to adopt self-government under a republic. To prove this in theory,  
337 Rousseau's Social Contract says that it is difficult for the central government to control over a vast nation. The  
338 European counties as well as the United States of America have all adopted Rousseau's style of Local self-  
339 government under the Federal system. To prove this in practice, the United States of America, with more vast  
340 territory than China, has initiated and achieved democracy remarkably by adopting self-government under a  
341 republic(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 43b). Chang Chien's knowledge about Rousseau's political theory  
342 was vague and superficial. In fact, Rousseau preferred a small nation (not a large nation) under a republic;  
343 and Lao-tzu's theory of "governing a nation is like cooking a small fish" is irrelevant to republicanism at all.  
344 Nevertheless, Chang Chien indeed tried hard to explain why he had changed from a constitutional monarchist to  
345 a republican. Chang Chien's son, Chang Hsiao-jo also explained why his father had changed from a constitutional  
346 monarchist to a republican:

347 Taking into consideration of the public opinion, and the situation after the 1911 Revolution, my father had  
348 no choice but to accept republicanism, so that chaos might be avoided ??Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930: 157, 159).

349 The following authors also gave interpretations: Chang K'ai-yuan from the people's Republic of China, in  
350 1963, attributed Chang Chien's change to his bourgeois attitude to property (Chang K'ai-yuan, 1963:100) ; But  
351 later in 1986 and in 2000, he changed his stand-point and attributed Chang Chien's change to his pragmatic  
352 attitude on politics, his wise judgment on the situations and his flexibility in following the tide of history ??Chang  
353 kai-yuan, 1986: 240-241; ??000:238-239). And in 2002 in their book entitled "Chang Chien and Modern Society",  
354 Chang K'ai-yuan and T'ian T'ung attribute Chang Chien's change to Ch'en, Teh-ch'uan and T'ang Shou-

355 ch'ian, his friends' influence upon him, the time and tide upon him, and his intention to maintain peace for  
356 economic development (Chang K'ai-yuan & T'ian T'ung, 2002:482-486). Hsu Lun, from the People's Republic  
357 of China, attributed Chang's change to a scheme of stealing the fruit of the revolution from the revolutionaries  
358 by penetrating their camp ??Hsu Lun, 1962:413). Li Shih-Yueh, from the People's Republic of China, shared  
359 the same view above with Hsu Lun ??Li Shih-Yueh, 1962: 71, 74). Chen Yu-ch'ing also from the People's  
360 Republic of China, attributed Chang's shift to his disappointment with the Ch'ing government, the influence  
361 of his friends such as T'ang, Shou-ch'ien upon him, and his willingness to accept a peaceful settlement (Chen  
362 Yuch'ing, 1988:76-79). Wu Yi-yeh, also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang's shift to his  
363 acceptance of the existing fact caused by the revolution and his dislike to Ch'ing government's insincerity on  
364 constitutional reform ??Wu Yi-yeh, 1993:44).

365 Yen Hsueh-hsi also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang Chien's change to his flexibility  
366 to follow the time and tide so that division and chaos could be avoided ??Yen Hsueh-hsi, 1996:244-245). Hou  
367 Yi-chieh, also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang Chien's change mainly to his despair  
368 with the Ch'ing government ??Hou Yi-chieh, 2000:195-196). Wang Tun-Ch'in attributed Chang Chien's change  
369 to his political adjustment to new situation, and had this to say: Chang Chien's thought has no difference  
370 with Sun, Yat-sen's goal for revolution in terms of seeking Democracy in politics, and national industry and  
371 commerce development in economics (Wang Tun-Ch'in, 2005:354) Lu Yao-tung from Taiwan attributed Chang  
372 Chien's shift to the impact of the tide of events upon him ??Lu Yao-tung, 1980:687). Jerome Ch'en attributed  
373 Chang Chien's change to his pragmatic attitude, including the consideration of the security of his property, the  
374 maintenance of his prestige and the consistence of his own ideas (Ch'en Jerome, 1983:2298-2303); Kikuo Fujioka  
375 attributed Chang Chien's change to his intention to minimize the disaster of the revolution in order to achieve  
376 constitutionalism ??Fujioka Kikuo, 1985:288); Chuzo Ichiko attributed the shift of the gentry, including Chang  
377 Chien, to their intentions to protect themselves by nipping any disaster in the bud and managing to seize real  
378 political power (Chuzo Ichiko, 1968 Chang Chien was steadfastly to the constitutional movement in China. His  
379 shift from support of limited monarchism to support of republicanism was only the natural development of his  
380 progressivism. His fundamental ideal was a democratic China with a constitutional government. During the  
381 imperial days Chang Chien, like other constitutional monarchists, was concerned only about the calling of a  
382 parliament and the organization of a responsible cabinet. After the establishment of the republic, his attention  
383 was transferred to the promotion of party activities and the establishment of a constitution (Wong King-kong,  
384 1957:62); And Chang P'eng-yuan attributed Chang Chien's change to the fact that there was "no basic difference  
385 between the two political groups in their ideal of representative government", "The constitutionalists did not  
386 wish to witness a China divided and in chaos", and as "it was apparent that the constitutionalists intended  
387 to control the situation themselves" (Chang P'eng-yuan, 1968:181-182); Ta Fu-hui attributed Chang Chien's  
388 change to his intention to avoid the chaos of war so as to maintain social order ??Ta Fu-hui, 1970:29); Shen  
389 Yun-lung said that Chang Chien, former speaker of the Kiangsu provincial assembly and outstanding leader of  
390 the constitutionalists in the Chi'ng dynasty, had different views from the revolutionaries, however, he had finally  
391 cooperated with the revolutionaries due to the Ch'ing government's reluctance to sincere constitutional reform  
392 (Shen, Yun-lung, 1971:275).

393 From the above mentioned you can see, his disappointment with the Ch'ing government, the influence of his  
394 friends upon him, his flexibility to follow the time and tide, his pragmatic attitude, his intention to minimize the  
395 disaster of the revolution in order to achieve constitutionalism, no basic difference between the two political groups  
396 in their ideal of representative government, the constitutionalists intended to control the situation themselves,  
397 and the natural development of his progressivism, are all persuasive factors leading to Chang Chien's change.

398 However, the underlying reason that Chang Chien's political thought with flexibility was to allow industry,  
399 education and self-government to be developed whether under a constitutional monarchy or a republic should be  
400 taken into consideration. Chang Chien advocated the practice of industry, education, and self-government, and  
401 hence a suitable funds and a stable society were important for him, his main concern was to obtain a suitable milieu  
402 for the development of industry, education, and self-government. Thus the consideration of economic property  
403 and social stability, of course, were reasonable. Chang Chien, with a sense of the prestige and responsibility of the  
404 traditional scholar-gentry, intended to participate and control the situation in order to avoid possible chaos. The  
405 best way to save China in that situation, he thought, was to support the powerful Yuan, Shih-k'ai as president  
406 of the Republic of China at the expense of the Manchu empire and Sun, Yat-sen. Hence, his involvement in the  
407 ensuing power struggle was inevitable. Besides, he had made the last ditch efforts to urge the Manchu authorities  
408 to make necessary reforms, yet they turned a deaf ear to his requests and thus he was totally disappointed with  
409 the Manchu regime. In addition, he frequently discussed matters with his talented contemporaries including the  
410 constitutionalists and the revolutionaries in Shanghai and thus was influenced by them after the revolution.

411 Hence it would be unfair to attribute Chang Chien's change only to his personal ambition to maintain his  
412 property, his prestige, or to attain political power. Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and his  
413 political thought with flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China  
414 whether under a constitutional monarchy or, the same, a republic.

415 In short, we can summarize the reasons attributing to Chang Chien's change as follows: a) Chang Chien's  
416 Political Thought With Flexibility Chang Chien's main concern was industry, education and local self-government,  
417 and he wanted to achieve and expand them under a stable government irrespective of a constitutional monarchy

## 5 VI. CHANG CHIEN'S DECISIVE ROLE DURING THE NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATION

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418 or a republic, and this is the most important point. As the above mentioned, with the pragmatic and reciprocal  
419 aspects of Confucian ideas serving the people, adjusting to China's concrete situations, Chang Chien developed  
420 his political thought firstly, saving China by industry (from 1866); secondly, saving China by industry and  
421 education (1895-1900); thirdly saving China by industry, education and self-government ??1901) ??1902) ??1903);  
422 fourthly saving China by industry, education, self-government under a constitutional monarchy ??1903) ??1904)  
423 ??1905) ??1906) ??1907) ??1908) ??1909) ??1910) ??1911); and lastly, saving China by industry, education,  
424 self-government under a republic ??1911) ??1912) ??1913) ??1914) ??1915) ??1916) ??1917) ??1918) ??1919)  
425 ??1920) ??1921) ??1922) ??1923) ??1924) ??1925) ??1926). Hence Chang Chien's political thought with  
426 flexibility is the underlying reason leading to his change to a republican.

### 427 4 b) His Pragmatic Attitude to Face Situation

428 He had no choice but to accept the fact that revolution had broken out and that most of the provinces had  
429 declared independence, and lots of the constitutionalists had changed their attitude toward republican, and he  
430 could not reverse the trend. Even his home county of Nant'ung and home province of Kiangsu were under the  
431 threats of troops in Nanking. He was concerned with the safety of his own county and province. He thought  
432 that the only way to stabilize the society was to accept the republic in order to avoid chaos so as to achieve his  
433 industry, education and local self-government program.

434 c) His despair with the Ch'ing government He was very much disappointed at the Ch'ing government's  
435 insincerity toward constitutional reform. His background made it impossible for him to lead an uprising, but  
436 he could accept the fact of revolution and independence of provinces. Although he had no ambition in catching  
437 political power, he had to get involved in politics. He found a solution by supporting Yuan, Shih-kai as president  
438 of the republic in exchange for the abdication of Ch'ing court under some concession ??Sun Shun-chih, 1991:330-  
439 332). In comparison with other intellectuals during the period from October 10 1911 to February 1912, Chang  
440 Chien's reaction to the 1911 revolution stands for the response of some relatively conservative intellectuals to  
441 the impact of the tide of events. After the 1911 revolution, most of the provinces declared their independence  
442 from Peking by the constitutionalists such as T'ang, Shouch'ien in Chekiang and T'an, Yian-k'ai in Hunan. The  
443 constitutionalists declared their independence with the purposes of protecting their native homeland and of  
444 achieving constitutionalism by way of revolution such as Chang Chien ??Chang Peng-yuan, 1983:191). ??hang  
445 Chien had close contact with the Constitutionalists Ch'en, Teh-ch'uan, T'ang, Shou-ch'en and revolutionaries  
446 such as Huang, Hsing, Hu, Han-min, Sung, Chiao-jen, and Wang, Ching-wei in this period and they have been  
447 influenced by one another.

### 448 5 VI. Chang Chien's Decisive Role During the North-South 449 Negotiation

450 In is "Revolution by Diplomacy: A Reexamination of the Shanghai Conference of 1911", Australian scholar  
451 Louis Sigel has put emphasis on "revolution by diplomacy": "The Revolution of 1911 was not much of a  
452 revolution: There was no fundamental overthrow of the existing social order, nor was there a significant shift  
453 in the allocation of political or economic power at the local level. Without the backing of a well-organized  
454 movement, the revolutionaries achieved a dominant role in the ending of imperial rule and the establishment of a  
455 successful political order in only four provinces-Kwangtung, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Human. Thanks to a shortage  
456 of defenders of the throne's interest, the Revolution was a relatively bloodless affairs. The precipitate cease-fire  
457 and general acceptance of a political rather than military solution reflected widespread acceptance, almost from  
458 the start of the eventual solution -a republic under Yuan Shih-k'ai" ??Sigel Louis,1979:111).

459 The nature of 1911 Revolution is debatable, one says that it is a revolution by diplomacy; another says that  
460 it is an all-people revolution(Chang Yu-fa, 1988:52,72); the other says that it is a bourgeoisie revolution ??Wu  
461 Yu-chang, 1961:26); still other says that it is just a dynastic revolution:

462 "The Revolution of 1911 turns out to be a dynastic revolution. This supposition is supported by two facts.  
463 One is that what attracted students, secret societies, and officers and soldiers of the New Army to the Revolution  
464 was nothing more than the anti-Manchu racism in Sun Yat-senism. The other is that no great economic and  
465 social changes can be detected between the period before and after the Revolution. Of course, there was some  
466 progress in industrialization, but this may be explained as natural growth than the result of the Revolution"  
467 ??Chuzo Ichiko, 1968:313). and still other says:

468 Nevertheless it is equally difficult, despite the role played by conservative elements, to regard the 1911  
469 Revolution simply as a traditional rebellion bringing about the fall of one dynasty and the founding of another.  
470 This revolution, although it followed the traditional pattern, had a new set of slogans, such as democracy, liberty,  
471 and national independence" (Berger Marie-Claire,1968:294).

472 All the above scholars are able to justify their arguments wisely with evidences. However, there is no doubt  
473 that the 1911 Revolution was able to be achieved mainly due to the success of the South North Negotiation  
474 among all parts struggling for power and interests. Without the success of the South North Negotiation, the  
475 1911 Revolution might have been pacified by Yuan, Shih-k'ai, the prime minister of the Ch'ing Court, and the  
476 birth of the Republic of China would not be possible. Of course, Yuan, Shih-k'ai had taken into consideration  
477 of his own best interest and accepted the negotiation so as to become the president of the Republic of China.

478 The 1911 Revolution indeed was accomplished by negotiation and it can be said that it was a "revolution by  
479 diplomacy".

480 Once Chang Chien had changed to a republican, he worked wholeheartedly behind the scene to achieve the  
481 north-south negotiation. On 11th January 1912, a time of deadlock between the south and the north, Chang Chien  
482 wrote two articles entitled "ko-ming Lun ( On Revolution)" in which he concluded that there were four kinds  
483 of revolution in Chinese history, namely "sheng-hsian (the sages) revolution", "hao-chie (the heroic) revolution",  
484 "ch'uan-chian (the power stolen) revolution", and "tao-chei (the villain) revolution", and the cases of the sages  
485 revolution and the heroic revolution were very rare in Chinese history but most of the cases of revolution were  
486 the power-stolen revolution and the Villain revolution as a result of the despotic political system of China. He  
487 suggested the revolutionaries to follow the cases of the sages and the heroic revolutions, but not the power-stolen  
488 and the villain revolution ( Chiulu, Wen Lu, chuan 3, 5b-7b). In this sense, though his theory on revolution is still  
489 within the scope of traditional China for his inclination of "the sages and the heroic revolutions", Chang Chien  
490 had already expressed out clearly his hate of "despotic political system of China". On the surface, the North-South  
491 negotiation was conducted by the representatives led by T'ang,Shao-i, chief representative of Yuan,Shih-k'ai, and  
492 by the representatives led by Wu,T'ing-fang, the chief representative of Sun Yat-sen. However, in fact, Chang  
493 Chien had played a leading role behind the scene during the North-South negotiation in 1911-1912. He connected  
494 with Yuan,Shih-k'ai who then controlled the Peking government, and he was also respected by the revolutionaries  
495 due to his great prestige and influence in the society and achievement in industry and in education. Before T'ang  
496 Shao-i went south for peace conference, Yuan,Shih-k'ai secretly advised T'ang that Chang Chien's opinion should  
497 be consulted firstly. On 10, January 1912, Chang Chien sent Yuan a secret telegraph indicating that the South  
498 had no choice but to set up a provisional government with the hope of unifying respective provinces and this  
499 was merely a temporary solution, and that the provincial president Sun,Yat-sen had already declared that he  
500 would resign his provincial presidency immediately after the abdication of the Ch'ing government ??Yang Li-  
501 ch'ang, 1987:28 ). And on 14, January 1912 Chang Chien again sent a secret telegraph to Yuan,Shih-k'ai to  
502 confirm him that Yuan would be surely elected as the president of the Republic by the republicans in the south  
503 immediately after the abdication of the Manchu throne (Chiu-lu, Chen Wen Lu, chuan 4,1a ). After several  
504 secret telegraphs between Chang Chien and Yuan,Shihk'ai, on 27, January forty-seven northern military leaders  
505 including Tuan,Ch'i-jui declared their inclination of a republic and this was a help in forcing the abdication of  
506 the Ch'ing regime ??Hsu Lun, 1962:423 ).

507 At this time Hu,Han-min, a leading revolutionary, sought out Chang Chien to draft an abdication decree.  
508 Chang Chien after consulting with his colleagues about this matter, turned the draft over to Hu, who, after  
509 obtaining T'ang,Shao-yi's approval in the matter, sent it to Yuan,Shih-k'ai. Subsequently this draft, after a bit  
510 revision, was published as the cabinet's decree, signifying the willingness of the throne to abdicate ??Chang  
511 Hsiao-jo, 1930:144-145 ).

512 During the period of the South-North negotiation, Ti,Pao-hsien's Hsi-lou and Chao,Fengch'ang's Hsi-yin-  
513 t'ang ( both private studies) were two places in Shanghai where the constitutionalists such as Chang Chien,  
514 Ch'en,Teh-ch'uan, T'ang,Shou-ch'en and revolutionaries such as Huang,Hsing, Hu,Han-min, Sung,Chiao-jen,  
515 and Wang,Ching-wei met with one another, the private talks were often held there. Chang Chien was a key  
516 figure between the North and the South, the peace negotiation envoys often came to ask his opinions, the  
517 doomed Manchu authorities received polite compensation ??Lu Yao-tung, 1980:694-695). Without Chang Chien's  
518 participation, the North-South negotiation might not have been concluded so successfully. The abdication decree  
519 read as follows:

520 We have received from the Empress Dowager Lung-yu an edict as the following:

521 Because of the uprising by the Army of the People, with the cooperation of the people of the provinces, the one  
522 answering the other like an echo, the whole empire is in turmoil and the people have endured much tribulation.  
523 I therefore specially appointed Yuan, Shih-k'ai to instruct commissioners to confer with the representatives of  
524 the Army of the people about convening a national assembly, at which the future of the government should  
525 be decided. For the past two months, there has been a wide divergence of opinion between the north and the  
526 south, each strongly maintaining its own view; the general results have been the stagnation of trade and the  
527 deployment of troop. As long as the form of government remains undecided, unrest will continue in the country.  
528 It is clear that the majority of the people favour the establishment of a republican form of state; the southern  
529 and central provinces first held this view, and lately the officers in the north have adopted the same sentiments.  
530 This universal desire clearly expresses the will of Heaven, and it is not for us to oppose the desires and incur the  
531 disapproval of millions of the people merely for the sake of the privileges and powers of a single house. It is right  
532 that the general situation should be considered and due deference given to the opinion of the people. With the  
533 Emperor at my side, I hereby hand over the sovereignty to the people as a whole and declare that the constitution  
534 shall henceforth be republican, wishing to satisfy the demands of those within the confines of the country, hating  
535 disorder and desiring peace, and anxious to follow the teaching of the sages, according to which the country is  
536 the possession of the people. Yuan, Shih-kai, having been elected Prime Minister some time ago by the Political  
537 Consultative Council, is able at this time of change to unite the north and the south. Let him then, with full  
538 power to do so, organize a provisional republican government, conferring therein with the representatives of the  
539 army of the people, and that peace may be assured to the people, and that the complete integrity of the territories  
540 of the five races-Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Muhammandans, and Tibetans-is the same time maintained in a great

541 state under the title of the Republic of China. The Emperor and I, will retire into a life of leisure, free from public  
542 The documents was sealed with the imperial seal and signed by all the members of the cabinets: Prime Minister  
543 Yuan,Shih-k'ai, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu,Wei-the, Minister of the Interior Chao,pingch'un, Acting  
544 Minister of Finance Shao,ying, Minister of Education T'ang,Ching-ch'ung, Minister of the Army Wang,Shih-  
545 chen, Acting Minister of the Navy T'ang,Hsueh-heng, Minister of Justice Shen,Chia-pen, Acting Minister of  
546 Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce His,yen, Acting Minister of Communication Liang,Shih-I, and Minister of  
547 Suzerainty Ta,shou.

548 There are two issues needed to be mentioned. Firstly, This document was far from an unconditional surrender  
549 to Nanking. It did not even recognize the existence of provincial government, instead referring to revolutionaries  
550 as the Army of the People. It instructed Yuan,Shih-k'ai to organize a provincial republican government in order  
551 to unify the north and the south. Yuan himself inserted the phrase "with full power so to do". So it was Yuan  
552 rather than the Nanking government who inherited the Will of Heaven (Chen Jerome, 1972:102). And secondly,  
553 indeed, the Ch'ing emperor was forced to give up his throne, not voluntarily, but this decree says that it is  
554 the willingness of the emperor to give his power to a more suitable person, and this is compatible to Chinese  
555 traditional political culture of "saving face".

556 The conditions for the abdication were three: (1) Favourable treatment was to be extended to the emperor  
557 after abdication in that he would retain his original title of emperor, would be cordially treated by the Republic  
558 as the ruler of a foreign country, would be supported in his annual expenses, amounting to four million dollars,  
559 by the Republic of China, would continue to live in the palace, be allowed to keep his guards, and be assured  
560 of protection for his ancestral temples and the property of the imperial family.(2) Favourable treatment would  
561 be extended to the members of the royal family, who could continue to enjoy their hereditary titles, the same  
562 privileges as Chinese citizens, protection of their private properties, and exemption from military service. (3)  
563 The Manchus, Mongolians, Mohammedans, and the Tibetans were all to have equal rights with the Chinese, to  
564 receive protection of their original private property, to enjoy their hereditary titles, and to receive subsidies for  
565 the poor. In addition, all of these peoples were to enjoy freedom of worship. All these articles were listed in  
566 official documents the contents of which were made known to the foreign ministers in Peking (Teng Ssu-yu and  
567 Jeremy Ingalls, 1956:267).

568 V.

## 569 6 Conclusion

570 The reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated. However, the underlying reason could be  
571 attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-government which were able  
572 to be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic.

573 The second main reason should be attributed to his pragmatic attitude. He had no choice but to accept  
574 the fact that revolution had broken out and that most of the provinces had declared independence, and lots of  
575 the constitutionalists had changed their attitude toward republican, and he could not reverse the trend. Even  
576 his home county of Nant'ung and home province of Kiangsu were under the threats of troops in Nanking. He  
577 was concerned with the safety of his own county and province. He thought that the only way to stabilize the  
578 society was to accept the republic in order to avoid chaos so as to achieve his industry, education and local  
579 self-government program.

580 The third main reason should be attributed to his despair with the Ch'ing government. His Chuan-yuan (the  
581 first place of the traditional Chinese civil service examination) background made it impossible for him to lead an  
582 uprising, but he could accept the fact of revolution. Although he had no ambition in obtaining political power,  
583 he had to get involved in politics. Therefore he found a solution by supporting Yuan, Shihk'ai as president of  
584 the republic in exchange for the abdication of Ch'ing court under some concession. Behind the scene during the  
585 period of North-South negotiation 1911-1912, Chang Chien had played a very important role.

586 The North -South Negotiation of December 1911 to February 1912 was the key to success of the 1911  
587 Revolution. Without the success of the South North Negotiation, the Chinese Republic might have not been  
588 established so successfully, of course, Yuan, Shih-kais had taken his own best interest into consideration, and  
589 behind the scene, Chang Chien had played a decisive role in accordance with the trend, in the process of the  
590 North -South Negotiation.

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Figure 1:

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Figure 2:

He forthwith abandoned the constitutionalists' cause, which he had championed for nearly a decade, and threw his support behind the revolutionary movement"(Chu Samuel C., 1965:69, 75); Wong King-kong attributed Chang Chien's change to the "natural development of his progressivism" and said:

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Figure 4:

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