

1 Great Powers' Conflict Management and Resolution in 2 South-East Asia: An Evaluation of North-Korean 3 Denuclearization Process and Six Party Talks

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7

8 **Abstract**

9 With the lessons of 1950's war on the Korean peninsular, drawing from the initial soviet
10 reluctance to back North Korea against the US forces and the subsequent lessons of global
11 realism and constructivism learnt by the north in US perpetual support of the south, the
12 latter resorted to building a nuclear armament for its continuity and survival. This paper is an
13 evaluation of the efficacy of six party talks as adopted in conflict management and resolution
14 in south-east Asia. The paper adopts a descriptive secondary research from existing
15 documented literatures for conclusive analogy. The paper discovers that, the six party talks is
16 a diplomatic way of engaging the provoked north to halt its nuclear ambition, for failure to
17 denuclearize north Korea may serve as a great threat to US ally (south Korea) in the region.
18 The paper concludes that, there is western nuclear strategy to dominate the global military
19 industrial complex and warfare around the world-hence the perpetual subjugation of the global
20 armament and the strategic deterrence of non proliferation. The paper recommends mutual
21 understanding, respect to the sovereignty of states and balance of power among other things.

22

23 **Index terms**— conflict; management; nuclear; south-east asia; great powers; six party talks.

24 **1 Introduction**

25 he six party talks is a movement that was set up to deal with the nuclear issue of North Korea through a
26 peaceful negotiation, paternalism and dialogue. The six parties include states like the United States, Russia,
27 Japan, china, South Korea and North Korea itself. ??issinger (1968) for example has defined negotiation as, "a
28 process of combining conflicting positions into a common position, under a decision rule of unanimity". Elsewhere,
29 theorists have portrayed negotiations as events of diplomatic artistry, mechanical reflections of relative power,
30 and weighted interactions between personality types or rational decision-making processes ??Eric, 2003).While
31 formal definitions of negotiation vary; theorists do accept certain basic tenets. Foremost among them are the
32 assumptions that parties who negotiate agree in at least one fundamental respect; they share a belief that their
33 respective Authors ? ? : Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Abuja,
34 Abuja-Nigeria. E-mail : sherfboy@yahoo.com purposes will be better served by entering into negotiation with
35 the other party. Implicitly then, negotiating parties have come to the conclusion, at least for a moment, that they
36 may be able to satisfy their individual goals or concerns more favorably by coming to an agreed upon solution
37 with the other side, than by attempting to meet their goals or concerns unilaterally. It is this mutual perception
38 that leads to the onset of negotiations and betrays the dependence that exists (to whatever degree) between
39 negotiating parties ??Eric, 2003).

40 II.

41 **2 Material and Method**

42 The material and method used in this research is a descriptive research based on secondary hypothetical order.
43 It investigates using documented library materials and existing published works of scholars in the relevant areas.
44 The paper is also aided by negotiation approaches to establish more theoretical backing on the concept of six
45 party-talks.

46 **3 III.**

47 **4 Results and Discussion**

48 a) Negotiation Approaches-The Structural Approach Structural approaches to negotiations consider negotiated
49 outcomes to be a function of the characteristics or structural features that define each particular negotiation.
50 These characteristics according to Dong (2002) may include features such as the number of parties and issues
51 involved in the negotiation and the composition (whether each side is monolithic or comprises many groups) or
52 relative power of the competing parties. Structural approaches to negotiation find "explanations of outcomes
53 in patterns of relationships between parties or their goals" (Dong, 2002; Tany and Azeta, 2010). They can be
54 deterministic in that they often view outcomes as a priori once structural factors are understood. In structural
55 approaches to negotiation theory, analysts tend to define negotiations as conflict scenarios between opponents
56 who maintain incompatible goals. Analysts who adopt a structural approach to the study of negotiations share
57 an emphasis on the means parties bring to a negotiation. One of the main theoretical contributions derived
58 from the structural approach is the theory that power is the central determining factor in negotiations (Hun and
59 Jeong, 2002). In this view; the relative power of each party affects their ability to secure their individual goals
60 through negotiations. Structural theories offer varying definitions of power. For example power is sometimes
61 defined as the ability to win, or alternatively, as the possession of 'strength' or 'resources'. The perspective that
62 power serves as a central structural feature of every negotiation has its intellectual roots in traditions of political
63 theory and military strategy including the writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli and von Clausewitz (Hun and
64 Jeong, 2002). The central idea in this school is the notion that the strong will prevail.

65 b) The Strategic Approach Gittings and Burkeman (2004) see strategy as "a plan, method, or series of
66 maneuvers for obtaining a specific goal or result". Strategic approaches to negotiation have roots in mathematics,
67 decision theory and rational choice theory, and also benefit from major contributions from the area of economics,
68 biology, and conflict analysis. Whereas the structural approach focuses on the role of means (such as power)
69 in negotiations, the emphasis in strategic models of negotiation is on the role of ends (goals) in determining
70 outcomes (Gittings and Burkeman, 2004). Strategic models are also models of rational choice. Negotiators are
71 viewed as rational decision makers with known alternatives who make choices guided by their calculation of which
72 option will maximize their ends or "gains", frequently described as 'payoffs'. Actors choose from a 'choice set' of
73 possible actions in order to try and achieve desired outcomes. Each actor has a unique 'incentive structure' that
74 is comprised of a set of costs associated with different actions combined with a set of probabilities (Gittings and
75 Burkeman, 2004).

76 **5 c) Behavioral Approach**

77 Behavioral approaches in the view of Young (2003) emphasize the role negotiators' personalities or individual
78 characteristics play in determining the course and outcome of negotiated agreements. Behavioral theories may
79 explain negotiations as interactions between personality 'types' that often take the form of dichotomies, such
80 as shopkeepers and warriors or 'hardliners' and 'soft liners' where negotiators are portrayed either as ruthlessly
81 battling for all or diplomatically conceding to another party's demands for the sake of keeping the peace. The
82 tension that arises between these two approaches for young ??2003), forms a paradox that has been termed
83 the "Toughness Dilemma" or the "Negotiator's Dilemma". The dilemma states that though negotiators who are
84 'tough' during a negotiation are more likely to gain more of their demands in a negotiated solution, the trade off
85 is that in adopting this stance, they are less likely to conclude an agreement at all.

86 The behavioral approach derives from psychological and experimental traditions but also from centuries-old
87 diplomatic treaties. These traditions share the perspective that negotiations -whether between nations,
88 employers and unions, or neighbors are ultimately about the individuals involved. Where game theory relies
89 on the assumption that players to a negotiation 'game' are featureless, uniformly rational, pay-off maximizing
90 entities, the behavioral approach highlights human tendencies, emotions and skills. They may emphasize the
91 role played by 'arts' of persuasion, attitudes, trust, perception (or misperception), individual motivation and
92 personality in negotiated outcomes. Other researchers from the behavioral school have emphasized factors such
93 as relationships, culture, norms, skill, attitudes, expectations and trust (Yong and Dong, 2002).

94 **6 d) Concession Exchange (Processual) Approach**

95 Though concession exchange theories share features of both the structural approach (power) and the strategic
96 approach (outcomes), they describe a different kind of mechanism that centers on learning. According to Zartman
97 (1976), this approach (which he calls the processual approach) looks at negotiation "as a learning process in
98 which parties react to each others' concession behavior". From the perspective negotiations consist of a series

99 of concessions (Yoo and Young, 2003). The concessions mark stages in negotiations, which are used by parties
100 to both signal their own intentions and to encourage movement in their opponent's position. Parties use their
101 bids both to respond to the previous counteroffer and to influence the next one; the offers themselves become an
102 exercise in power.

103 **7 e) Integrative Approach**

104 In the analysis given by ??ric (2003), integrative approaches, in sharp contrast to distributive approaches, frame
105 negotiations as interactions with winwin potential. Whereas a zero-sum view sees the goal of negotiations as an
106 effort to claim one's share over a "fixed amount of pie", integrative theories and strategies look for ways of creating
107 value, or "expanding the pie," so that there is more to share between parties as a result of negotiation. Integrative
108 approaches use objective criteria, look to create conditions of mutual gain, and emphasize the importance of
109 exchanging information between parties and group problem-solving ??Eric, 2003). They also emphasize on
110 problem solving, cooperation, joint decision making and mutual gains, integrative strategies call for participants
111 to work jointly to create win-win solutions. They involve uncovering interests, generating options and searching
112 for commonalities between parties. Negotiators may look for ways to create value, and develop shared principles
113 as a basis for decision-making about how outputs should be claimed ??Eric, 2003).

114 **8 IV. Us Warsened Relation with Korea and the Beginning of 115 the Six Party Talks**

116 It is generally known that since after September 11 attack on the world trade centre, the US foreign policy shifted
117 towards fighting terrorism. George bush has not only tried to have a good relation with north Asian states but
118 considered North Korea as a threat to the region and the United States.

119 The cooperative relationship, according to ??ric (2003), between the United States and North Korea, suddenly
120 cooled as President Bush came into office in 2001. The Bush administration set up a new foundation for its
121 relationship with North Korea. The initial step was to recognize North Korea as a grave threat towards peace
122 and security of Northeast Asia. President Bush issued a statement on June 6, 2001, outlining the United State's
123 new policy objectives over North Korea's nuclear and missile program and its conventional forces ??Eric, 2003).
124 Bush (2002) made the assertion that if North Korea took positive actions in response to U.S. policy, the United
125 States "will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions and take other political steps." The
126 U.S. administrative officials warned that North Korea's proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
127 could make such weapons available to Al Qaeda (Byung, 2004). But one major truth that is discernible is that
128 the Bush administration's policy was to eliminate even the minutest elements of North Korean military power
129 and to secure absolute U.S. hegemony in Northeast Asia.

130 This perspective was clearly enunciated by President Bush's State of the Union speech of January 29, 2002,
131 in which he regarded North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" (JMFA, 2004), a group of states that included Iran
132 and Iraq-all countries which were presumed to be producing and proliferating WMDs. In October 2002, matters
133 took a turn for the worse when North Korea indirectly acknowledged its nuclear weapons development program
134 ??Eric, 2003).

135 In response to the acknowledgment, the United States decided to stop supplying heavy oil to North Korea in
136 November ??Karin and Julia, 2005). ??between 2002 and, it became very apparent that North Korea was building
137 weapons of mass destruction (WMD).The only effort the United States could venture into, was, however, to begin
138 talks on how to denuclearize the peninsular. The denuclearization process has taken four steps which are (Selig,
139 2004 North Korea would permit the inspection access necessary for the International Atomic Energy Agency
140 to determine how much plutonium has been reprocessed since the expulsion of the inspectors following the
141 breakdown of the Agreed Framework in December, 2002; the sequestering of this plutonium and any spent fuel
142 under international controls, and the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and reprocessing plant under international
143 controls ??Selig, 2004:4-13).

144 If North Korea agrees to surrender all of the plutonium found through the inspection process for shipment out
145 of the country, the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia would reciprocate with: The resumption
146 of shipments of the 500,000 tons of oil per year delivered under then Agreed Framework, which was cut off in
147 December, 2002 But one thing to note here is that, there were no agreements reached as how much was to be paid
148 on every kilogram forfeited by North Korea as a process leading to the denuclearization. It is on this argument
149 that Selig (2004) wrote:

150 The Task Force does not specify how much should be offered in payment per kilogram. However, for illustrative
151 purposes, it points out that if the plutonium inventory totals 40 kilograms, and if a price of \$25 million per
152 kilogram were agreed upon, the funds available for these assistance programs would total \$1 billion. The Task
153 Force also notes that South Korea and Japan had agreed to provide \$4 billion and \$1 billion respectively to
154 construct light water reactors under the Agreed Framework, and that the United States spent \$405,106,000 from
155 1995 In a formal proposal presented to North Korea on June 24, 2004, in Beijing, the United States outlined a
156 six-stage denuclearization process. North Korea would be required at the outset to acknowledge that a weapons-
157 grade uranium enrichment program exists and to make specific commitments providing for its elimination in a
158 denuclearization agreement. The six principles contained in the proposal are ??Selig, 2004: 4-13): 1. The DPRK

9 VII. US SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA

159 would make a unilateral declaration pledging to "dismantle all of its nuclear programs" 2. "Upon acceptance of
160 the DPRK declaration, the parties would: a. provide provisional multilateral security assurances, which would
161 become more enduring as the process proceeded. b. begin a study to determine the energy requirements of the
162 DPRK and how to meet them by non-nuclear energy programs. c. begin a discussion of steps necessary to lift
163 remaining economic sanctions on the DPRK, and on the steps necessary for the removal of the DPRK from the
164 List of State Sponsors of Terrorism." 3. Based on the DPRK declaration, "the parties would then conclude a
165 detailed implementation agreement providing for the supervised disabling, dismantling, and elimination" of all
166 DPRK nuclear programs, the removal of all nuclear weapons and weapons components, centrifuge and other
167 nuclear parts, fissile material and fuel rods; and a long-term monitoring program. "To be credible, and for the
168 programs to get underway," the declaration and the agreement would have to include "the uranium enrichment
169 program, and existing weapons, as well as the plutonium program" (Selig, 2004:4-13). 4. Upon conclusion of this
170 agreement, "non-U.S.

171 parties would provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK." 5. Implementation of the agreement would begin with a
172 three-month preparatory period in which the DPRK would: d. provide a complete listing of all nuclear activities.
173 e. cease operations of these activities. f. "permit the securing of all fissile material and the monitoring of fuel
174 rods." g. "Permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons/weapons components
175 and key centrifuge parts". These steps would be subject to "international verification." 6. After the dismantlement
176 is completed, "lasting benefits to the DPRK" would result from the energy survey and the discussions on ending
177 sanctions and the removal of the DPRK from the terrorist list ??Selig, 2004:4-13).

178 In retaliation, North Korea refused to admit the KEDO delegation from entering the country to inspect the
179 use of heavy oil ??Soo-Min, 2006) and also, proclaimed the resumption of the construction and operation of all
180 its nuclear facilities. In fact, North Korea made preparations for reoperating the nuclear reactors between the
181 22nd and 25th of December, and purged the IAEA inspectors on December 27, 2002 (Bacharach and Lawler,
182 1981). This uncompromising trend of the United States reached its peak with its "tailored containment" policy
183 against North Korea at the end of 2002 ??Bacharach and Lawler,1981).

184 Having recognized that this hostile policy of the United States was a grave threat to its 'supreme national
185 interests' and sovereignty, on January 10, 2003, North Korea declared their withdrawal from the NPT ?? It was
186 however, on August 27, 2003, six nations-China, the United States, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas -gathered
187 at a hexagonal table in Beijing for a three-day meeting to discuss how to resolve the pressing issue of North
188 Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program (JMFA, 2004), the meeting served as a forum for clarifying the
189 positions between North Korea and the United States. However, their mutually irreconcilable positions were
190 reconfirmed. North Korea's objective was to construct a new level of relations leading to the normalization of
191 ties with the United States, and to obtain economic rewards for giving up its nuclear program. North Korea's
192 position may be divided into the following: (1) it wanted to confirm that the United States would shift away
193 from its hostile policy; (2) it wanted to secure a non-aggression treaty that would strictly and legally guarantee
194 that neither of the two sides would resort to attacking one another; and (3) it would not submit to inspections
195 until the United States would agree to abandon its antagonistic position toward North Korea (Karin and Julia,
196 2007). The United States, however, was deliberately vague on what rewards it might bestow upon North Korea
197 if it agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner (Karin and Julia,
198 2007).

199 The purposes of the other nations that were present at the talks may be summarized as follows: China tried
200 to play the role of an active mediator, by hosting the second nuclear talks after the trilateral meeting in April
201 2003. China also attempted to increase its influence over the Northeast Asian region ??Byung, 2004). Russia, by
202 offering a joint assurance (along with China) to the Kim Jong-Il regime in North Korea, wanted to intervene as
203 a main actor in resolving the nuclear crisis (Yoo-sung, 2005). Japan's primary concern in the talks was to solve
204 the kidnapping of the Japanese by North Korea as well as to maintain its security from the suspected nuclear
205 weapons and missiles. Finally, South Korea, by reconfirming its position as the most important counterpart of
206 North Korea, hoped to enforce a non-nuclear Korean peninsula plan. South Korea had hoped that the success of
207 the multilateral talks would translate into a more permanent peace regime between the two Koreas (Karin and
208 Julia, 2007).

209 9 VII. Us Sanctions on North Korea

210 The United States maintains sanctions against North Korea under five primary rationales: first, the state is
211 considered a national security threat; second, it is on the State Department's list of state sponsors or supporters of
212 terrorism; third, the DPRK is a Marxist-Leninist state; fourth, the country has been implicated in the proliferation
213 of weapons of mass destruction, and fifth, the country is a non-nuclear weapons state that has denoted a nuclear
214 device. In addition to diplomatic sanctions ??Eric, 2003), the U.S. government maintains various economic
215 sanctions on trade, aid, arms sales and transfers, and access to assets under U.S. jurisdiction based on these four
216 principles. Sanctions under the first rationale are specific to North Korea while the latter three apply to various
217 country groupings of which North Korea is a part. Individual sanctions cannot necessarily be categorized neatly
218 under one rationale or another but have sometimes been imposed under several different laws or regulations.
219 Some of these (few) sanctions imposed according to ??ong (2005) January 26: The U.S. Bureau of Industry and
220 Security (BIS) amends the EAR to impose license requirements for the export and re-export of "virtually all

221 items subject to the EAR" except food and medicines not listed on the Commerce Control List and releases a
222 list of luxury items prohibited for export and re-export to the DPRK. February 13: Agreement signed in which
223 the U.S. agrees to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism
224 and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the
225 DPRK."

226 VIII.

227 **10 Conclusion**

228 It is rather apparent that international relations and politics are best represented or explained by realist analogy
229 of the systemic nature, which is anarchy and lack of general security. The North had since discovered this, hence
230 tried to develop its own military capability. But what is obtainable on the ground is the sheer attempt by the
231 United States and the west to dominate global production and possession of military industrial complex with
232 the purpose to dominate the global armament by discouraging arms race among major and emerging powers and
233 states.

234 **11 IX.**

235 **12 Recommendation**

236 The continuity of international peace and mutual cooperation among nation-states is based on the following
237 peaceful recommendations:

238 The major powers of the global system must respect the territorial sovereignty of other miniature states for
239 them to have political confidence, trust and respect on the great powers and for peace to reign at different levels
240 of the global system.

241 There should not be any form of deliberate provocative political or military alliance against any nation. This
242 will do away with other forces such as those that engendered the Second World War from the lessons learnt from
243 Hitler's Germany of building and establishing some security and military alliances and pacts with the Soviet
244 Union, Italy, and Japan.

245 More balances of power are indispensable. This will go by the tenets of balance of terror. If countries have
246 equal capability of military destruction and might, there is the likelihood for such states not to fight each other,
247 due to the destructive nature of each and the calculated collateral damage.

248 It is also recommendable that the United States withdraws its troops from South Korea and ceases all forms
249 of joint military drills with the south to ensure more peaceful coexistence and stability between the Koreas.

250 The major powers in the six party talks must also be sincere and honest and stand firm to ensure meaningful
251 perpetual negotiations with the north, for more mutual understanding and respect be achieved among all parties
252 involved. ¹ ²

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Figure 1: F

[Note: c. Upon conclusion of the proposed aid agreement, North Korea would initiate steps to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and permit the resumption of the IAEA inspection access cut off in December, 2002]

Figure 2:

through 2003 for oil shipments and for administrative support of the light water reactor project.¹² b). Step Two : Plutonium Cleanout a. North Korea would agree to surrender the remainder of its plutonium inventory, including pre-1994 plutonium reprocessed prior to the Agreed Framework. b. c). Step Three : Eliminating the Plutonium Weapons Infrastructure a. North Korea would open previously-barred waste and storage sites and other plutonium-related facilities to a level of inspection acceptable to the IAEA. b. The United States would initiate talks with North Korea to set the stage for the elevation of their liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington to the status of embassies. c. The United States would declare its readiness to keep open the option of completing one or both of the two light water reactors promised under the Agreed Framework, as South Korea and Japan have urged. d. Step Four : Elimination of Weapons-Grade Uranium Enrichment If North Korea permits the unimpeded inspection access necessary to determine what, if any, weapons-grade uranium enrichment facilities exist, and takes the comprehensive measures necessary to eliminate any such facilities, the United States would: a. Establish full diplomatic relations, upgrading its liaison office in Pyongyang to an Embassy. b. Authorize Exxon-Mobil to pursue a natural gas pipeline to South Korea that would cross North Korea. c. Open negotiations on a tripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War.

Figure 3:

12 RECOMMENDATION

A Pedigree To The Six Party Talks			
Date	Nuclear stand off		
October 4, 2002	North Korea reportedly acknowledged its nuclear weapons development program when James Kelly visited Pyongyang.		
Year 2013	October 25, 2002	North Korea proposed a non-aggression pact with the United States. KEDO announced the discontinuance of heavy oil supply to North Korea. The United States declared the nullification of the	
2 80	November 14, 2002	Geneva Agreed Framework with North Korea.	
	December 12, 2002	North Korea purged the IAEA inspectors from its territory.	
Volume XIII Is- sue V Ver- sion I	December 29, 2002 January 10, 2003 April 17, 2003 March 14, 2003 April 23, 2003 July 12, 2003 July 17, 2003 August 1, 2003	The United States adopted a 'tailored containment' policy against North Korea. North Korea withdrew from NPT. The U.S. Ambassador to South Korea clarified that U.S. policy toward Korea would be different from the case of Iraq. North Korea announced its acceptance of new multilateral talks for resolution of nuclear problem. Trilateral Talks (DPRK, USA and China) in Beijing, China Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo visited North Korea. Dai Bingguo visited Washington. North Korea agreed to participate in six-party talks	
Global Jour- nal Hu- man So- cial Sci- ence F ()	VI. August 27- 9, 2003 The Us Proposal Febru- ary, 25-8, 2004	First Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China First Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China	
Lewicki, Barry, Sounders and John, 2005). It accelerated the			

Figure 4:

Year 2013
Volume XIII Issue V Version I
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of Human Social Science
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Figure 5: F

7. In March 2006 the Treasury Department announced a prohibition on transactions between any U.S. person and a Swiss company, Kohas AG, and its owner, Jakob Steiger, for allegedly doing business with Korea Ryonbong General Corporation; another blacklisted company. The Treasury Department action also froze any of their assets under U.S. jurisdiction.

8. Then in April 2006 a new OFAC regulation prohibited as of May 8 "US persons from owning, leasing, operating or insuring any Vessel flagged by North Korea."

9. Regulation prohibited as of May 8 "US persons from owning, leasing, operating or insuring any vessel flagged by North Korea." More significantly, as noted above, beginning in 2005 the Treasury Department used the powers authorized by the U.S.

Patriot Act to address counterfeiting concerns. In September 2005, under Article 311 of the Patriot Act, the U.S. Department of Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank in Macau at which North Korean entities maintained accounts, as a "primary money laundering concern" and proposed rules restricting U.S. financial institutions from engaging in financial transactions with it. Some U.S. officials believe a number of the accounts belong to members of North Korea's ruling elite. The Treasury Department's designation resulted in a run on BDA by account holders; consequently, the Macau Monetary Authority assumed control of BDA and impounded the North Korean accounts.

12 RECOMMENDATION

253 [Nicholson ()] , H Nicholson . 1964. New York: Oxford University Press.

254 [Lewicki et al. ()] , R J Lewicki , B Barry , D M Saunders , M W John . 2003. Irwin McGraw-Hill. (4th edition)

255 [U.S. and DPRK (ed.) ()] *EARs revised to allow export of "commercially-supplied goods intended to meet basic human needs" to DPRK with licenses granted on a case-by-case basis. Revisions ease regulations concerning travel to DPRK for special activities. Revisions to the IEEPA to reflect advances in media (such as CDs, etc.) allow for ease in flow of information materials between U.S. and certain countries, including DPRK 1991 North and South Korea join the UN. 1992 FACR revised to allow telecommunication between, U.S. and DPRK (ed.) 1992-2002.*

261 [Selig ()] *Ending The North Korean Nuclear Crisis.A Proposal By The Task Force On US Korea Policy. Chicago, Centre For East Asian Studies, S H Selig . 2004. p. . University Of Chicago*

263 [Gittings and Burkeman ()] J Gittings , O Burkeman . <http://dawn.com/2002/text/int12.htm> *Bush Seeks to Turn Screw on N. Korea: Tailored Containment Policy*, 2002. 2004. 8. (last visited June)

265 [US ()] *issues first International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) which includes North Korea on list of countries that should be denied, "licenses, other approvals, Exports and imports of defense articles and defense services, US . 1965.*

268 [Karin and Julia (1955)] L Karin , C Julia . [Http://www.Nautilus.Org/Fora/Security/0687choilee.Pdf](http://www.Nautilus.Org/Fora/Security/0687choilee.Pdf) *North Korea: Economic Sanctions And U.S. Department Of Treasury Actions*, 2007. 1955. September 2007. 2007. p. . National Committee On North Korea

271 [Korea-related Foreign Asset Control Regulations (FACRs) revised to prohibit transactions related to agricultural products that contained raw goods originating in the DPRK 1985 DPRK joins NPT 1987 KAL flight 858 is bombed, 1988. (reportedly by North Korean agents)

275 [Dong (2002)] *Light Water Reactor Project. ILBO DAILY, A Dong . <http://english.donga.com>* 2002. Nov. 15.

277 [Tanya and Azeta ()] 'Negotiation Theory And Practice:A Review Of The Literature'. A Tanya , C Azeta . *Fao Policy Learning Programme.Easypol-Module* 2010. 179 p. .

279 [New FACR revisions allow unlimited travel-related transactions, establishment of news organization offices and transactions related to provision of LWR. The revisions also allow for the importation of North Korean magnesite and magnesia. 1996 FACR revision allows for humanitarian donations in response to DPRK floods and famine 1997 FACR revision authorizes payments for services rendered by North Korea to U.S aircraft in connection with overflight of, (A range of economic sanctions eased. or emergency landing, in the DPRK)

285 [North Korea is added to U.S. Department of State's list of state sponsors or supporters of international terrorism] *North Korea is added to U.S. Department of State's list of state sponsors or supporters of international terrorism,*

288 [Source et al. ()] *north korea: economic sanctions and u.s. department of treasury actions 1955-september2007. national committee on north korea, Karin Source , Julia Lee , Choi . 2007. p. .*

290 [Hun-Joo ()] *North's Notice to IAEA; President-Elect Roh Demands Turnaround of North*, C Hun-Joo , Jeong-HK . 2002. Dec. 28. DONG-AILBO DAILY.

292 [Kissinger ()] 'Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy'. H A Kissinger . *The Manager as Negotiator*, W W York, Norton, D A Lax, J K Sebenius (ed.) (New York) 1969. 1986. Free Press.

294 [Bacharach and Lawler ()] 'Power and Tactics in Bargaining'. S Bacharach , E Lawler . *Industrial & Labour Relations Review* 1981. 34 (2) p. .

296 [Bush ()] *President Bush's State of the Union speech Jan, J W Bush . [http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/30/ret.axis.facts/\(lastvisitedJune9](http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/30/ret.axis.facts/(lastvisitedJune9)* 2002. 2004. 30. (axis of evil)

298 [President Clinton announces the most significant easing of trade and travel restrictions since their imposition in 1950. 2000 EARs and FACRs revised to allow for easing of these trade and travel sanctions, (The DPRK announces a self-imposed moratorium on missile testing. Regulations on financial transactions are also loosened so that most transactions are permitted)

303 [President Truman declares a state of national emergency in U.S. because of Korean War. Department of Treasury issues Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR), forbidding financial transactions by, or on behalf of, North Korea, including transactions for travel. These regulations also froze North Korean assets held under, U.S. (United States institutes total embargo on exports to North Korea. jurisdiction 1953 Armistice halts Korean War)

309 [Raiffa ()] H Raiffa . *The Art and Science of Negotiations*, (Cambridge) 1982. Belknap Press.

12 RECOMMENDATION

310 [Sanctions and other Treasury Departments Actions against the DPRK 1950 Timeline : U.S] ‘Sanctions and
311 other Treasury Departments Actions against the DPRK 1950’. *Timeline : U.S*

312 [U ()] *sanctions various North Korean entities for violation of U.S. missile nonproliferation laws found in sections*
313 *of the Arms Export Control Act, U . 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002.* (Export Administration Act, and Iran
314 Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Sanctions passed on North Korean entities in 1992. and 2006 often alongside
315 sanctions on Iranian, Syrian or Pakistani entities)

316 [Dprk] *Sign the Agreed Framework*, U S Dprk .

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