

Rethinking Globalization and Continuing Relevance of the "State" In Comparative Politics

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Abstract

Comparative politics is one of the sub-fields within the academic discipline of political science as well as an approach to the study of politics and development across countries. As a field of study, comparative politics focuses on understanding and explaining political phenomena that take place within a state, society, country, or political system. However, it should be noted that while the field of comparative politics continues to change over time, it is important to note that its definition too changes. This paper, therefore, provides a comprehensive debate on the ontology, epistemology and methodology within the entire field of comparative politics with critical reflections on the continuing relevance of the states in a globalizing world. As a critical reflection, this paper is not wedded to any single world-view or conclusion about globalization. As a whole, this paper is guided by the proposition that, despite the assault on the state from a number of directions, its role will remain central to the study of comparative politics as well as in the contemporary era of globalization.

Index terms— Comparative politics, Globalization, State, Third World ?Without comparisons to make, the mind does not know how to proceed? (Alexis de Tocqueville

1 Introduction

Comparative politics is one of the sub-fields within the academic discipline of political science as well as an approach to the study of politics and development across countries. Comparative politics draws on the comparative research method, what Mill characterized as "the method of agreement" and "the method of difference" or, more commonly, most similar (e.g. Anglo-American democracies) and most different (e.g. democracy versus dictatorships) systems. By drawing on the comparative method, comparative politics attempts to provide a systematic study of the world's polities, and seeks to explain both similarities and differences among and between political systems. It is a systematic, comparative study of the world's politics which seek to explain both similarities and differences among these political systems (Wiarda, 2007; Lijphart, 1971; Hopkin in ??arsh, D. and G. Stoker, 2002). addresses these themes from a number of theoretical perspectives such as rational choice theory, political cultural, political economy, as well as institutionalism. As argued by Kesselman et al ??2007), comparativists often analyze political institutions or processes by looking at two or more cases that are selected to isolate their common and contrasting features. Studies in comparative politics can be single-country case studies, comparisons of two or more countries, and/or studies of some dimensions of the entire global universe of countries (Wiarda, 2007). In this respect, a comparative upon across sociologists, anthropologists, among other disciplines.

As a field of study, comparative politics focuses on understanding and explaining political phenomena that take place within a state, society, country, or political system ??Lim, 2006, 5). It is not necessarily about deciding which political system is best or worst, but learning more about how and why different systems are different or similar. In this respect, comparative politics helps us to understand the effects of both differences and similarities in different political systems. In fact, the real world of comparative politics can be viewed as a

44 laboratory for political scientists to critically and systematically assess what works and what does not, as well
 45 as to demonstrate important theoretical relationships among different political variables. Sartori (1970) makes a
 46 similar point arguing that "to compare is 'to assimilate' i.e. to discover deeper or fundamental similarities below
 47 the surface of secondary diversities". This is based on the fact that, we can only obtain comparability when
 48 two or more items appear 'similar' even theoretical areas of focus, which are quite heterogeneous. Comparative
 49 politics concentrates on areas such as democratization, state-society relations, identity and ethnic politics, social
 50 movements, institutional analysis, and political economy. Comparative politics draws a better understanding of
 51 how politics work as well as rules about politics. understand ourselves, i.e. gaining knowledge of the self, through
 52 knowledge of others. Thus, by studying the ways in which other societies govern themselves, we can better
 53 understand the character, origins, strengths and weaknesses of our own system of government (Ibid). Moreover,
 54 comparative politics explores how interest groups relate to the state or government, political culture and political
 55 values in different countries.

56 processes by which countries become developed, modern, and democratic; how civil society emerges in different
 57 countries; and the effects of economic growth and social change on the developing nations.

58 the contemporary era of as well as in study is drawn political scientists,

59 Mc Cormick refers to CP as a tool to Wiardanotes further that comparative politics studies the enough 'to
 60 the extent that they are neither identical nor utterly different (Ibid). Just like other social science disciplines
 61 and fields of study, political science has undergone remarkable changes following the end of World War II (Lim,
 62 2006). In part, this was driven by the importance of knowing about other countries so as the militarystrategic
 63 interests of the United States (US) could be better protected. As Wiarda (as cited by ??im, 2006: 9) noted,
 64 the rise of fascism and military in Germany, Japan and Italy and the rise of communism in Russia and China,
 65 had a profound impact on the field of comparative politics and political science as a whole. More recently, the
 66 end of the Cold War opened the window of opportunity that has resulted not only in some remarkable political
 67 changes, but also in a closer integration of the world's economies than ever before (Green and Luehrmann 2007).
 68 Lim tells us that this historical gen of comparative politics informs us clearly that the field is not immune to
 69 a host of subjective, mostly hidden social and political forces and that, "what is true of the past is almost
 70 assuredly true of the present" (p11). While the field of comparative politics continues to change over time, it
 71 is important to note that its definition too changes. comparative politics as defined by many authors focuses
 72 on what happens inside countries, while international relations basically focuses more on what happens outside
 73 countries or more accurately relations among states. However, it is interesting to note that the renewed interest
 74 in the globalization among political scientists during the 1980s occurred almost parallel with changes in the role
 75 of the state in society in most Third World countries. Held (2000) alongside many scholars, argues that "we are
 76 in a new 'global middle ages', which though the nation states still have vitality, they cannot control their borders
 77 and therefore are subject to all sorts of internal and external pressures".

78 However, this paper does not agree with this fairly miserable image of the state and its centrality in
 79 contemporary governance. The paper provides a comprehensive comparative politics with 'critical reflections'
 80 on the World) in a globalizing world. As a critical reflection, this paper is not wedded to any single world-view
 81 or conclusion about globalization. In the same agreement on how the critical conceptions should be understood
 82 on what characterizes globalization.

83 Whereas others see globalization from inside out, other lens provides peripheral vision which sees globalization
 84 from the outside in. A critical perspective in this respect, examines how facts about the Third World' states are
 85 artificially constructed 'globalization' and whose interest they serve. The paper discards any sharp distinction
 86 between domestic and international concerns about the state and pays vigilant attention to the environments
 87 surrounding states and their influences on variations among states. This paper is guided by the proposition that,
 88 despite the assault on the state from a number of directions, its role will remain central to the study of comparative
 89 politic as well as in the contemporary era of globalization.

90 This paper is organized as follows: The first part is an introductory remarks and definition of the subject
 91 matter. The second part provides a general knowledge about comparative politics, focusing on the major
 92 ontological, epistemological and methodological debates, assumptions and impasses as well as major theoretical
 93 approaches in comparative politics. The third part narrows down to discussing comparative politics is the context
 94 of the Third World. In this section, the central argument of globalization and state is examined, with the question
 95 of 'what is new and what is not new' with globalization. Finally, the paper concludes by looking ahead toward
 96 a clear understanding of state and its relevance to economic development in a globalizing world. Since it is not
 97 possible to cover everything in this paper, the choice and speciality had to be made.

98 2 II.

99 The Substance of Comparative Politics a) Ontological, Epistemological and Methodological Debates Questions
 100 and issues relating to what to compare, why compares, and how to compare are the major concern of any
 101 comparativist. Comparative politics and comparative methodologies are, thus, well suited for addressing such
 102 questions. Addressing these questions does not only provide extensions of knowledge, but also a strategy for
 103 acquiring and validating new knowledge (Sartori, 1970). Making comparisons is a natural human activity.
 104 Comparing the past and present of nation X , and comparing its experience with that of other nations, deepens the
 105 knowledge and understanding of both nations, their policies, histories and experiences that are being compared

106 ??Almand and Powell, 1996). Comparative politics, *inter alia*, aims to describe the political phenomena and
107 events of a particular country, or group of countries (Landman, 2003). Comparative methods is a powerful and
108 adaptable tool which enhances our ability to describe and understand political processes and political change
109 in any country by offering concepts and references points from a broader perspective. Thus, this exposes the
110 comparative politics field into diverse intellectual enterprises. While Peters (1998) regards this heterogeneity as
111 both a strength and weakness of comparative politics, 1998:9) argues that this heterogeneity of the field will
112 prolong its vitality, and it is a source of strength rather than of weakness. According to Verba, the openness of
113 there is no universal in the name Verba (as quoted by Peters, the field to various theories and methodologies
114 helps to maintain its vitality and its capacity to cope with realities in a rapidly changing political world. So,
115 the practical analyst of comparative politics needs to know not only what political reality (ontology) is, but
116 also how to begin to know and explain it, (epistemology), before even addressing the particular problem under
117 investigation (methodology). ??andman (2003:16) discusses ontology, epistemology and methodology as terms
118 that occur in the discussion of the philosophy of science and distinctions between them often become indistinct
119 in the comparative literature. Thus, these three concepts provide a 'directional dependence' among each other.
120

Whereas ontology establishes what is knowable, epistemology discusses how it is knowable and methodology
121 how it is acquired systematically. In a sense, different broad ontological and epistemological positions inform
122 different methodological orientations or preferences ??Marsh and Stoker, 1995:14). Drawing a link between
123 methodology and ontology, Hall (2003) argues that, 'if methodology consists of techniques for making observations
124 about causal relations, an ontology consists of premises about the deep causal structures of the world from which
125 analysis begins and without which theories about the social world would not make sense.' This author argues
126 further that, ontology is ultimately important to methodology because the suitability of a particular set of
127 methods for a given problem turns on assumptions about the nature of the causal relations they are meant to
128 discover.

'Ontology' in comparative politics refers to theory of being, or a metaphysical concern. It relates to what can
130 be studied, what can be compared, and what constitutes CP. Hall (2003) defines ontology as the fundamental
131 assumptions scholars make about the nature of the social and political world and especially about the nature of
132 causal relationships within that world. It is the character of the real world as it actually is (Ibid). In comparative
133 politics, ontology is relevant to our study of the 'what' of -countries, events, actors, institutions, and processes
134 that is observable and in need of description or analysis. While we may have a lot least five types of studies that
135 are classified as being components of comparative politics. The first unit of analysis according to Peters is single
136 country' descriptions of politics in X, whatever X may be.

While this is a most common form of analysis in the discipline, it has the least assert to advancing the scientific
137 status of comparative politics. The obvious weakness of this approach is that it is not really comparative but
138 rather an explication of politics 'someplace else' (Ibid).

A second unit of analysis in comparative politics is processes and institutions. This can be a selection of a small
141 number of instances that appear similar or comparable in some significant ways; those instances are then used
142 to clarify the nature of either the process or the institutions itself, or the politics of the country within which it
143 occurs. This method does not describe and implicitly compare whole systems, but rather to develop lower-level
144 comparisons of a particular institution or political process. are among the two significant modes of thought
145 that have greatly influenced contemporary social science ??Chilcote, 2000:32). Positivism (and its empiricist
146 epistemology), in particular, has indeed dominated the discipline of comparative politics and social science at
147 large for a number of decades. Positivism has a very long history in social science (Smith et al, 1996) with the
148 early theorists, such as Auguste Comte, David Hume, and Herbert Spencer. Comte in particular, is the one who
149 coined the word 'positivism' and 'sociology' in early 19th century (Chilcote, 2000; ??mith et al, 1996; ??eufeld,
150 1995). His major aim was to develop a science of society based on the methods of natural sciences. According to
151 Comte, the positivist approach would give in a methodologically unified conception of science which would give
152 true, objective knowledge, in the form of causal laws of phenomena, derived from observation (Neufeld,(D D D
153 D) C Year to analyze in

Peters discusses at comparative politics, a 1995). Comte's view was very significant in the development of the
155 social sciences during the 19th century, fundamentally influenced writers such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
156 and Émile Durkheim ??Smith et al, 1996; ??eufeld, 1995). Nonetheless, Comte's view suffered from a number
157 of ambiguities and even internal challenges which gave way to logical positivism which arose in 1920s in Austria
158 (The Vienna Circle), German (The Berlin School) and Poland. This approach claimed radically that science
159 was the only true form of knowledge. Hence, it became very dominant and perhaps the most influential variant
160 in social science, dating from the first half of the 20th century ??Neufeld, 1995). The logical positivists located
161 many of the problems and uncertainties of science in general and social sciences in particular with the unclear use
162 of language. The proponents of this variant argue that, in order to avoid production of meaningless statements,
163 scientific language must be governed by strict rules of meaning. They appeal to the certainty of empirical sense-
164 perception in an effort to stabilize scientific and social scientific categories ??Hall et al, 1995). However, logical
165 positivism was discredited as a philosophy of science especially after World War II. Its epistemology and ontology
166 became increasingly challenged throughout the social and behavioural science in the 1950s and 1960s, thus giving
167 rise to postpositivism (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).

3 FEMINIST STANDPOINT BUILDS

168 Post-positivism, on the other hand, was a response to the widely discredited maxims of positivism, whereas
169 many of its doctrine were in direct opposition to those of its fore runner.

170 -positivism believes that a research is influenced by the values of investigators as investigator. Moreover, it
171 believes that the nature of reality is based on the fact that our understanding of reality is constructed (Ibid). The
172 post-positivist objective is not to reject the scientific project altogether, but identify the need to understand
173 properly what they are doing when engaged in any form of research (Fischer, 1998). Post-positivism can thus
174 be explained as an attempt to understand and reconstruct that which already is being done when engaged in
175 scientific inquiry. For post-positivist, the central debates in politics are not often over data as such, but pretty
176 over the underlying assumptions that organize them (Ibid). Tashakkori and Teddlie noted that, since these tenets
177 reflect common understandings regarding both the 'nature of reality' and the conduct of social and behavioural
178 research, they are widely shared by both qualitatively and quantitatively oriented researchers.

179 Moreover, women as a category, gender as a topic and the impact of feminism as an ideology are three
180 powerful sources of ideas which contribute to feminist epistemology in political science (Grant and Newland,
181 1991). According to Randall (in Marsh and Stoker 2002), feminism has gone through three epistemological
182 phases in political science: rationalist (positivist), anti-rationalist and post-rationalist (interpretive). According
183 to her, both liberal feminism and early radical feminism were implicitly rationalist, but without reflecting upon
184 their own epistemological basis. The anti-rationalist approach represents the world in terms of a series of dualistic
185 oppositions, e.g. between culture and nature, or mind and body, identified with men and women respectively
186 (Ibid). Randall explains this approach as inevitably limited for feminists working in the social sciences. One
187 of the attempts to escape from anti-rationalist approach is feminist standpoint. ??artsock (1983) suggests that,
188 feminism is intellectually indebted to Marxist theory. According to Hartsock (1997)

189 3 feminist standpoint builds

190 Marx's understanding of criticize patriarchal theories which rely primarily or exclusively on male experience in
191 political science. Hartsock's ideas draw on the theorizing of Marx, whose theory is centered less on the material
192 aspects of life than on the more broadly defined social ones. Feminist standpoint inherited the more realist
193 notion of historically constrained awareness. That is, it "depends on the assumption that epistemology grows in
194 a complex and contradictory way from the material life" (Ibid). However, standpoint theory has been criticized
195 by other feminists on a variety of reasons. One of the criticisms has come from postmodernist feminists. This
196 paradigm shift to postmodernist feminisms which occurred by the middle of the eighties was highly influenced
197 by French thinkers like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, to mention but few (Benhabib,
198 1994). As the impact of their theories, no matter how diverse and sometimes contradictory was felt upon
199 the core of study of social science especially in the US, feminist theorists also discovered an attractive ally in
200 postmodernism for their concerns. As a criticism to standpoint theory, postmodernist feminists such as Judith
201 Butler 2 Given the feminist diversity in politics, there is not one single shared feminist epistemological position
202 so far ??Randall, 2002). Feminist epistemology is a loosely organized approach to epistemology, rather than a
203 particular school or theory. Its diversity reflects the argues that there is no concrete "women's experience" from
204 which the knowledge can really be constructed. From Butler's viewpoint, there is no single cause for women's
205 subordination, and no single approach towards dealing with the issue. Thus, standpoint theory has failed to take
206 into account the substantial differences between women's lives ??Randall, 2002:115). In other words, the lives of
207 women across space and time are so diverse, hence, impossible to generalize about their experiences (Benhabib,
208 1994). experience and is used to diversity of epistemology in general, as well as the diversity of theoretical
209 positions that constitute the position of women in the fields of political science. What is common, however to all
210 feminist epistemologies is an emphasis on the epistemic salience of gender and the use of gender as an analytic
211 category in discussions, criticisms, and reconstructions of epistemic practices, norms, and ideals. Since gender
212 is intrinsic to the politics, political and transformative value of feminist epistemology on the study of politics is
213 crucial to overcome gender silence on this matter (Hudson, 2005). (D D D D) C Year

214 The systematic study of political science involves the variety of methods that are adopted within the discipline.
215 Hence, the distinction between different comparative methods or approaches is a function of the kind of research,
216 time and resources available, as well as his/her epistemological position. Landman, (2003) emphasizes that the
217 central distinction between different methods in comparative politics depends on the key trade-off between 'the
218 level of abstraction' and 'the scope of countries or cases under study or investigation'. If the level of conceptual
219 abstraction is higher (e.g. focus on many countries), the researcher is more likely to include a large number of
220 countries or cases in his or her study. Conversely, the lower the level of abstraction (e.g. focus on one case or
221 few cases), the researcher is less likely to use abstract concepts that are more grounded in the specific context of
222 investigation.

223 Case study approach is the popular form of research design which is widely used throughout the social sciences
224 research ??Burnham et al, 2004). It was a dominant mode of inquiry in American government and politics since
225 the 1950s (Eulau, 1962). However, Hall (2003) argues that the role of the case study has been concealed for years
226 for enveloping confusion about what constitutes a case and what constitute an observation relevant to the testing
227 of theory. Burnham et al give us a simple definition of cases , i.e. 'how many' and 'which'. ??in (2003) suggests
228 that case study should be defined as a research strategy, an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon
229 within its real-life context. Case studies enable comparative researchers to focus on a single individual, group,

230 community, event, policy area or institution, and study it in depth (Ibid). Though this approach can be used in
231 collection of both quantitative and qualitative data, it has more of the qualitative to it as it generates a wealth
232 of data relating to one specific case. Doing a case study in a comparative perspective implies that, a researcher
233 must not only conduct intensive (highly focused) research on the primary case, but must also carry out extensive
234 (broad-based) research on a range of other relevant cases ??Lim, 2006, 50). However, the disadvantages of case
235 studies in social sciences is that, a single case study can provide little basis for creating new generalizations or
236 grounds for invalidating existing generalizations (Axline, 1994). It is often noted that, the group studied may be
237 unique, and the observer may be biased in his or her perceptions. Similarly, hypotheses can rarely be put to an
238 objective test, and in some cases the analysis may not rise above mere description.

239 While case study approach has a considerable influence in comparative politics and social sciences at large,
240 case selection merits some special attention as well. This is because; the quality of any comparative research
241 depends much on what cases are included in that study. This is imperative given that most comparative work
242 does involve purposeful, rather than random selection of cases (Peters, 1998). However, the number of cases to
243 be included in a comparative research design depends essentially on how many suitable cases are available for
244 such a research work. Comparative case selection should take place on the basis of three selection principles: cases
245 should be able to maximize experimental variance, minimize error

246 As it has been noted earlier in this paper, comparative politics is much more than simply a subject of study –it
247 is also a means of study. Methodology in comparative politics consists of methods, procedures, working concepts,
248 and rules used to test theory, guiding inquiry, and searching for solutions to problems of the real world (Chilcote,
249 2000). It is a particular way of viewing, organizing, and giving shape to inquiry. Green and Luehrmann(2007)
250 argue that, through the use of the comparative method we seek to describe, identify, and explain trends -in some
251 cases, even predict human behaviour. The most important of these are inferences about causal relationships,
252 where the object of a methodology is to increase confidence in claims that one variable or event (x) exerts
253 a causal effect on another (y) (Ibid). Since comparative politics is a branch of social science, many political
254 scientists emphasize attention to explicit assumptions and to systematic and quantitative investigation. This
255 implies a systematic procedure for comparative political science investigation, akin to that of natural science.
256 In comparing different cases, comparative politics uses various models or hypotheses as a way of simplifying
257 and explaining various political realities more easily. Models bring disparate parts together and demonstrate
258 relationship (Ibid). An effective model simplifies reality by dividing it into clear and manageable components
259 ??Wiarda, 2007:36). Models help a researcher to organize, highlight and give coherence to various events,
260 processes, and institutions. They simplify complex events and give a researcher an understanding of them more
261 clearly. However, the overall usefulness as well as limits of models should be recognized by the researcher,
262 especially when they have outlasted their utility.

263 4 b) Theoretical approaches in comparative politics

264 Theoretical framework serves as a logical prerequisite of comparative analysis because it alone can provide that
265 tertiumcomparisonis 4 3 Guy Peters defines Experimental variance as the observed differences or changes in
266 the dependent variable that are a function of the independent variables identified as central to the analysis.
267 'Error variance' on the other hand are that portion of the variance observed in the dependent variable that
268 is not a function of random occurrence and errors in measurement, while 'Extraneous variance' refers to the
269 situation where there are one or more variables that have a systematic relationship with the dependent variable,
270 and perhaps also with the independent variables in an analysis. Extraneous variances are more likely to creep
271 into the analysis. 4 Tertiumcomparisonis Latin worldliterally means, a third for comparison. It is a basis for
272 comparison where the quality that two things which are being compared have in common. It is the point of
273 comparison which prompted the author of the comparison in question to liken someone or something to someone
274 or something else in the first place without which comparison is impossible (Eula, 1962). Among the commonly
275 known approaches to the study of comparative politics are behavioural; political culture; rational choice; and
276 political development approaches. However, the distinctions among these approaches reveal the various tendencies
277 employed in the study of comparative politics.

278 Behavioural approach to political analysis was one of the dominant paradigms especially in the 1950s and
279 1960s in American political science ??Burnham et al, 2004). Sanders (2002:63) explains behavioural approach as
280 "a single, deceptively simple, question: why do individuals, institutional actors and nation states behave the way
281 they do?"One of the distinctive features of behavioural approach is that, observable behaviour (both individual
282 and social aggregate) should be the focus of analysis (Ibid). Sanders further explains that any description of
283 that behaviour should be inclined to scientific empirical testing. This approach readdressed the field to study
284 and examine political activities such as mass political participation especially in voting; leadership behaviours;
285 actions of interest groups; as well as political parties both at the local and international level. The advocates of
286 this paradigm saw themselves as spokesmen for a very broad and deep conviction that political science should
287 abandon certain traditional kind of research and execute a more modern sort of analysis ??Burnham et al, 2004).
288 However, this approach faced criticisms from three broad directions. It was in the first place criticized for its
289 failure to fulfil its own goals i.e. to offer an adequate account of some of the most important dimensions of politics,
290 even in an area such as voting behaviour (Gibbons, 2006; ??urnham et al, 2004). Secondly, behaviouralists were
291 also criticized for inserting an 'undue emphasis' on process at the expense of the content and substance of political

4 B) THEORETICAL APPROACHES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

292 events and systems. Sanders argues that in between early 1950s and the mid-1970s, many scholars working within
293 the behavioural approach were more concerned with an inductivist approach to research which accentuate what
294 can easily be measured rather than what might be theoretically important. Moreover, behavioural approach was
295 attacked by the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 1967 as of 'no relevance' due to its tendency
296 to concentrate on readily observable phenomena -such as voting-rather than more subtle and deeper analysis
297 (Burnham et al 2004; Sanders 2002). Notwithstanding all these criticisms, the legacy of behaviouralism and its
298 counterpart post-behaviouralism remains enormous in the twenty-first century in a sense that, its ideas lay across
299 nearly all empirical social researchers (Sanders, 2002). As Macridis (1968) argues, behaviouralism opened up the
300 study of contextual factors within which political structures and forms develop and political roles flourish.

301 Political culture approach to politics is another eminent approach marked the field especially in the 1960s.
302 ??lmond (2000) explains the notion of political culture as one of the most powerful themes of classical literatures
303 since the ancient Greek and Roman Empire. According to him, the Greeks had a cyclical theory of political
304 change which explained the rise and fall of ??998, 31; ??urnham, 2004, 62). Two main comparative approaches
305 for choosing cases are: most similar system (MSS) and most different systems (MDS) (Przeworski and Teune,
306 1970). While, both system designs are used in comparative politics, mostly by those who compare few countries
307 or cases, they do vary to a greater extent. MSS design is the usual method which most of political comparativists
308 undertake. It includes a range of countries or cases that appear to be similar in as many ways as possible in
309 order to control for concomitant variation ??Peters, 1998, 37). MSS design is particularly well suited for those
310 engaged in area studies (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Landman, 2003). It deals more directly with countries as
311 a unit of analysis and attempts to control for extraneous sources of variance by selecting cases which are likely
312 to avoid this problem. By and large, MSS looks for differences between cases that appear to have a great deal
313 in common, e.g. United States and Canada. On the other hand, the MDS design is not particularly interested
314 in countries, rather a more variable based research. It is mainly interested in finding the relationships among
315 variables that can survive being transported across a range of very different countries (Peters, 1998). While cases
316 in MSS should have the different independent variables, the independent variable in the MDS should be the same
317 across all cases (Burnham et al, 2004).

318 Thus, this kind of research compares two or more cases that are as different as possible except on the
319 independent variables (Ibid). MDS looks for commonalities between cases that appear absolutely opposed in
320 experience.

321 variance, and control extraneous variance 3 ??Peters, political constitutions in social psychological terms.
322 On the other hand, Jacobsen and Losada (2005) explained the evolution of the concept of 'political culture'
323 from its root in Plato and Aristotle, through 1960s' political science, to the more recent 'cultural turn' where
324 culture is seen as universally constitutive of social relations and identities. They define political culture as a
325 "perspective on processes of change and continuity in any human polity or its component parts which privileges
326 symbols, discourses, rituals, customs, norms, values and attitudes of individuals or groups for understanding
327 the construction, consolidation and dismantling of power constellations and institutions" (Ibid:58). Similarly,
328 (2007:66) defines political culture as values, beliefs, ideas, attitudes and orientations that citizens of different
329 countries have about their political system". According to him, political culture of nation X means the cognitions,
330 feelings, and orientations of people toward politics of that nation. It comprises of the core values, not temporary
331 ones with regards to whether people accept the basic premises of their political system such as democratic system,
332 rule of law, separation of powers, civil liberties etc., and not whether or not one approves or disapproves on a
333 daily basis of how well the president and his cabinet are doing their job (Ibid). Since political culture varies
334 greatly from one country to another, it is the similarities as well as differences in political beliefs and attitudes
335 between countries and regions that stimulate comparisons and thus make 'political culture' a subject of major
336 interest to comparative politics (Ibid). Political culture helps us understand different factors driving politics or
337 political change. At its macro level, political culture serves to characterize nations or national political systems
338 ??Chilcote, 2000:104). However, Chilcote argues that the macro political culture revolves around reductionism,
339 bias and explanatory value. This author argues further that "most social science is culture-bound and that most
340 generalizations are valid only within particular cultural situation" (Ibid, 105). Almond (2000:7) points out eminent
341 political theorists such as Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau who contributed a lot to the political culture
342 tradition. According to Almond, both Machiavelli and Montesquieu draw lessons from Roman history on the
343 significance of moral and religious values and upbringing for the formation of Roman character which eventually
344 explained the steadfast course and remarkable performance in war and peace of the Republic. However, both
345 Machiavelli and Montesquieu emphasized on political culture and socialization in a subjective and descriptive
346 way, rather than analytically (Ibid). On the contrary, Rousseau used to identify political culture in terms of
347 morality, custom and opinion, where he treats these as a kind of law more significant than law properly speaking
348 i.e. a kind of law that is imprinted on the hearts of the citizens.

349 Rational choice theory (RCT) is another paradigm that shaped the post-war political science especially in the
350 US but also with an impact elsewhere ??Burnham et al, 2004). This paradigm aimed at understanding and often
351 modelling social and economic behaviour. RCT reveals how intentional and rational actors generate collective
352 outcomes and aggregate behaviour (Levi, 1997). While models of rational choice may be widely diverse, they all
353 share one thing in common, i.e. assume that individuals choose the best action according to stable preference
354 functions and constraints facing them. The strength of this approach is seen in its capacity to generate testable

355 theory with clear scope condition as well as its ability to make sense of a correlation or a set of events by providing
356 a reasonable and compelling story that identifies the causal mechanisms which link together the independent
357 and dependent variables (Ibid). Another strength discussed by Levi is, the universalism that rational choice
358 theory reveals generalizable implications applicable to cases beyond those under immediate investigation. RCT
359 embarks on from the viewpoint of the individual, rather than from several individuals interacting together, social
360 situations, or groups. The emphasis on the individual and his or her interests is always an initial point for any
361 theory of rational choice. One of the major aspects of RCT is that it is sociologically minimalist in a sense that,
362 different theorists of rational choice may make somewhat different simple assumptions about the individual and
363 proceed in different ways from the individual to explain the complexities of larger social groups and/or systems.
364 Thus, though the approach is methodologically individualist, yet its focus is not on individual choice but on
365 the aggregation of individual choices. However, Levi argues that comparative rationalists face a very important
366 challenge on "how to offer explanations that compel both logically and empirically" (p20). Similarly, Green and
367 Shapiro (as quoted by Levi) doubts whether rational choice has yet to produce significant empirical contributions
368 in politics. Generally, RCT has been criticized for being too individualistic, too minimalist, and too focussed on
369 rational choices in social action. According to Wiarda (2007), most scholars of comparative politics have so far
370 been sceptical of this approach. Nevertheless, this paper agrees with Wiarda that, politics is too complex and
371 multifaceted to be agreeable to any single causal explanation.

372 In the late 1950s to early 1960s, political development (PD) approach emerged out of North America as the
373 dominant approach in comparative politics. Viewed as a dependent variable, PD brings into bear a number of
374 different approaches such as culturalism, structuralism, rationalism, political economy, historical institutionalism
375 and regime analysis ??Hagopian, 2000). However, PD scholars assert to work in these areas in a manner that is
376 distinct from those specialize in any one of these. Pye, 1965 (as quoted by Hagopian) defines PD as the "extent
377 to which patterns of behaviour identified as 'modern' tend to prevail over those considered to be 'traditional'
378 and as taking place when achievement considerations replace ascriptive standards, when functional specificity
379 replaces functional differences in social relations, and when universalistic norms supersede particularistic ones".
380 In general, PD can be viewed as the growth in the capacity of societies to organize for political action and for
381 states to govern (Ibid). Given the sudden emergence in the late 1950s and the early 1960s of the nations of
382 the Global South, PD scholars found particularly appropriate to study the politics of these new or emerging
383 countries. The 1960s witnessed not only a propagation of development studies on a range of subject areas, but
384 also the emergence of the study of development and modernization as the leading paradigm in the comparative
385 field ??Wiarda, 1999). Modernization theory elaborates differences between societies in terms of their positions
386 on various indices of modernity or development that measured their similarity to the modern industrial society
387 (Peet and Hartwick, 1999). During the 1950s and 1960s modernisation was taken to mean the process of change
388 socially, economically and politically similar to what happened in North America and West Europe from 17 th
389 century to 19 th century and later spread to other parts of the world. These processes of change included the
390 advancement from simple techniques towards scientific knowledge-based techniques; evolution from subsistence
391 to commercial agriculture; transition from the use of human and animal power towards power driven machines
392 and the movement from farm and village to urban centres. As a whole, this paradigm was more concern on
393 the conditions and mechanisms necessary for social transformation from traditional to modern. However, PD
394 approach faced a number of criticisms. Among other things, this approach was criticized as biased, ethnocentric
395 and based entirely on the U.S. and European experiences of development. Furthermore, timing, sequences and
396 stages of development 5 5 Walt W. Rostow developed a model in later 1950s -1960 to elucidate five stages of
397 economic of growth: Traditional society; Pre-conditions for take-off; Take-off; The drive to maturity and; High
398 mass consumption. According to Rostow, all societies are identified, in their economic dimensions, as lying within
399 one of these five categories.

400 proposed in this approach are based on the Western experiences and may not be replicated in today's developing
401 nations. Lastly, ??iarda(1989) noted that, PD was just part of a larger Cold War strategy fomented by the U.S. to
402 keep the Third World depressed and 'in chain'. Consequently, dependency theory (DT) grew out of dissatisfaction
403 with the PD approach and it main paradigm of modernization. DT emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s
404 both as a guide in its own right to thought and praxis on Latin America ??Wiarda, 1999). The main argument
405 raised by DT was that, rather than U.S. and Latin America's development proceeding complementarily and in
406 harmony, the development of industrialized countries had occurred at the expense, and often on the backs of, the
407 developing nations (Rodney, 1974; ??iarda, 1989; ??iarda, 1999). Thus, underdevelopment is seen as the flip-side
408 of the coin of development, with the development of industrialized countries a product of the underdevelopment
409 of the Third World countries (Ibid; Wilber, 1979). According to Stavrianos(1981), the central theme of this
410 school of thought is that the 'underdevelopment' of the Third World is the result of the economic exploitation
411 of the 'periphery' by the 'centre' rather than of any internal impediments to modernization and development.
412 This was due to global expansion of European capitalism which emphasised trade based on the unequal terms
413 and power structure. DT is girded in Marxist perspectives (class analysis) which became increasingly relevant
414 for understanding the situation of underdeveloped countries. DT is hence more critical to the U.S. and often
415 uses the terms 'colonialism' and 'imperialism' to describe the relationship between developed and developing
416 nations. While PD saw the main causes of underdevelopment as domestic and internal to the developing nations
417 themselves (such as lack of political parties, interest groups, effective government etc.), DT charges U.S. and

5 III. COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF THE THIRD WORLD A) THIRD WORLD: A GENEALOGY AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

418 Europe as a source of the backwardness of the Third World. Despite strong criticisms of PD in the 1970s and its
419 disappearance in the 1980s, it was revived in a form of "Washington Consensus" 6 6 The Washington Consensus
420 is a phrase initially coined in 1990 by John Williamson to describe a relatively specific set of ten economic
421 policy prescriptions that he considered to constitute a "standard" reform package promoted for the developing
422 countries by Washington, D.C.-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank
423 and the U.S. Treasury Department. Since then, the phrase "Washington Consensus" has become a lightning
424 rod for dissatisfaction amongst anti-globalization protestors, developing country politicians and officials, trade
425 negotiators, and numerous others. It is often used interchangeably with the phrase "neoliberal policies". in the
426 1990s whereas; those who most strongly supported this idea were often the same individuals who had been the
427 architects of the PD thirty years earlier ??Wiarda, 1999). Proponents of Washington Consensus insisted that
428 the internal political and economic arrangements in Africa and other developing countries created the disabling
429 environment and slowed the rate of development (Owusu in ??mth, 2006). Hence, the Washington Consensus
430 brought with it a "new political economy" that requires elimination of barriers to cross-national interaction
431 and exchange that were earlier created by protectionist states ??Haques, 2002). Under this architecture, the
432 state has not only adopted market-driven policies such as privatization, deregulation, and liberalization, but
433 also transformed the terms of role, structure, orientation and organizational culture (Ibid). While this mode of
434 governance can easily function in developed countries, it has had many adverse outcomes to the Third World
435 countries both internally and externally. As Haques argues, internal effects include worsening conditions of
436 poverty and inequality, as well as weakening status of citizens' social and political rights. Externally, the main
437 concern is diminishing state sovereignty, worsening external dependence and expanding international inequality.

438 5 III. Comparative Politics Of The Third World a) Third 439 World: A Genealogy and Theoretical Perspective

440 The origin of 'Third World' can be traced back in the 1950s. As pointed out by ??a (2005), the term originated in
441 France from system of three estates: lords spiritual, lords temporal and the 'third estate' comprising the ordinary
442 people. Consequently, in 1952 the French demographer Alfred Sauvy invented the term 'Third World' to refer
443 to the 'third estate' before the French Revolution. In its initial meaning, Third World is termed as economically
444 poor, politically powerless, and socially marginalized. The term was in fact grounded in the post-1945 conjure
445 of decolonization, national liberation and the Cold War (Berger, 2004). Even though the original notion of the
446 Third World was "not based upon the prior existence of the First and Second World" ??Ma, 1988:344), this clear
447 division gave rise to the notion of the First World, referring to the advanced capitalist countries led by the USA,
448 in contrast with the Second World consisting of the Soviet bloc countries. In such an antagonistic geopolitical
449 context, Third World inevitably became political, expressing the attractions of keeping a neutral position, or
450 finding a third way between the capitalist and communist camp -Non Aligned Movement (NAM) (Payne, 2001).
451 Despite the NAM attempts, most nationalist movements and Third World regimes had diplomatic, economic and
452 military relations with one or both of the superpower, e.g. Ghana and Tanzania -Eastern bloc whereas Kenya
453 and Nigeria -Western bloc.

454 However, from a modernization perspective especially in 1960s, the emphasis was more on economics. The
455 world was therefore divided between 'Developing Countries' (viewed optimistically) or 'Less Developed Countries'
456 (viewed only a little less optimistically), on the one hand and 'Developed Countries' on the other (Ibid). Under
457 a dependency school of thoughts, especially in 1970s, the world system approach used different vocabulary, i.e.
458 the 'core' (developed countries) and the 'periphery' (less developed countries), and somewhat 'semi-periphery'
459 for those countries which play an intermediate role in the system. As Payne noted, the overall approach was still
460 based on a bipolar analysis. In the 1980s, the world setting was characterized by the notion of a North-South
461 divide. This was mostly a divide between the northern and southern hemispheres, separating North America
462 from South America, Europe from Africa, and North Asia from South Asia, deviating only to draw Australia
463 and New Zealand into the economic and political north (Payne, 2001). Today, most textbooks in comparative
464 politics have traditionally been organized according to two main categories based on the dependency i.e. centre
465 (Global North) and periphery (Global South).

466 Nevertheless, since early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the end of Cold War and the
467 intensification of globalization, the notion of the Third World has been challenged by many scholars. Ma (1998),
468 have raised doubts on the validity of the threeworld taxonomy (i.e. 1 st World, 2 nd World and 3 rd World),
469 since the so called 'Second World' has disappeared and many former Soviet states fall under developing world.
470 On the other hand, there are countries formerly classified as less developed, but which are becoming rapidly
471 industrialized. The first wave of countries to be identified as 'Newly Industrializing Countries' (NICs) included
472 Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. These countries underwent rapid industrial growth in the 1970s
473 and 1980s, attracting significant financial investment, and are now associated with hightechnology industries.
474 More recently, Thailand, China, and Malaysia have been classified as newly industrializing countries.

475 However, Cho (2005) argues that there is still the 'Third World' in reality and the validity of it as an analytical
476 category. He argues that the transition from authoritarian to democratic regime in Third World should bring with
477 it a revival of the original sprit of Bandung 7 7 Bandung is a city located in the middle of the West Java province,
478 around 180 km south-east of Jakarta, Indonesia. It is a place where the idea for the Non-Aligned Movement was

479 originated during the Asian-African Conference in 1955. This conference played a constructive role in mobilizing
480 the counter-hegemonic forces of what was to become known as the Third World against the bi-hegemony that
481 emerged in the post-World War II period (Mushakoji, 2005). Cho (2005) defined the Bandung spirit as "a
482 non-aligned self-helped organization against the predominance of the powerful, especially the Western advanced
483 countries and analyze in what kind of domestic conditions this spirit was born, how these initial conditions changed
484 in the process of authoritarianization of the Third World, how should the Third World revive its original spirit
485 in democratization of the authoritarian Third World, and consider what tasks are ahead in order to revive the
486 Bandung spirit". In view of the spirit of Bandung, Cho argues that the only challenge facing the Third World it is
487 to look at how it related to the current globalization context. Cho proposes that Third World states have to put an
488 emphasis on strengthening national sovereignty, in the way of recovering the manoeuvring power of the nationstate
489 and emphasizing that nation-state-centred strategy Globalization has become a key concept in the social sciences
490 (Kiely, 2005) and a new regime of truth from the 1990s (Blackmore, 2000). While the concept of globalization
491 is not new, it is only since the end of the Cold War that the term has been under the analytical spotlight
492 (Haynes, 2003). Globalization is typically described as increased economic, cultural, environmental and social
493 interdependencies and new transnational financial and political formations arising out of the mobility of capital,
494 labour and information, with both homogenizing and differentiating tendencies. ??iddens (1990:64) defines
495 globalization as "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that
496 local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa". Globalization has transformed
497 the relationship between political process and territorial, sovereign states, thus political responsibilities and
498 practices commonly attributed to states have shifted to an international level (Ougaard, 2004). This has resulted
499 into an emergence of increasingly influential non-state actors (e.g. terrorist groups, civil society) as well as
500 international organizations and institutions. Thus, political decisions are increasingly made at the international
501 level rather than local level. With the current global system, the ability to generate policy for multiple nations is
502 vested to international institutions, since it is not within the boundaries of individual states any more. As Ougaad
503 argues, this ability has become increasingly important in dealing with the most pressing global issues facing states
504 such as climatic change, pandemic diseases, increased migration, proliferation of poverty, 8 Refer to its invention
505 by the French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952. 9 Refer to NIC economic recession, the spread of weapons,
506 terrorism, However, globalization as described by Mittelman is a highly contested domain thus no absolute lines
507 for demarcating it. In fact, there are diverse interpretations with regard to the meaning, intensity, dimension,
508 extent, cause, and consequence of globalization in existing literature ??Haque, 2002). Whilst economists have
509 defined globalization as 'an open economy', sociologists might define the same as 'an open society' (Van Der Bly,
510 2005), and so do developed states versus developing states. Thus as explained by Kumar (2003), "?the nature
511 of globalization is contingent upon one's theoretical perspective?" Likewise, Bartelson argues that the concept of
512 globalization stands in a double and paradoxical relationship to the world of international relations. According
513 to this author, the concept of globalization seems to presuppose a stratification and compartmentalization on
514 one hand, and transgress this stratification and compartmentalization on another hand. Bartelson writes: "Indeed,
515 the logic of the concept of globalization seems to undermine not only those distinctions that have conditioned
516 the intelligibility and autonomy of international relations, but also to an extent the very practice of making
517 such ontological distinctions". ??Bartelson, 2000:183) Conversely, social theorists refer globalization as a part of
518 interlocking and long-term social processes beginning in early modernity. As Bohman (2004) noted, the social
519 fact of globalization proves exemplary since it can be experienced from different perspectives and as such can
520 best be understood in a multiperspectival practical inquiry into the framework of decision-making and problem
521 solving. Van Der Bly makes the same claim that, the current sociological concept of globalization is open to
522 various interpretations which offer both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage according to her is the
523 "freedom to highlight the concept in a broad way and from various perspectives". The disadvantage on the other
524 side arises on the confusion resulting from this broad and yet undefined and implicit points of reference. Thus,
525 Van Der Bly argues that "If something is everything, eventually it becomes nothing"; hence, "The Globalization
526 of Nothing" ??Ritzer, 2004) in this aspect has become a tautology.

527 Moreover, neo-Marxism and postmodernism have explored their own unique definitions of globalization
528 which denotes globalization as a "phase" or a "stage" that the world has come into. Kumar explores a
529 neo-Marxist AnkiHoogveld's idea that globalization is not a euphemism for either 'internationalization' or
530 'transnationalization' nor? the expanding phase of capitalism, but the "deepening phase of capitalism".

531 Kumar also discusses the postmodernist theorist Douglas Kellner who describes 2004) argues that Third World
532 still retains its strategic relevance in some geopolitical circumstances. The 1996 summit of the NAM (of which
533 majority of them are Third World countries) in Havana, Cuba showed that the Third World countries are asking
534 for a bigger say in world affairs. Profound and fruitful debates were held, in an atmosphere of true understanding,
535 unity and cohesion, which allowed for the adoption of documents of crucial importance to the future of the Non-
536 Aligned Movement. From my perspective, the term 'Third World' is not useful due to its negative connotation
537 right from its onset 8 .The authors of this paper would prefer other terms such as developing countries or emerging
538 nations simply because of their optimistic view on the Third World. East Asian 'miracle' provides a particularly
539 good example of the way in which Third World countries can be viewed optimistically.

540 this "phase" as a move away from modernity. Thus, globalization is a state of betweenness from modernity
541 to postmodernity which according to him is not yet complete. Munck (2002) explores another view which

5 III. COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF THE THIRD WORLD A) THIRD WORLD: A GENEALOGY AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

542 sees globalization as a new imperialism. This author argues that globalization has led not to a levelling of
543 social and economic conditions worldwide but to a dramatic increase in social exclusion within and between
544 nation-states. Vilas (2000) argues on the same trail that, from historical perspective, globalization is the
545 present stage of economic imperialism. According to this author, globalization transforms the market place
546 into the universal mechanism for economic regulation and accentuates and complicates international and internal
547 inequalities. Consequently, Chilcote argues that globalization can only be as a manifestation of imperialism and
548 devastating capitalist order. Although globalization is new phenomenon, I agree with many scholars that its
549 intensification especially after the Cold War, has transformed the economic, social, political and cultural aspects
550 in the contemporary world. However, there is a need for comparativists to clearly delineate 'what is new', and
551 'what is not new' with the contemporary globalization particularly in relation to the traditional roles of the state.

552 In modern political science, state theory and analysis is mainly dominated by two traditions: one derived from
553 Marx (and Engel) and the second one from Max Weber. Derived from the "Communist Manifesto", Marx sees the
554 state and its institutions as agents of the dominant class in capitalist society to further bourgeois' interest at the
555 expense of other classes (proletarian). In contrast, Weber's account of state is less political and more precise than
556 that of Marx. He was more concerned with 'how' the state operated rather than the character of its rule or nature
557 of its output. For Weber, the modern state is a compulsory association with a territorial base; legitimate by its
558 members and run by an impersonal bureaucratic staff; in the context of legal administrative order; regulated and
559 limited by legislation and representative fundamental assumption of the modern state proposes that public offices
560 should not be used for private gain and that occupancy should entail no powers of private patronage in support
561 of any particular private client base. By and large, Weberian conception of the modern state and bureaucracy
562 has been central debates in empirical democratic theory and public administration and policy. Nevertheless, as
563 Leftwich argues, these characteristics of the modern state are just ideal-typical but no state in the modern world
564 is 'perfectly' embracing them.

565 The Third World' experience reveals that, the making of modern state in colonial and post-colonial milieu was
566 not geared at promoting economic development growth or transformative development. Consequently, these states
567 lack most of the conditions and capabilities associated with the state's emergence in developed world. However,
568 this was, to a great extent, caused by colonial rulers. With exception of Japanese rule in Korea, the rest of colonial
569 rulers in developing countries were not developmental in a sense, but intended for extraction of riches and raw
570 materials as their focal goal. In his book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Walter Rodney argues that, "Africa
571 helped to develop Western Europe in the same proportion as Western Europe helped to under-develop Africa"
572 (1972:75). Accordingly, after independence, many states in developing world have had great trouble in establishing
573 their supremacy and maintaining sovereignty within their borders and in relation to regional and international
574 political forces. Most of them aspired to combine the best in their own traditions of governance to oversee social,
575 political and economic development. Thus, the wide variation among states in the developing world is based on:
576 the nature of the precolonial polities; the economic purpose of colonial rule; the characteristics of the colonial
577 state institutions; socio-political groups which dominates these institutions and; the manner of incorporation
578 of pre-colonial political processes and institutions in the systems of colonial and post-colonial rule ??Leftwich,
579 1994).

580 The theory and practice of state in developing countries vary from country to country and time to time. Hence,
581 different countries will inevitably confront very different historical circumstances and developmental challenges,
582 something that makes generalisation more difficult. Over the past two decades, developmental states have begun
583 to shed their reputations as 'welfare laggards' especially in East Asia. The idea of the developmental state is
584 most closely associated with Chalmers Johnson and his influential analysis of Japan's very rapid and successful
585 post-war reconstruction and reindustrialisation. Johnson's central argument was that Japan's pretty remarkable
586 and historically unparalleled industrial revival was neither a fluke nor inevitable, but a consequence of the efforts
587 of a 'plan rational' states. According to him, a plan rational or developmental state was one that was dogged
588 to influence the direction and pace of economic development by directly intervening in the development process,
589 rather than relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate economic resources. This form of
590 state is well known for its capacity to define, pursue and implement developmental strategies which can and do
591 overrule class, regional or sectoral interests in the reputed national interests. It involves a much closer symbiosis
592 between state and private sectors, but with autonomy, effectiveness and legitimacy. Historically, this form of
593 state can be traced back to Bismarckian Germany and Meiji Japan. However, in contemporary Third World,
594 it has been replicated widely in South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, China, Indonesia, Mauritius and Botswana.
595 Generally, this form of states maintain a control of public good, an arena of public space in which citizens can
596 debate common problems and attempt to achieve a common goal.

597 Moving to globalization and state, Hirst and Thompson (1996), akin to other scholars, propose that the
598 contemporary globalization suggests that certain (if not all) traditional powers of the state are declining. These
599 authors argue that, the power of nation states as administrative and policy making agencies has declined while
600 the state's role as an economic engineer is lessening. Held also argues that with the intensification of globalization
601 has diminished the powers of states, thus "national states have largely become decision takers". In a similar vein,
602 Habermas (1999) explores the idea of weakening of the nation-state. He suggests that state can no longer count on
603 its own forces to provide its citizens with adequate protection from the external effects of decisions taken by other
604 actors. has brought about the increased influence of nongovernmental organizations that have international allies.

605 According to him, this shift in bargaining power between states and non-state actors leads those pessimistic about
606 the effects of globalization on the state to accentuate declining state capabilities, whatever the national policies
607 pursued. The critical question for discussion in this paper is; which state is losing power? Can we compare a state
608 like US or UK and Zambia and argue 'equally' that state is losing power in capitulate to globalization? It might
609 be true that a state like Zambia is losing power, but is US or UK losing power in capitulate to globalization or
610 rather gaining more power? To me, this sounds like a cover for an imperialistic strategy, where America and many
611 of states of the Global North are chief beneficiaries of globalization at the expense of the Global South. Lentner
612 (2004) claims that with the idea of globalization, liberal states maintain dominant positions in the international
613 system, managing international political economy through coordinated and largely institutionalized action, where
614 the US remains central and hegemonic within this arrangement (p.44). Moreover, it appears that the events of 11
615 September 2001 and the so called 'war on terror' have brought into sharp focus the classic role of the state. These
616 events have also highlighted the importance of the role of global cooperation for global safety and security. This
617 shows that after 9/11, despite of the globalization forces, states have reaffirmed power, but back to our question
618 is; which state has reaffirmed power? For instance, while a US citizen does not need a visa to go to Zambia, a
619 Zambian immigrant and visitor to the US continues to face both old and new procedures and restrictions, as well
620 as greater scrutiny and suspicion. Moreover, since 9/11, there have been many security enhancements to the visa
621 process which have added to its cost. As Chowdhury(2006) claims, globalization is sometimes used as a cover for
622 endless warfare, where US as a chief beneficiary of globalization, extends its political authorities to undermine
623 the global system.

624 Although globalization is not a new phenomenon, this paper agrees with many scholars who argued that its
625 intensification has mounted especially after the Cold War. However, the whole debate about "Globalization and
626 State" sounds to me that the state is not losing power, but changing or revising its roles. It should be also noted
627 that, a revised role for the state does not necessarily imply a 'greater' role, but a more 'effective' role of the state
628 to meet challenges of globalization. Weiss argues that the state is not so much devolving power, rather seeking
629 power sharing arrangements which give it scope for remaining an active actor, for a 'catalytic' state. Hirst and
630 Thompson (1996) discussed three interrelated key functions of states as a crucial element of the international
631 system: i.e. the state must construct a distributional coalition to win the acceptance of key economic actors and
632 the organized social interests representing these actors; the state must orchestrate social consensus among the
633 actors for the common national economic goals and; the state must also achieve an adequate balance between
634 different levels of government in the distribution of its fiscal resources and regulatory activities. Weiss notes that
635 "?nation state will matter more rather than less and?this will advance rather than retard development of the
636 world economy."

637 6 IV. Concluding Remarks

638 Generally, the historical analysis of comparative politics has manifested to a large extent "expansion of politics"
639 beyond the local boundary. Needless to say, the bright line separating domestic and international politics has been
640 rubbed out by the complex set of cross-border economic, cultural, technological, and relations that constitute the
641 contemporary global order. Hynes (2003) notes that, as a consequence of globalization, states are now subject to
642 a multiplicity of external influences and must make policy in a world characterized by both vague and shifting
643 power structure. As pointed out by Sartori, politics results objectively bigger on account of the fact that the world
644 is becoming more politicized and globalized. In contrast, politics is subjectively bigger in a sense that political
645 focus and/or attention has paradigmatically shifted from local to global. Consequently, the 21 st century is racked
646 by turmoil caused by globalizing capitalism, new wars, renewed search for meaning in life and the discovery of
647 newly critical knowledge. As Kesselmanlaid it, there is a danger of entrapping ourselves in worlds of our own
648 making. Such an outlook has inevitably acknowledged the essentiality of states for the continued promotion of
649 social, political and economic development. Nevertheless, instead of fading away, a state in the so called 'the era
650 of globalization' remain indispensable to upholding a stable international system and a thriving political economy
651 both in developed and developing nations. The basic argument that has been entertaining in this paper is that,
652 "an effective and autonomous state enables a society to participate and benefit fully in the international political
653 economy and to resist pressures emanating from it". Munck explores a conception that, "?the global is dynamic
654 and fluid while the local is embedded, static, and tradition-bound". That said, without a strong state, a country
655 will not be able to compete in a globalizing world. Whilst capital is global, exists in the space of flows and
656 lives the instantaneous time of computerized networks, labour lives in the local, exists in a 'space of places' and
657 lives by the clock time of everyday life. As Munck suggests, we might now consider reversing the 1970s slogan of
658 "Think Globally, Act locally" to "Think Locally, Act Globally". However, from the analysis made earlier in the
659 paper, it is difficult to escape the feeling that in order for the state to function properly in the contemporary
660 era of globalization, it is subjected to redefinition of its roles, to take into account the emerging global political,
661 economic, social, environmental and cultural challenges.



Figure 1:

662 7 V. Bibliography
663 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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