

# 1 Motives of Internal Revolutions Phenomenon on Arab Political 2 Regimes

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## 7 **Abstract**

8 Internal Revolutions Phenomenon on the Arab Political Regimes is considered a compound  
9 phenomenon; that was aroused from a combined number of elements and their combination in  
10 a way that we can not assume that the cause of this phenomenon returns to one reason or an  
11 element without the other reasons or elements. We can not understand this phenomenon  
12 unless within the factors network and reasons that led to its appearance. In order to achieve  
13 the purpose of this study, a random sample of (280) individuals was selected, who represent  
14 different segments from the intellectuals and politicians, those who are active in economic,  
15 media, religious and social, in addition to the other interested people in the issue of internal  
16 revolutions from various Arab nationalities. Where as a questionnaire which consisted of (55)  
17 questions has been distributed on five main themes equally, it was discovered that the  
18 underlying political, economic, media, religious and social reasons were the most important  
19 reasons that led to the internal revolutions, where all the reasons got a positive arithmetic  
20 means. It turns out that the economic factor was one of the strongest reasons that led to the  
21 emergence of revolutions in the Arab Countries. The study also revealed that there are  
22 differences due to the impact of gender in the study sample individuals. In addition, no  
23 differences were found due to the impact of marital status on the opinions of the study sample  
24 individuals. As for the correlation among all the reasons leading to the internal revolutions, it  
25 has been shown that there is no correlation between the political reasons and religious reasons  
26 of the internal revolutions.

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28 **Index terms**— Internal Revolutions, Arab, Political Regimes.

## 29 **1 Background**

30 he world traces the revolutions' events that are now threatening all the existing Arab political regimes. Where  
31 the revolutions have been able to change the path of government of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya; furthermore they  
32 continue to threaten some of the political regimes in both Yemen and Syria. Where as, the revolution holds a  
33 new meaning which aims at changing the authoritarian regimes and broad sectors of the people participating in  
34 this revolution which aims are centered on three categories; combine bread, freedom and dignity.

35 of the regime and its own interests, which worked on controlling this culture and covering up their  
36 flaws, that were based on of traditional governance rules and regime's authoritarian practices against peoples  
37 ??Belkeziz,1996:81).

38 The concept of (Revolution) is one of the old terms that have accompanied the emergence of the state and  
39 political life since the beginning of history, however, the concept of revolution that has prevailed over other  
40 concepts, is considered the people's revolution against colonialism or authoritarian regimes, but revolution in its  
41 meaning in the language is not limited to this aspect but includes any act that leads to change the situations  
42 radically, whether they are political, economic or social.

### 5 III. STUDY HYPOTHESES

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43 Political liberalism has achieved great success in western countries after the circulation of the word "democracy"  
44 since the seventeenth century, especially after the success of the American Revolution in 1776, the French  
45 Revolution in 1789 and the establishment of many of democratic regimes in Europe.

46 However, the political regimes in various Arab countries has succeeded to a large extent in the domestication  
47 and taming many of the (educated, economic, religious, military, political parties, governmental organizations)  
48 elites, sometimes by threats and intimidation, in other times by temptation and arousal of interest, especially  
49 that the large class of these regimes rely in its authoritarian strategy on political elite as well as its counterpart  
50 the military. Additionally, some of these elites have their own interests, and their involvement in financial,  
51 administrative and political corruption, which have contributed significantly in creating of a gap between the  
52 ruling political power on the one hand and community members on the other hand , in addition to imposing the  
53 continuation of the political situations to be the same. Which caused for these elites to loose the confidence of  
54 the masses and create a sense of frustration among all the Arab peoples ??Lkrini,2008).

55 Moreover, some Arab countries gaining the satisfaction of foreign countries in order to maintain its survival,  
56 where they resorted to the practice of seclusion and concealment within their societies, which led to the increased  
57 dependence on the outside, in addition to reducing its sovereignty and meeting the demands of the Protecting  
58 countries and the implementation of its

## 59 2 C

### 60 3 Year

61 Arab political regimes exercised few years ago a political culture which was directed to meet the aims policies  
62 without taking the local public opinion to ensure its legitimacy (Qaleyoon,1990:27-28).

63 Furthermore, (Modernization Theory) confirmed the need of specific conditions and requirements for the  
64 establishment and continuity of democratic political regimes, the existence of developed social and economic  
65 building was included in these conditions and characterized by the presence of a certain degree of richness and  
66 wealth, economic growth, low illiteracy rate, the emergence of strong middle class and influential, urbanization,  
67 social mobility as well as a media capable of delivering the word (Lipset,1959:69-105).

68 The political culture prevailing in the societies of the Third World, consists of a set of customs, traditions  
69 and values, which established even in the authoritarian in social relations prevailing in the society and led  
70 to the delay of democracy and prosperity in the authoritarian dictatorship rule of the societies Third World  
71 Countries(Abusada:3-5).

72 The dictatorships prevailing within a ruling political party, such as what was found in most of the third world  
73 countries, lack of the parliament role and the power of people, which led to the emergence of some educators and  
74 reformers who exclaim for the need of freedom from authoritarian regimes.

75 The dictatorial regimes characterizes in addition to its dependence on a small group in the ruling through ruling  
76 party, by depending on the suppression of political opposition and not to allowing it to express its opinions. In  
77 many cases, the dictatorship governments declare that the opposition parties are considered illegal parties and  
78 since the opposition is illegal, which leaves room for dictatorship governments to rely on the army and secret  
79 police in suppressing all forms of opposition.

80 There is a tendency that determines the legitimacy of political violence and its legitimacy which was based on  
81 the nature of political regimes. In the countries of political pluralism, violence practiced by citizens or certain  
82 categories is considered an illegal use of force, for it represents a breach of the law, surpassing the intermediary  
83 institutions that organize the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. While legal violence is only practiced  
84 by the State and it must be within the law. In authoritarian and coercive regimes, the practice of violence by  
85 citizens is considered lawful and legitimate due to the lack of effective legal channels for participation in power  
86 or changing it ??Miller,1984:. 401-419).

### 87 4 II. Study Questions

88 1. What are the main reasons leading to the internal revolutions on Arab political regimes? 2. What are the  
89 strongest reasons that led to the emergence of internal revolutions on the Arab political regimes?

90 3. Are there statistical significances due to the impact of sex and marital status on the opinions of the study  
91 sample individuals about the reasons leading to the internal revolutions? 4. Is there a correlation between all  
92 the reasons leading to the internal revolutions?

### 93 5 III. Study Hypotheses

94 1. The most important reasons of internal revolutions are: "economic reasons" (3.90), "political reasons" (3.75), "  
95 media reasons "(3.67), "religious reasons" (3.67), "social reasons" (3.52) and all of these got positive arithmetic  
96 means ranged between (3.52-3.90), the total mean of the internal revolutions' reasons is (3.72). 2. The economic  
97 factor turns to be one of the strongest reasons that led to the emergence of revolutions in the Arab countries,  
98 arithmetic means ranged between ??3.21-4.40), where the item "the prevalence of unemployment and the lack  
99 of employment opportunities" received the top, and the item "the emergence of globalization phenomenon and  
100 economic opening-up policies", got the lowest, the total mean is (3.90), which is a positive arithmetic mean. 3.

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101 There are differences due to the impact of sex on the opinions of study sample individuals about the economic  
102 and social reasons, and the reasons as a whole leading to the internal revolutions, where the females' views are  
103 greater. Regarding marital status, the study showed that there are no differences in the views of study sample  
104 individuals. 4. There is no relationship between political and religious reasons of internal revolutions.

## 105 **6 IV. Method and Procedures:**

106 The method and procedures of study included a description of statistical processing that will be used in the  
107 analysis of data and extracting the results. The researcher used the descriptive analytical method (SPSS) to  
108 achieve the objectives of the study and to answer the first and second questions. The researcher used tests for  
109 independent samples (Independent Sample T-test) to answer the third question. To answer the fourth question  
110 Pearson correlation test was used (Pearson Correlation).

111 Questionnaire's items are (55) items distributed on five main axes equally and by (11) items for each axis  
112 and study tools are built like Likert Five Point Scale and they are the following: very large degree, large degree,  
113 medium degree, low degree, very low degree, They are represented in numbers by the following scores, respectively:  
114 (5.4, 3, 2.1).

115 The researcher showed the study tools that have been built to arbitrators from faculty members who specialize  
116 in measurement and evaluation; to detect the C Year validity of the questionnaire's items, their relevance in terms  
117 of language, clarity of the items and the extent to which the item is related to its domain. After retrieving the  
118 questionnaires from the arbitration committee, the researcher wrote down of arbitrators' views about every item  
119 and adopting each item got 75% or more of the arbitrators' consensus on its suitability, modifying or reformulating  
120 it, so these tools became in their final form.

## 121 **7 V. Study Individuals**

122 Questionnaire items distributed on intellectuals and activists in the political, economic, media, religious and  
123 social domains from different Arab nationalities, representing a category follows-up and is interested in the issue  
124 of internal revolutions in the Arab world. The study chose a group of people numbered (280) individuals, were  
125 randomly selected (see Table 1).

## 126 **8 Total**

## 127 **9 VI. Study Importance**

128 The importance of this study is related to its subject novelty and development dramatically among the Arab  
129 Peoples and what it includes of quick reactions that have a profound impact and strong in the diversion of the  
130 Arab regimes towards overall reform process after the broken down of some of the political regimes in some Arab  
131 countries. This study addresses the most important reasons that led to the internal revolutions to be an example  
132 and role model for all political decisionmakers, as well as taking the preventive role in a civilized and democratic  
133 manner to deal with these crises in the future.

## 134 **10 VII. Study Objectives**

135 1. Introducing a recent study in the development and escalation of the phenomenon of internal revolutions in  
136 light of the failure of some Arab countries leaders. 2. Knowing the reasons behind the outbreak of internal  
137 revolutions against Arab political regimes. 3. Providing successful and alternative means about using political  
138 violence against the peoples.

139 4. Realizing the real democracy value and exercising it correctly. 5. Realizing the meaning of public freedoms  
140 and its role in changing the course of the regime rule in the Arab world. 6. Focusing on the need to respect Arab  
141 human rights, protecting his dignity and providing decent life for the peoples.

## 142 **11 VIII. Previous Studies (Literature)**

143 The emergence of the political thought helped John Locke, Muntasiko and Jan Jacque Rousseau on the  
144 development of the democracy concept through John Locke's invitation to limit the powers of the monarchy  
145 and his interest of public freedoms. As well as Muntasiko has been first to call for the separation of powers, by  
146 making each body of the three governmental bodies to comply with specific function and without interfering with  
147 other bodies' affairs, which leads to ensure the rights of citizens and respect their freedoms. While Jan Jacque  
148 Rousseau considered that the general will is the source of sovereignty in the state, not the ruler or the king power.

## 149 **12 Year**

150 Max Feber thinks that the possession of any political regime of power and ability, not enough to stabilize it for a  
151 long time because the relationship between the ruler and ruled concerned, unstable and the source of the weakness  
152 of the existing regime and when the people convinced of the efficiency of the existing power and its eligibility in  
153 government it will reach the essence of legitimacy, this (Legitimacy) is the basis of the continuation of the regime.  
154 The relationship between Arab political regimes and their peoples appeared to be based on suspicion and fear.

155 Arab regimes surrounded themselves by security forces, armies and special guard forces spending on them more  
156 than spending on development projects and modernization for their peoples (Bassiouni, 1996:54) .

157 Louis Althusser, assure that peoples rise up in search of full sovereignty against fatherhood and authoritarian  
158 regimes and sacrifice the safety, tranquility and life and exposing themselves to the need, death and the decline  
159 in order to get rid of slavery, insult, tyranny and injustice and what they earn from behind this is prevalence,  
160 glory and freedom, in order to make regimes run in a democratic manner and through the election and selection  
161 (Althusser, 2006).

162 Al-Hamalawy says if there is no plan to manage the crisis and end it in the way you want, so the crisis will  
163 end itself in the way it wants and not in the way that we want. 9 political writer, Choral Bill says that when we  
164 try to study crisis manage it, we find only two ways not three, either to go back to an experience has had on the  
165 ground and we still have experience its results or to fabricate fictional assumptions that do not have reality in  
166 fact did not tested yet and when choosing, the first option is unquestionably the right(Al-Hamalawy,1997:16).

167 Tanter and Ullman say that the concept of crisis returns back to the history of Greek medicine and it means  
168 (turning point) in the course of the disease after that the patient's health may improve, and end up to recovery  
169 or end in death, like heart attack (Tanter& Ullman,1972:126) . Al-Khudairi points that the crisis is a critical  
170 decisive moment, regarding the source of the management entity, which suffered of it. It forms a hard difficulty to  
171 deal with for the decision makers and make them very confused in decision-making in light of lack of knowledge,  
172 uncertainty and reasons and results mixing(Khudairi,2012: 76).

173 Joseph Lapalmbara says that the problem of distributive justice refers to a defect in the estimated distribution  
174 of the political regime. This defect takes the form of a widening gap between the distributive demands on the one  
175 hand and the regime's ability to respond to them on the other hand. This defect stems from two sources: First:  
176 Lack of wealth sources, commodities and material services i.e. the values disputed among members of society and  
177 hence the importance of economic development appears. The second is: Lack of justice in wealth distribution  
178 and valuable things among different social classes and its groups, due to inefficiency of distributive policies and  
179 their bias in favor of groups without others, and hence comes the importance of changing the foundations of the  
180 distribution process (Lapalmbara, 1971:233-281).

181 Beitz states that political regimes differ in their policies towards distribution crisis, in any solution to the  
182 distribution crisis comes only through the regime pursuit to increase production through the completion of  
183 positive changes in production methods, structures and relations. In addition, to ensure a minimum level of  
184 equitable distribution of it among the various groups and society sectors at the same time, so as to satisfy the  
185 basic needs of citizens, especially those with lowincome(Beitz, 1981:321-345).

186 Both Morrison and Stevenson confirm the positive relationship between the spread of education and increasing  
187 acts of violence, through their study that they conducted on a number of African countries and Latin American  
188 countries in order to determine the social and political requirements for political stability in these countries  
189 ??Morrison & Stevenson,1974:252-263).

190 Hoseltiz confirmed that the spread of education and what resulted from it of the emergence of new patterns  
191 of political awareness and social movement, leading to increased likelihood of political violence, especially when  
192 the regime do not have the capacity and flexibility to create new job opportunities for graduates and to respond  
193 and adapt to new demands arising from the educational process( Hoseltiz, 1965:61).

194 Medela Reski concluded from his study about the relationship between scarcity and inequality on the one hand  
195 and the popular revolutions on the other hand. While, the probabilities of revolutionary violence have increased  
196 in countries that suffer from a scarcity in agricultural land and inequality in distributing; with the observation  
197 that the problem of inequality is exacerbating with the increasing number of population (Midlarsky, 1982).

198 Abdulfattah presented a study showing the changing roles of the armies at the stage of Arab revolutions,  
199 which answers questions about the possibility of changing this interfering role of these armies during the next  
200 phase and turning them to guarding armies of the political process without interference in directing their tracks,  
201 particularly since these revolutions have raised the slogan of democracy and civil state( Abdulfattah ,2011:7-  
202 10). From the previous table we note that the items that represent political reasons of internal revolutions got  
203 positive arithmetic means ranged (3.22-4.08), where the item "Removing competencies from political action and  
204 the monopoly of top jobs" received the top one and the item "The absence of parties' role of and the opposition  
205 in the political reform process" got the lowest, the total average is (3.75), which is a positive arithmetic mean.

## 206 13 IX. Results Analysis

207 ii. The Second Axis: Economic reasons of internal revolutions:

## 208 14 Year

209 From the previous table we note that the items that represent economical reasons of internal revolutions got  
210 positive arithmetic means ranged ??3.21-4.40), where the item " Prevalence of unemployment and the failure  
211 to provide job opportunities " received the top one and the item " Emergence of globalization phenomenon  
212 and economic openness policies " got the lowest one, the total average is (3.90), which is a positive arithmetic  
213 mean. From the previous table we note that the items that represent political reasons of internal revolutions got  
214 positive arithmetic means ranged (3.22-4.08), where the item "Removing competencies from political action and

215 the monopoly of top jobs" received the top one and the item "The absence of parties' role of and the opposition  
216 in the political reform process" got the lowest, the total average is (3.75), which is a positive arithmetic mean.

217 From the previous table we note that the items that represent religious reasons of internal revolutions got  
218 positive arithmetic means ranged ??3.19-3.89), where the item " Lack of Arab regimes commitment of Islamic  
219 Sharia" got the top one and the item " Clergy's desire to dominate regime " got the lowest, the total average is  
220 (3.67) which is a positive arithmetic mean.

221 iii.

222 The Third Axis : Media reasons of internal revolutions v. The Fifth Axis: Social reasons of internal revolutions:  
223 From the previous table we note that the items that represent social reasons of internal revolutions got positive  
224 arithmetic means ranged ??3.35-4.56), where the item "Spread of nepotism and favoritism in Arab societies"  
225 got the top one and item "State's adopting of average is (3.52), which is a positive arithmetic mean. b) Second  
226 Question: What are the strongest reasons that led to the emergence of internal revolutions on the Arab political  
227 regimes?

228 To answer the second question Arithmetic means, standard deviations and percentages of study axes are  
229 calculated and the following table shows that:

230 From the previous table we note that the reasons presented as a reason of internal revolutions all of them  
231 got positive arithmetic means ranged (3.52-3.90) and reasons ranked as the following "economic reasons" (3.90),  
232 "political reasons" (3.75), "media reasons "(3.67), "religious reasons" (3.67) and "social reasons" (3.52), the total  
233 mean of internal revolutions is (3.72). c) Third Question:

234 Are there statistical significances due to the impact of sex and marital status at significance level less than  
235 (0.05) on the opinions of the study sample individuals about the reasons leading to the internal revolutions?

236 Table ?? : T -results of independent samples of effect of sex test on the answer, where we note that sex has  
237 the effect on economic and social reasons as well as for reasons combined as a, where the results were greater  
238 for females. A -To answer the study question on the impact of sex, T-test for independent samples is used  
239 (Independent Sample T-test), where T values are not statistically significant at a level less than (0.05) for the  
240 political, media and religious reasons of the revolutions and they are statistically significant at a lower level of  
241 (0.05) for the economic and social reasons as well as for reasons combined as a whole, which indicates that there  
242 are differences due to the impact of sex at the significance level less than (0.05) on the opinions of the study  
243 sample individuals on the reasons leading to the internal revolutions in the Arab world, where the views are  
244 greater for females individuals on the reasons leading to the internal revolutions in the Arab world.

## 245 15 Std. Deviation

246 B -To answer the study question on the impact of marital status, T-test for independent samples is used  
247 (Independent Sample T-test), where T values are not statistically significant at a level less than (0.05) for  
248 the political, media, religious economic and social reasons of the revolutions, which indicates that there are  
249 differences due to the impact of marital status at a significance level less than (0.05) on the opinions of the study  
250 sample. d) Fourth Question: Is there a correlation between all the reasons leading to the internal revolutions?

251 To answer the study question Pearson Correlation Test (Pearson Correlation) is used, it is found that there is  
252 no relationship between the political and religious reasons of the internal revolutions.

## 253 16 X. Conclusion and recommendations

254 The study presents the reality of the Arab regimes ruling for their people, which describes the most important  
255 reasons behind the collapse of the regimes in some Arab countries which continued to rule for many years. The  
256 study revealed the errors of the regimes and their methods of exercising their policies against their peoples,  
257 prompting the Arab people to get out of the ordinary and remove from power their countries' rulers, in light of  
258 Arab regimes' failure in building political and economic balance with their peoples and the absence of democracy  
259 manifestations. This study also focused on the concept of revolutions, their development stages, the emergence  
260 of political, economic, social, religious and media elites which calls for reforms and change in the regimes, Arab  
261 regimes, known as (the Arab Spring) under the spread of means of communication and speed of information  
262 access.

263 Through the study of the internal revolutions phenomenon on the Arab political regimes, we find that they  
264 came as a result of the regimes' failure in achieving the objectives of the Arab nation and its aspirations towards  
265 freedom, independence and dignity. Thus these Arab regimes have failed politically, economically, security and  
266 socially; because of wrongful conduct in the usurpation of power by the people and systematic corruption and  
267 adherence to self-interests in order to achieve special objectives of the owners of power and money and the  
268 monopoly of power, public office and positions in the Arab world at the expense of their peoples. Arab political  
269 regimes must recognize the need to accelerate the comprehensive reforms in all areas. This study recommends  
270 the following :

271 1. Preparation for amending the regimes procedures on the basis of free, fair, competitive and periodic  
272 elections on all government executive and legislative positions as well as strengthening the judicial system  
273 and its independence of any intervention. 2. Fighting all types of financial and administrative corruption  
274 and the necessity for multiple centers of decision-making, including means of parliamentary accountability and

## 16 X. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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275 administrative transparency. 3. Respecting citizens' rights, freedoms and their dignity, in addition to reject all  
276 kinds of violations against humanity. 4. Removing all restrictions on media and interest in freedom of individual,  
277 collective and media expression in the diffusion of events and facts about national issues. 5. Establishing  
278 the concept of democracy, respect and acceptance from all segments of the political forces in Arab countries.  
279 Moreover, promoting comprehensive development, social justice, equality, principle of equal opportunity and  
280 respecting religious and ethnic minorities. 6. Focusing that the nation is the source of authority and rejecting  
281 the domination and oppression policy against peoples by using armies and security institutions. 7. Providing  
282 the principle of distributive justice for all categories of society and non-bias to certain elites. 8. Supporting the  
concept of citizenship and strengthening the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. <sup>1 2 3 4 5</sup>



Figure 1: Table 2 :

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Variable	Category	Frequency	Percent
Gender	Male	153	54.6
	Female	127	45.4
Marital Status	Single	174	62.1
	Married	106	37.9
Scientific Qualification	Intermediate Diploma	30	10.7
Residence Area	BA	172	61.4
	Master	36	12.9
	Ph.D.	42	15
	City	123	43.9
	Village	68	24.3
Age	Desert	46	16.4
	Camp	43	15.4
	20-29	111	39.6
30-39		106	37.9
40-49		46	16.4
50 and over		17	6.1
		280	100

Figure 2: Table 1 :

3

Economic Reasons	Mean	Std. Devia-tion	%
Prevalence of unemployment and the failure to provide job opportunities	4.40	0.760	88.00
Emergence of financial and administrative corruption	4.30	0.799	86.00
Rising of commodity prices and products	4.20	0.853	84.00
Falling of workers' salaries and wages	4.07	0.907	81.40
Increasing fees and taxes on the citizens	4.04	0.909	80.80
Widespread of poverty and emergence of famine	4.03	0.976	80.60
Exploitation of state's sources and its monopoly in favor of the powerful	4.02	0.759	80.40
Lack of transparency to maintain public money	3.65	0.915	73.00
Weakness of development process and economic reform	3.55	1.042	71.00
Import and export monopoly in favor the benefit of the powerful	3.47	0.942	69.40
Emergence of globalization phenomenon and economic openness policies	3.21	1.194	64.20
Average	3.90	0.537	78.00

Figure 3: Table 3 :

4

Media Reasons	Mean	Std.	%
	Deviation		
Spread of satellite media	3.95	1.085	79.00
Governments follow policies of repression and media blackout	3.89	0.944	77.80
Lack of transparency and credibility of the local media	3.87	0.972	77.40
Lack of control over the electronic media	3.85	1.177	77.00
Not exercising freedom of opinion and imposing restrictive laws	3.71	1.012	74.20
Government control over local media	3.63	1.123	72.60
Knowledge and knowing of electronic communication means	3.59	1.063	71.80
Ease of information access and its spread	3.56	1.214	71.20
Spread of community awareness in the search for information	3.54	1.158	70.80
Inefficiency of local media	3.43	1.111	68.60
Sincerity and diversity of information through satellite media	3.30	1.229	66.00
Average	3.67	1.099	73.40

iv. The Fourth Axis:

Religious reasons of internal revolutions:

Figure 4: Table 4 :

5

Religious Reasons	Mean	Std.	%
	Deviation		
Lack of Arab regimes commitment of Islamic Sharia	3.89	1.191	77.80
Dissatisfaction of religious parties on government performance	3.82	0.994	76.40
Clergy's desire to participate in political decision-making	3.57	1.114	71.40
Incompatibility of clergy with legal legislations	3.51	0.894	70.20
Emergence of influential religious blocs on the public opinion	3.50	1.117	70.00
Clergy's rejection of the State's liberal regimes	3.48	1.047	69.60
Clergy's Invitation to change and reform	3.46	1.138	69.20
Clergy's refusal to followers of profitability capitalist systems or regimes	3.45	1.080	69.00
Unwillingness of political parties and religious blocs about entrance of Arab regimes in alliances and treaties with western countries	3.44	1.217	68.80
Clergy's disharmony with cultural openness policy	3.41	1.185	68.20
Clergy's desire to dominate regime	3.19	1.305	63.80
Average	3.67	0.538	73.40

Figure 5: Table 5 :

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6

Social Reasons	Mean	Std. Devia-tion	%
Spread of nepotism and favoritism in Arab societies	4.56	0.868	91.20
Absence of justice and social equality	4.10	0.958	82.00
Existence of differences among society classes and hegemony of the rich to the poor	4.07	0.951	81.40
Poor service delivery and its organization (infrastructure)	3.84	0.919	76.80
Lack of representation of social groups in power	3.67	1.101	73.40
Absence of educational sector development	3.62	1.087	72.40
Poor health services	3.62	1.078	72.40
Lack of interest in local community institutions	3.54	0.983	70.80
Spreading social discrimination culture	3.51	1.274	70.20
Absence of solidarity and social solidarity	3.47	0.998	69.40
State's adopting of racial discrimination / sectarian	3.35	1.227	67.00
Average	3.52	0.585	70.40

Figure 6: Table 6 :

7

Axis	Mean	Std. Deviation	%
Economic reasons	3.90	0.537	78.00
Political reasons	3.75	0.475	75.00
Media reasons	3.67	1.099	73.40
Religious reasons	3.67	0.585	73.40
Social reasons	3.52	0.585	74.40
Reasons as a whole	3.72	0.364	74.40

[Note: CYear]

Figure 7: Table 7 :

9

Motives of Internal Revolutions Phenomenon on Arab Political Regimes		T	df	Sig.(2-tailed)	Sex	N	Mean	
Political reasons of internal revolutions	-		278	0.213	Male	153	3.72	0.518
		1.247						
	-							
Economic reasons of internal	-		278	0.02	Female	127	3.79	0.416
	2.333			*	Male	153	3.83	0.576
	-							
2012 revolutions Media reasons of internal revolutions	-		278	0.222	Female	127	3.98	0.475
	1.223				Male	153	3.63	0.585
	-							
Year Religious reasons of internal revolutions	-.354		278	0.724	Female	127	3.71	0.473
	-				Male	153	3.51	0.643
	-				Female	127	3.53	0.509
72 Social reasons of internal revolutions	-		276	0.006*	Male	151	3.67	0.635
	2.771							
	-							
Ft	-		278	0.019	Female	127	3.86	0.451
	2.363-			*	Male	153	3.67	0.399
	-							
D					Female	127	3.78	0.309
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		T	df	Sig.(2-	Sex	N	Mean	Std.
				tailed				Deviation
Political reasons of internal revolutions	0.468		278	0.64	Male	174	3.76	0.498
					female	106	3.73	0.435
Economic reasons of internal revolutions	0.086		278	0.932	Male	174	3.90	0.529
					female	106	3.90	0.552
Media reasons of internal revolutions	0.692		278	0.49	Male	174	3.68	0.493
					female	106	3.64	0.605
Religious reasons of internal revolutions	1.708		278	0.089	Male	174	3.57	0.566
					female	106	3.44	0.611
Social reasons of internal revolutions	0.922		276	0.357	Male	173	3.78	0.569
					female	105	3.72	0.560
Ft	1.191		278	0.235	Male	174	3.74	0.340
					female	106	3.69	0.398

Figure 8: Table 9 :

Figure 9: Table 10 :



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